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Abstract
This dissertation is a study of the post-Mao industrial reforms and their effects on state/enterprise 
relations and on shop-floor politics. These effects are characterised by the progressive dismantling of 
party/state controls over the grassroots units. The research focuses on a number of institutional 
reforms in China's state sector, including (1) a series of political reforms to the party leadership 
structure, the cadre appointment system, management mechanisms, and the enterprise/state 
administrative chains; and (2) market reforms with an emphasis on ownership reform, which has 
created a hybridized property structure in the state sector and opened a process leading toward quasi­
privatisation of the national economy. The dissertation analyses an emerging new model for China's 
market economy as a result of the current reform of the government administrative system; and 
reforms that have brought about significant changes in the industrial wage system. Based on both 
documentary research and interview fieldwork in China, the author argues that two distinctive trends 
in the state sector have emerged: depoliticisation and de-statisation.These two trends have helped to 
reconstruct a new social base for political change in China.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
This thesis is about changing state/society relations in China since the post-Mao 
reform began in the late 1970s.1 Given its very broad parameters, the research concentrates 
only on a small part, namely the institutional reforms in China's state enterprises and their 
lasting impact on political and social change in the country.
1.1. The Purpose of the Study
The significance of this study of state enterprises lies in its analysis of work units 
known as danwei.2 These danwei are the basic cells of the party/state in China. An indust­
rial danwei assumes a large number of the party/state's political and ideological missions of 
control; it is an economic producer attached to central or local planning; and it is also a state 
agency providing social welfare to workers. These multi-functional tasks are carried out by 
a set of institutional arrangements which constitute the core of the danwei system. These 
institutions include a monolithic party command system, a bureaucratic ranking system 
rooted in state ownership that has grafted a factory onto an administrative hierarchy, and a 
remuneration system based on a unified state wage structure: the eight-grade system. These 
institutions have played a key role in transforming a factory into a unique setting that tied 
workers to the state, thus embodying a unique state/society relationship.
Through an analysis of this multi-functional framework, we will evaluate how the 
party/state structure penetrates a factory and how this penetration is reflected in cadre/
1 The 'state' is used here in the broad sense defined by Gordon White, as denoting "a complex organiz­
ational system comprising three sets of basic institutions at central level and below: political (not­
ably the party), administrative (governments at each level and their subordinate bureaucratic agencies) 
and coercive (the PL A)". See Gordon White (ed.), The Chinese State in the Era of Economic 
Reform, London: Macmillan, 1991, p. 2.
2 Lu Feng, "Danwei: a Special Type of Social Organization", Social Sciences in China, no.l, 1989, 
pp. 71-88.
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worker interactions. By examining the changes generated by the post-Mao reform at the 
grassroots, we will evaluate the depth of social transition. For instance, one direct result of 
the reforms in the state sector has been the formation of a hybridized property structure 
within a state firm. This has paved the way for enlarged economic pluralism to emerge at 
the base of the state edifice, although at the apex of political power the party/state remains 
strongly authoritarian. Whether this dialectical political process will forge some form of 
authoritarian-pluralism, a term that Robert Scalapino used to theorize about the communist 
transition in East Asia,3 is still to be seen. But it is certain that whether China can transform 
its party/state the way Taiwan has done will depend largely on whether it can transform the 
authoritarian infrastructure embedded in the danwei system.
The dissertation targets three institutional reforms in China's state sector in the post- 
Mao era: (1) a political reform comprising reforms of the party leadership structure, the 
cadre appointment system, management mechanisms, and the state/enterprise administrative 
chains; (2) a series of market reforms with an emphasis on an ownership reform and corp­
oratization that help state firms emerge as independent economic entities; and (3) reforms in 
remuneration that have brought about significant changes in the industrial wage system. 
These institutional reforms, the dissertation argues, have pointed to a direction in which 
state factories gradually break away from the tight control of the party/state, as reflected in 
the phenomenon of the “two D's” in China's industrial sector: depoliticisation and de- 
statisation. The marketization of the economy has reinforced these developments. While the 
following chapters will elaborate this in detail, the thesis, as summarized here, is that this 
development is undermining the foundation of the party/state. It seems that the effects of 
dismantling party/state controls in the infrastructure has assisted an accelerated transition of 
political and economic liberalization in China.4
3 For China's emerging authoritarian-pluralism, see Robert Scalapino, The Politics of Development: 
Perspectives on 20th Century Asia, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.
4 Yu Ying-shih, "About China's Future", World Economy, June 1992, p. 23.
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The essence of this gradual transformation of state factories, from being danwei (cells 
of the party/state) to gongsi (corporations) marks a transformation of state enterprises from 
political institutions to depoliticised economic organizations. This inevitably redelineates the 
boundary of the state and society. At the beginning of the post-Mao reforms many observ­
ant scholars detected remarkable readjustments in state/society relations.^ Yet while they 
have attributed the political relaxation in China to the concessions made to society by 
reform-minded party leaders,6 few have pointed out that it is the structural changes in 
work units at the grassroots that have institutionalized political relaxation. As shown by the 
events in 1989, grassroots opinion must be taken into account. This is changing the nature 
of China's politics, which was long dominated by the ruling elite. And this factor will 
become increasingly decisive in post-Deng China. Only through looking seriously at the 
change in China’s political structure at the grassroots can our understanding of China's 
political and social transformation under the Dengist reforms be sharpened, and in this 
sense a study of the institutional reforms in the industrial danwei system will prove partic­
ularly helpful.
1.2. The Concepts of Process and Transition
The concept of 'process' is the key to analysis of China's second revolution. The 
central thrust—socio-political and economic liberalization— refers to the loosening of 
restrictions on social activities and expression within an authoritarian regime. It is important 
to note that restrictions are only loosened, not renounced. China's process of liberalization 
has been largely confined to the social and economic domains. Political liberalization has 
been manifested largely in the form of a freedom to escape politics. However, the mutually
5 Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politics, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1988, p. 11.
6 See for instance, Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao, The Brookings 
Institution, Washington, DC, 1987, and Barrett McCormick, Political Reform in Post-Mao China: 
Democracy and Bureaucracy in a Leninist State, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1990.
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conditioning interactions between social and economic liberalization and political restrict­
ions have generated enormous stress in the political system,7 the resolution of which calls 
for a greater scope of systemic political change. Study of the process of China's post-Mao 
reforms has taught us that both structuralists and behavioralists tend toward a static persp­
ective when looking at a political and economic system in transition. It is interesting to note 
that many analysts believe that the Leninist system cannot change, but can only collapse.7 8 
Although this dissertation will not make judgement on this, it calls upon, and indeed, relies 
on, an evolutionary approach to assessing the changes in China, an approach that combines 
elements of the structural and the behavioural approaches, but extends them along a crucial 
third axis, which is that of time. Without comparison of different periods, one may become 
shackled by a dogmatic perspective.9
However, "transition analysis" must confront socio-political and cultural distinctive­
ness. Scholars working on Taiwan in transition have pointed out that a hybrid regime, 
neither fully authoritarian nor democratic, may persist for a long time. China will most 
likely have a longer path of transition, as it has not even broken away from its authoritarian 
political culture and organization. One can anticipate a dialectical process, not a linear pro-
7 For the concept of mutually conditioning interaction, see Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State: 
Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic, p. 26.
8 Many western scholars of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe hold such a view. The extent 
to which the attempts to reform by the communist parties in the Sovist bloc failed has proved them 
correct. See, for instance, the articles written by Robert Miller, in Robert Miller (ed.), The Develop­
ments of Civil Society in Communist Systems, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992. For a similar pred­
iction on the socialist countries in Asia, only time can tell. But there is a possibility that a 
convergence can happen to them, as the current market reforms dictate greater change with greater 
force.
9 For an analysis of the evolutionary approach, see John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations The­
ory and the End of the Cold War", International Security, Vol. 17, no. 3, Winter 1992/93, pp. 15- 
17.
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gression, in this as in all political evolutions. Openness and its excesses will be followed 
by retrenchment, which will create new pressures and, hence, yet another adjustment. 10
Indeed, in the dozen years of reforms we see intensification of an authoritarian image 
at some given points of time, such as at the turn of 1986 and 1987 and the aftermath of 
June 4, 1989. Yet if one views the socio-political and economic developments of the whole 
period, one sees a trend of "one step backward and two steps forward" in social relaxation. 
This was characterised by the regime easing control when it felt confident, and reapplying 
repression when things threatened to get out of hand.* 11
Examining this as an on-going, ever-shifting process may also help prevent the tend­
ency of absolutism inherent in both idealizing the positive signs and dramatizing the nega­
tive ones. This is very important in evaluating social change in China. As most China scho­
lars point out, China's reform is a "reform within the system" (tizhinei gaige) rather than a 
revolution. Social transition as such is clearly pregnant with contradictions. Visible changes 
are intertwined with clear continuity of the party/state, as the new institutional estab­
lishments are strongly influenced by the old and its enduring political culture. On the other 
hand, in the course of evolution, reform has produced new political actors. More abundant 
at the grassroots than at the apex of power, they readily take chances to enlarge their realm 
of freedom. In the process, they reconstruct political culture as they go along, and make 
"rules of the game" as a product, not a precondition. ^  In this light, the thesis approaches 
the subject from the angle of "what has been changed, why and how" rather than "what it 
should change to".
10. Robert Scalapino, "Northeast Asia-Prospects for Cooperation", The Pacific Review, Vol. 5, no. 2, 
1992, p. 102.
11 Tang Tsou, "Political Change and Reform: the Middle Course", in Norton Ginsburg and Bernard 
Laror (eds.), China: The 80s Era, Boulder: Westview, 1984, pp. 27-70.
12 Edwin Winckler, "Taiwan in Transition?", in Tun-jen Cheng & Stephan Haggard (eds.), Political 
Change in Taiwan, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992, p. 226.
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Thomas Rawski has pointed out the danger of applying stereotyped criteria to an 
economic system in transition. When commenting upon the following sentence— "The crux 
of the question is to make enterprises totally autonomous of government agencies, as such 
enterprises may operate independently, lower cost, raise quality and increase sales"— 
Rawski wrote:
Is there a firm in the USA that is totally independent of government? Can we see such examples in
Japan or in other countries? This is another case of absolutism in economic theory.13
Rawski's approach is relevant to this dissertation in that when observing economic 
reforms in China, it is not enough to judge any phenomenon in terms of what the economic 
model should be, usually derived from comparisons with the market economies. China 
should be compared first of all with its own recent past. The central concern of the thesis is 
on what has changed in China's state industrial system, both politically and economically— 
how different the system is now compared with its past.
For instance, the market reforms may both increase workers' dependence on or 
independence from their danwei. Factory management now has more authority and means 
in deciding on workers' income and in providing housing and other social welfare benefits. 
At the same time the emergence of the market has also increased alternatives through which 
workers can fight for the right to quit their job, find opportunities to moonlight, or rely on 
the market for goods and services that were distributed through coupons by their work 
units in the past. Evidence exists for scholars to conclude both that "organized dependence" 
has been enhanced and that it has been greatly weakened, depending from which angle they 
view the situation. This not only reflects the complex nature of China's political and social 
transition, it also makes any generalization about developmental trends in China vulnerable 
to criticism.
13 Thomas Rawski's comments on this dissertation, February 1992.
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Talcott Parsons remarked 40 years ago that the social sciences were not sophisticated 
enough to answer questions posed by social change. My research efforts only attempt to 
serve as a complementary perspective, not provide a single-factor explanation. Social 
reality is complex. The study of China's industrial danwei system is not intended to dilute 
this complexity, but can only try to make it more intelligible. Obviously it will encounter 
numerous pitfalls.
1.3. China's State Sector
The state sector — that is, what the government own and operate at and above the 
township or urban district levels, is the backbone of the Chinese economy. At the early 
state of the reform in 1981 it produced 78.3% of the country's total industrial output value. 
Although its share has shrunk to a bit over 50% in 1991, it is still dominant in all the key 
industries, such as energy, transport, telecommunication and manufacturing. As Chen 
Jinhua, the new Minister for China's State Planning Commission (SPC), rightly pointed 
out in 1992, the reform of the state sector is the soul of the country's economic reform. 14 
The study of the reform of the state sector also occupies the central place in the study of 
socialist transformation because it directly affects how the state controls the majority of the 
urban population.
As is true in most nations, control of the urban population is crucial for a regime to 
hold onto power. And Chinese society is fast urbanizing. This can be seen in the percent­
age of the total population living in cities and towns. 15 About 100 million of these new 
urbanites (who may still be under agricultural registration) have entered the industrial and 
commercial world, of which the nonstate sector has absorbed the greatest number. Private 
concerns alone have absorbed about 25 million employees. This gigantic development has
14 Jingji ribao, 24 June 1992.
15 One scholar deemed that in the six years between 1982 and 1988 the urban population reportedly rose 
from 20.8% to an incredible 49.6%. Gregory Eliyu Guldin (ed.), Urbanizing China, New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1992, p. 3. Obviously the author has included people engaged in nonagricultural 
work but still with rural household registration.
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generated enormous pressure for social change with a particular challenge to the party/state: 
no longer can the state control its factories the way it did in the past, as numerous closed 
systems.
The state sector comprises a large number of public concerns, about 463,210 in 
1985.16 For the sake of analysis, there is a need to differentiate factories of different 
scales, for the intensity of political and economic control varies tremendously as applied to 
different factories. 17 Large and medium-sized factories, numbering 11,540, or 2.5% of the 
total in 1992,18 are most effectively controlled by the state in the form of tighter bureau­
cratic chains of command and stricter production quotas and material allocation quotas. The 
large and medium-sized factories contain more complete political establishments (e.g. party 
and state representation) and more political personnel, a stronger tradition of ideological 
indoctrination, and more means to provide social welfare benefits. So organized depend­
ence had been more visible in these factories before the reforms.
Small factories lack many of the privileges that large and medium-sized factories are 
entitled to. For instance, a large proportion of them have no access to state allocated goods. 
Even before the reforms they had to seek outlets for their products themselves. This was
16 The state sector, by the Chinese definition, consists of both industrial and commercial firms, such as 
department stores and bank agencies. The figure 463,210 covers only public industrial concerns that 
enjoy the administrative rank of township or above. State factories numbered 96,841 in 1985, the 
rest are collective factories. The State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System (the 
SCRES) (ed.), Qiye jizhi gaige chutan, Beijing: Zhongguo shangye chubanshe, 1988, p. 157.
17 There are several ways to classify factories of different sizes, such as by the number of workers, the 
profit turnover and the position of a given firm in the national industrial hierarchy. The criterion 
often used by the Chinese officials to distinguish large and medium-sized factories is their fixed 
assets, based on which their administrative ranks in the tiaotiao or kuaikuai hierarchy are evaluated. 
A factory with fixed assets of 50 million yuan or above is defined as large, one with between 20 to 
50 million as medium-scale, and the remainder small. See Zhibu shenghuo (Party branch life), 
(Shandong), no. 4, 1990, p. 32.
18 See Minister Chen Jinghua’s speech on enterprise reform in the 1992 national conference of 
economic reform, Qiye gaige tongxun (Enterprise Reform Newsletter), no. 1, April 1992, p. 4.
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particularly true for local factories at the county level or below. 19 Central controls over 
factories become progressively less detailed at each level down the bureaucratic track. 
While the local government may exercise effective control over its factories in terms of 
management personnel and investment, it lacks a significant lever to make the control com­
plete, as it is short of the means to obtain sufficient raw materials for the local firms and 
channels of sales for their products. Thus small factories have enjoyed more autonomy in 
operation in comparison with their large counterparts.
Within these small factories the political control mechanisms are not as effective as in 
the big ones. For instance, near the bottom of the bureaucratic hierarchy most of these fact­
ories did not have the authority that many big ones have had in deciding to have someone in 
the factory detained for political transgressions. They have had to first report to their super­
iors. In terms of life chances and social welfare provisions, small factories also lagged far 
behind the large ones.20 The uneven development of transition in China's state sector is 
reflected by the different degree of change in its big and small factories under the different 
bureaucratic command structure of tiaotiao and kuaikuai.21 Generally speaking, the trend 
of depoliticisation and de-statisation is more visible in small plants than in big ones.
Factories that are under the state budget are the main sources from which the state 
levies taxes, and to which it allocates strategic materials and toward which the state form­
ulates macro economic policies. In 1990 the total number of these was 38,210. This categ-
19 Pan Zhenmin & Lu Shouchu, Shehui zhuyi weiguan jingji junhenglun (Equilibrium in socialist 
micro-economics), Shanghai: Sanlian chubanshe, 1988.
20 For an analysis on the structural features that differentiate large and small, state and collective 
factories, see Andrew Wälder, "Communist Social Structure and Workers' Politics in China", in 
Victor Falkenheim (ed.), Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China, Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan, 1987, pp. 45-90.
21 Tiaotiao in Chinese means vertical lines. Here it implies the command chain of central industrial 
ministries in which factories are created and controlled. Kuaikuai in Chinese means horizontal 
blocks. Here it implies factories created and controlled by the regional government at four levels: 
provincial, prefectural (municipal), county and township.
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ory can be further divided into two subgroups. The first are the so-called central industrial 
concerns. They are immediate affiliates to 20-some central industrial ministries and serve as 
the "backbone" of the state sector. There were about 1,200 in 1992. The second are the 
local factories whose production is incorporated, wholly or partially, into the state plan. 
The factories under the state budget embrace most large and medium-scale enterprises, and 
the tight control of the party/state over the state sector is based on its tight control over the 
factories in this category. However, outside this core there are smaller factories more than 
ten times greater in number, and in the reform era the periphery has seen the greatest 
decline in party control. And it is from this periphery that the quiet revolution from below 
spreads toward the core.
There is not much literature covering the different degrees in erosion of political con­
trol in large and small factories. Nor is this the focus of this dissertation. What is relevant is 
that when measuring the trend of political and economic relaxation in China's state sector, 
the degree of loss of control by the party/state and the effect of the market in small state 
factories is way ahead of the large ones. And as concerns the number of workers, the main 
subject of political and economic control, workers from small factories represent the major­
ity of the labour force.22 If one focuses mainly on large factories, a common practice in 
Western scholarship on China's state sector, one is likely to reach a different conclusion 
from that reached through an overall assessment of both large and small state firms.
1.4. Methodology
Research activities for this dissertation were divided between (1) the collection and 
analysis of laws, government regulations, research and media reports and other relevant 
documentary data, and (2) interviews with factory managers, party functionaries and 
workers. While the first category of research provides the basic framework for my analysis 
of the institutional reforms in the state sector, the second reveals the impact of these
22 The number of workers in large and medium-sized factories is currently 20 million, only about 20%
of the total. Jingji ribao, 22 June 1993.
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institutional reforms on everyday shop-floor politics. Recently, both official and unofficial 
documentation concerning state factories has become increasingly easy to obtain. However, 
the question of how to interpret the information still poses an enormous challenge. And the 
problem is further complicated by the ever-changing situation in state enterprises due to the 
frequent oscillations in state policies.
The interview findings derive from four visits to China in 1988, 1989, 1991 and 
1992. The extended field research in China and Hong Kong in 1991 was particularly 
fruitful. The interviews were conducted in two ways: 1) casual talks that helped me gain a 
general impression of the state of affairs in various state firms, the workers' attitudes to­
wards the state and management, and managers' perceptions of both workers and their 
bureaucratic superiors; and 2) detailed systematic interviews with a number of workers, 
managers and government officials about issues of importance in the on-going transform­
ation of state enterprises. I came across many dozens of people in the first category and 
engaged them, sometimes on a one to one basis and sometimes in a group, with questions 
on my concerns, although most of them did not know that I was approaching them with 
any special purpose in mind. Any situation could be a useful venue for a discussion, be it a 
long train journey, or while lining up to buy something, or when having my hair cut or 
when having dinners with old and new friends. Notwithstanding that these talks were not 
neatly structured (I never took notes during chats), they served my intention quite well as 
tools not for the purpose of acquiring a quantitative picture but for an understanding of the 
general processes of change in state firms and the assumptions behind those processes. The 
biggest advantage of interviewing in such a manner is its casualness, so that people talked 
with no reservations.
If the casual chats offered me a good amount of peripheral knowledge of how a state 
firm was changing over the course of reform, the detailed interviews with about 50 work­
ers, managers and government researchers and officials provided me with systematic descr­
iptions of the changes. During these discussions, I repeatedly raised a number of quest-
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ions, such as what was the state of the relations between the party secretaries and managers 
in their factory, how active were the party cells and non-party activists, what was the 
percentage of their products allocated by the state plan and sold in the market, the ways by 
which wages were distributed to workers and managers and so on. In terms of the rel­
iability of the information obtained from these interviewees, I am positive that it is genuine 
to a fairly high level because most of them are my relatives, former classmates, and 
acquaintances introduced by mutual friends. There is no convincing reason why they 
should not have told me what they really thought.
In many cases, observation through these regular and casual contacts yielded good 
insights and a background against which one could read official documents and media 
reports. The resulting study is a combination of close analysis of primary sources of 
documentation, formal interviews exploring in depth a number of specific questions, and 
informal chats to grasp the general situation in the changing state sector. More importantly, 
the empirical basis of the dissertation is intimately related to my own experience of 30-odd 
years living in China and working in a number of danwei there. In fact, compared with 
what I experienced when working in a state factory for a month in 1974, the new changes 
in the state sector are revolutionary.
The time-frame of this dissertation starts from the beginning of China's post-Mao 
reforms in 1979 to the latest development that the dissertation can possibly incorporate. The 
main reason behind this design is the conviction that as I look at the changes as an evolving 
process, the longer period this can cover the more comparative differences it may offer. Yet 
since the industrial reforms are the focus of the dissertation, more attention will be devoted 
to the period after the industrial reform commenced in 1984. Due to the word limits of a 
Ph.D thesis, the discussion of the situation in the state sector before the reform will be as 
brief as possible. Needless to say, this has limited the analytical perspective.
The dissertation consists of five parts. Part One consists of an introduction (Chapter 
One) and a theoretical chapter (Chapter Two). Part Two comprises three chapters and
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concentrates on political change in China's state enterprises. Chapter Three deals with the 
institutional reforms that affect the leadership structure. Chapter Four and Chapter Five 
analyse the reforms of the party's organizations in state factories. Part Three comprises 
Chapter Six and Chapter Seven, which examine the changing state/enterprise remuneration 
relations and the impact of wage reform on the shop floor politics. Part Four, which 
comprises Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine, is evaluationg the changing state/enterprise 
relations with an emphasis on the ownership reform and the government organizational 
reform. Chapter Ten is a conclusion.
Chapter 2
Party/State Controls in A Danwei
2.1. A Theoretical Analysis of State/Society Relations
The study of state/society relations has traditionally been a central aspect of the 
W est's academic efforts to understand the communist systems. The classical view of 
communist states has evolved along the lines of totalitarian and interest group models. The 
two models provide different angles from which to interpret the nature of the socio-political 
system and the political power of the communist regimes, which once held one third of the 
globe's population under their rule. The totalitarian picture of communist countries des­
cribes a system in which all forms of association were dependent upon the state — a mono- 
organizational socialism . 1 The model concentrates on total social control based on terror, an 
exclusive ideology leading to hegemonic expansionism and a vanguard party overriding 
every social institution. Clearly the angle of analysis of this model is exclusive and top- 
down (from the state to society).
In contrast, the interest group model looks at state/society relations from the bottom 
up. It relies on the many empirical studies carried out at the grass-roots level of society 
which testify to the fact that a fairly large number of political activities are kept alive by 
various social groups, such as peasants, workers, intellectuals and lower level bureaucratic 
institutions. Their persistent campaigning for improvement of their lot, even under a Lenin­
ist type of dictatorship, suggested the existence of "organizational pluralism" within a 
hegemonic power structure.2 Of particular importance is the fact that representatives of 
these interests can be found among the ruling elites, who use these groups a base for their 
power. For instance, David Goodman's research of the interest conflicts between China's
1 T. H. Rigby, "The USSR: End of A Long Dark Night", in Robert Miller (ed.), The Developments
of Civil Society in Communist Systems, p. 15.
2 Robert Dahl, "Pluralism Revised," Comparative Politics, Vol. 10, no. 2, 1978, pp. 191-197.
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central and provincial governments produced pioneering works on and a new analytical 
framework for the study of communist leadership politics.3 Although the proponents of 
this model do not equate group politics in communist societies to western political plural­
ism, they do use the model to show how the state is subject to restrictions and pressure 
from social interest groups.4
Students of communist regimes have become increasingly dissatisfied with the limit­
ation of these two models. For instance, Jowitt argues that the emergence of communist 
societies should be seen as the outcome of complicated social, political and historical proc­
esses. The systemic changes that have occurred in these societies could not be adequately 
explained by the theory of totalitarianism, which provides no sophisticated tools for analys­
ing the developmental features of communist regimes. By overtly emphasizing a fixed ideo­
logy and horrible political reality, this model actually makes the empirical study of Leninist 
regimes superfluous.5 On the other hand, the interest group model has also attracted 
criticism.6 One weakness of the model is that it has not firmly established links between the 
influence exercised by groups primarily outside the formal state institutions and the weight 
of their informal bargaining in the elite policy decision-making process. For instance, it 
fails to explain adequately why sometimes "mass influence" works and other times it will 
not.
The 1970s and particularly the 1980s witnessed big strides in scholarly pursuits 
world-wide to grasp the realities of communist societies. This had been helped by increased
3 See, for instance, David Goodman, "The Provincial First Party Secretary in the People's Republic of 
China, 1947-1978: A Profile", British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 10, 1980, pp. 39-74; and 
Groups and Politics in the People's Republic of China, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1983.
4 Victor Falkenheim, "Citizen and Group Politics in China", in Victor Falkenheim and Ilpyong Kim 
(eds.), Chinese Politics from Mao to Deng, New York: Paragon House, 1989, pp. 1-15.
5 Ken Jowitt, "Weber, Trotsky and Holmes on the Study of Leninist Regimes", Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 45, no. 1, 1991, pp. 31-49.
6 Andrew Wälder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986, pp. 243-244.
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access to some of these countries due to reforms and open-door policies. Departure from 
central planning in the reforms in Eastern Europe constituted a key feature of the economic 
transition that had preceded the collapse of the communist system. The reform experience 
in some of these East European communist countries inspired scholars to develop a trans­
formation paradigm with focus on the changing social foundation of politics in these 
states.7 Special attention has been given to concepts such as the second economy, collective 
identities and activities among social groups that have become increasingly politicised 
against state power, and the growth of market transactions that reduced the dependence of 
citizens on the state .8 Transformationists have concluded that reform has occasioned a 
"quiet revolution from below", and with the reemergence of civil society, the boundary 
between the state and society has to be redrawn.9 Consequently, it is thought that political 
and market reforms will help democratic transformation reach the point of no return sooner 
rather than later. Despite the fact that the transformation theory has somewhat overlooked 
the legacy of the Leninist political culture, the difficulties of turning a planned economy into 
a market one and the impact of the economic transition on the population at large,10 events 
in the collapse of the Soviet bloc have brought credit to these theoreticians.
7 Ota Sik, Wlodzimierz Brus and Janos Komai were among the first to reveal what was wrong with 
the command economy and what should be done to reform it. A recent book entided Remaking the 
Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and East Europe, (Stanford University Press, 1989, 
edited by Victor Nee and David Stark), summarises the key ideas of the transformation school of 
thought.
8 For instance, for the second economy, see I. R. Gabor, "The Second Economy", Acta Oeconomica, 
Vol. 22, no. 3-4, 1979, pp. 291-311. For organized mass activities against the authorities, see Ivan 
Szelenyi, Socialist Entrepreneurs: Embourgeoisement in Rural Hungary, Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1988.
9 For a collection of papers on civil society in socialist states, see Robert Miller (ed.), The Develop­
ments of Civil Society in Communist Systems.
10 For an insightful analysis on the relations between political and economic transformation in Eastern 
Europe, see Ota Sik, "Socialism - Theory and Practice", in Ota Sik (ed.), Socialism Today?, Lond­
on: Macmillan, 1991, pp. 25-29.
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2.1.1. Communist Neo-Traditionalism
China specialists in the west have also developed elaborate analytical frameworks to 
examine state and society interactions in China. The neo-traditional image put forward by 
Andrew Wälder to describe state enterprises in urban China and the clientelist paradigm 
suggested by Jean Oi in analysing the politics of rural harvests have helped to sharpen our 
understanding of the pre-reform Chinese government and society. 11 Numerous insightful 
books have appeared to give us a fuller grasp of authority relations in a communist regime 
as reflected by intellectuals, urban youth, university students and central and local bureau­
crats.12 The scholarly exploration by these authors provides us with "a grain of sand 
through which people examine the world," as a Chinese saying describes the approach.13
Wälder developed his neo-traditional image in keeping with the totalitarian model. 
This has some foundation given the strong totalitarian tendency inherent in the communist 
party/state, as reflected in the process of turning virtually all Chinese urban work units into 
state danwei. What Wälder does is shift the research focus from a vogue in the 1960s and 
70s on Pekingology to the social institutions which formed the political base of the Chinese 
party/state. Neo-traditionalism has remained one of the most useful portrayals of the polit­
ics of the urban industrial sector before the Dengist reform.
The most valuable contribution of the neo-traditional model to our understanding of 
communist state/society relations is its analysis of a state enterprise as an institution (less an 
economic than a social and political institution). The very nature of being a political institut­
ion explicates the party's ubiquitous penetration into workers' everyday life and the state's
11 Andrew Wälder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism; Jean Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary 
China, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
12 See for instance, Caro Lee Hamrin, China's Establishment Intellectuals, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 
1986; Anita Chan, Richard Madsen and Jonathan Unger, Chen Village Under Mao and Deng, Berk­
eley: University of California Press, 1992; and James Watson (ed.), Class and Social Stratification 
in Post-Revolution China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
13 Peter Nan-Shong Lee pointed this out for me during a conversation with him in Chinese University 
of Hong Kong in 1991.
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unparalleled exercise of power at the very bottom of society in Chinese history. In addition, 
the system of employment and remuneration and its patterns of social welfare allocation 
constitute another core task of state enterprises vis-a-vis workers. Within the framework of 
neo-traditionalism, the delivery of social welfare provisions by the enterprise, such as unit 
housing and everyday necessities in short supply, is no ordinary mission as reflected in 
welfare states in the west. It carries the distinct function of political and social control by 
the party/state. Under such tight controls, workers effectively bowed to "peaceful 
coercion" .14
As a logical development, two distinct features strongly influenced political life in the 
factory. The first, says Wälder, was the organized dependence of workers on their employ­
ers and the second was the politicised clientelist ties formed between workers and their im­
mediate bosses. The workers’ organized dependence on their danwei was thorough: emp­
loyment did not mean simply to get a place to work and receive wages but to obtain a 
political and civic identity, and a whole set of social welfare benefits, including sometimes 
even an inheritable job for one's children. This dependence ingrained a sense of vulnerab­
ility of workers toward their employers. Moreover, because workers' right to quit their 
jobs was largely denied, their dependence on danwei was a life-time phenomenon in which 
gradually they regarded themselves the equivalents of other factory assets. 15 Politically, 
this implied the subordination of workers to the party/state of which the factory was an 
embodiment.
Walder's evaluation of politicised clientelism at the basic level is an important ad­
vance on traditional thinking of communist politics as characterised by impersonal dominat­
ion by state power and ideology. In fact, no authority relations can be entirely impersonal.
14 The term is from John Wilson Lewis, Leadership in Communist China, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1963, p. 4.
15 Interviewees of Perry Link told him that they felt that they were owned by their danwei. This word 
"owned" was also repeated many times during my interviews with workers in China. See Perry Link, 
Evening Chats in Beijing, New York: Norton, 1992, p. 68.
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Walder's contribution is that he based his analysis of clientelist ties in enterprises on a 
recognition of an unprecedented level of political and social subordination of workers that 
went far beyond industrial relations in the market economies.
The core of this politicised clientelist network is 'principled particularism', which 
rewards a group of loyal followers with goods and services not easily available to 
everyone. This practice clusters activists and non-activists and thus splits the workforce by 
creating different blue-collar status groups in enterprises. Criteria for selecting who are 
more equal than others were both political and personal. The political demand echoes the 
official requirement of the party/state on workers, while the personal dealt with the every­
day attitudes of workers towards their immediate bosses. Mutually they constituted the base 
for authority relations in the danwei system. Wälder was among the first to point out that 
using political favouritism to subdue workers' passive resistance was more cost effective 
than naked terror. 16
Organized dependence and politically oriented clientelist networks paved the way for 
the creation of a peculiar institutional culture in China's state enterprises. Enterprises as 
social welfare agencies both attenuated the gravity of the short supply of goods in shops 
and underlined the need of workers to rely on the danwei system. Their entering into the 
clientelist network as followers was often a self-protective act, reflecting their recognition 
of the dominant status of their patrons. This was normal behaviour in an uncertain environ­
ment where the political and social pressures were high but the provisions of goods and 
services were short. This is not to deny that the factory cadres were also constrained by 
their lack of authority to fire workers and by the need to solicit cooperation from their 
subordinates. Yet the play of power was simply not balanced. For workers, submission to 
the rules of a clientelist network was more rewarding than confronting authority. This 
characterised the political culture in state enterprises in the Maoist era, despite spasmodic 
eruption of discontent.
16 Wälder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism, pp. 246-50.
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Several academics have raised critical points about the model of communist neo­
traditionalism. For instance, Elizabeth Perry has diagnosed one weakness: a lack of histor­
ical perspective.17 This is probably due to Walder's focus on the "remade" society of 
socialist China. Yet organized dependence has its roots in China before 1949. And it is not 
an isolated design based purely on communist ideology.
China's industrial workforce originated before the turn of the century from bankrupt 
peasantry who had lost land. Large numbers of them were brought to big cities by 
contractors. As these workers had no roots in cities, it was a normal practice that factories 
provided shelter and some limited welfare services. The biggest problem for these landless 
peasants-turned-workers was the lack of job security.18 This is the reason why the struggle 
for job security was central to the agenda in the workers' movements both before and after 
1949. As far as the provision of welfare is concerned, the practice can be traced back to the 
pre-liberation period in both the "red and white areas". Once the provisions became 
institutionalized in the "big rice bowl" system, attempts to remove them would certainly 
damage the claims to legitimacy of the regime, as shown currently by the workers' 
resistance to the reform of "smashing the three irons", namely, tenured positions for cad­
res, life employment for workers, and guaranteed wage increases for them all. Historically, 
the socialist ideology of people's entitlement to jobs became deep-rooted and created 
entrenched vested interests in the state sector.
The system of "a big rice bowl" has alleviated the financial and economic strains on 
the majority of workers in a populous poor country, not just activists. Security of job 
tenure, housing, free medical care and so on had been what Chinese workers had dreamed 
of for many decades before 1949. If the positive incentives associated with neo­
traditionalism had been meant just to ensure compliance, an outright power given to factory
17 Elizabeth Perry, "State and Society in Contemporary China", World Politics, Vol. 61, no. 4, 1989, 
p. 582.
18. Lin Hong, Shanghai gongshang fazhan shihua (The brief history of Shanghai's industrial and comm­
ercial development), Shanghai: Keji chubanshe, 1974, pp. 3-17.
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cadres to fire workers would have served the purpose better. Wälder numbered these 
incentives as the third structural source of regime legitimacy in China.19 Even today, more 
than a decade after reform, the majority of state workers still support the positive side of 
socialism reflected in the provision of public housing, life employment, free medical care 
and retirement benefits.20 Deng Xiaoping's upholding the socialist road (maintaining these 
incentives) has been especially designed to appeal to urban workers who are regarded by 
some analysts as the party's second mass base of support.21
In the wake of the post-Mao reforms, politicised clientelism made it difficult to adapt 
to new circumstances. At the same time, the sweep of the reforms altered the socio-political 
environment from which those guanxi relations sprang and caused a revolution in thinking. 
The general social and political attitudes of the population have made obsolete the traditional 
criteria for political favouritism based on ideological correctness and political activism. 
With money in command, people have increasingly become apolitical. Although the guanxi 
network becomes even more important, it is oriented much less towards political 
favouritism.
Secondly, neo-traditionalism is the product of the command economy, whose by­
product, a scarcity of goods and services, strengthened the hands of factory cadres vis-a- 
vis workers. Now the market, even though still partial, provides alternatives for workers 
for both consumption and profiteering. Gradually, the base of control by the party/state 
through clientelist, organized dependence has been eroded. Organized dependence, the 
major ingredient of neo-traditionalism, is best applied to a situation of autarchy in a closed 
system and becomes less effective when the system is being opened up.22
19 Andrew Wälder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism, p. 248.
20 Gongjing neican, no. 23, 1992, p. 27.
21 Kathleen Hartford, "Reform or Retrofitting? The Chinese Economy since Tiananmen", World Policy 
Journal, Vol. IX, no. 1, Winter, 1991-92, p. 49.
22 In fact, Wälder was among the first to point out the changes in his recent writings. For instance, 
"Wage Reform and the Web of Factory Interests", China Quarterly no. 109, 1987, pp. 21-41.
2 Party/State Controls in A Danwei—22
2.1.2. Work Unit Socialism and State Corporatism
Recently, some China specialists have proposed a new approach to understanding 
basic-level Chinese politics. Their basic argument was described by Womack as "work unit 
socialism" (WUS).23 What is useful about this approach is that it deals with the welfare 
benefits provided by a work unit. According to Womack, as a permanent community a 
work unit is part of a rational, future-oriented, differentiated and technological structure in 
search of modernization. Womack tries to show that a work unit in socialist China, be it a 
factory or a hospital, is not just designed for the state's control over society. It also 
constitutes a mechanism that delivers goods to members of a community. As long as WUS 
can deliver goods, it remains a social experiment in state-run industrial communities that 
integrates the state and society with people's "active consent".24 And permanent 
employment in state factories places effective restrictions on the exercise of state power, 
thus distinguishing WUS from both the images of totalitarianism and neo-traditionalism. 
Implicit in the argument is a denial of the totalitarian approach that envisions a socialist 
country in which "the interests of state and society are dichotomized and juxtaposed and the 
state is assumed to be the enemy of the people."25.
Womack's thesis deals with the tension between the irresistible power of the state and 
the immovable permanence of work unit membership. As a result of this tension there had 
emerged a vast difference between formal powers and actual control. This touches the 
nerve of the study of state/society relations in China under Mao, where we see an all-
23 Brantly Womack, "Party/State Democracy: A Theoretical Exploration", in King-yuh Chang (ed.), 
Mainland China after the 13th Party Congress Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 11-29; "Trans­
figured Community: Neo-Traditionalism and Work Unit Socialism", China Quarterly, no. 126, June 
1991, p. 320. Peter Nan-shong Lee deals with the issue from a different angle, see his paper, "Corp­
oratism and the Chinese Economic Reform", in Ershiyi Shiji, (H.K.), Vol. 7, 1991, pp. 150-160.
24 Christine Buci-Glucksmann: Gramsci and the State, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980, p. 93, 
quote from Peter N.S. Lee, "Corporatism and the Chinese Economic Reform", p. 156.
25 Brantly Womack, "Transfigured Community: Neo-Traditionalism and Work Unit Socialism", China 
Quarterly, 1991, p. 320.
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powerful state machine on the one hand and its less than effective functioning at the 
grassroots on the other. The centre's policies became distorted bit by bit in the process of 
implementation at each and every level of its functioning bodies, which represented their 
units' interests.26 In the state sector these interests often appeared in a pattern of mass 
welfare at the expense of the state, a facet of social change that China accomplished without 
too much polarization of society.27
One drawback of the work-unit socialism approach is probably its tendency to project 
an idealized welfare community under the rigid political conditions of the party/state. WUS 
does not occur in a political vacuum, and the welfare benefits are not just benign handouts. 
There are thus discrepancies between the ideal operation of state/society relations envisaged 
by WUS and its actual working in the party/state danwei system, which divides the 
industrial communities into powerful and powerless. For instance, factory cadres assumed 
political and ideological missions on behalf of the state. It was their duty to make sure that 
workers' attitudes (biaoxian) were in line with what the party/state required, although the 
result might not be what the party/state fully expected. So they did not run social welfare 
affairs like a charity. Without adequate checks and balances, the enormous power entrusted 
to factory cadres inevitably blurred the boundary of individual authority and the authority of 
office. As a result, the cadres did not give out goods and services according to the rules of 
WUS. For the subordinates, in a society based on explicit and authoritative status differ­
ences, it became rational for them to act on the premises enforced by the privileged.28 From 
the 1950s onward, workers' "active consent" gradually gave way to passive submission to 
a powerful "new class" of cadres.
26 Peter Nan-shong Lee, "The Chinese Industrial State in Historical Perspective: from Totalitarianism 
to Corporatism", in Brandy Womack (ed.), Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspect­
ive, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 153-179.
27 Brandy Womack, "Transfigured Community", pp. 320-23.
28 Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Maxist-Leninist 
Systems", The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXVII, September, 1974, pp. 1171-1191.
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Therefore, the first condition for workplace socialism to work properly has to be de­
politicization of the workplace, namely, depriving factory cadres of political and ideological 
power over workers and setting effective rules to mete out social welfare provisions. This 
needs a profound political reform in the state sector: while the state's efforts to attract 
workers' cooperation soften its forceful political and economic grip on the latter, the exist­
ing social welfare system (the big rice pot and iron rice bowl) is in the main to be preserved 
to protect workers' interests. In this process the depoliticised state enterprises are gradually 
transformed into economic entities assuming some key social welfare functions.
By adopting a historical analysis Peter Nan-Shong Lee explored work unit politics 
from a different angle but arrived at a perspective similar to Womack's. He put forward a 
concept of state corporatism that accounted for both the ideological and institutional 
constraints within the party/state power structure. Two major features of state corporatism 
are worthy of analysis. The first is a degree of enterprise autonomy as a result of an 
inherent contradiction in the omnipotent and omniscient image of the party/state and the 
institutional and functional realities of the socialist economy. This autonomy was due to the 
pivotal position of work units in fulfilling the state plans. The state was compelled to share 
its monopoly over industrial production with them in order to maintain a peculiar type of 
relationship — decentralization was needed to improve effectiveness and material 
concessions had to be made to enlist compliance. These inevitably created segmentary 
interests, despite the subordination of interests to the state. 29 What is important about the 
argument is that we have for a long time emphasized the commanding heights but given 
less attention to the differentiated roles and interests of the state and producers before the 
reforms. Now the gap has been increasingly appreciated by both Chinese and western 
scholars.
29. Peter Nan-shong Lee, "The Chinese Industrial State in Historical Perspective: from Totalitarianism 
to Corporatism", pp. 153-156.
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The second feature is a relationship of obligations between a work unit and its staff 
members. The institutional pillars of the ties were the systems of fixed wages and life 
employment protected by state corporatism. These institutional arrangements had created 
constraints upon factory cadres when they interacted with workers. Under such a 
corporatist framework the unit/workers' relationship was centred on the role of collectivism 
and mutual obligations between workers and management.30
Based on these two features Peter Lee put forward an argument similar to Vivienne 
Shue's concept of "honeycomb". He concluded that "to a considerable extent, corporatism 
is seen in the autonomous and effective role of a work unit that stands between the 
party/state and individuals."31 To many observers, the degree of this autonomy is a matter 
of controversy. However, a measure of autonomy laid the base for the post-Mao industrial 
transformation, which Peter Lee summarised as a metamorphosis from totalitarianism to 
corporatism. Together with Womack's concept of WUS, this provides additional angle to 
analyse Chinese industrial reforms.
2.2. The Functions of An Industrial Danwei
Chinese urban society is composed of numerous danwei, which creates a type of 
authority relation rooted in a special type of social and political order. Indeed, the peculiar 
danwei system provides a good case for a behavioural analysis based on which empirical 
evidence can be accumulated and theoretized. On the other hand, in order to have a good 
grasp of the pattern of authority relations rooted in such a system, it is important to have a 
good grasp of the institutions of power through which the authority is exercised. For 
instance, a well-accepted fact in the study of a political system is that mobilization is 
achieved more through coercion or commitment to an ideology or a leader and through a set 
of institutions. Rarely is mobilization achieved merely through the use of patron-client
30 Peter N.S. Lee, "Corporatism and the Chinese Economic Reform", pp. 150-160.
31 Peter Nan-shong Lee, "The Chinese Industrial State in Historical Perspective: from Totalitarianism
to Corporatism", p. 162.
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networks.32 So a study on the institutional arrangements becomes crucial in determining 
the nature of authority relations.
A strong political and ideological orientation is the first feature of the danwei system. 
The politicising of a state factory began with the establishment of party cells on shop 
floors. Organizationally, any Chinese workplace with more than three party members had 
to set up a party branch, and more than 50, a general party branch or party committee.33 As 
politicisation deepened, the party created a monolithic leadership structure in state factories 
supervising and very often replacing factory management from the apex to the workshop 
sections. One key element of this was the nomenklatura appointment system, whereby the 
party selected cadres and made them directly responsible for the party's policies.34 The 
party firmly placed the political and security network under its wing and at times made it an 
agency of terror. The party also exercised tight control over other "transmission belt" 
organizations such as trade unions, the Youth League and the Women's Association. In­
deed, through these "belts" the party's penetration was carried into every comer of the shop 
floor.
Party cells were instigators of ideological indoctrination and propaganda work. They 
exercised control over workers' thinking. Ideological work in China's state factories was 
not only designed to disseminate propaganda but also an institution for commanding con­
crete patterns of behaviour patterns. Thought control and organizational control were linked 
by the party in the monitoring of workers. For instance, a worker with an allegedly poor 
work record was commonly regarded as entertaining hostile ideas against the party and 
should be "educated".
32 Jean Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary China, p. 7.
33 The Party Charter (1956).
34 For the analysis of the system, see John Bums (ed.), The Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklatura 
System, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1989, pp. ix-xliii.
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The command economy is by nature an administrative economy requiring an all 
powerful bureaucracy to execute central planning. This has fashioned a unique type of 
state/enterprise relations. Based on Marx's criticism of the blindness of capitalist product­
ion, the socialist theorists and practitioners envisaged an economy where all production 
activities were organized as if conducted within one enterprise. Thus the ownership had to 
be "pure" because such an enterprise needed to have only one owner. The plan had to be 
detailed to ensure strict management procedures. Exchange relations had to be curtailed, as 
they may cause disorder.35 From this Stalinist model developed the second feature of an 
industrial danwei: its appendage status vis-a-vis state administration.36
The cornerstone for such a state/enterprise relationship is state ownership. In China 
the ownership system has a distinctive political function of control, as it subjects state 
enterprises to the government's economic agencies, which, as the investors, firmly hold the 
property rights in their hands. Stemming from these ownership powers, these agencies 
possess the authority of appointment of factory directors, allocation of their products, and 
formulation of their remuneration and employment policies, and so on.37
Built on this state ownership structure is a vast economic bureaucracy, which 
embraces all state factories in its ranking system. Under the hierarchical rules based on the 
amount of the state's investment, the importance of products, the number of workers, etc., 
state factories were granted a status at the levels of a township and army company (guji), 
the county and regiment (xiantuanji), prefecture and army divisions (dishiji), all the way to
35 Rong Zhaoxin, Qiye xingzhi yanjiu (The study of the nature of state enterprises), Hefei: Anhui 
renmin chubanshe, 1992, p. 123.
36 The word "appendage" is popularly used by Chinese economists to describe the highly dependent sta­
tus of a state factory on the state. See Zhou Shuliang, "Reform of the Planned Economy and Plann­
ing System", in George Totten and Zhou Shuliang (eds.), China's Economic Reform: Administering 
the Introduction of Market Mechanism, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, p. 25.
37 For a detailed analysis on the features of command economy, see, Robert Demberger, "China's Econ­
omic System: A New Model or Variations on an Old Theme", in Yu-ming Shaw, (ed.), Mainland 
China: Politics, Economics and Reform, Boulder: Westview, 1986, pp. 344-48.
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the province and army (shengjunji). This military-sounding bureaucratization of factories 
was meant to make easier the fulfilment of central plans, as central decrees could be most 
effectively carried out within an administrative pyramid bearing resemblance to an army.
As far as enterprises were concerned, in this hierarchy they acquired not only an 
administrative rank and but also a superior administrative officer. Through the hierarchy, 
they were guaranteed capital investment and outlets for products but they largely lost their 
identity as an economic entity. Although between a factory and its immediate bureaucratic 
boss, there was room for bargaining over the level of production ,38 under the strict 
command system, this room was generally limited and a factory engaging in bargaining 
could be subject to criticism as "having a weak sense of organization and discipline", 
becoming a potential target in political and economic campaigns.
Direct state control over factory employees' salaries, as embodied in the nationally 
unified eight-grade industrial wage system, was another feature of the danwei structure and 
served as a main indicator of state penetration into the grassroots. Under this system, the 
whole state sector was run like one institution, with the state delivering the salary and the 
factory management acting as the cashier. In this closed system of the "big rice bowl" both 
enterprises and workers had little influence on state wage policies. This centralized, 
nationally unified wage arrangement had been based on a formula of low wages, low 
consumption. Although this pertained to the low level of development of the economy, it 
had a function of control, for workers had to remain satisfied with whatever they were 
offered and to contain their everyday pursuits within the limit that the state believed 
appropriate. The unified wage system served several strategic purposes during the Mao era. 
The most important ones included: a high accumulation rate for heavy, particularly, defence
38 Barry Naughton, "Hierarchy and the Bargaining Economy: Government and Enterprise in the Reform 
Process", in Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton (eds.), Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision­
making in Post-Mao China, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, pp. 245-279.
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industries and an employment policy to keep abreast of the fast growth of urban 
population.
For instance, in 1978 the per capita income for each urbanite was 26.3 yuan per 
month, while the rationed commodities — the necessities for people's everyday life - cost 
22.74 yuan. These included an average of 15 kilos of grainstuff, 0.56 kilos of vegetable, 
0.51 kilos of meat, 0.16 kilos of sugar and 0.25 kilos of cooking oil. With other social 
welfare provisions and state-subsidized items, people could just make it through each 
month. Throughout the two decades from 1959 to 1979, about 20% of all urban families 
received less than 20 yuan per head. They therefore had to depend on their factory's 
"jiujijing" or welfare survival fund.39
In terms of politicisation, bureaucratization and, to a lesser extent, the centrally 
controlled remunerative system, the danwei phenomenon could be found also in collective 
factories under the guidance of these factories' party branches within the factories and the 
administrative control of government bureaus. As a result, China's urban industrial sector 
became part of the infrastructure for the party/state. For workers and government staff the 
distance between the state and themselves was terribly close, as the institutional 
establishments of the state within their danwei amplified the detailed control of a 
dictatorship. Authority relations were built on organizational pressure. This represented a 
strong tendency toward totalitarianism.
2.3. Reconstructing the Social Base for Political Change
The large-scale danweiization of social organizations since the 1950s had increasingly 
blurred the boundaries between the state and society, and at the same time each danwei, in 
being a small closed society, had atomized the whole of society.40 The danwei system pro-
39. Cheng Xinsheng and others (eds.), Zhongguo 2000 nian de xiaofei (China's consumption in the year 
2000), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1987, pp. 33-38.
40 A number of old workers in their 60s told me that at the beginning of their career as workers, they 
still called their factories wornenchang, or our factory, but gradually they changed the vocabulary to 
women danwei, or our danwei, which they said they unconsciously followed the social vogue.
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vided a setting of abuse of power by state cadres and caused widespread discontent among 
workers and decay of the grassroots party organizations. To a great degree the politicised 
clientelist ties served as a hot-bed of corruption. Some scholars have defined this trend in 
terms of feizuzhi liliang or a breakdown in organization, which had pushed the dynastic 
cycles of ancient China for thousands of years.41 Since the 1970s the increase of such 
disorganizational forces has accelerated at an alarming pace. This became one of the key 
reasons for the post-Mao reforms. In the interests of the long-term rule of the party, as 
pointed out by Andrew Nathan, a transition begins when the ruling elite, or a substantial 
section within it, perceives that the potential advantages of giving up some control over 
outcomes outweigh the risks.42 Indeed, the efforts to implement workplace de-controls 
have given the enterprises unprecedented breathing space to ease political tensions between 
workers and factory authorities.43
The post-Mao industrial reforms have, in short, greatly curtailed the totalitarian reach 
embodied in the danwei system. While the following chapters deal with a number of 
specific reform measures in detail, the transformation of the danwei system can be 
conceptualized, as briefly stated in the introductory chapter, as the development of two D’s: 
depoliticisation and de-statisation. To a large extent, this involves two interrelated and 
interdependent processes: transition from a command economy to a market economy and 
transition from communist party dictatorship toward liberalization.44
2.3.1. Conceptualizing Depoliticisation and De-statisation
41 Jin Guangtao & Liu Qingfeng, Xingsheng yu weiji (Prosperity, Crisis and Opportunities), Taipei: 
Fengyun shidai Publishing House, 1990, pp. 70-89.
42 Andrew Nathan, "Is China Ready for Democracy?", Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, Spring 1990, p. 
54.
43 However, tensions in other areas may have worsened. For instance, the monetized labour relations 
have given rise to increased conflicts between workers and managers and among workers themselves.
44. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "The Connection between Political and Economic Reform in Communist 
Regimes", in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), Dismantling Communism: Common Causes and Regional 
Variations, Washington, D.C. The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1992, p. 62.
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Depoliticisation is a process in which the long-term practice of the party/state in 
turning the workplace into a political institution is gradually reversed. The central part of 
the process is the reform of those establishments responsible for the totalitarian control. 
The key to this, according to Chinese party theorists, is to alter the organizational functions 
and leadership mechanisms of party cells in the workplace to accompany a general social 
change that is increasingly apolitical.45 It is a process of reducing the power of the party at 
the grassroots, as will be explicated in Chapter 3.
Depoliticisation means phasing out of direct political intrusions into economic activit­
ies.46 At the macro level, depoliticisation redefines the relationship between the party and 
socio-economic management, which stimulates a separation of economic activities from 
overt political impulses. With the unfolding of the reforms this separation encompasses two 
systemic changes in the economic system: marketization and privatisation. These changes 
have been increasingly accepted and, in fact, used by the party leadership, as reflected by 
the deepening government reform (separation of party and state administration) and 
ownership reform (separation of government administration and property operations). At 
the enterprise level, depoliticisation requires the party leadership to retreat from business 
management and attend to its internal affairs only.
Depoliticisation is accompanied by de-ideologization. Actually these two notions can 
be seen as two sides of a coin that underline the dismantling of 'politics in command' in the 
workplace, both as a mentality and as mechanisms. The importance of the Marxist ideology 
to the CCP had long been at once a theoretical guidance for action and a practical means of 
control. Without either, it was believed that chaos would ensue.47 This combination gave 
the party justification for suppression. With the belief system largely bankrupt, the
45 Li Ming, "Jiceng danzuzhi zai shehui zhuanxingqi de zuoyong" (The functions of the grassroots 
party organizations in the era of social change", Dangjian luntan, no. 6, 1992, pp. 23-27.
46 Kathleen Harford, "Reform or Retrofitting?", p. 46.
47 See, for instance, Deng Xiaoping's speech to the ranking officers of martial law enforcement on 19 
June 1989.
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ideology has been reduced to inculcating in workers a sense of compliance to the regime, 
more as a control system. But with the deepening of depoliticisation — for instance, as seen 
from one of its indicators: the phasing out of political campaigns at the grassroots -- the 
control function of the ideology has largely lost key control mechanisms.
At the same time ideology has been effectively reduced to "economism" (jingjizhuyi) 
or material incentives, in order to enlist cooperation from workers and ensure harmony 
between workers and management. In other words, ideology has been neutralized to suit 
general management purposes. For instance, a lot of efforts in ideological education have 
been devoted toward promoting a community of common interests (liyi gongtongti), and an 
"enterprise culture" (qiye wenhua). But these efforts could help create a collective identity 
in terms of a common struggle for more income.48 To a degree this development is a blow 
to the unified culture embodied in the danwei system which emphasized conformity to the 
state. The new enterprise culture that is advocated stresses the individuality of a factory and 
nurtures its own enterprise value, a clear departure from the Marxist ideology.
This dissertation argues that depoliticisation means restoration of a work-unit to a 
status more strictly related to its functions in the division of labour in a society. Still under 
the party/state, this does not necessarily mean that a state factory becomes independent of 
the state. It describes a process in which specialized organizations are granted autonomy in 
running their own business and, in this process, gradually free themselves from some of 
the major core tasks of the party/state in controlling the population. For instance, a fairly 
independent industrial unit will become a business firm in the basic sense that it does not 
function as a political and ideological mobilizer, or a level of state administration assuming 
a wide range of duties of state control, or an agency of public security monitoring the 
everyday activities of members of a work unit. It will have power of production and sales 
more according to market signals than government decrees. Moreover, it will have its own
48 Fan Zhu, Qiye wenhua daolun (The general theory of the enterprise culture), Beijing: Shijia zhishi 
chubanshe, 1991, pp. 190-213.
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remuneration and employment policies, although still responsible for a large amount of 
social welfare provisions for workers on behalf of the state. In sum, depoliticization in the 
state sector is about dismantling party/state controls in a state enterprise with removal of 
many tasks of the enterprise as a political institution.
De-statisation describes three crucial aspects of state/enterprise relations in China's 
state sector. The first is the changing property relations between the state and enterprises 
which is decisive to the nature of state control over factories. The second is the changing 
bureaucratic relations between the state and enterprises that is decisive to their interactions. 
The third is the changing remunerative relations between the state and enterprises that is 
decisive to the redistribution of interests between them. These three sets of relations 
constituted the foundation for the industrial danwei system. The dissertation argues that the 
changes in these three systems will provide the institutional foundation for a new 
state/enterprise relationship to emerge, and that this new relationship will accelerate the 
general social transformation in China.
Kathleen Hartford employed the term de-statisation. To her the notion means the 
reduction of the state's regularized, direct role in the economy as owner, producer, planner, 
or organizer of production. This can occur either through the outright surrender of that role, 
or parts of it, or through the growth of other sectors.49 The scope of her definition mainly 
covers the mechanisms through which the state regulates the command economy, although 
it touches upon the issue of ownership.
De-statisation in property relations is regarded as opening up a process in which state 
enterprises move toward privatisation (minyinghua). However, there are differences 
between the two concepts. The term de-statisation emphasizes the dismantling of the state's 
hierarchical controls over its factories. A property analysis of it clearly points to the efforts 
to transfer property rights and control from the state to producers, two of the elements
49 Kathleen Hartford, "Reform or Retrofitting?", p. 46.
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included in the broadly defined concept of privatisation.50 Shackleton's definition of 
privatisation, for instance, covers the whole range of reforms that subject administrative 
activity to the discipline of the market.51
It is inadequate, though, to regard privatisation as merely a transfer of control. For 
instance, decentralisation in the form of contracting out factories by the state may not turn 
them into private concerns, although it may alter the ownership structure through injecting 
into it property acquired by contractors through their own investment. To the extent that the 
previously monolithic state ownership is diluted by such a hybridized ownership and that 
the contractors obtain more power over income distribution, privatisation of the state sector 
begins with de-statisation. From the experience of privatisation in Eastern Europe, it is 
crucial to First destatise state control over a factory in terms of transfer of property rights to 
producers and dilution of monolithic state ownership in state factories so as to make them 
fairly autonomous entities before a smooth path can be paved for privatisation. Chapter 8 
will focus on this.
In China the diluting of the state share in the national ownership structure has been 
gathering momentum since the mid-1980s. Within the state sector various forms of owner­
ship are emerging. The recent leadership consensus to remodel state factories through corp­
oratization has marked a quickened pace for the dilution of state ownership. Since corpor­
atization is carried out mainly through creating limited liability companies and joint stock 
companies,52 the reform will decisively reverse the state's long-standing commitment to 
ever "purifying" state ownership. And the logic inherent in such a reform will herald a
50. Richard Hemming and Ali Mansoor, "Privatisation and Public Enterprises", Occasional Paper 56, 
Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1988, p. 1.
51 Ng Chee Yuen and Toh Kin Woon, "Privatisation in the Asian-Pacific Region", Asian-Pacific 
Economic Literature, Vol. 6, no. 2, 1992, p. 46.
52 Gao Shangqun, "Shi qiye zhenzheng chengwei shichang jingzhen de zhuti" (To transform state enter­
prises into true competitive entities in the market), Qiye gaige tongxun, no. 11, February 1993, pp. 
7-11.
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constant decline of the property shares of the state within a state factory being converted 
into a joint stock company or a limited liability company.
De-statization in the administrative sense describes a gradual process in which state 
enterprises break away from the command bureaucratic chains and become, to borrow the 
buzz words currently most popular in China, wushangji qiye, or enterprises without 
administrative "mothers-in-law". To this end, the concept analyses the emergence of a new 
set of institutional arrangements, which have undercut the foundation of the old industrial 
administrative system and have accelerated creation of the new, based on the ownership 
reform mentioned earlier.
The core of de-statisation is reflected in the current reform of China's economic ad­
ministration, which will shift the state's direct control over factories to a new model of in­
direct guidance, following the principles of sectoral industrial policies and macro economic 
levers.53 As a result, most of the industrial bureaus that have exercised tiaotiao and kuai- 
kuai dictatorship over state factories will be gradually removed from the government struct­
ure, as shown in Chapter Five.54 And as a corollary, the ranking hierarchy will gradually 
be phased out. The fundamental rationale for this development is that if the economy is 
modelled on market deregulation, there is no need to keep the vast bureaucratic machine 
whose chief mission is to allocate goods, funds and quotas, now the job of the market.55
The process of de-statisation in the state's industrial remuneration system concerns 
the abolition of the nationally unified eight-grade wage system.56 In its place there has
53 Gao Zimin, "Lun zhuanbian zhengfu zhineng" (On changing government functions), Qiye gaige 
tongxun, no. 14, May 1993, pp. 3-10
54 For a detailed analysis of tiaotiao and kuaikuai, see Jonathan Unger, "The Struggle to Dictate Chi­
na's Administration: The Conflict of Branches vs Areas vs Reform", The Australian Journal of Chin­
ese Affairs, no. 18, July 1978, pp. 15-45.
55 Gao Zimin, "Lun zhuanbian zhengfu zhineng", pp. 3-10.
56 Formally, the unified wage system exists, although now it has 15 grades. This system accounts for 
the main body of workers' fixed part of wages, guding gongzi. However, since the fixed part has
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emerged a variety of wage forms with, currently, the "linkage wage system" as the 
mainstay, which partially links the rewards of workers to the level of profit and turnover 
achieved by producers.57 Alongside this, the locus of remuneration have been made closer 
and closer to the shop-floor, with sub-factories and workshops now playing a key role, as 
shown in Chapter Seven.
The linkage of wages to profits and turnovers is in essence the linkage of a produc­
er's production to the market where profits are extracted. And this gives a factory increased 
say in its wage settlement. As a result, the state's direct control has shifted to become more 
and more indirect.58 This transition has exerted tremendous impact on the state/enterprise 
and management/worker relations. With the introduction of the linkage reform, the 
enterprise remuneration regime has been partly uncoupled from the state's unified wage 
system. This has rendered industrial wage matters much less at the mercy of the state. 
Moreover, because the linkage reform spells out the principle that enterprises may increase 
workers' income through their own sources of income, their status as economic entities has 
been thus enhanced.
2.3.2. The Role of the Market
The course of depoliticisation and de-statisation is intimately linked to marketization 
in China. As shown by the market reform experiences of both China and Eastern European
dropped to between 30-50% of the workers' pay slip, (the rest is the "floating part), it is de facto 
phased out in most state factories' distribution process.
57 The linkage wage system is a profit-oriented, institutionally based wage arrangement. By the begin­
ning of 1990, 70% of Chinese state enterprises had carried out this wage reform. See Wage Research 
Task Force of the State Planning Commission, "Qiye gongzi tong jingji xiaoyi guagoude yanjiu" 
(Research on the mechanism of linking aggregate wage and economic efficiency), Zhongguo gongye 
jingji yanjiu (Studies on the Chinese Industrial Economy), no. 3, 1991, pp. 49-54.
58 By western standards, the indirect control is basically a monetary control, which clearly is not the 
case in China's linkage reform. However, compared with the state's unified wage system, the fact­
ory's power in deciding remuneration matters has made the state's control less direct by a large 
measure.
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states, as soon as the command economic system is open to the market, new economic 
mechanisms are created that undermine the authority of central planning, erode state 
ownership and cause conflicts between the government and factories. The two different 
sets of economic imperatives give rise to "a confusion of traffic, as some vehicles drive on 
the right, some on the left". State factories in most socialist economies in transition have 
experienced what Kornai described as "double dependence", namely focusing one of the 
eyes on the state for subsidized goods and the other on the market for profits.59
Somewhere in this transition, the point of no return will be reached. Politically, 
interest groups are emerging with new or enhanced collective self-identities, and sometimes 
with political clout to influence government decision-making. Behind the conflicts of inter­
est represented by these different groups, new types of political competition become more 
and more active and even penetrate into the factional infighting at the apex of power. At the 
same time, the market generates powerful pressure of consumerism which undermines the 
base of the communist ideology and defies the efforts of reversal by the party.60 Moreover, 
with expansion of market transactions conceptions of rights, property and economic justice 
become more pronounced, leading in turn to the making of new kinds of political demands.
Consequently, workers as well as managers begin to position themselves in the 
clashes of the two logics. In a dual-track system, with the co-existence of planning and 
market, factory directors acquired more authority to make investment, sales and distribution 
decisions. However, the more they obtain these powers, the more they become intolerant 
of the state's interference. While the expansion of the market increases the business power 
of factory managers, through using this power these managers have developed a kind of 
entrepreneurialism that has gradually changed their previous perception as cadres of the
59 Janos Kornai, "The Double Dependence of State Enterprises: the Hungary Experience", Jingjin yan- 
jiu, no. 10, 1985, pp. 10-15.
60 Peter Van Ness, "Introduction", in Peter Van Ness (ed.), Market Reforms in Socialist Societies, 
Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1989, p. 19-20.
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state .61 For workers, the opportunities in independent interest-seeking offered by the 
market progressively diminish their sense of being "state workers".
As the market penetrates aggressively into the operations of the state sector in terms 
of providing available materials, services and income increases, the state's capacity to satis­
fy the needs of its factories has shrunk to the point where enterprises are increasingly 
forced to make a choice of whether to depend more on the state or the market. In facing the 
"squeeze" of market competition from the fast-growing non-state sector, most state enter­
prises feel their reliance on the state more and more unreliable,62 and begin to call for the 
elimination of their bureaucratic "mothers-in-law". In sum, the market serves as a cutting 
edge between the state and factories and provides unprecedented opportunities to society at 
large.
61 For the influence of entrepreneurialism in China, see Ronald Glassman, China in Transition: 
Communism, Capitalism, and Democracy, New York: Praeger, 1991, pp. 84-85.
62 For a quantitative analysis of this transition, see William Byrd, The Market Mechanism and Econo­
mic Reform in China, Armonk: E.M. Sharpe, 1991, particular Chapter 3 and 4. According to Gao 
Shangqun, vice minister of SCRES, the number of state allocated material has shrunk from 256 to 
19. While effectively limiting the state's ability to meet the demands of the majority of state factor­
ies for cheap goods, the reduction has forced them to rely more on the market for supply. Gao 
Shangqun, "Guanyu shichang jingji de jige wenti" (On some issues of the market economy), Qiye 
gaige tongxun, no. 6, September 1992, p. 5.
Part Two
Depoliticisation: Diminishing Party Controls
Chapter 3
The Reform of the Leadership Structure of State Enterprises
The existence and domination of party cells in all state firms formed a parallel govern­
ing hierarchy to management. In fact, the role played by the CCP in penetration into and 
control over shop floor politics had been much greater than in any country in the former 
Soviet bloc. For instance, there were restrictions on setting up party committees in factories 
in the USSR, where party command was not established in factories with less than 300 
members. Under the one-man management system, most of the Soviet industrial party cells 
were not power holders. According to the Party Charter (1986), party committees in state 
factories could exercise some supervisory role over management in certain areas of work, 
but on the whole they were mainly care-takers of their internal affairs.1 In contrast, the 
party command in China's factories had been its leadership core. It constituted the elite of 
elites and monopolized ultimate policy- and decision-making authority.2
Taking government and society as a whole, the party command crossed both vertical 
and horizontal lines of state and public administration, from the centre to remote villages 
and firms. After 40 years of this "party build-up" in Chinese society, the party chain of 
command had become heavily bureaucratized. Because the party organs at every level of 
the social fabric serve as the key components of a hub of communications and tools of 
policy implementation, it is not exaggerated to state that the running of the country would 
come to a halt without it.
The party cells in state firms maintained an active "organizational life" that was 
routinized in daily factory life. Party members were constantly reminded of their political
1 Li Mu, "Sulian dongou guojia qiye dangzuzhi de jiegou he huodong xingshi" (The party organization 
in state factories in the Soviet Union and East European countries), Zuzhi shenghuo (Shandong), no. 
4, 1989, p. 46.
2 A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1967, pp. 429-30.
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duties. One of these duties was to disseminate to the workers around them what they 
themselves were being indoctrinated with. Furthermore, to perpetuate the party's "life", an 
activists' training and recruitment system was always in search of "new blood". Because 
the basic lifeline of the party's "organizational life" was "revolutionary struggle", ranging 
from class struggle to production struggle, the shop floors became a setting for endless 
such struggles. To cope with such a highly politicised environment, survival for many 
workers, especially for those from "bad family background", required much more than 
labouring eight hours a day. They also had to appear politically correct to cope with the 
pressures around them.
3.1 The Origin of the Party's Monistic Control in the Industrial Workplace3
Politicisation of a factory started with creating a party organization there and then 
moved to make it a dominant force in factory life. At the beginning of 1950, there were 
2,858 state industrial enterprises, with a workforce of 750,000, mainly confiscated from 
the KMT government. Party organizations existed in only a small number of these factories 
in the form of an "underground".4 In the spring of 1949 the Second Plenum of the Seventh 
Party Central Committee passed a resolution that in the liberated areas, party organizations 
in factories and schools would be gradually brought into the open. This policy was a 
response to the tension developing between party members, who manipulated activists 
from behind the scenes as a new centre of power in the wake of the communist victory, and
3 Due to the limits of space this section will be confined to a review of policy process at the apex of 
power that consciously transformed the industrial units into the settings of political control.
4 These figures included mainly workers in manufacturing industries, mining and railway transportat­
ion, which the Chinese call chanye gongren, or the industrial workforce. The total number of in the 
industrial workforce (including the private sector) was about three million and the total urban work­
force (including the tertiary and commercial sectors) was about eight million. See Xiao Liang, 
Zhongguo suoyouzhi jiegou yanjiu (A Study on China's ownership structure), Shanxi jingji chuban- 
she, 1988, p. 57. In addition, over the next two years over 10,000 foreign owned firms with about 
100,000 employees were nationalized and became state enterprises. Zhibu shenhuo (Beijing), no. 7, 
1991, p. 45.
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management and ordinary workers, who were under constant pressure, as they could not 
tell for sure who were party members and what functions they performed. It was hoped 
that through a public announcement (dazibao) listing all the party members in the factory, 
they would be placed under proper supervision by the masses, as they had to be more 
watchful.5 In the process the party branch committees openly set up office. This alleviated 
the fears of many people of a mysterious force at work from behind the scenes, and also 
legitimated the existence of a parallel power structure to management, marking the 
beginning of politicisation of plants, since the party branch heads could now wield power 
in an open manner.
The party branches began to recruit new members in a big way. Nevertheless, by the 
time of the founding of the PRC, the number of worker party members remained very 
small. According to the statistics of the Central Organization Department (COD), the 
proportion of party members in the industrial workforce was only 1.8 per cent. Even in 
Northeast China, which came under the party's control two to three years earlier, party 
members were relatively scant. For instance, among 70,000 workers in Harbin City, which 
was liberated in 1945, there were only 845 party members. At the national level worker 
party members numbered 112,000, or 2.5% of total party membership and about 0.5% of 
the urban workforce.6 This small representation slowed the consolidation of communist 
control in the newly captured cities. In factories, in particular, the traditional gang-boss 
networks persisted, adversely affecting the communist takeover.7 The opening-up policy 
was meant to address this problem and indicated a change in the party's focus from rural 
struggle to urban control. According to An Ziwen, deputy chief of the Central Organization
5 Zhao Shenghui, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi gangyao (The outline of the CCP's 
organizational history), Anhui: Renmin chubanshe, 1987, p. 235.
6 Ibid, pp. 235-237.
7 For an analysis of the gang-boss networks and the industrial take-over by the CCP in 1949, see Part 
1 and Part 2 of Bill Brugger, Democracy & Organization in the Chinese Industrial Enterprises: 1948- 
1953, Cambridge University Press, 1976.
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Department, the party would recruit about one-third of all industrial workers in the five 
years from 1950.8
The large recruitments played an important role over the successive political 
campaigns in the next several years. In the campaigns of the Sanfan, Wufan and suppress­
ing Reactionaries,9 the new party members were organized to carry out propaganda and 
struggle meetings, mobilize the masses to report "special agents" of the KMT, search for 
more activists and promote production. Workers began to feel a different factory atmos­
phere. Some benefited from the new political and productive relationship that the revolution 
brought to the shop floors, others suffered as a result. This gradual politicisation created 
tensions between the party and management, party members and other workers. Most 
workers could no longer afford to be apolitical.10
The party committees soon ran into a rift with the management. Until the party centre 
approved the one-man management system in late 1953, most state firms were run by a 
committee comprising managerial staff and trade unionists with managers as the head. In 
private concerns the trade unions were erected by a state decree which required factory 
owners to sign a collective contract with the unions and forbade them to dismiss workers at 
will. Yet as far as the party's policy was concerned, enterprises were supposed to be run as
8 Brugger, p. 86.
9 Sanfan and Wufan were political movements initiated in 1951 and 1952. Sanfan means three antis: 
embezzlement, squandering and bureaucratism; Wufan means five antis: bribery, tax evasion, steeling 
state property, doing shoddy work and using inferior materials, and economic espionage. The 
Suppressing Reactionary Movement was launched in October 1950 and continued to Autumn 1953, 
aiming to eliminate elements hostile to the new regime.
10 When I interviewed a number of retired managers and workers in China in 1991, on the question of 
when they felt they could no longer confine themselves to their private lives but had to join numer­
ous political activities sponsored by party cadres, they all indicated the three years of economic 
restoration (1950-52).
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economic entities, even though they took orders from the state. Briefly at the beginning this 
still allowed managers substantial autonomy in running production.11
3.1.1. The Trade Union Debate 1950-1953
A model for political control at workplace had remained undetermined among party 
leaders for a number of years after 1949. The subsequent consolidation of the party's 
control at the basic level prompted two extensive debates among the leadership: over the 
issues of trade unions and the relations between the party cells and management. In July 
1950 Deng Zihui, secretary of the South China Party Bureau, wrote to Mao, stating that the 
state, factory management and trade unions all had specific and separate missions and inter­
ests. It was not correct to mix them up under a single political agenda. While the basic 
standpoint (jiben lichang) of all these groups were in accord, the party branches, manage­
ment and trade unions in state enterprises may differ in their concrete standpoint (juti 
lichang) due to their division of labour. This should be recognized as legitimate. On 4 
August Deng's report was disseminated to the whole party as a "good" report with Mao's 
approval (he ticked off his name on the submission).12
Deng's view was disputed by Gao Gang, secretary of the Northeast China Party 
Bureau, who claimed in a letter to Mao on 22 April 1951 that in socialist enterprises the 
state's interests were the interests of workers and that the goal of the party, government and 
trade unions was the same. To stress the difference of interests represented by the state and 
trade unions was to blur the distinction between public and private concerns.13
Other key leaders were drawn into the debate. Li Lisan, deputy chairperson of the All 
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), argued that trade unions in a socialist society 
had two functions: to protect worker interests from being encroached upon by the state and
11 Zhang Zhailun, Changzhang fuzezhi (The enterprise director responsibility system), Beijing: Jingji 
kexue chubanshe, 1985, pp. 3-6.
12 Zhang Zhanbin, p. 53.
13 Zhang Zanbin, p. 54.
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to organize workers to protect the state. The key to resolve the contradiction between the 
state and individual interests was what Mao had advocated, that "public and private 
interests should both be given attention and factory management and labour should both 
benefit from production". With support from Liu Shaoqi, Li commented that it was naive to 
believe that if workers had political consciousness, they could work hard without food and 
clothes. That was why trade unions must not be the tail of the administration (the state).14
Neither side of the debate questioned the leadership of the party over unions. The dis­
cord involved how much space the party should allow an organization to have for its own 
initiatives in accordance with the division of labour, even as a "transmission belt" organiz­
ation. Those who called for better recognition of workers' interests did so in a belief that 
over-zealous party interference in the wake of its "opening up" and the bossy attitudes of 
management towards workers had suffocated the latter's enthusiasm and thus became 
counter-productive for the long-term rule of the party. However, those with the opposite 
view held that more breathing room for social organizations might help foster anti-govern­
ment interests, leading to challenges to the power of the party.
Mao Zedong intervened in the debate in October 1951 when he wrote on a central 
report that the ACFTU had seriously erred. His decision to side with Gao quickly settled 
the wrangling among top leaders. Li Lisan was purged in late 1951.15 Yet Mao had expres­
sed concern over the worsening relations between the party and workers one year earlier. 
On a report on the labour movement submitted to him, he wrote on 31 December 1950:
The Fourth Plenum must discuss the trade union issue, with the focus on how to administer unions. 
In the past the work of trade unions achieved merits but many problems remained to be solved. In 
many enterprises the relations between the party and unions and party members and workers are
14 Zhang Zhanbin, pp. 59-64.
15 Lin Yunhui, Fan Shouxing & Zhang Gong, 1949-1989 de Zhongguo: Kege xinjing de shiqi (China: 
1949-89, a period of march with victorious songs), Henan: Renmin chubanshe, p. 323.
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abnormal. Workers are fearful of party members. They would stop talking as soon as party members
come in. They are afraid of being reported and see party members as 'special agents' (tewu).16
Under such circumstances Mao's usual resolution was to tighten the party's control. 
An explicit emphasis on the different interests of the party, management and trade union 
would be easily regarded as undermining the party's authority at the grassroots at a time 
when Mao was intending to initiate the Sanfan movement. Advocating workers' interests 
was now interpreted as "narrow economism" and stressing the autonomy of trade unions in 
relations with the party and management was labelled as syndicalism. In fact, "economism" 
spelled the dichotomy of interests between the state and workers and "syndicalism" was 
indicative of workers' resolve to campaign for the realization of their interests. These were 
interpreted as anti-party activities. With the regrouping of the ACFTU, all trade unions 
were ordered to establish a party fraction within their leadership. And the union work was 
formally placed under the party system in factories. 17 As a result, more direct party control 
started to take root in shop floor politics in the wake of the clamp-down on unions. 
However, as long as the workers' interests were solidly structured in the differentiated 
articulation of interests between the state and society, they continued to make their demands 
known whenever there was a chance. 18
16 Mao Zedong, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao no. 1: 1949 jiuyue - 1950 shieryue (The selected 
works of Mao Zedong: September 1949-December 1950), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 
1990, third edition, p. 753.
17 Du Yaohua, "XinZhongguo jianli yihou geshiqi qiye lingdao zhidu de bijiao" (The comparison of 
leadership systems at the different eras since the founding of the PRC), in Sha Ye (ed.), Zemyang 
shixing changzhang fuzezhi (How to implement the director responsibility system), Zhejiang 
renmin chubanshe, 1987, p. 299.
18 The clampdown on the ACTFU in 1951 did not stop altogether the union's striving to articulate 
workers' interests. Over the next two decades there were three more workers' movements, organized 
or otherwise, that expressed their discontent. See Anita Chan, "Revolution or Corporatism? Workers 
and Trade Unions in Post-Mao China", The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 29, January 
1993, pp. 32-35.
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3.1.2 The Rise and Fall of Factory Administration 1953-1956
At the same time the tension between the party branches and management came to a 
head. Between 1950 and 1953 several leadership forms were exercised in state plants in 
different regions of the country, including one-man management in Northeast China and 
the director responsibility system under the leadership of party committees in North, East 
and Southeast China. With the conclusion of the three years of economic restoration, the 
need for standardizing the industrial management system across the nation became press­
ing. This triggered another leadership dispute over which should play the central role in a 
state firm: the party committee or management.
In the early days of the PRC, with no expertise in running the economy, the Chinese 
had adopted a Stalinist model with vigour. The agreement between Stalin and Zhou Enlai in 
1950 required the Soviet Union to provide China with the industrial plants to lay a found­
ation for China's industrialization. And the Soviet experts brought with them Stalin's idea 
that industry had to be managed by professional managers without interference from the 
party.19 One-man management was the direct result of such a learning process, which exer­
ted the heaviest influence in Northeast China.20 Yet as will be illustrated later, the Soviet 
approach to industrial management based on experts ran into conflict with party cadres 
from the very beginning.
About 800,000 non-communist government and business administrators worked for 
the new regime in North, East and South China in October 1949.21 Under Mao's 
instruction "not to destroy the old management structure", most factories were still
19 Bo Yibo , "Zhaijinian Li Fuchun danchen jiushi zhounian dahuishang de jianghua", (Speech at the 
memorial meeting of Li Fuchun’s 90 birthday), in Li Guangan, et al, Jinian Li Fuchun (In memery 
of Li Fuchun), Beijing: Zhongguo jihua chubanshe, 1990, pp. 10-11.
20 Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1966, pp. 239-240.
21 Lin Yunhui, Fan Shouxing & Zhang Gong, p. 70.
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managed by these retained personnel (liuyong renyuan) between 1949 and 1954.22 In order 
to have them carry out the party's directives, the newly established party branches were 
required to play a dominant role. That was the reason why the director responsibility 
system under the leadership of party committee was instituted in most areas of China. 
Under this system party secretaries controlled the overall political and production agenda 
while directors were to execute in daily administration the instructions reached by party 
cells. To strengthen the party's role, the restoration period had seen, in addition to an 
enlarged party membership among workers, a massive transfer to industry of party cadres 
from the army and rural government.23 They brought to shop floors a distinctive style of 
leadership characterised by a preference for political and ideological priorities. Although 
this work style was snubbed by many urban staff as a guerrilla approach, there was no 
doubt that party cadres carried enormous weight in the management process. Therefore, the 
first condition in implementing one-man management was to ask them to surrender many of 
their powers in late 1953.24 Resistance was a natural outcome.
From April 1954, when the CC first approved the universalization of one-man 
management to its abolition in late 1955, many factories practiced one-man management 
only in name. Managers failed to carry out their responsibilities because of constant 
interference from party secretaries. They complained to the investigation teams dispatched 
by the Centre in 1954 and 1955 that "they did not even know what the leadership system in 
their factories was".25 In order to overcome the party cadres' non-cooperative attitudes,
22 Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu (Review of several major events and decision 
formulations), Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991, pp. 89-93.
23 In the period about 163,000 cadres were transferred to industry, among whom 103,000 went to the 
state sector and the rest to the private sector. Most of them assumed positions as party secretaries and 
political personnel. Zhang Shenhui, p. 269.
24 By the end of 1953 most of the retained personnel had been replaced by state cadres. This was regard­
ed as the precondition for the one-man management system.
25 Special writing group of Heilongjiang, Jianguo yilai qiye lingdao zhidu yanbian shilie (The outline 
of the history of the enterprise leadership system), Heilongjiang: Renmin chubanshe, 1984, p. 17.
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many provinces and ministries had to appoint factory managers with higher party and 
administrative ranks.
The resistance of party cadres to one-man management had been a familiar scene. 
There were heated debates among party cadres and managers over such issues as whether a 
manager who was a party member should abide by the party's principle of democratic 
centralism, and on how extended a manager's authority should be in handling production 
versus non-productive affairs. Very often managers were blamed for not seeking advice 
from the party and as a result, their management decrees got blocked in the process of 
implementation.26 Gao Gang, the most firm supporter of one-man management, noted:
A party committee is not the administration of a factory. It is the leading body of party cells 
whose mission is to ensure that party members work hard and the production plan is being 
fulfilled. It may raise suggestions but cannot replace the director in making decisions.27 
At the same time controversies in the top leadership also worsened. In February 1954 
Gao Gang was purged at the Second Plenum of the 7th CC. Due to his role as a chief cam­
paigner for one-man management, the system attracted severe criticism for its alleged eff­
ects in undermining party leadership. At a central conference held in October 1955 many 
participants argued that because the country was still in a period of transition, class struggle 
dictated the necessity for stricter party control. Pending a decision by Mao, a compromise 
was worked out, which at once confirmed the continuity of one-man management and 
stressed the central position of the party branches. A dual leadership structure soon em­
erged and most enterprises leaned toward party command.28 This was actually the preced­
ent for the "two centres" phenomenon in Chinese enterprises in the reform era, which illus-
26 Du Yaohua, "XinZhongguo jianli yihou geshiqi qiye lingdao zhidu de bijiao", pp. 304-305.
27 Gao Gang, "Zhanzhai dongbei jingji jianshede zuiqianmian" (Standing at the forefront of economic 
construction in Northeast China), in Zhonggong caijing zhengce fating huibian (Collections of 
party policy documents regarding finance and economics), Beijing: State Council Document Series, 
Vol. 1, August 1951, p. 17.
28 Bill Brugger, p. 54.
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trates the long history of tension between the factory party cells and management. This will 
be discussed in more detail in later sections.
Mao intervened in the matter personally in early 1956. During Feburary-April, in 
response to reports from central industrial ministers, he said on several occasions that the 
running of state enterprises should follow the long tradition of the CCP, not the practice of 
the Soviet Union. That is, all major issues must be discussed first by party committees and 
then executed by directors. He even ordered an investigation into who in the Politburo 
approved one-man management.29 A few years later he remarked:
All capitalist countries implement the director command system. The socialist principles of 
management should be fundamentally different, as reflected in our system in which directors 
undertake management responsibility under the collective leadership of party committees.30
So in July 1956 the director responsibility system under the leadership of party 
committees was formally adopted at the party's Eighth National Congress. This marked the 
beginning of unified party leadership, which provided an institutional framework for party 
control to penetrate into every comer of the shop floor.
3.1.2. Party Domination, Politicisation and Factories as Danwei  
In review of this dispute between advocates of one-man management and the party 
command system, one may ask a question: what was the difference between them, since 
factory management also basically comprised party functionaries? The answer has several 
aspects. The two systems had created different mechanisms of control and reflected 
different organizational principles and mentalities. Franz Schurmann summarized this as 
follows:
The manager thinks in terms of techniques, both technological and organizational; he prefers rational 
organization, for he has the confidence that he can manipulate it and use it to achieve his own ends;
29 Zhang Zhanbin, pp. 78-79.
30. Mao Zedong's talks with Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Tian Jiaying and others on reading the Soviet text­
book of political economy between the end of 1959 to the beginning of 1960. Zhan Zhanbin, p. 78.
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he likes rules because he knows he can bend them to his will, to enforce compliance from his work­
ers. The cadre, however, is a leader who thinks in terms of human solidarity. He knows how to 
solidarize men so that goals can be achieved; he knows how to manipulate their thoughts and senti­
ments; he operates not with ethos but with ideology; he strives for a different kind of mechanical 
solidarity, namely that of the combat team.31
In terms of structure, one-man management was based on the principle of 
individuation of management versus the collective leadership preferred by party cells. The 
system of production-unit areas was in operation ranging hierarchically from the factory to 
the work sections. Each production unit was headed by a single leader.32 As a result, in the 
name of production, factory managers had taken control over virtually all sub-systems in 
their own hands: production, social welfare and even political control, leaving the party to 
provide moral leadership only. This induced criticisms against managers that the system 
harmfully diminished the functions of party committees. If this effect was still not very 
evident in the mid 1950s when one-man management was only partially practised, in the 
eighties it became a striking feature of the renewed director responsibility system with the 
party cells increasingly marginalized. Under the party command system, however big the 
authority of a manager, he was only an executive.
At the core of the contention between advocates of the two systems was the level of 
politicisation in state firms. Mao always believed that political control was most effectively 
carried out through administrative control at the level of people's everyday lives because 
"management was also socialist education" and a factory was a "revolutionary school".33 
Under one-man management, however, directors tended to be preoccupied with production 
and political tasks enjoyed only vocal priority, sidelining the party agenda on shop floors. 
In contrast, the party command system subjugated managers to party secretaries and
31 Franz Schurmann, p. 251.
32 Franz Schurmann, p. 264.
33 Mao Zedong's famous May 7 instructions in 1966.
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production to politics. Party cadres were asked to keep an eye on production performance, 
but they were more inclined to follow the requirements for political preference set by their 
party superiors. For instance, they were judged by whether they had achieved a level of 
ideological indoctrination of workers and had held enough struggle sessions against "class 
enemies". In other words, the party command system was the concrete form of politics in 
command, the primary texture of China's continuing revolution under the conditions of the 
proletarian dictatorship.
First, in the frequent political campaigns initiated by the party centre in the 1950s, 
with tight organizational networks party cells played a much more effective role as political 
mobilizers than could management. Second, party cells were instrumental in pushing the 
party's "mass line",34 which institutionalized the mechanisms of political control, such as 
an open and populous system of informers and well structured system of activists. The 
difference between political mobilization and a mass line is that the former highlighted 
periodic political impulses, while the latter, the function of the "mass dictatorship", was 
meant to routinize political impulses in periods of non-political campaigns. Combined, 
these formed a unique system of control based on both the terror of campaigns at certain 
periods of time and everyday pressures Filling the air on shop floors.
So the different mechanisms of control to be used in running China's state firms had 
serious consequences for state/society relations at the outset of its industrialization. In 
practice, control is a function any organization must have to induce expected behaviour 
from its members. However, the degree of control means a great deal more when carried 
out by different mechanisms. The control exercised by one-man management was more 
designed to maintain orderly production order, while the party command system was meant 
to keep people under a political organization, an official ideology and a special way of life. 
From the party's point view, the latter was more suitable for its purpose of revolution.
34. "Mass line" is a special term created by the party to describe a process in which masses are mobilized 
by the party to achieve a specific objective.
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When everything was put under the monistic party leadership in a factory, the 
directives from the party were often carried out without the sanction of legal and 
administrative procedures. As party branches assumed all major decision-making powers, 
the factory became not only the appendage of the state in terms of property relations and 
administrative hierarchy, but also became an appendage of the political ruling party, 
providing financial support for party operations. The interlocking of party cells in all work 
units enhanced the integration and unification of all these bodies and vertically, converted 
decision-making, execution and control into one all-encompassing and centrally 
administered hierarchy.35 As almost all work units became political institutions, it became 
difficult to answer the question of where the state begins and where it ends.
3.2 The Rationale for Abolishing Monistic Party Leadership
By the late 1970s the damaging effects to both the party and society of politicising the 
workplace served as the rationale for a major overhaul in the enterprise leadership structure 
by the post-Mao leadership. Deng Xiaoping has been an enthusiastic campaigner for this 
reform. His explicit concern over poor management and implicit concern over defects in the 
political system underscored his determination to phase out the party command system in 
state firms. To some extent, while his explicit concern stemmed from economic 
considerations, his motivation also implicitly reflects his conception of how to preserve the 
long-term rule of the party.
The economic and management rationale
The creation and evolution of the party's monistic leadership in state firms had em­
bodied the party's concern over political and social control, yet this had given rise to a situ­
ation where nobody was responsible for economic performance, as managers did not have 
authority to make policy while party secretaries were little interested in policy execution. 
Production suffered as a result and ultimately the decline of the economy had posed a ser-
35 On this see Ferenc Feher, Agnes Heller and Gyorgy Markus, Dictatorship Over Needs: An Analysis
of Soviet Societies, New York: Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 106.
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ious threat to party control. Shortly before the epoch-making Third Plenum of the 11th CC 
in 1978, Deng raised the point that the party command system in factories disguised the fact 
that nobody was really responsible for management there. He questioned in particular 
whether the party cells in workshops and sections should assume any leadership role at 
all.36 In August 1980 Deng categorically instructed the Politburo:
The director responsibility system under the party committee's leadership must be abolished. I am for 
some experiments but it should not be delayed. It is now clear that eliminating the party committee 
leadership system will resolve not only the problem of a lack of talents in factories but improve the 
overall management. ...The system of party committee leadership is a big obstacle (for production) 
and represents the inability of our party in managing the economy 37
Deng's belief that the party command system was detrimental to production can 
actually be traced back to the late 1950s when he was entrusted by Mao to formulate a 
guideline for industrial production and management. In order to draft the document, a 
special team was dispatched in 1961 to the Beijing Number One Machine Tools Factory for 
a detailed field survey. The team was led by Ma Hong and was responsible directly to Li 
Fuchun and Bo Yibo.38 In June the team submitted a report to the Central Committee in
which it summarized eight defects of the party command system:
1. The party committee leadership decided on everything. As a result the responsib­
ilities of management, trade unions and the Youth League were seriously tramp­
led upon.
2. Party leadership was seen as the personal control of party bosses. Without their 
approval, the decisions of managers had no legitimate base.
3 6 Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected works of Deng Xiaoping), Beijing: Renmin 
chubanshe, 1983, p. 234.
37 Quoted from Chi Fulin & Huang Hai, Deng Xiaoping zhengzhi tizhi gaige sixiang yanjiu (Research 
of Deng Xiaoping's thought on political reform), Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988, p. 55.
3 8 Ma Hong, Beijing Diyi jichuangchang diaocha (The survey of the Beijing Number One Machine 
Tools Factory), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1980, pp. 1-8.
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3. The system galvanized a mobilizational approach to production. This finding was 
based on the team's evaluation of the factory's economic campaigns in 1958 and 
1959 in which a normal division of labor into sections and workshops was 
replaced by combined operations (daxiezuo) to achieve quick results.
4. The system created too many meetings. On average the factory party secretary 
had one meeting a day, general branch secretaries two, and branch secretaries, 
two to three.
5. Under the party command system the party branches in the technical and admin­
istrative offices exercised the same control over their daily work (such as approv­
ing the departments' technical plans) as party cells did in workshops. However, 
according to the Party Charter, party cells should not lead the work of these off­
ices (xingzheng jishu jiguan)39
6. Under the party command system the representation of specialists in party comm­
ittees was too small. This caused problems for party committees to formulate 
management decrees effectively. In the factory investigated, the manager was the 
only expert (neihang) sitting in the five-member Party Standing Committee. Very 
often administrative proposals could not be discussed in time, and many of the 
party decisions did not reach even senior managers. A gap of communication was 
thus created.
7. Under the party command system managers were not duly respected. This was 
reflected at two levels: personal and organizational. Personally, managers' decis­
ions, especially managers who did not sit on party bodies, were ignored or 
delayed. Organizationally, the management plans at the factory level did not exert 
sufficient authority over party branch committees at the workshop level which 
was responsible only to the party secretaries above them.
8. At the very bottom level in the workshop sections there was a mini party com­
mand system whereby party groups were in control. Serious problems arose: 
first, party members were always placed in the leading posts, qualified or not. 
Secondly, since most party members were young unskilled activists, a situation 
developed where older skilled workers were placed under them. As a result,
3 9 This can be seen in the party's organizational arrangements in state functional agencies where only a 
danzu or party fracture was established. A dangzu and a dangwei (party committee) are different in 
that the latter is a leadership organ that is established only in the government administration of 
various levels. The former is a body of the party’s internal affairs erected in government functional 
agencies that does not lead the operation of these offices.
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antagonisms deepened between party and nonparty personnel, sometimes to the 
point of disrupting production.40
Based on the report of the survey team and other findings from the field by central 
work groups sent to 11 provinces, Deng organized the drafting of the "77 Articles on 
Industries" in August 1961, which was promulgated in September.41 The document was 
meant to repair the defects of the "one-man command of the party boss" and enhanced the 
authority of managers. Deng tried to maximize what he held to be a correct line at the time 
of politics in command. Five years later when he was purged, the "77 Articles of 
Industries" became evidence of his crime of taking the capitalist road and undermining 
party leadership in state firms.42
When Deng reemerged on the political scene in China in the late 1970s, all the above- 
mentioned flaws inherent in the party command system had deteriorated to a point that 
called for a thorough reform of the system. This time Deng was not under as many political 
constraints from one particular leader like Mao as from the system per se. Apparently it was 
his series of instructions mentioned at the beginning of the section, that set in motion a 
chain of reforms in the plant leadership structure. Of deeper interest is the rationale under­
lining this retreat of the party from its ubiquitous presence in China's industrial society. 
Susan Shirk defined this political concession as a transition from virtuocracy to merito­
cracy. According to Shirk, virtuocracy was a central feature of a revolutionary regime 
which was committed to bringing about social transformation, mass mobilization for econ­
omic development and political consolidation and legitimation. In short, the nature of
40  Ma Hong, pp. 82-85.
41 Deng Liqun, Dangdai Zhongguo jingji tizhi gaige (Reform of the economic system in contemporary 
China), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1985, p. 154.
42  Liu Guoguang, Zhongguo jingji tizhi gaige moshide yanjiu (The study on the reform model of 
China's economic system), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubnashe, 1988, p. 665.
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virtuocracy was politicisation of factory life in China, which was inherently unstable and 
left workers and staff alienated from one another and from the state.43
Deng's success in bringing about a reform toward meritocracy has meant a reverse 
process of depoliticisation. But the catalyst that propelled Deng to wage the reforms was 
economic development, upon which hinged the legitimacy of the party/state.44 What Deng 
might not have anticipated at the time was that the redefinition of the party's role in econo­
mic management would also affect a basic change in a firm's organizational mechanisms, 
ideological orientation and production objectives. The abolition of the party command 
system amounted to the transformation of the regime's procedural legitimacy from 
charismatic to what Max Weber defined as rational-legal authority.45
Moreover, the shift to meritocracy was the result of 'expert' prevailing over 'red' in a 
protracted and highly politicised debate between the party's pragmatic reformers and 
dogmatic ideologues. Meritocracy recognises the indispensable role played by managerial 
professionals in running firms. As a country modernizes, bureaucracy inexorably 
proliferates in response to the administrative needs of the state and society. The type of 
managerial bureaucrat that is needed is not only a skilled administrator capable of managing 
policies and people, but is also well-versed in the technical aspects of the economy .46 In 
contrast, while the party command system in state firms provided channels for party cadres 
blindly to command, it erected barriers for professionals to participate in decision-making, 
as political calculations always outweighed professional inputs. To a large extent
43 Susan Shirk, "The Decline of Virtuocracy in China", in James Watson (ed.) Class & Social 
Stratification in Post-Revolutionary China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 57- 
60.
44 See for instance, Benedict Stavis, China's Political Reforms: An Interim Report, New York: 
Praeger, 1986, p. 26.
45 Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao, Washington D.C.: The Brookings 
Institute, 1984, p. 184.
46 David Shambaugh, The Making of a Premier: Zhao Ziyang's Provincial Career, Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1984, pp. 117-118.
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meritocracy is a matter of institutionalizing rational decision-making. In other words, even 
if the debate over 'red and expert' is resolved in favour of the latter, there must be an 
institutional framework for experts to perform. Deng was not only the first to blame poor 
management upon the party command system in state enterprises but a firm advocate for 
establishing the central authority of managers. This is one of Deng's major contributions to 
the post-Mao reforms.
The political rationale
The implicit concern of Deng in abolishing the party command system was that it had 
accelerated the party's internal decay, as the unchecked power in the hands of party cadres 
increasingly enabled them to defy party discipline, worker supervision and higher level 
commands. Deng had pointed out as early as 1941 that the best way to make a party corr­
upt, decadent and alienated from people was to allow it to replace the state administration.47 
When in exile in Jiangxi Province from 1969 to 1972 he worked in a small state factory and 
observed first hand the abnormal situation around him.48 Deng's personal suffering during 
the Cultural Revolution and close contact with workers made him more aware of the truth 
that "water can carry a boat and can overturn it too". He considered that the enormous 
power of party cadres in controlling the everyday life of the populace had gradually sur­
passed the party centre's ability to control its own organization.49 As this threatened the 
party's long-term monopoly of power, Deng realized that efforts had to be made to inhibit 
the growth of corruptive forces, mainly through decentralizing the power vested in the 
party's grassroots cells. In a famous 1980 speech, Deng noted:
47  Quoted from Chi Fulin and Huang Hai, Deng Xiaoping zhengzhi tizhi gaige sixiang yanjiu, p. 55.
48 Maomao, "Zaijiangxi de rizhili", (The Jiangxi days), in Zhou Ming, (ed.) Lishizai zheli chensi: 
1966-1976 jishi, (History is pondering here: record of 1966-1976), Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 
1986, pp. 91-99.
49  Deng Xiaoping, "Gaoji ganbu yao daitou fayang dangde youliang chuantong" (The senior party 
cadres must carry on the fine party tradition), in Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (The selected works of 
Deng Xiaoping), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, pp. 190-192.
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Under the slogan of strengthening the party's unified leadership, all power was improperly and 
indiscriminately concentrated in party committees and exercised by a few secretaries. Everything was 
decided by the first secretary. Ultimately the party's unified leadership became personal leadership.50
He stated that without sound political institutions good people may become corrupt 
but with sound political institutions, even bad people would not indulge wildly in their 
pursuits.51 Deng's prescription for the overt-concentration of power in the hands of 
grassroots party cadres was dramatic. In 1979 he outlined a blueprint for the reform of the 
factory leadership structure:
Party committees (in state enterprises) should be preserved. But they should be elected from among 
managers, vice managers and workers. The committee is a party organ. With one or two clerks hand­
ling its daily affairs, there is no need to set up other functional offices. Its task is to manage the 
party's affairs only 52
In practice Deng's reform was implemented through a process of power-sharing in 
the leadership structure in state enterprises. The managers were to take control of all matters 
related to production and administration. A Workers Congress system was erected to play a 
part in setting remunerative and social welfare policies. The party's role was increasingly 
confined to the management of its internal affairs, as prescribed in the formula of the separ­
ation of the party and management functions by the party's 13th Congress. The previous 
unified party control structure was split into three subsystems: the party cell, management 
and trade unions; and each supposedly discharged its own functions.
Numerous books and articles were written by Chinese economists to explain why 
such a redivision of labour was necessary to improve China's industrial management. 
However, few scholars in China offered a rationale for the reform from a political angle.
50 Deng Xiaoping, "Danghe guojia lingdaozhitu de gaige" (The reform of party and government instit­
utions), in Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, 1983, pp. 288-289.
5 1 Ibid, 293.
5 2 Chi fulin & Huang Hai, p. 64.
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Political scientist Yan Jiaqi gave an interesting account of why the party command system 
should be withdrawn from the leadership structure in state firms. He commented that, from 
the institutional point of view, the power of a manager could be fairly easily checked and 
balanced by other political interests in the plant, because he wielded power on an individual 
basis, as compared with the support a party cadre could obtain from a powerful 
organization.53 This is an important point. Generally speaking, when encountering factory 
leaders, workers and unionists would have different calculations vis-a-vis a manager and a 
party secretary, in that the managers' network of loyalists could not match the party's 
network of branches and shop-floor activists.54 They saw the difference in a person who 
exercised power on an individual basis despite from a top management position and one 
who exercised power on behalf of a powerful political ruling party. In practice, it was 
conceived to be less dangerious to resist a manager, a matter of discipline, than party cells, 
a matter of political attitudes. In terms of outside checks and balances, it was easier to 
dismiss a manager appointed by the government than a party secretary because the state's 
legal and supervision agencies had less authority to hold party personnel accountable.
Another political rationale was the party's concern over its image due to the party's 
involvement in everyday conflicts of interests among workers.55 As mentioned earlier, a 
Chinese firm assumes major social welfare and remuneration functions. When the party 
was in command, its cadres had to be in personal charge of the distribution of housing, 
medical care and wage raises. Very often this involved the party cells in clashes among 
workers due to the short supply of these provisions. As a result, the party's image as bias­
ed arbitrators became widespread. Worse still, because the party controlled the functions of
53 "Interview with Yan Jiaqi", Jiushi niandai, (H.K.) no. 12, 1986, pp. 40-46.
.54 Andrew Wälder, "Factory and Manager in as Era of Reform", China Quarterly, no. 118, June 1989, 
p. 147.
55 Yan Shiqu, "Shilun hongguan huanjing dui qiye dang zuzhi gongneng jiegou de yingxiang" (The in­
fluence of Macro-environment on the functional structure of party organizations at enterprise level), 
Zhengzhixue yanjiu (Studies in Political Science), no. 4, 1987, p. 20.
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social welfare and remuneration and there were no checks and balances, opportunities were 
abundant for the abuse of power and nepotism, helping to erode the party's legitimacy.
The proponents for the separation of the functions of the party and management cons­
trued Deng's proposal to revoke the party command system in state firms as a response to 
the worsening alienation of workers that the system had aroused. They believed that if the 
party was not directly entrapped in the routine conflicts of workers over the distribution of 
limited social benefits, it would become less a target of workers' discontent. As an outside 
arbitrator, this would even give the party more levers in their relations with management 
and unions, which now would have to deal with these "headaches". Most importantly, to 
free party cadres from their duties of dictatorship over workers' needs would remove an 
everlasting source of corruption and thereby prolong the party's monopoly of power.56
The legal and market rationale
In addition to the party's explicit concern over management efficiency and its implicit 
concern over a popular backlash against party decay, the reform of the factory control 
structure was also dictated by the need for a new industrial management system in harmony 
with the evolution of the market in the wake of the post-Mao reforms. Although Deng 
Xiaoping raised the question that China should practise a market economy as early as 1979, 
about the same time he advocated that the party command system in state firms should be 
phased out, it is difficult to see the correlations of the two proposals in Deng's mind.57 
However, the marketization process between 1979-1988 revealed the deepening
5 6 Nevertheless, corruption deepened in a big way in the course of reform, due in part to the partial nat­
ure of the reform. Connie Squires Meaney, "Market Reform and Disintegrative Corruption in Urban 
China", in Richard Baum (ed.), Reform and Reaction in Post-Mao China, New York: Routledge, 
1991, pp. 124-142.
57 This was revealed by the deputy director of the Party Central Propaganda Department, Gong Yuzhi. 
According to Gong, Deng remarked: "It is certainly not correct to say the market economy is only 
applicable to capitalist societies. Why should socialist countries not practise a market economy as 
well?" See Gaige (Reform), no. 6, 1992.
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discrepancies between the factory's internal structure centred on the party command system 
and its economic pursuits that were aggressively dominated by the evolution of the market. 
The legal and market rationale for a new management structure articulated itself in the 
practice of reform.
The party command system best suited a command economy, where central plans 
were pushed by both the state’s bureaucratic decrees and the party organizations' enforce­
ment and mobilization. As a government appendage, a state firm had little concern for 
profitability as long as it fulfilled the plan.58 Since the reforms started in 1978, the market 
has increasingly exerted itself, fulling state firms with a force opposite to the state plan. 
Within the factories' internal leadership structure, party cells and management responded to 
different imperatives This tug-of-war was highlighted by the mobilization of party cells 
whenever the centre decided to retrench, while management felt more confident to engage 
in market activities whenever the leftist rhetoric subsided.
Edward Friedman has suggested that Leninist regimes in the late 20th century could 
no longer cope with the world's technological advances due to their rigid political and econ­
omic systems.59 By the same token, at the micro level, the rigid party system presented 
itself as an anachronistic type of control standing in the way of factories to become econ­
omic entities. The rationale for abolishing the party command system has become better re­
cognized not only because of the insistence of some top leaders but also as a reality 
imposed by a logic of the market affecting a plant.60
58 Janos Komai, Contradictions and Dilemmas, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986.
59 See Edward Friedman, "Technological Revolution and China’s Tortuous Path to Democratizing Len­
inism", in Richard Baum (ed.), Reform and Reaction in Post-Mao China, pp. 162-182.
60 Ying Hao, "Weirao shengchan jingying zhongxin tansuo dangde gongzuo" (Explore the party's work 
around production as the centre), in Huang Chuhua (ed.), Changzhang fuzezhi: chenggong yu cuozhe 
bashilia (The director responsibility system: 80 cases of success and failures), Shanghai Jiaotong 
University Press, 1987, p. 151.
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First, the party's organizational principle is that a lower body must obey its immed­
iate superior and ultimately the party centre. In this top-down vertical command system it 
was natural that party secretaries were held responsible to their party superiors. This was at 
odds with the horizontal and spontaneous competition of the market, especially when there 
was a contradiction between the demands of central planning and the self-interest of an 
enterprise.
Secondly, in terms of the internal relations of the party, the party command system 
had two distinct features that inherently opposed the trend of marketization: (1) The system 
tended to bring everything under its control (yiyuanhua). This tendency was at odds with 
the status of the factory manager as the representative of the legal person under the 
Enterprise Law.61 If the director must be held accountable first to the party secretary in the 
factory, how could it be possible for him to take legal responsibilities for what he or she 
has done? (2) The requirement for collective leadership of the party system made it unlikely 
that anybody could be held responsible for policy failures. This would prevent managers 
from responding to fluid market opportunities.
Thirdly, the party was still committed to its socialist ideology, although to a decreas­
ing degree. One key ingredient of this was egalitarianism in the form of a "big rice pot". 
Under this principle, state workers and staff had to be permanently employed and receive 
relatively similar incomes regardless of their contributions. And the party committees tend­
ed to see themselves as the guardian of such a principle.62 This not only inhibited the kind 
of competition for greater efficiency generated by market forces but also created difficulties
61 See The Enterprise Law in Hua Gong (ed), Zenyang gaohuo qiye (How to enliven enterprises), 
Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1988, pp. 1-13.
62 See for instance, Jiang Zhemin's speech on 1 July 1989, which he gave priority to the principle of 
"common prosperity". Rentnin ribao, 1 July, 1989. When this was practiced in state firms many 
party secretaries insisted that emphasis on differentiated income among workers jeopardized the 
party's efforts to uphold socialism. Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 8, 1989, p. 4.
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for reform of the industrial remuneration and employment systems to be responsive to the 
market.
All these barriers to marketization associated with the party system were deeply 
rooted in a politicised industrial danwei. As a party secretary stated:
The party committee must play a decisive part in the management of socialist enterprises. This is 
because a socialist enterprise is not simply an economic entity that is only directed by the market. It 
is also "a small society" taking care of a number of political control and social welfare functions. 
Even though managers can take overall charge of production and sales, they can in no way deal 
effectively with the other functions a factory is endowed with. These are our responsibility.63
Indeed, it is exactly these other functions that make party responsibilities work 
against market forces and underline the rationale for a thorough reform. Clearly without 
getting rid of these functions it became difficult to depoliticise state factories in a 
meaningful manner. In other words, the persistence of the non-economic functions would 
always legitimize the party's interference.
3.3. The Changing Enterprise Leadership Structure since 1979
As the corner-stone of the party/state at the grassroots, it was predictable that any 
attempt to undo the party command system would encounter severe resistance from both 
the party's industrial lobby in Beijing and its power base at the grassroots.64 This was 
demonstrated during the difficult process of translating into reality Deng's determination to
63 Yao Lantang, "Buyao ba dangyao guandan yangbianwei dangzhi guandang" (Not to change (the 
slogan) "the party should manage party itself' to "the party should manage party only itself), Zhibu 
shenghuo (Shandong), no. 8, 1989, p. 33.
64 The party's industrial lobby consists of party functionaries in state factories, industrial departments 
of local party committees at various levels, sections in charge of industries in the organization and 
propaganda departments of these committees and in the "transmission belt" organizations. At the 
centre, the Central Organization and Propaganda Departments both have bureaus specializing in indu­
strial work and they are responsible to the persons in the Politburo in charge of political and ideolo­
gical work. Nationwide the lobby comprises several million full-time personnel.
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phase out the party command system in factories. At the very beginning, he was fighting 
almost single-handedly for a basic change in the factory leadership structure.65 Yuan 
Baohua, the former minister in charge of industry, disclosed in a national conference on the 
director responsibility system in 1984 that, when Deng demanded that the party command 
system in the state sector be substituted with the director responsibility system, he asked 
Peng Zhen to work on it after Peng was rehabilitated in 1979. Later Deng reiterated this in 
his famous speech on political reform in August 1980. However, due to difficulties in 
reaching a consensus on the suggestion, not only was Deng's plan shelved, but when The 
Selected Works o f Deng Xiaoping went to press in 1983 he had to agree to rewrite the 
manuscript in which the sentence about his preference for the director responsibility system 
was deleted.66 It was not until 1 July 1987, when the piece was republished, that the 
manuscript was restored to what it had been in 1980.
Beginning in 1979, when Deng proposed the enterprise leadership reform, the whole 
process can be roughly divided into four phases: 1978-82, 1982-86, 1986-89, 1989-1992. 
The guiding thread of this periodization involves the changing relations between the party 
and management and the main dividing lines are based on the promulgation of major 
official documents which reflect a suuccession of changes in party policies. The study of 
this process is significant in that it illustrates how the party leaders had to balance off 
different lobby groups such as the party's central propaganda and organizational elites, its 
industrial organizations and the state agencies in industrial administration. At the micro 
level it revealed complicated political interactions involving the web of interests in the 
factory leadership, whose response to the reform could best be described as a seesaw 
battle.
65 . Deng certainly had support from Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. But at the beginning of the 1980s 
when Deng raised the issue, their authority had not yet been well established.
66 See Yuan Baohua, Renzhen gaohao qiye lingdao tizhi gaige (Earnestly do a good job in reforming 
the leadership structure in state enterprises), Beijing: Gongren chubanshe, 1985, p. 8.
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The first phase (1978-82)
This phase can be viewed as the transition from the extreme practices of the Cultural 
Revolution to some normalcy in the factory leadership structure. The guideline was what 
the "revisionists" had advocated before the Cultural Revolution, such as the Dengist "77 
Articles on Industries". On 4 April 1978 the central document "30 Articles on Industries" 
was published, abolishing the Revolutionary Committees in factories. The position of 
factory director was restored and its responsibilities specified, a shift from monistic control 
by the Revolutionary Committee with the party boss as the chair. However, leftist ideas 
carried on through inertia; politics was still in command, and the party remained the 
ultimate authority for virtually everything.
Deng wanted to change all this. He ordered that the State Enterprise Law be drafted in 
early 1978 in order to institutionalize factory management. In addition to his series of 
instructions on abolishing the party command system mentioned previously, he suggested 
that a system of director responsibility under the factory management committee be 
established. Preferably, the new committee was to be composed mainly of specialists such 
as the chief engineer and accountant. The draft of the Law based on Deng's ideas was 
tabled in the State Council in September but was rejected on the grounds that the conditions 
were not ripe for the reform.67 Yuan Baohua explained in 1987 that many comrades did not 
accept Deng's opinion because they were not prepared to change their ingrained model of 
party leadership. The fundamental disagreement was over what system of leadership a state 
firm should adopt, party centred or director centred.68
Despite this disagreement the first phase did see experiments with the director 
responsibility system in some state factories. In terms of party and management relations,
67 Song Guoshuang, Qiyefa zhinan (Guide to Enterprise Law), Beijing: Jingji guanli chubanshe, 1988,
p. 16.
68 See Yuan's Preface to Sha Ye (ed.), Zenyang shixin changzhang fuzezhi, pp. 1-2.
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Deng's insistence on having strong management in production gained more currency.69 
The proposal to reform the party command system per se was significant, as the country 
was moving out of the vicious circle of politicisation since the early 1950s.70 At the same 
time management was granted more power, trade unions were restored. With Li Lisan and 
Lai Ruoyu rehabilitated, the group interests of workers and a degree of autonomy for 
unions was again recognized. In a short span of time up to the end of 1982, 440,000 
unions were re-erected with a membership of about 75 million after having been done away 
with in the Cultural Revolution.71 The party's monistic control started to lose grounds.
The second phase (1982-1986)
The second phase of the structural reform in enterprise leadership began with the 
promulgation in 1982 of a set of official documents regarding the work of the party and 
management in state firms. These included "The Provisional Regulations on Factory Direct­
ors" and "The Provisional Regulations on the CCP's Basic Units in Industrial Enterprises". 
The two provisional Regulations confirmed the leading position of the factory party comm­
ittees, but by giving the specific powers of control to directors to run production, the econ­
omic functions of an enterprise were to be separated from the previously totalitarian tend­
encies of the danwei system. According to the Provisional Regulation on Factory Directors, 
a director was authorized to make independent decisions in allocations of management 
personnel, funds and productive materials, on production plans and sales, on discipline, 
promotion and remunerative measures concerning labour, on matters of workers' training 
and major technical innovations. And directors were empowered to set up their own 
management networks to facilitate daily management. This system was to be made up of
69 Deng Xiaoping, "Gongren jieji yaowei sige xiandaihua zuochu youyi gongxian", (The working class 
should make good contributions to the four modernizations), Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, Renmin 
chubanshe, 1983, pp. 124-129.
70 Rosalie Tung, Chinese Industrial Society after Mao, Lexington Books, 1982, pp. 160-163.
71 Zhang Zhanbin, p. 146.
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vice-directors, chief technical staff and middle-level managers responsible to directors 
rather than party secretaries. Of particular interest was the inclusion of a regulation that a 
director could have the power under urgent situations to decide on matters outside the pre­
scribed areas of his authority. Since the urgent situations were not defined in clear terms, 
the director could interpret this through his own manipulative judgement. Theoretically at 
least, with these enlarged powers granted to managers, a new power centre was gradually 
to become evident, posing threats to the 'party's empire' in an enterprise.
In contrast, the Provisional Regulation regarding the CCP's industrial units restricted 
the power of party cells. For instance, although the factory party committees should 
continue to discuss and decide upon fundamental issues of production and the trade unions, 
the Regulation for the first time stated that they should not be directly involved in the work 
of management and trade unions. Another far-reaching reform initiated by the Regulation 
concerned an institutional change at the workshop level, which created a structure equiva­
lent to the one-man management system, characterised by vertical line management with the 
shop director as the final authority. In contrast, the position of party branch secretaries was 
made concurrent, namely, held part time either by the director or by any other party 
members through elections.72
Pertaining to the design of an orderly transition, the Regulations still provided 
enough scope for party secretaries to wield power, although again over specified issues and 
at reduced degrees. This was exemplified by their power in two important areas of control. 
The first was the requirement that all major administrative decisions should be submitted to 
party committees for clearance. The second was a restricted continuation of the cadre app­
ointment system. The coverage of the system became narrower and was applied now large­
ly to the higher echelons of management. However, due to the retention of these two cruc­
ial powers, party committees remained the overriding authority in state firms. This contrad­
iction underscored the concerns of the party about the prospects of losing control over the
72 Zhang Zhanbin, p. 167.
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urban population and compromised the purpose of the reform, that party cells should only 
take care of their own affairs. Indeed in practice, owing to these two powers, it was hard 
for party cadres not to intervene in everyday management. As for managers, their earlier 
experience of Maoist politics based on party domination continued to make them balk at 
deciding on anything independently. Moreover, as party members, they were constantly 
reminded of the party's principle: individuals must obey the organization. This frustrated 
the attempts to institutionalize the decision-making process through a clear separation of the 
functional duties of party committees and management. For these reasons, this round of 
reform to the power relations in state firms yielded only marginal results, although the 
general trend pointed to a weakened party role and enhanced authority of management.
The unsatisfactory result of the second stage reform of the party command system 
was confirmed by a survey conducted in 1984 by the Research Institute (Tigaisuo) of the 
SCRES. Less than 15% of factory managers among 400,000 state firms believed that their 
power in running everyday management had been enhanced in a significant way by the 
Regulations. They pointed out that the major obstacles preventing them from taking on the 
full authority permitted by the Regulations had come from the intervention of party secretar­
ies under the name of party leadership. They claimed that unless the party command system 
was completely overhauled, party secretaries would continue to wield power without a 
need to shoulder responsibility, and managers would have to assume responsibility without 
the power to administer. To many managers this was worse than the pre-reform power 
structure. Earlier they had at least been able to escape from being blamed for anything that 
went wrong. Now tougher demands for delivery made this more difficult.73
Deng raised the question of abolishing the party command system again in late 1983 
when hearing reports of the Politburo Standing Committee on the preparation of the Third 
Plenum of the 12th Central Committee, which was to launch the urban industrial reform.
73 Tigaisuo (ed.), Gaige: Women mianlingde tiaozhan yu xunze, (Reform: we are facing challenges and 
opportunities), Beijing: Jingji chubanshe, 1986.
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The Politburo then passed the resolution that state firms should adopt the director 
responsibility system, although first on an experimental basis.74 Peng Zhen at last took a 
survey tour of the pilot factories in South China in 1984, a delay of five years since Deng's 
original suggestion. In April of the same year, the Party General Secretariat approved 
Peng's report favouring the director responsibility system. At the same time, however, it 
was also deemed that 'conditions' were not ripe for the universalization of the reform.75 
The so-called conditions were none other than the role of the party in the state sector. The 
disagreement among the party hierarchy on the annulment of the party command system 
was particularly acute. This was reflected again in January 1985 when the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress turned the Enterprise Law draft back to the 
party for "more discussion". The major reason for doing so was the perception that the 
manager's power vs the party was too enlarged. Managers were blamed in late 1984 for the 
loss of control over wage rises and failures in investment decisions. The concerns of the 
powerful lobby of the party's industrial organizations were explicitly expressed in a Jingji 
ribao article:
Will the director responsibility system lead to abuses of power and arbitrary decisions by directors? 
Will they develop personal factions and nepotism with their newly acquired power over personnel? 
As the reform of the enterprise leadership structure deepens, people now have many doubts about the 
ability of factory directors to use their authority correctly. And these doubts are not groundless 76
At the same time, at the experimental spots the resistance from the party's basic units 
also turned out to be unexpectedly strong. By mid-1986, the total number of factories 
entering the experiment reached 27,700 and many problems accumulated calling for 
solution.77 The reform required directors to have three types of powers relating to political
74 Rosalie Tung, Chinese Industrial Society after Mao, p, 125.
75 Jingji ribao, 10 May 1986.
76 Jingji ribao, 24 June, 1986.
77 Yuan's Preface to Sha Ye (ed.), Zenyang shixin changzhang fuzezhi, p. 3.
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affairs, personnel and production. Political power meant that a manager should be the 
number one boss in order to run this multi-functional "small society". Power over 
personnel meant that managers were able to appoint technical staff in key positions. In 
Chinese factories, where clientelist ties prevail, this means that managers must attract 
personal supporters to carry out their orders effectively. However, because this was 
traditionally the prerogative of party cadres, managers ran into many obstacles.78 To 
overcome this tendency, high-powered working groups were dispatched to the trouble 
spots and resorted to administrative decrees to have party secretaries stand aside from the 
centre of power. For instance, the groups convened all-staff meetings to announce that 
directors would from now on take overall charge of the factory's work with specific 
authority in key policy areas. However, new problems arose: how to resettle the powerful 
interest lobby of party personnel and rearrange a whole set of party institutions? The reform 
was not just dealing with a few individuals but a deeply rooted system created by the over­
all political system. In fact many of these factories slid into chaos because both directors 
and party cells did not know how to handle their new missions. This resulted in a vacuum 
where directors only assumed partial authority and party cadres appeared as auditors while 
erecting road blocks through their established clientele networks.79
Deng now realized that the reform was not only a change of management mechanisms 
but a major restructuring of the web of interests in state firms. He called his reform the 
second revolution exactly because every step of reform addressed problems of substantially 
reassembling political, productive and human relations. The success in abolishing the party
78 In a summary of the experiment work, Renmin ribao carried complaints of directors who believed 
that they were tied by six "ropes", including: 1) the power to appoint middle level managers was res­
tricted by the party committee's "discussion"; 2) the decision-making process was interfered with by
a "multi-headed system", with party cells and trade unions having veto powers,......Renmin ribao,
18 May 1987.
79 Excerpted from a 1986 report of the Shandong Party Organization Department, Zhibu shenghuo 
(Shandong), no. 1, 1989, p. 35.
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command system in plants rested on whether several million party cadres affected by the 
reform could be provided with a decent way out.80 This had to include compensation for 
their surrender of power.
The third phase (1986-1989)
The third phase began when the State Council and the Central Organization Depart­
ment promulgated a second set of documents regarding the party cells and management in 
state firms in September 1986. This time the word "provisional" was removed: the docu­
ments now became final official rules for the work of the party committee and factory 
manager, marking the end of the party command system in state firms. This second set of 
Regulations was later contained in the Enterprise Law, which took effect in April 1988 and 
affirmed the transformation of the factory leadership structure in legal terms. Since Deng 
had first made the suggestion in 1979, the lengthy seven-year process was itself indicative 
of the difficulties in revamping the institutions of the party/state through incremental means. 
However, this phase of reform had seen the dominant role of party cells in everyday 
factory life greatly curtailed. As each set of Regulations had been put into practice, the 
possibility had opened up for a qualitative change in shop-floor politics.
The fundamental difference between the new and the provisional Regulations was the 
removal of the sentence: "The leadership structure of China's state enterprises is the direct­
or responsibility system under the leadership of party committees". It was categorically 
stipulated that an enterprise is a legal entity and its manager its legal representative vested 
with all necessary powers. The party's role was reoriented to that of political and 
ideological supervision.81 This was reflected by the following changes:
80. "Deng Xiaoping tan zhengzhi tizhi gaige" (Deng Xiaoping on political reform), Zhongguo xing- 
zheng guanli, no. 1, 1987, p. 1.
81 See Hua Gong (ed.), Zenyang gaohuo qiye (How to enliven enterprises), Beijing: Xinghua 
chubanshe, 1988, pp. 88-104.
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1) The new Regulations omitted the process of clearance of management decisions by 
party committees, stipulating that major decisions should be worked out through an admin­
istrative committee chaired by the director. This committee should include such people as 
deputy directors, the chief engineer, chief economist and chief accountant. The party secret­
ary, the chair of the trade union and representatives of the Workers Congress could also 
join such committees. Here it is worth noting that the party secretary was only one of the 
committee members. The Regulations reconfirmed that when different opinions emerged, 
the director had the right to make the final decision against the view of the majority.
2) A factory director had the power to select and appoint managerial staff up to the 
deputy factory director. While the input of the party committee was required, there was no 
compulsory procedure through which appointments were cleared through party organs. 
This effectively restricted the second-line veto power of party committees. Moreover, most 
appointees became either contractual or for a definite term. The power of directors over dis­
ciplinary, promotional and remunerative matters was enlarged beyond those stated in the 
Provisional Regulations.
3) The new regulations emphasized the binding power of contracts on all parties in 
enterprises and their administrative superiors. These contracts were to be signed by direct­
ors and the state, a crucial indicator designed to protect managers' authority as the legal 
person and principal party to the contracts. The emphasis on contract relations was intended 
to apply restrictions on the interventionist tendency of party organizations as well as 
bureaucratic planners.
4) In relation to party committees, the new regulations made it clear that the factory 
party cells were political organizations, not power holders. This meant that they did not 
carry the powers of management, nor could they interfere at will with the management of 
production. The chief mission of party committees was to ensure the good conduct of party 
members in the factory. Although the party's role of supervision over the management in
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terms of adhering to the party's line and policies was reiterated, this became general and 
abstract.
Shortly after the promulgation of the second set of regulations, the Enterprise Law 
was passed and relieved party committees of their power to formulate the agenda for 
political and ideological work. The question of whether to make managers the masters of 
political and ideological work had been the centre of controversy in the process of drafting 
the Law and had delayed its submission to the NPC for a number of years. In April and 
September 1984 and again in January 1985, the General Secretariat three times discussed 
the draft of the Law. Each time consensus evaporated because of two major issues. The 
first was the status and role of managers in plants, whether they should be the centre of 
only production or the centre of everything including political affairs (personnel, 
propaganda and enforcement of discipline), mass organizations (trade unions, the Youth 
League and women's association) and social welfare. The second question was whether the 
director's overall charge should be carried out personally (one-man management) or 
collectively, with him one among equals, particularly in relations with party secretaries and 
chairs of trade unions.82 The final breakthrough in having factory directors take control 
over political and ideological work showed that the debate had clearly favoured managers. 
It also indicated the extent to which the party leadership came to grips with the changed 
perception of the nature of a state firm, which, it concluded, was essentially an economic 
organization.83 Therefore, the mission of party cells in state firms was different from cells 
in the national and local government: as the factory was not a level of state power, the party 
body there should not hold political power.84
The distinction as to whether an enterprise was a body of government or an entity of 
the economy was significant. Historically government and business had been closely
82 Song Guoshuang, Qiyefa zhinan (The Enterprise Law guide), pp. 17-19.
83 The Production Bureau of the SCRES, "Zhongguo gongshangye gaige jiankuang" (The introduction
of China’s enterprise reform), in the SCRES (ed.), Qiye jizhi gaige chutan, pp. 157-180.
84 See Zhao Ziyang's political report to the party’s 13th National Congress.
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interwined since the beginning of Chinese industrialization at the end of 19th century. The 
command system further mingled the two spheres, which was blamed as a root cause of 
China's poor economic performance.
The enterprise leadership structure had undergone impressive changes during the 
third phase of institutional reforms of 1986 - 1989. With Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang 
holding sway in the top party leadership, a series of far-reaching reforms was also initiated 
within the party structure of state firms, such as streamlining party agencies, and overhaul­
ing the cadre nomenklatura system. These will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
The fourth phase (4 June 1989-1992)
The events of the Beijing Spring of 1989 slowed down the tempo in diminishing the 
party's functions in state firms. Concerned to uphold one-party domination in China, the 
CCP leadership realized that consolidation of its power needed to start from re-strengthen­
ing the sway of its grassroots organizations. Jiang Zemin openly commented in 1989 that if 
grassroots party units exercised political leadership only, but without organizational con­
trol, his leadership as general party secretary could be rendered insubstantive. A central 
document "The CC Notification on Strengthening Party Construction" was issued in 1990 
to formally give "kernel" status to the party's industrial organizations.85 In the wake of 
this, the tug-of-war between party cadres and management has come to a head, signalling a 
tremendous task ahead for the reform of China's factory leadership system.86 Although 
political and ideological networks were still placed under the control of directors, they were 
required to match the initiatives of party cells to advance a propaganda campaign against 
'peaceful evolution'. Hence there existed a danger that the enlarged power of managers 
would be circumvented with the tightening of political control by the party. The most
85 Wu Zhiqing, Xinshiqi qiye dang de jianshe (Party building in enterprises in the new era), Nanchang:
Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1991, p. 151.
8 6 That is, contention between the "kernel" of the party's political and ideological pursuits and the cen­
tre of the factory director's overall charge. For a detailed description of the "two centre contention", 
see the case study later in the chapter.
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concrete reversal of reform was the re-emphasis on the principle of the "party managing 
cadres", meaning that factory directors were forced to seek approval from party committees 
before they could make any important appointments.87
This trend of 'back to the future' was largely rectified at the beginning of 1992 when 
Deng urged a deepening of reforms during his South China tour. In the subsequent 14th 
Party Congress in October the party finally came to a consensus that the Chinese economy 
should be market modeled, thus terminating a long battle between central planners who had 
campaigned for Chen Yun's Soviet model 'with Chinese characteristics' and reformers 
who held that the only way out for state enterprises was the road to the market.88 How­
ever, the party networks that have interlocked enterprises to the party/state hierarchy still 
represents an obstacle for their transformation. Today it is less controversial to talk about 
freeing a factory from its government superior, but it remains a taboo area to think of also 
ejecting it from its party hierarchy.89 In a conference on Deng's South China speech, many 
managers complained about constant interference from both factory party cells and party 
organs above. A manager from Dalian City commented: to compete in the market, he was 
required to streamline management agencies in his firm. But nobody raised the same quest­
ion of streamlining party bodies, which had become out of touch with the new situation. 
Yuan Baohua answered: "Nobody said that the party bodies should not be streamlined but 
nobody dares to do so because people are afraid of making mistakes".90
87 This is stipulated in "The Notification". See Zhu Huaqiang, "Qiye dangjian de zhiyue yinsu ji duice" 
(Factors that obstruct party building in factories and counter measures), in Yue Xiuwu (ed.), Zuzhi 
gongzuo lilun yanjiu (Research on the theory of organization), Beijing University Press, 1990, p. 
171.
88 For an analysis of the leadership conflict over the reforms of the Chinese economy, see You Ji, 
"Zhao Ziyang and the Politics of Inflation", The Australian Journal o f Chinese Affairs, no. 25, 
January, 1991, pp. 63-91.
89 Liaowang (Outlook), no. 42, 1992, p. 1.
90  Zhongguo qiyebao, 3 September 1992.
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The party leadership has been engaged in soul-searching for a solution to the dilemma 
it faces: to accord more power to its branches may strengthen political control and thus 
temporarily deter social protest. However, in doing so it also risks accelerating internal 
decay, alienating the population and jeopardizing economic development, which will 
stimulate potentially larger-scale social protest. There is no easy way for the party to break 
this self-defeating cycle. Eventually, however, development of the market will surely force 
qualitative changes to the party system in the industrial sector. In the process the party's 
role would have to change, too, as enterprises become increasingly politically neutralized to 
respond to the new productive relations imposed by the market. One party secretary put 
forward an interesting notion of a "production and welfare party" from his own experience. 
He explained that the function of party cells would be mainly to assist in raising production 
and workers' income, which could be possible only through market successes. He said 
what pushed the party units in this direction was the party members' self interest in the 
factory's market performance. In the marketization process state firms would create new 
forms of leadership structure and engender independent interests. Both institutionally and 
financially, they would dislodge themselves from the chain of the party/state, and bring 
their party cells with them if these still exist.91 It is impossible to tell from existing evidence 
whether the party cadre's idea represents the will of the majority of his fellow comrades. It 
is certainly against the will of the party's industrial lobby. However, he did point out a 
convergence of interests of party cadres and managers to work together for common goals. 
If this is indeed happening, it will be a remarkable progress of depoliticisation of the 
danwei system, driven by the party's new commitment to the market.
3.4. The Two-Centre Contention: A Study on Party/Management Relations
There is no doubt that since the industrial reform was launched in 1984, Chinese 
factories have been much depoliticised. However, the new patterns of interaction among 
contending interests have also developed. The new conflictual relationship between factory
91 My interview with the secretary in Beijing in November 1992.
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party secretaries and directors has attracted the most attention of both the government and 
researchers. This has been described as the "two-centre contention", which by and large 
affects the trend of dismantling the party/state controls in China in general and the future 
reforms in the internal leadership structure of Chinese state firms in particular.
As illustrated earlier in the chapter, the rivalry between the two centres is not really a 
new phenomenon. Now the question re-emerges with the altered political agenda: the 
emphasis on economic development as the saviour of Chinese socialism rather than leftist 
radical rhetoric nearly 40 years ago. Yet party-vested interests are entrenched in the 
remaining institutional frameworks of control that the current top party leadership wants to 
maintain in case they are needed for repression, similar to the aftermath of 1989. So the 
root cause of the two-centre rivalry is the concern of the party leadership over whether the 
party can continue to hold firmly onto its monopoly of power. The outcome has witnessed 
structural barriers that limit China's enterprise reform. Probably, the confused boundary of 
functions between party cadres and managers will linger on for some more years to come.
3.4.1. The Contention over Supervision
The current role of the party's industrial organizations is so-called supervision based 
on a separation of the party and management functions. However, the meaning of supervis­
ion is not clarified. According to the definition given by the party system, "supervision" 
means overseeing the process of a major decision formulation ( i.e., participating in the 
policy-making), of its implementation (periodic hearing of reports from management), and 
of assessment afterwards (to find out what has gone wrong and who is responsible, in 
order to take organizational measures for punishment). Here it is not difficult to see that the 
party's efforts to institutionalize supervision and lock it into the directorial system, arousing 
conflicts that cannot be resolved by the two parties involved.92 This is a problem well 
anticipated by the party centre. In creating this bipolar system, it stipulated that in case any
9 2 The Theory Department of the Central Party School, Tansuo tizhi gaige zhilu (Exploring the road
for systemic reforms), Beijing: Qushi chubanshe, 1991, pp. 98-101.
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serious dispute occurred the party secretary and director should report to the superior 
government and party bodies for arbitration.93
This detailed supervision inevitably clashed with the managers in running the every­
day affairs of their factories. The very fact that management can contend with the party cells 
reveals a lot about the course of reform. In addition, managers have gradually nurtured 
their own networks of loyalists. This means that the management is in a position to resist 
the party's supervision. For instance, although the party guidelines give scope to party in­
puts into the factory's strategic policy formulations, again there is no fine line as to what in­
puts should be solicited and how these should be taken into account by directors when 
major management decisions are being made. It is common for factory directors to press 
ahead with what they think is appropriate without giving much consideration to the inputs 
of their party colleagues.94 Even though the inputs of the party committees are accorded 
institutional platforms in the management committee, very often these inputs carry less 
weight than the opinions of directors who control its agenda.
In a report written by the Party Organization Department of Weihai City, Shandong 
Province, the party's industrial interests expressed sincere worries about the trend of 
depoliticisation:
In theory, the power of supervision is institutionally granted to the party organizations in factories. 
In reality, however, the authority cannot be exercised in many danwei. There are several main diffic­
ulties. The first, the question of what form of supervision is positive and what is picky, is not clear 
at all. In the atmosphere of diluting party leadership at factories in the last several years, a lot of 
party organizations have dared not to use their power. Secondly, many others do not know how to
93 Information gathered from interviewing party functionaries in Beijing Municipal Party Committee in 
1992.
94 There is a large body of literature in the Chinese media about managers making major decisions 
without involving the party cells. E.g., see the book Shidai xuanzele tarnen (The era has chosen 
them), which collects more than twenty case studies of how managers make strategic decisions. Very 
seldom is the party mentioned. (Shanghai: Zhishi chubanshe, 1988).
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use the party's power. The main channel of supervision is to raise opinions or suggestions. But 
without practical powers these have no binding force. All depends on whether the director is "happy" 
to accept them. Thirdly, the party system is supposed to supervise only major policies. However, 
there is no clear dividing line between major and minor. Moreover, it is not likely that serious 
problems arise from major policies that implicate the party and state line. Minor issues nevertheless 
often cause major damage.95
The structural hurdles to smooth party/management relations also lie in the obscured 
boundaries of the multiple functions of the danwei which has imposed many crossing 
points for the two system to clash. For instance, the handling of remunerative matters and 
social welfare provisions are within the realm of managers, although not regarded as 
directly as production per se. However, given the explosive nature of these affairs, these 
matters are always viewed as major issues that the party system has to supervise. Because 
actual authority over the provision of social welfare gives substance to one's decision­
making power, it becomes an irritant and a source of strife. This is especially true to the 
allocation of housing, due to the big gap between supply and demand. At these times both 
parties mobilize every resource available in order to reward their inner circles of their 
clientelist networks.96 Even for small matters party secretaries are inclined to get involved. 
There is good reason for this. With the removal of the party command system the 
secretaries have less opportunities to control workers directly. This has undoubtedly 
tarnished their image as key power brokers. Sometimes one's power depends upon people 
perceiving that one has power. To get into the disputes associated with distribution of 
perquisites may remind workers that "I can still be counted". One party secretary told me:
95 "Dui qiye dangwu gongzuo de yousi yu jianyi" (Worries and suggestions on the factories' party 
affairs), Zhibu shenghuo (Shandong), no. 9, 1989, pp. 29-30.
96 This was the general impression of my interviews with several dozen workers, managers and party 
functionaries in China in 1991 and 1992.
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When workers no longer come to us for the arbitration of any disputes, we feel abandoned and 
redundant. Because of this transfer of the gravity of power, not only workers but also we 
ourselves realize that the notion of party leadership is increasingly only rhetorical. We must 
fight back exactly because of this.97
And they do. They raise objections or alternatives to management decisions whenever 
possible. It is often opposition for opposition's sake, which they believe is an effective 
way to make their presence felt. Gradually these voices of opposition become a stereotyped 
source of conflict between the two systems. Clearly the rivalry between party secretary and 
director touches upon sensitive issues of clientelist networks revolving around the two 
power centres.98
3.4.2. The Contention over Appoinment
Another key feature of the contention is the personnel appointment system. The En­
terprise Law has vested the factory manager with this power, yet the rules of the game are 
more complicated, as the party has its own regulations that directors should make appoi­
ntments after consultation with party committees. Many party secretaries have regarded this 
consultation as equivalent to a power of veto. Others have used it as a delaying tactic to 
block management decisions. On the other side, most directors have envisioned this con­
sultation process as a formality. So while strong directors get away with their appointment 
decisions through an arbitrary approach, consultation has often become a bargaining 
process in which both sides try to strengthen their own hands.99
9 7 Interview with the party secretary of Beijing No. 2 Leather Products Factory in 1991.
98 There are many accounts describing the above-mentioned phenomenon. See for some vivid examples, 
Tansuo tizhi gaige zhilu, p. 100; Yuan Yong, "Yige lanyong chengbaoqun de dianxing" (A typical 
example of abuse of power through taking advantage of the contract responsibility system), Zhibu 
shenghuo (Beijing), no. 12, 1991, pp. 32-34. Most of my informants also confirmed this point.
99 This was the opinion of a number of informants in 1991 and 1992. What is worth mentioning is 
that in 1992 most of them believed that the power centre had moved further toward the director sys­
tem due to the changed environment after Deng's South China visit. Newspaper and journal coverage 
of the phenomenon in China is also widespread.
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The organizational procedures for an appointment are also confused, adding fuel to 
the fire. Although the Enterprise Law gives the factory manager legal power to appoint his 
deputies and lower-level managers, the party's regulations, still in force, concern the 
selection, investigation and dossier maintenance for any party members who are middle- 
level managerial staff at workshop level, for instance, or above. Only those managerial 
personnel who are not party members come under the direct control of factory managers 
through the factory's personnel department. Since the majority of middle-level managers 
and above are party members at large and medium-scale factories, the overlap in 
appointment procedures has given rise to constant conflicts. For instance, when a factory 
manager wants to select a deputy factory manager who happens to be a party member, he 
has to go to the factory party organization department to check on his dossier, and needs to 
report the planned promotion to his government superior through the factory party 
organization department, which must enquire of its superior party organization department 
about whether the selection is in accord with its cadre promotion quota. It is the factory's 
party organization department which is first notified. It is the cadre in this department who 
first notifies the candidate. After the factory manager finally announces the appointment, 
the organization department will continue to assess the performance of the appointee 
together with the party's discipline agency. In this whole process the factory manager 
constantly has to deal with the party secretary even if he prefers not to. The secretary can 
delay the submission and can also influence his superior by raising different opinions. 
Under the regulation that the factory party committee should meet to discuss such an 
appointment, he may also block the motion through members' votes. Although it is a bit 
easier to appoint a workshop manager, the party organization department's evaluation and 
the party committee's discussion cannot be cut short, thus complicating the appointment 
process. Because of these rigid party controls many managers have tried hard to circumvent
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the procedures, particularly as appointments at workshop level do not require detailed 
reports to government superiors.100
Behind this struggle over appointments, both power centres have attempted to main­
tain and enhance their clientelist networks. In China's state enterprises the title of director 
or party secretary does not deliver authority automatically, and so each has sought to rely 
on their own clique. When Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang called for the dilution (danhua) 
of the industrial party leadership, party cadres were under increased pressure, and they des­
perately rallied behind their secretaries as a way of self-protection. For the managers, to 
have orders implemented, they sought to appoint their supporting staff along the lines of 
personal liking. Under these circumstances, the two-centre conflict reflected the concern of 
many party cadres over their political survival and, among the managerial staff, the chances 
for further promotions.
3.4.3. The Director/Party Secretary Relationship: Field-Work Findings
When I visited state factories in 1991 and 1992,1 found the relationship between 
managers and party secretaries varied markedly from one particular factory to another. 
Basically, their relations seem to divide into four types.
The First was the so-called "chummy brothers" type (geliahao), as workers describe 
it. Close personal ties had traditionally existed between party secretaries and directors and 
this provided room for continued effective cooperation and mutual support in their plants. 
When disagreements arise, they are able to sit down and talk it over. Generally speaking, 
their friendship guarantees a workable division of labour between them. That is, directors 
actively counsel party secretaries before making any major decisions and the latter help
100 For the official view and regulations, see Wu Zhiqing, Xing shiqi qiye dangde jianshe (Party building 
in the new era), pp. 178-184. My analysis is based mainly on my field-work findings of 1991 and 
1992. Since the promulgation of the State Council's Regulation on Changing the Operational Mech­
anisms of State Enterprises in July 1992, many of these requirements have been revoked, according 
to my interviews in China in late 1992. However, I have not come across an official document that 
specifies the changes.
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clear the way for implementation. The key to such a smooth relationship is personal rather 
than institutional. The following case describes how a good party secretary/manager 
relationship works.
At Beijing Wool Textile Plant, party secretary Zhang Yuhe and manager Zhou Wen- 
kai were personal friends, allowing them to tackle difficult issues together in both manage­
ment and party work. For instance, in early 1989 the problem of labour shortage on the 
production lines became so acute that the fulfilment of production plans was threatened. 
The basic reason for this was that, while work was much harder on the lines, workers were 
paid lower compared with the supply and management staff. The secretary and manager 
decided that the only way to solve the problem was to raise the wages of the line workers. 
When the decision was announced, the supply and management staff became agitated. With 
the manager busy with other management affairs, Secretary Zhang ventured to bite the bull­
et by takinAt Beijing Wool Textile Plant, party secretary Zhang Yuhe and manager Zhou 
Wenkai were personal friends, allowing them to tackle difficult issues togg charge of the 
controversy, which would otherwise fall to the responsibility of the manager. In a short 
period of time he convened more than a dozen meetings of party members in the supply and 
management sections. By combining ideological pressure, party discipline and personal 
appeals to activists, resistance was finally overcome and the new wage package got 
implemented. As a result the line workers raised production.
Manager Zhu, for his part, gave a green light to conducting party activities during 
work hours. He also tried to raise the pay scales of party and political cadres, which were 
generally a bit lower than management staff. Channels for discussing production matters 
were extended to party committee members, to enlist party organizational support for his 
plans. All this was conducive to the unity of the two systems. In fact this benefited the two 
systems generously. The party branch in the factory was promoted as a model in Beijing's 
textile industry, because it "cultivated" enough party activities to meet one of the criteria for 
party cadres' promotion. On the managers' side, good relations with the party personnel
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can help guarantee smooth running of their production agenda, which also serves to 
advertise the ability of the manager in the eyes of both their superiors and workers. 101
The second type of manager/party branch relationship involves one power centre 
dominating the other. The major feature of this type is the overriding authority of one 
central figure, be it the director or party secretary, in controlling the agenda of both party 
affairs and management. The varied strength of their clientelist networks can imposes an 
asymmetry of power in the contention. Traditionally managers were groomed by party 
secretaries and subject to their control. Since the end of the party command system, and as 
many of these secretaries were retired, the balance of power has been moving towards 
managers. Yet the transition is far from complete, and a lot of party secretaries can still 
wield considerable power over managers.
A typical example of this type is the Capital Iron and Steel Corporation of Beijing. 
Officially the corporation is one of a small number of factories still practicing the 'director 
responsibility system under the leadership of the party committee'. However, overall pow­
er is concentrated in the hands of general manager Zhu Guanwu. The party secretary acts 
only as his assistant in charge of the party system within the corporation. But Zhu Guanwu 
rose to the status of indisputable authority through the party ladder. He preferred to keep 
the party command system largely intact because he, as a party leader for a long time, 
recognized that an effective managing mechanism lies in the party's organizational network, 
provided that he could firmly control the organization.102 Yet there is a qualitative differ­
ence between the current party command system and that exercised before reform. Above 
the party committee there now sits another powerful committee called the corporation 
managing committee, something similar to a board of trustees. Most important issues are 
discussed first in this committee, with Manager Zhu as chair. Although the party secretary
101 This account was published in Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 10, 1992, pp. 27-28. I followed the
case by visiting the factory in late November 1992 and found the story basically true, although the
account given here also mixes in my personal findings.
102 Interview with the corporation's deputy party secretary in 1992.
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sits on the committee, all he can do, essentially, is to vote for whatever has been decided by 
Manager Zhu, and then transmit the decisions arrived at in the managing committee to the 
vast party machine and move the machine to the liking of the General Manager. The party 
system is completely dominated by a manager and services his needs.103
A third type of party/management relationship reportedly involves the majority of 
factories. This relationship can be described as evasion, which means that the two centres 
usually avoid direct confrontations in running the factory. Normally they deliberately leave 
some vacuum of responsibility in between them. However, this does not mean that there is 
no rivalry. Their conflict is disguised by a number of personal taboos rather than restricted 
by any clearly defined institutionalization of power. This evasion per se contains the seeds 
of confrontation. According to Chinese economists, this type of relationship is not regarded 
as better than confrontation, as the "intermediate zones" between the two centres often 
prevent timely management decisions. The level of motivation and discipline among 
workers tends to be low in these factories, due to the fact that nobody from the two centres 
is able to manage firmly and effectively.
The fourth type of relationship is confrontational, whereby whatever one centre de­
cides, the other tries to obstruct. This type exists in factories where the two power centres 
possess fairly even networks of followers. Friction is intense in this kind of relationship. 
Party heads argue that party committees must still take the "kernel role" in factory leader­
ship, in line with party tradition and post-Tiananmen rhetoric, and based upon such an 
assumption they interfere in management affairs whenever they see fit. Directors on the 
other hand affirm that they can act in accordance with the Enterprise Law, which gives 
them all the legal authority they need to run the firm.
T Factory is a large factory in Shanghai's mechanical industry. When the new party 
and management heads were appointed in 1986, the two systems were able to work 
together smoothly and each system operated with help from the other. The party secretary
103 This information was gathered from a series of visits to the corporation in both 1991 and 1992.
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and manager exchanged visits on a regular basis. But soon things began to turn sour and 
eventually undermined both parties' as well as the factory's production.
Party secretary Lu Ming, aged 57, was a cadre of the old generation (he joined the 
party in 1949 and climbed upward as a generalist). In 1964 he was transferred to this fact­
ory to take the post of deputy factory manager and became manager in 1976. He became 
party secretary ten years later as a step toward retirement. On the other hand manager Xu 
Li, a university graduate, was 45 years of age and a party member whose career had started 
in the factory's technical department. He was first promoted to be the factory's deputy 
manager in the late 1970s and became manager in 1986, both times at the recommendation 
of Party Secretary Lu. Because of this guarvci, everybody, including the factory's party and 
state superiors, expected that both could support each other at the time of their appoint­
ments.
Towards the end of 1986 there was a trend towards larger bonuses in the entire ind­
ustrial sector. Manager Xu proposed to Secretary Lu to do likewise in order to alleviate the 
pressure extended by workers. Lu opposed the motion. But Xu insisted that without the 
raises production would suffer, as workers became disgruntled. He took the decision alone 
and workers got more bonuses. Soon word spread that the new manager was more capable 
and knew better how to win the workers' hearts. Upon hearing this Lu was quite annoyed.
A few weeks later the factory received a big order from a foreign trader. Xu 
announced to the workers that if the order could be completed on time, all workers and 
staff could have ten-day holidays. When this was achieved, Xu made good on his word. 
However, Xu had not notified the party committee, which scheduled a training program at 
the time for all party members in the factory. When party members failed to show up, Lu 
criticised Xu as being production-minded only, without giving thought to party building.
The tension between Xu and Lu developed from bad to worse in July 1987 over 
Xu's personnel decisions for the posts of chief engineer and chief accountant. The first ap­
pointee was 58-year-old Li Guang, an expert engineer but generally regarded as arrogant.
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The second was Xiao Jun, a zhiqing (educated youth sent to the countryside during the 
Cultural Revolution), who had entered the factory to replace his mother under the state's 
retirement substitution (dingti) policy. Mr. Xiao was thought very clever, with a business­
man's mind, but not very steady since he was cynical regarding what he deemed to be dog­
matic regulations. Lu once again opposed the decisions, stating to Xu that Li was near 
retirement and did not have a good "mass base", and that Xiao was not reliable and did not 
have a college degree. He suggested the party organization department review the appoint­
ees. Xu, however, insisted on appointing them and issued contracts to them himself.
Lu was very angry and convened the party committee the following day. He criticized 
Xu for arbitrarily using his power and violating the party's organizational principles. Xu 
argued that what he had done was within his authority as prescribed by the government. He 
stated that neither Li nor Xiao was a party member so there was no need for an evaluation 
by the party organization department. Since nonparty members should be assessed by the 
factory's personnel department and the personnel department was answerable to himself, 
he had not done anything outside party regulations. In addition he held that appointments 
should be based on ability not on age or certificate. The party committee meeting broke up 
without any consequences.
From then on their policy disputes became personal. Even the most routine decisions 
by one side would be interpreted as a deliberate act to force the other to lose face. Both 
management and party work could not go on normally. Towards the end of 1988 Xu suff­
ered a heart attack, supposedly the result of these long personal battles. He anticipated that 
he would not be able to resume duties for some time to come, so he convened a meeting of 
the management system and announced that his work would be entrusted to vice manager 
Li. But the next day party secretary Lu called a party meeting without Xu attending and acc­
used him of abuses of power and of lacking any organizational sense. Under this pressure,
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deputy manager Li felt too scared to take over the manager's responsibility, and the factory 
became leaderless.104
During my two field trips in China in 1991 and 1992, the worst story of a struggle 
for power involved a director who stripped a party secretary of his cadre status and sent 
him to work in a workshop under a government regulation that directors were responsible 
for issuing work contracts to all staff in a factory. In retaliation the party secretary suspend­
ed the director's party membership, accusing him of not attending enough party meetings.
How deep does this two-centre contention run in China's state enterprises? The 
problem must be serious since everywhere I went in China in 1991 and 1992, I heard 
stories of power struggles between the 'two centres'. According to a survey conducted by 
the State Council in 1987 in more than 1,000 factories in 18 large cities, one third were 
troubled by one kind of contentious relationship or another, including about 10% of the 
confrontational type. About 30% of the factories belonged to what I call the evasion type. 
About 40% ran fairly smoothly, among which the "good brother" type accounted for 
13%.105 Surveys by local governments showed a far less promising picture. For instance, 
among state enterprises in Liaoning Province, easy relations between the two centres exist­
ed in only 25% of the factories surveyed,106 while in Taian city in Shandong Province, 
among 649 state firms, the relationship in 40% were quite contentious.107 Although the 
Chinese industrial authorities have tried many methods to get the two centres to cooperate 
over the past few years, progress is not at all visible.108
104 This account is summarised from a survey by Li Yongming, "Zenyang chuli T cheng de dangzheng 
guanxi", (How to handle the party/management relations in Factory T), Xinzheng yu renshi, no. 3, 
1990, pp. 18-20.
105 Liaowang, no. 48, 1987, pp. 19-20.
106 Zhongguo qiye bao, 15 June 1992.
107 Zhibu shenhuo (Shandong), no. 12, 1991, pp. 12-14.
108 For instance, many industrial bureaus and party bodies are required to choose suitable types to head 
the two systems, e.g. aggressive managers are provided with less aggressive party secretaries. Pun­
ishments are meted out to warn the heads of the two centres of the consequences of rivalry. A rotat-
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In short, the co-existence of the two power centres provides a focus for rivalry. 
Personal conflicts are only a secondary contributing factor, though the type of relationship 
which exists in any given factory is largely determined by its leaders' personal dimensions. 
This reveals the dynamic nature of the two-centre contention. This is to say that while the 
two-centre contention is a permanent feature of factory politics (unless one of the centres is 
deprived of a leadership function), individual firms flow from one type to another at 
different stages. So far, though, the trend points to the upper hand being gained increasing­
ly by management.
ion program has been put in place in big factories to have the heads of the two systems shift jobs. 
But none of these strategies achieved satisfying results (information gathered from interviews, 1992).
Chapter 4
The Party’s Organizational Reform
4.1. Dismantling the Industrial Nomenklatura System
Prior to the reforms the concept of "cadre" embraced a wide range of meanings and 
personnel. By the broadest definition anybody except a farmer and blue-collar worker 
could be bracketed as one, even a nurse or a monk, since he/she received a state salary and 
worked for the state. 1 When applied to questions of leadership and authority, it served as a 
touchstone in reference to those cadres who ran the party and state offices. Although this 
significantly narrowed the definition of cadre, it still covered a large number of people. 
With the emergence of the danwei system, a factory manager or a director of a bank branch 
became state representatives and thus automatically became cadres of the party/state.2 In 
political terms, as a result, the ideology and attitudes of cadres were regarded as relevant to 
the stability of the political ruling party. The CCP therefore declared that all cadres should 
be answerable to the party and appointed through party or party controlled channels. 
Because of the vastness of the consequent cadre system, the reach of the party/state as 
represented by state cadres blurred the boundary between the state and society. Never 
before in China's history had ordinary people had to deal with state representatives 
(officials) on such an everyday basis.
The cadre system in plants constituted an integral part of the party's nomenklatura
1 This definition is based on the state wage system which classifies the urban population into two 
large groups, worker wage and cadre wage, although the latter can be further subgrouped into different 
occupation rate systems. Another indication involves passport categories: anybody holding a govern­
ment passport is labeled by the customs bureau as a cadre regardless of his occupation. See Wu 
Guoguang, "The Dilemmas of Participation in the Political Reform of China, 1986-1988", in Roger 
Des Forges (ed.), Chinese Democracy and Crisis of 1989, State University of New York Press, 
1993, p. 136.
2 See Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China, Berkeley: 
The University of California Press, 1991, p. 352.
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system imported from the Soviet Union. Generally speaking, the system comprised cadres 
of the party system, the management system, mass organizations and technical staff. Under 
each system, cadres could be further categorized into subgroups. Under the party system, 
there were two different kinds of cadres. The first were party cadres, who occupied posit­
ions in the party hierarchy. The second were political cadres, who were not even necess­
arily party members. They worked for the factory's political and security departments, 
propaganda office or militia corps. Cadres from the mass organizations such as the Youth 
League branches and trade unions were also regarded as political cadres assuming "trans­
mission belt" roles. Administrative personnel and technical staff manning the management 
system were called managerial cadres (guanli ganbu) and technical cadres (jishu ganbu).
This whole cadre system was under the rigid control of the factory party committee 
through a nomenklatura system. Under this nomenklatura system all party and political 
cadres were placed under the party's organization department. All the cadres who were 
party members in the management system and nonparty members at the rank of workshop 
or above were also placed under the list of nomenklatura. Managerial cadres not directly 
controlled by this nomenklatura system were managed by the factory personnel department, 
whose members had to be party members responsible to the party's organization 
department.3 Cadres' discipline, awards, promotions, dossier maintenance and transfers 
were all determined by the party organization department. As plants became highly politic­
ised, all cadres had to see to political duties and the ideological indoctrination of the party. 
So the first feature of the industrial cadre system was the politicisation of the management 
staff at all levels of state firms. For instance, when a party secretary of a workshop was 
absent, the shop manager was apt to be required to carry on the absentee's political tasks. 
This distinguished managers in China and the West, as the former not only managed
3 Yu Zhenbo, "Ganbu xuanba gongzuo de chuantong yu biange" (The tradition and change of the cad­
re's selection and promotion system), in the Zhejiang Provincial Party Organization Department 
(ed.), Zuzhi renshi gongzuo xintan (The new exploration of the organizational and personnel work), 
Zhejiang University Press, 1987, p. 304.
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production but also people's political life.
In the appointment process, usually party secretaries one level up "discovered" a 
candidate, proposed his promotion at a party meeting and made the appointment. Logically, 
the appointees had to be answerable and loyal to the cadre who promoted them. As a result, 
the authorities at every level were linked together to form a transmission belt radiating all 
the way from the party centre. This became the primary organizational chain of the party/ 
state. Moreover, this chain of control was supported by numerous patron-client linkages 
arising from the personalized appointment process, and each served as an informal cell of 
the vast hierarchical system. So the second feature of the cadre system was the guanxi relat­
ionships linked to appointment procedures,4 which was characteristic of the closed system 
of the factory party leadership. This gave rise to nepotism, personal favouritism and 
factionalized power cliques. This party-dominated appointment system served as the found­
ation for what Wälder defined as "clientelist rules" in Chinese firms.5
The clientelist networks centred on party cadres were perpetuated by their tenure of 
office, which was the third feature of the cadre system. Sitting on an "iron chair", party 
cadres, management cadres as well as technical cadres needed to worry not so much about 
the production record under their leadership as about political rectitude, the primary reason 
for removal from office. So taking a correct party factional line and holding to the current 
interpretation of the official ideology had always been their norm for judgements and 
conduct.
The emergence of this permanent cadre stratum, distinguished by special status and 
wage ranks, formed the basis for a class-like division between the "mental" and "manual" 
labourer. In the eyes of workers. Since the cadre system provided obvious political, econ­
omic and social welfare privileges, it attracted political activists to join its ranks. This 
constituted a major source souring relations between the party and workers.
4 John Bums, The Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklatura System, p. xxxii
5 Andrew Wälder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism p. 175
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The reform of the enterprise cadre system is part of an overall reform of the political 
system. It recognizes the different natures of a firm and a government agency and thus 
differentiates between the management of cadres in these two systems. The line of thinking 
for the reform was summarised by a ranking official from the Central Organization 
Department as follows:
The requirements for industrial cadres should be different from those for government 
cadres. So it is necessary to erect a management system for factory personnel separate from 
the integrated post-and-ranking system now in use for all state cadres. The new system 
should be based on their specialized responsibilities and carry awards and benefits accord­
ingly. The leading personnel should be appointed through open tendering. They then app­
oint their deputies and middle-level managers. An individual can choose to take the post or 
quit by his choice.6
The reform of the enterprise cadre system has basically proceeded along this line 
since the mid 1980s. Although the results are mixed, the system has substantially contribut­
ed to the trend of depoliticisation. This has been reflected in two major reforms: not just a 
new delineation of the different categories of cadres but also the introduction of a contract 
and fixed term system for the majority of cadres.
4.1.1. The New Classification of the Factory Cadres
The new delineation of cadre categories went hand in hand with the progress of the 
director responsibility system. In order to give factory managers necessary authority to 
manage, there was a need for them to have a team of management personnel, as embodied 
in the new reform principle of guanshi yu guanren tongyi or "combining management of 
production and management of personnel", under the leadership of the factory director.7
6 Hu Zhenmin, "Ganbu zhidu de qunmian peitao gaige" (On the systematic and matching reform of the 
cadre system), in Liu Kegu (ed.), "Dangzheng jiguo gaige yanjiu" (Study of the reform on party and 
government institutions), Beijing: Renmin ribao chubanshe, 1988, p. 337.
7 Wang Jianxin, Ganbu guanli gailun (The outline of the cadre management studies), Liaoning 
University Press, 1986, p. 47.
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This was in contrast to the past practice whereby managers managed production but the 
party managed managers. So it was necessary to work out a new division of labour in 
personnel management between the party and management. As a result, the umbrella 
concept of control over cadres was discarded. A more explicit regrouping and 
classification of cadres was dictated by both the reform policies and requirements by 
management. Through redefining the different roles played by party cadres, managers and 
technical professionals, it became possible to separate party and political cadres, managerial 
staff and technical professionals from the hitherto 'one big cadre family'.
In the mid 1980s this process of regrouping began, with the unified party cadre cont­
rol system being split into two separate subsystems. The party organization department still 
controlled party and political cadres. The control over party cadres was exercised through 
an appointment system not very different from the pre-reform days. As far as political cad­
res were concerned, the party organization department only appointed the upper echelon 
through the nomenklatura system: generally the heads of the factory’s mass organizations, 
education departments, militia and security agencies. The remainder were transferred to the 
personnel department under the management system. On the other hand, with the shrinking 
of the party's nomenklatura coverage, the personnel department has greatly widened its 
scope of control. Originally the department only controlled personnel affairs of ordinary 
workers and junior, nonparty member cadres. Now this function has been transferred to a 
separate body in the management system: the labour affairs section. The department 
concentrates on the control of management and technical staff from vice factory managers 
down. And it is directly responsible to the factory manager.8
8 Lin Bin, Woguo qiye ganbu suzhi yanjiu (The quality of enterprise cadres in our country), M.A. 
Thesis, Sociology Department, Beijing University, 1988. Lin's above analysis was based on a field 
survey of 900 factories between 1986-87. My fieldwork findings generally confirmed his description. 
However, in many large key factories (still producing goods within the state plan) vice factory 
managers and the main three chiefs (Chief engineer, accountant and economist) are under the party's 
nomenklatura. Some factories have had this practice only since June 1989. Generally speaking,
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In addition to this structural change in the nomenklatura, there has been a further re­
classification of management cadres and technical cadres. First the management of technical 
cadres has become separated from the management of state cadres.9 They are regarded 
more as professionals, as they have become extracted from the cadre ranks. For instance, a 
factory's chief engineer may still be granted a vice deputy manager's official rank and enjoy 
special provisions that a state cadre at that level may be entitled to, such as in housing 
allocation and use of company cars. But he would be relieved of the key political privileges 
with state cadres of that level, like reading classified reports, hearing state and party docu­
ments, and so on .10 The fundamental difference is that their political duties are no longer 
emphasized, according to the Stipulation of the Central Leadership Group of Professional 
Posts. The only political requirement demanded of them is to abide by the law. Prominently 
excluded is their supposed commitment to the party and ideological indoctrination that 
every state cadre must possess.* 11 The management of these technical staff is largely based 
on their technical titles and the wage/rank system. That is, a factory works out a list of the 
technical staff of different ranks it needs. Then the factory management hires them on a 
contract basis. There is no doubt that the reform has depoliticised a large contingent of 
cadres . 12
Compared with the change in the personnel management of technical staff, the reform
managers at the workshop level and heads of administrative and technical offices are under the 
management list.
9 Here the term refers to the managers of the middle level or above who are called senior administrative 
cadres. There is a confusion in the terminology here because while we use the word manager, the 
Chinese often use the terms of manager and cadres to express the same thing. This is because a large 
proportion of these managers are still on the pay-roll designated to state cadres.
10 Information gathered from interviews with a number of senior factory technical staff. They are often 
invited to attend such political meetings though, as a sign of the party's intellectual policy.
11 Zhao Qizheng, Ganbu renshi gongzuo shouce (The handbook of cadre and personnel work), 
Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe (for internal distribution), 1986, pp. 23-28.
12 China Daily, June 18, 1992.
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of personnel management toward managerial cadres has been less dramatic. A difficult 
question remains unresolved, namely, whose interests should a manager represent: the state 
or the workers in his factory? A manager in China's state firms has long been regarded as a 
state representative assuming the missions of taking care of the state's property, implement­
ing the state's economic plans and distributing social welfare in behalf of the state. This 
makes the manager a state cadre responsible to the state bureaucracy that has appointed 
him. Now with marketization deepening, the internal pressure from workers and staff for 
more income has mounted, forcing managers to place the factory's interests before the 
state's. In 1985 the State Economic Commission surveyed several dozen factory managers 
on the question of which they believed they represented, the state or their factories. Only 
10% of them claimed they represented the state, while 20% said both and 70% held they 
worked for the good of their factories. The answer was a shock to some Chinese leaders. 
Deng Liqun criticised this as a serious situation where "the buttocks commanded the 
heads". These managers were asked to think whether they were good party members.13 
This new thinking of the majority of managers was indicative of the emerging independent 
interests of the industrial community in the wake of the market reform. More importantly, 
however, it reflected the breaking away of these managers from the mentality that their lot 
was organically tied to that of the state.
The decoupling of the managerial salary system from the general wage system of 
state cadres has helped foster this new perspective. After the 1985 enterprise wage reform, 
a manager's wage was decoupled from his administrative rank in the nomenklatura pay-roll 
system but linked to the post he occupied in the factory.14 The post wages are determined
13 Deng Liqun, "Zai qiye sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo yanjiuban jieye dianli shang de jianghua" (Speech 
at the closing ceremony of the study session on enterprise political and ideological work), in the 
State Economic Commission (ed.), Shixing Changzhang fuzezhihuo qiye dangwei ruhe gongzuo 
(How to conduct party work in the factories that practise the director responsibility system), Beijing: 
The PLA Political College Press, 1985, p. 28.
14 See for instance, Zuzhi renshi bao, 17 September 1992 and Guangming ribao, 12 January 1993.
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more by factories than the state. 15 The previous equation of state manager and state cadre 
started to alter, as a manager's new source of income gradually diminished their sense of 
belonging to the state, even though he still carries the dual status of being both a state 
manager and a state cadre in the eyes of the state. 16 This will be discussed further in 
Chapter Six.
The second precipitating factor is still unfolding, which is to delink an enterprise's 
official rank from the government rank system and to remove the posts of its managers 
from the state's nomenklatura. 17 One of the key features of nomenklatura, as earlier noted, 
is that state factory managers and government officials have been listed under the same 
cadre rank system. A county director and a county level factory director have similar offic­
ial status and special privileges. The new reform will do away with a firm's government 
rank and instead rank it according to its market profits and shares. With this, a factory 
manger will not possess any position paralleling the cadre ranks18, thus losing much of his
15 Xu Songtao, Zhongguo gongzi zhidu gaige (The reform of the Chinese wage system), Beijing: 
Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 1989, pp. 104-140.
16 This has been especially true since Deng made his South China tour in 1992. Not only do factory 
managers see themselves more as businessmen, but more and more cadres in government agencies 
have given up their positions and jumped into the "business seas". See the series of discussion on 
"jumping into the business seas" carried in Jingji ribao, January and February 1993.
17 The State Council's Personnel Ministry announced that from 1993 on, the Ministry would no longer 
issue compulsory cadre quotas to state firms. This meant that each factory could now appoint its 
own managers according to its needs. The realization of the reform will cut the ties of the industrial 
cadre system with nomenklatura. China Central Television, 5 March 1993.
18 Although the reform started in 1988, it progressed slowly. It has picked up speed since 1992. 
According to my interview with one leading figure of the SCRES in 1992, the goal should be 
achieved by 1996. Former minister Ma Hong named this reform as one of the precondition of 
China's market economy. Zhongguo jingying bao, 16 October 1992. At the moment it is difficult to 
gauge how deeply this reform has affected state firms. Increased media coverage indicates that many 
provinces have pushed the reform hard. For instance, Shenzhen, Hangzhou, Shanghai, Suzhou and a 
number of other large cities have abolished the state cadre system in state firms. Guangming ribao, 
28 January 1993.
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official capacity as a state cadre.
The aim of the reform of the factory cadre system is to create a new contingent of 
entrepreneurs in state firms. In the words of Minister Yuan Baohua, this is a process of 
professionalizing management cadres according to the rules of the market.19 This will 
further promote the trend of depoliticisation of the state firm, for entrepreneurs will have a 
diminished interest in the political controls dictated by the danwei system. Unlike a political 
cadre who is a generalist with multiple goals in his mission, as an executive of the party/ 
state, an entrepreneur takes management of a factory as a profession. Currently, managers 
still assume some of the cadre's political duties because the enterprises they manage still 
keep elements of a politicised damvei, such as political studies. However, what has made 
the difference strongly felt is the fact that their role has been politically neutralized. And 
their numbers far exceed that of party and political cadres.
4.1.2. The Contract Cadre System
The contract cadre reform has effected a great impact on the cadre system since it was 
formally implemented in 1984. One goal of this contract cadre reform is to tear open the 
closed nomenklatura system and give cadres the right to quit.20 At the same time a 
successful contenders will not have the permanent special status of a state cadre. A related 
factor, according to the personnel minister, Zhao Dongwan, is that the contract cadre 
system has paved a way for workers to compete for cadre positions. Moreover, it was the 
first time that factories had the autonomy to hire "cadres", as compared to the past practice 
of being assigned them by their administrative superiors.21
19 Zhongguo qiye bao, 22 June 1992.
20 Pu Guangzhong, "Shixian jihua zhidaoxia de pinrenzhi shirencai guanli zhidu gaige de yixiang 
zhongda gaige" (The realization of the contract system under the guidance of the plan is a major 
breakthrough in the management system of talent), in Shanghai Party Organization Department 
(ed.), Zuzhi renshi zhidu gaige tantao lunwenxuan (Selected assays on the reform of organization and 
personnel work), Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1986, p. 139.
21 Zhao Dongwan, "Yao jianchi he wanshan ganbu pinyong zhidu" (To hold and improve the cadre
4 Reform of Industrial Party Organisations—99
What should be pointed out is that the contract cadre system Minister Zhao talked 
about is only one of the systems in operation. There is a larger contingent of cadres who 
were appointed before the introduction of the contract system. By the end of 1990 about 
2.1 million contracted cadres had entered onto the factory cadre pay-roll. However, the 
number was only one-third of the total.22 This is another one-factory-two-systems 
phenomenon paralleling the co-existence of permanent workers and contract workers.
The reason for the emergence of the one factory two cadre systems is complicated. 
According to researchers of the Personnel Ministry:
The state's control over the industrial cadre quota had been traditionally tougher than that for govern­
ment agencies. For a long time the practice of "using workers as cadres without giving them cadre 
status" (yigong daigan) was an expedient measure to make up the shortage. But this was terminated 
in 1983. At the same time the marketization of factory operations further highlighted the need for a 
new brand of managers. So the demand for more capable managers became more pressing. Now, 
since the Enterprise Law has granted firms more autonomy in manager recruitment and the state still 
controls the cadre quotas, the easiest way to solve the problem of a shortage is to hire non-cadre- 
status cadres.23
The managerial shortage has become more acute in recent years. According to a 
survey by the Personnel Ministry of 17 state enterprises in Zhuzhou City, Hunan Province, 
there were 6,869 cadre posts available but only 5,184 state cadres on the rolls. So these 
factories hired 1,785 contract cadres, making up 24.1% of the total. And among the 5,184 
state cadres, there were many who did not meet the requirements of the new situation.24 
While it is hard to ask these unqualified cadres to resign right now, the general line of
contract system), Renshi zhengce fagui zhuankan, no. 11, 1991, p. 30. It should be noted that the 
Chinese usage o f 'cadres' here really means managerial staff.
22 Ibid.
23 Wen Wen, "Ganbu pinrenzhi de shijian yu tansuo" (The practice and study of the cadre contract 
system), Xingzheng yu renshi, no. 10, 1990, p. 6.
Ibid.24
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reform is to have all factory cadre posts filled by contract managers in due course, a 
situation similar to the phasing out of permanent workers.25
The reform of the permanent cadre system began as early as 1984, albeit on an 
experimental basis in a small number of state firms.26 Since early 1992, the drive to abolish 
the system has gathered momentum with the party's new consensus on marketization. By 
the end of the year Tianjin had pushed half of its state factories to put their state cadres on 
contract.27 Shanghai announced that it would soon delink all of its industrial state cadres 
from the government cadre system in terms of ranks and management and erase the status 
lines of the state cadres and workers.28 So the battle of hiring new contract cadres and 
putting the permanent cadres on contract has been joined. Some of the reform methods that 
are being tried are state prescribed, others have been designed as "local policy" (tu zhengce) 
by individual factories.29
The most thorough is the so-called qunyuan hetongzhi, or the all-staff- and-worker 
contract system. Under this reform all cadres are supposed to lose their state cadre status 
automatically. Anyone who obtains a management post through competition becomes 
enterprise management staff. They have to sign a contract with the factory management, 
usually for three years. During this period they are regarded as management staff but at the 
end of the period they have to compete with others for the post. If they fail they have to go 
back to the assembly lines.30 A second method is to assign a specific number of manage­
ment posts to contract managerial staff which had been previously held by permanent 
cadres. And the number will rise incrementally. In this way the coverage of contracted
25 This was reflected by the commitment of the Chinese leadership to smash the three "irons". The 
other two: the "iron rice bowl" for permanent workers, the "iron wage" for all staff.
26 Zhongguo qiye bao, 2 April 1992.
27 Guangming ribao, 15 September 1992.
28 Jingji ribao, 28 February 1993.
29 Jingji tizhi gaige yanjiu, no. 4, 1992, p. 23.
30 The United Survey Team, "Shanghai dier fangzhi jijiechang zhengqang huoli de diaochia" (Field 
survey on the Shanghai Second Textile Machine Plant), Qiye gaige tongxun, no. 1, 1992, p. 33.
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positions will encroach from the periphery to the core of factory management. In the end all 
the positions will become contract based. To this end, there will be no permanent cadres 
appointed in the transition allocated to the factory by the state. The third method is still 
more gradual. That is, factories will contract out any position that has become vacant. The 
new manager taking the position will have a fixed term in which he/she is under constant 
evaluation. Failure to meet the prescribed requirements means that the contract can be 
terminated any time during this period.31
The biggest barrier to the universalization of the contract cadre system has been the 
resistance of the cadres currently on the permanent state payroll, having watched the 
introduction of the labour contract system in the 1980s.32 Generally factory management 
has adopted a soft approach towards those regarded as inadequate state cadres, which can 
be described as "feeding them but giving them no work in management". For instance, 
there were 428 managerial posts with 385 state cadres on the payroll at the Zhuzhou Iron 
and Steel Plant. Among these 385 cadres 60 were thought incompetent. In addition to 43 
contract cadres filling that shortfall between 428 and 385, 60 more contract cadres were 
hired to substitute for the poorly regarded state cadres. However, these 60 state cadres 
were still employed. Some were sent to work in workshops, although they did not do any 
real work. Others simply became a "floating population" in the factory. But this was 
believed to be a worthwhile price for the maintenance of "stability and unity".33
Another question central to the contract cadre reform has been the creation of an eval­
uation system to assess the contract staff from firm managers downward. The system is 
composed of leadership and worker assessment, examinations and open tender. The prop-
31 This is the summary of information gathered in more than a dozen state factories during my two 
fieldwork trips in 1991 and 1992.
32 For an analysis of the contract worker system, see Pat Howard, "Rice Bowls and Job Security: The 
Urban Contract Labour System", The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 25, January 1991, 
pp. 93-114.
33 Wen Wen, "Ganbu pinrenzhi de shijian yu tansuo", pp. 6-8.
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ortion varies as applied to the different levels of staff. Generally the leadership evaluation 
carries more weight for top management posts and workers have an increased say as to the 
contract posts at the grassroots. The leadership assessment includes both an outside evalua­
tion process by a factory's bureaucratic superior for the appointment of top factory 
managers, and internal decisions by top managers to appoint middle-level staff. The evalua­
tion by workers is usually channelled through the Workers Congress, which solicits work­
ers' views on given candidates. Examinations are used more often to the technically related 
posts.34 The key contents of the assessment have been de-ideologized, with production and 
profit as the principal criteria. The security of careers begins to be less tied to whether they 
have exercised effective political control over workers in behalf of the party but depends 
more on whether they have fulfilled the contract terms centred on profit earnings.
The ways in which the industrial managerial staff currently enter contracts are in 
sharp contrast with the party's previous appointment mechanisms. While the latter was a 
strictly top-down process channelled through party forums, the contract system is a system 
with multiple inputs, including tendering, competitive running for office, workers' elect­
ions, self-marketing and direct administrative appointments. This has oriented personnel 
management towards an open and semi-open style of office. With the burgeoning practice 
of advertisements for the positions available within an enterprise, across the sector and 
region-wide, the possibility of job transfers at management level is being opened up. More­
over, because the terms of office of contract managers are linked to the targets of profits of 
the factory and workshop and to their own income as well as workers', the incentives and 
punitive measures begin to pressure managers to deliver. An increasing number of manag­
ers have been demoted due to their poor results in running production and sales. For 
instance, by the end of 1990, some 7,100 state cadres had lost their "iron chairs" in 
Shandong Province.35 At the enterprise level, among 190 state cadres in the Beijing Piano
34 Ibid.
35 Guangming ribao, 17 July 1992.
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Factory, 22 have been stripped of their cadre posts, including three factory level managers 
and 17 middle-level managers.36 One of my interviewees confirmed to me with some 
bitterness in 1991 that he had to go back to the assembly lines after his workshop failed to 
fulfil the production quota under his management as a workshop director. Although it is 
impossible to determine how deep this reform has already cut into the factory state cadre 
system, its development has marked the beginning of the end of the system of 
nomenklatura in the state sector.
Generally speaking, four types of contract-based appointment have been common. 
The first is through a recommendation process by individual workers and the Workers 
Congress. As stated earlier, low-level managers are often contracted this way. The rationale 
is that low-level posts require strong organizing ability, familiarity with basic machine 
operations and good guanxi with co-workers to put through management policies. Because 
the bulk of contract cadres are at a low rank, they constitute a near-majority of managerial 
staff in the new system. In the 17 factories in Zhuzhou City, for instance, contract cadres in 
this lower group made up 45% of all contracts.37 As far as the appointment process is 
concerned, usually multiple candidates are put forward for section and workshop director­
ships. Sometimes after a lengthy consultation, including taking suggestions from party 
cells, a vote is cast and those who win the most ballots are appointed by the manager of the 
factory.38
The second method is the direct-appointment system. It covers top and middle levels 
of managers. Often the appointments of factory managers are made by the industrial 
bureaus, with a fixed term contract, usually hand in hand with a contracted production and 
profits responsibility system that the bureaus enter into with the factories concerned. And
36 Xiao Wei, "Xia de xuewen" (The way of stepping down), Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 5,1992, p.
6 .
37 Wen Wen, pp. 6-7.
3 8 The information was obtained in a number of factories in Beijing and Hunan in 1991 and 1992.
There is no way at this stage to determine how widespread it is.
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these managers further appoint their deputies. The terms are specified at the very beginning: 
that the appointees will not have an "iron chair" and that their cadre status will last only as 
long as the contract stays valid.39 At lower levels, the shop directors appoint their major 
aides and section chiefs. And all the appointees are personally responsible to those who 
appoint them.
The third method is to appoint managers through a comprehensive bidding system 
both at the factory and middle management levels. About 40% of state firms now practise 
this reform one way or another and it is recommended as the basic form of recruitment for 
professionalized managers in the future.40 The bidding has been mainly conducted through 
two channels: from within a factory and from outside through advertisement. The former 
method is pursued mostly by large and medium-scale enterprises believed to possess 
enough competent managerial staff. For small firms, the external system of tendering is 
often carried out. The procedures for both are similar, usually consisting of seven steps: 1) 
advertising positions with descriptions of duties; 2) soliciting submissions with detailed 
plans of management; 3) selection inputs by bureaucratic superiors and shortlisting of 
candidates, 4) debates among contestants; 5) workers’ evaluation and vote; 6) the signing 
of the contract and, 7) the process to notarise the contract by a legal body. The main goals 
are to give wider scope to participation of contestants and mass assessments, thus 
enhancing the authority of the successful candidates in running factories.41
The fourth method is appointment based on both written and practical examinations, 
including tests for technical and managerial skills. The appointees in this category are 
normally technical staff. They have to go through a process of application, examination,
39 The Central Organization Department and the Personnel Ministry, "Quanmin suoyouzhi qiye 
pinyongzhi ganbu guanli zhanxing guiding" (The provisional regulation of contract cadres in state 
enterprises), Renfafa, no. 5, 1991, (The Personnel Ministry, issue no. 5, 1991).
40. Tang Daiwang, et al., Xiandai renshi guanlixue jiaocheng (The modem personnel management 
course), Beijing: Zhongguo renshi chubanshe, 1990, p. 324.
41 Interview with a number of contracted managers in Beijing in 1991.
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assessment and entry into contracts. This reform is aimed at raising the competence of 
managerial and technical personnel.
However, it is naive to think that the Chinese party/state will relinquish control over 
this large contingent of contract managers. The Central Organization Department and the 
Personnel Ministry clearly stipulated that contract cadres in state firms must be incorporated 
into the unified management of the state plan. According to the Provisional Regulation of 
Contract Cadres in State Firms, every contract manager must fill in a Contract Evaluation 
Form which has to be approved by the factory's administrative superior.42 One copy of the 
form should be kept in the cadre personnel department of the local government. The 
political requirements for permanent state cadres should also be stated in the contract. 
Moreover, the party committees should discuss the major appointments of contract 
managers. The Regulation also erects barriers for contract cadres to seek transfers through 
themselves terminating contracts. It stipulates: that the contract managers in the key areas of 
responsibility and the major technical personnel must apply for approval from their danwei 
before the contract can be retrieved. This has imposed conditions on the badly needed 
professionals who are most likely to quit. Stipulations for contract managers include a 
requirement of a senior high school certificate, three years service at minimum, normally 
under 35 years of age and half a year probation period.43
It is clear that the control of contract managers is much weaker than with state cadres. 
This is mainly because the Regulation leaves it open for contract managers to terminate their 
contract for better positions elsewhere.44 Certainly this is more the case for skilled technical
42 The Personnel Ministry, issue no. 5, 1991.
43 These conditions are normal requirements set by any employers but when coupled with the control of 
dossiers, household registration, party organization relations, they may be effective means of 
political controls. The announcement that from 3 March 1993 the Personnel Ministry would not 
allocate any cadre quotas mentioned earlier will make this Regulation less forceful, although more 
time is needed to see the real results.
44 The Regulation stipulates that contract cadres may raise the question of cancelling the contract two 
months prior to their leaving the posts.
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staff than for formerly blue-collar contract managers, who regard their promotion a big step 
forward in their career and are conditioned by this.45 At the same time, similar to the 
phenomenon where contract labourers seek to change their status to permanent workers, 
there have been efforts in many regions for contract cadres to be made permanent.46 This 
has not only betrayed the purpose of the reform but given rise to a factionalized 
management, as managers at different levels used their newly acquired power to enlarge 
their clientelist networks.
To sum up, the removal of an "iron chair" for both political cadres and managerial 
staff has been unfolding in the current campaign to change the operational mechanisms in 
state factories. Even though this change cannot be predicted as leading to the eventual 
erosion of the different political status of cadres and workers, one outcome of the reform 
efforts has been less fear among workers towards cadres on contract, now that the latter 
increasingly present themselves as employees of a corporatized firm with much weaker 
links with the party/state. The period of their control over workers' life and work has 
become fixed, too.
4.2. The Party’s Key Organizational Reforms
In addition to the reform of the party's appointment system, the party presence in 
state firms has been effectively reduced by a series of other reforms, such as the 
amalgamation of party offices at the factory level. Of particular significance for the 
relaxation of pressures on workers was the transfer of party offices of security affairs to the 
management. At the same time the vertical command system linking the party's industrial
45 Jingji ribao carried a sensational debate in February 1993 on what has gone wrong with China's 
economic system. The debate followed a story that the three "chiefs" (chief engineer, chief accountant 
and chief economist) of the Daliang Mechanical Plant, the biggest in the country, had "fled" to work 
at a nearby township factory without permission and dossiers and they brought 50 major technical 
staff with them. Surprisingly, most of the discussants, including the Governor of Liaoning, 
approved the action.
46 Zhao Dongwan, p. 31.
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sectoral offices and their factory counterparts has also begun to undergo structural changes 
under the principle of shudi guanli, namely, the command chain of the industrial party 
system would be transferred from its vertical and sectoral bureaucratic lines to the party's 
local offices where the factories were situated.
4.2.1. Streamlining Party Bodies
With the basic change of party functions in state firms, the question of redundant 
party bodies and excessive full-time party functionaries became an urgent matter to be addr­
essed. In September 1986 Deng Xiaoping, having achieved his goal of abolishing the party 
command system, again pressed to streamline the party's functional bodies in enterpri­
ses.47 On 28 April 1988 the Central Committee issued a circular on implementing the 
Enterprise Law. The document categorically stipulated:
From now on the party committees and their secretaries of every level in state firms should be elect­
ed through multiple candidatures. The full-time party cadres and functional bodies should be limited 
to a minimum. Party bodies that assume management missions should be transferred to manage­
ment. Large factories may keep full-time party secretaries, vice secretaries and a few crack offices. 
Small factories in principle should not maintain full time party cadres and functional bodies. The 
medium-scale factories may or may not have full-time party cadres and bodies. It should be decided 
by the factory itself.48
This central decree initiated a major overhaul of the factories' party control system. 
Now that the factory's party organization department had an ever smaller list of 
nomenklatura, as mentioned in the previous section, it had not had much in daily work. 
The party's propaganda department encountered the same problem. Consequently party 
committees of many medium and small firms were stripped of their organization and 
propaganda departments, amounting to severing the two powerful arms with which the
47 Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, p. 156.
48 Zhang Zhanbin, p. 285.
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party had extended its influence into major areas of factory management and workers' 
everyday life. The number of party bodies and functionaries in large factories were also 
deeply cut.
The Changye Bearing Factory, with more than 3,000 workers, provides an example 
of a medium-sized firm. Before the party's institutional streamlining, it maintained three 
departments, three offices and one committee under the factory party committee. 47 full­
time party cadres worked in these bodies. After the streamlining, the party structure 
comprised only one department and one committee staffed by seven people. Three agencies 
— the militia department, the office for suppressing economic crimes and the office of 
correspondence and contacts — were transferred to the management system.49 The 
departments of organization and propaganda were merged into the party committee's 
general office to form the Party Work Department. Only the Party Discipline Inspection 
Committees was preserved, although its staff was cut significantly. All party branch 
secretaries in the management sections and workshops became part-time. The seven full­
time party cadres included the party secretary, concurrently heading the Party Work 
Department, and three functionaries in the Party W ork Department, respectively in charge 
of organization work, propaganda and everyday office maintenance. The deputy party 
secretary was also the head of the Party Discipline Inspection Committee which included 
the remaining two party cadres, with one managing disciplinary affairs and the other party 
member education.50
The Changye case gives a good account of institutional trimming at a medium-scale 
state firm. But I found in a dozen factories of similar size in Beijing and Hunan in 1991 that 
the party organizations there had not cut their personnel as deeply as Changye. The 
difference rested on the restoration of party organs in 1989 post-Tiananmen. Generally
49 The office of mass correspondence and contact held the mission of handling people's letters of
complaints and suggestions, personal visits on certain issues and very often xiaobaogao, or "big
brother’s" reports.
50 Guangming ribao, 13 December 1987.
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speaking, the new criterion for whether the party in medium-scale firms should have 
departments of organization and propaganda was, according to Politburo member Li 
Ximing, whether the number of workers in these factories exceeded 1,000.51
Most large enterprises still keep a full-fledged party structure consisting of the 
departments of propaganda, organization, political security and united front work, offices 
of general affairs, supervision, correspondence and contacts, the party school and the 
discipline inspection committee. In many giant factories, such as the Daqing Oil Field, 
these party organs exist not only at the corporation level, but also at the factory and sub­
factory levels, forming a party machine. Despite this, the overall number of full-time party 
cadres has been greatly reduced to the centrally prescribed ratio of 1:100, although in most 
of these big corporations the ratio has been slightly higher. For instance, the ratio at the 
Capital Iron and Steel Corporation of Beijing has been 1.4: 100 since the late 1980s.52
At the more than 430,000 small state firms, the streamlining of party organizations 
has affected the party's control over the urban population most, because the workers in 
these small concerns make up 70%of the state sector workforce. As stated earlier, it was 
required that in principle there should not be any full-time party bodies and cadres in such 
small factories. The party work is to be done by party member activists. In reality, 
however, there is no uniformity about the party structure there for several reasons. Firstly, 
there is a wide range of "small state firms", as this covers firms with anything from several 
dozen to several hundred staff. So the number of party members varies significantly. 
Secondly, under different control mechanisms, such as the ministries' tiaotiao or the 
localities' kuaikuai, the party structure tends to be tight or loose. Generally, they appear 
tight in the tiaotiao system. But even under the kuaikuai system the party structure tends to 
be tighter in provincial capital cities than in counties or townships.53 I visited five small
51 Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 6, 1990, p. 31.
52 Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 5, 1991, p. 20.
53 Most of ministerial factories are large and medium-sized. The small factories are usually important
specialized factories servicing the large ones. So the party work has been traditionally stronger. In
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firms in Haidian District, Beijing, in 1992 and found each of them had a full-time party 
secretary. Three of them even had a party branch office with a full-time clerk handling 
everyday work. But when I surveyed another five small firms in Hengyang City, Hunan, 
there was only one full-time party secretary. Among the other four, two party-member 
managers concurrently held the party secretary position, and the final two secretaries were 
old workers.54
There has also been wide coverage in the Chinese media of the streamlining reform in 
small state firms, although the contents are often lop-sided to show how the party bodies 
have been rationalized. According to a 1988 survey of 121 small firms by the party 
organization department of Penglai County, Shandong Province, only 14 had a full-time 
party secretary. The rest were all part-timers elected by the firms' party members.55 
Another report revealed, more surprisingly, that in 725 factories and business firms in 
Shacheng District, Hangzhou City, which employed 16,934 workers, there were only 92 
party and political cadres and among them 53 were only part-timers, with their principal 
duties falling outside party and political work. Their main duties were those of managers, 
cooks, office secretaries, and shop assistants. As far as party and political offices were 
concerned, 80% of these 725 firms had none whatsoever.56
However difficult it may be to assess the exact situation of the party structure in small 
firms, it is fairly clear that it is fragmented in the majority of them, since the strength of any
addition, the number of small ministerial factories is small, thus making it easier to control from the 
above, while under the kuaikuai system, the number of factories is far larger and the levels of control 
are multiple.
54 These factories contain between 70 and 300 workers. Only one of these factories is under the 
Electronic Industry Ministry. All the others are local.
55 Yu Shaoxuan, "Penglaixian qiye dangde gongzuo chuxian sige bianhua" (The four emerging changes 
in party work in Penglai County's enterprises), Zhibu shenghuo (Shandong), no. 12, 1988, p. 36.
56 Zhou Zhibin, "Qiye sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo baoruo de shehuixue sikao" (A sociological analysis 
of the weakness of political and ideological work in enterprises), Shehuixue yanjiu (Sociological 
Studies), no. 2, 1990, pp. 55-56.
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political organization is intimately linked to its organizational context. This is due mainly to 
the fact that a large proportion of the small firms have been contracted and leased out to 
individuals .57 One party document stated that party work in small leased firms was 
different from large and medium-scale factories in that the party cells there did not assume 
concrete supervisory roles.58 Since contractors have full authority in production, personnel 
affairs and the disposal of profits, the party cells are truly subordinate. Moreover, the party 
structures there tend to be loose because there is no regular party activity, as the contractors 
do not allow these activities to take place during the working hours and party members 
have no interest to engage in party activities after work.59
The streamlining reform also shifted the security apparatus from the party system to 
the management. In the past, security controls had had two chief missions:60 first, the 
maintenance of so-called "political security", which monitored the political attitudes of 
workers; and secondly, to protect the firm from criminal offences. The political and public 
security personnel were part of the system of political cadres and served as the sources of 
control, as indicated by the numerous cases of political and criminal charges brought 
against workers before the reform.
Now the mission of political security has largely been handed over to the local public 
and state security bureaus. However, the latter's limited resources allow them only to
5 7 For instance, more than 60% of the 7,000 small factories in Beijing had been contracted or leased out
by the end of 1992 and it is planned that more will be leased out before October of 1993. Jingji 
ribao, 4 March 1993.
58 Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 4, 1990, p. 23.
5 9 Zhuo Zhibin, p. 56. Also information gathered from talking to several party members of small state 
firms in 1991 and 1992.
60 During my field work I made inquiries on a dozen occasions about the situation of the security 
apparatus. Except for a few large factories, the department of political security under the party 
committee in most factories was merged into the public security department within the management 
system.
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watch the black-listed political dissidents.61 Normally, legal and administrative procedures 
have become tighter for the pressing of counter-revolutionary charges against ordinary 
workers. This means that although factory party cadres are still required to monitor the 
"abnormal actions" around them, they are not supposed to forge charges against workers at 
will, as they used to do in the Mao era. Here again, some of the political cadres still keep to 
the habit of harassing people (zhengren), and violations of workers' political rights 
continue. However, the removal of the institutional framework for zhengren from the party 
cells has made a difference for organized oppression in terms of its effectiveness.62
The public security department's tasks have been reoriented towards safeguarding 
production in step with the central concerns of factory managers. Most factory managers I 
interviewed in China in 1991 expressed contempt for the past practice of seeing everything 
from a political angle. In contrast to their previous focus on class struggle, the public 
security people now interpret a potentially offensive act more from the perspective of law- 
and-order than as anti-party and state. This has reduced the political tensions in factories. 
Although workers often show genuine annoyance towards the security people, they agree
61 Information gathered from my field work. However, the factory security department remains the first 
contact of the local government’s public security bureaus. This was especially true immediately after 
June 4 when the police conducted the search for anti-government activists.
62 It is interesting to note that in a few dozen factories I visited in 1991 and 1992, when I asked 
factories cadres about how they had handled political dissidents, they all answered that there were no 
political dissidents in their factories. They said there were workers with backward attitudes, but when 
dealing with them, cadres reportedly never linked the cases of violation of work discipline to political 
crimes. One party cadre told me that everybody complained against some party policies and some 
party leaders, even in party meetings. By the standard of the Cultural Revolution, everyone could be 
counted as an anti-party element. But now, who cared? However, most of the party cadres I inter­
viewed agreed that the demarcation line was whether people took organized actions. Even a non­
political organized action, such as a strike for wage raises, would be interpreted as very serious, and 
would be immediately reported to the party and government superiors. It is in this sense that the 
workers' political rights were constandy violated.
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that they are politically less fearful when approached.63 Indeed, since the 14th Congress, 
the 1989 reversal has been reversed.
Regarding state firms as a whole, the streamlining went quite deep. According to Gao 
Qixiang, Beijing's deputy organization boss, since the streamlining began, 70% to 80% of 
state factories nationwide had been affected one way or another, with party and political 
cadres halved.64 Now the majority of factories have a very fragmented party structure.65 
Even in big factories, what I found in 1991 and 1992 convinced me that the party structure 
there could no longer be compared with any time before the Dengist reform. This is not 
only related to what party organs a factory may have but also to what they can do.
4.2.2. The Concurrent System
What has further weakened the authority of party committees was a reform called "the 
concurrent system" (jianrenzhi). Under this, the post of party boss was made part-time and 
the secretaries' principal responsibility became nonparty, either in management or in other 
work. The most common form has been for managers to take the party portfolio. The 
concurrent system had not been uncommon throughout the history of the PRC, yet a 
person now takes both the party and manager portfolios, most often because he is factory 
or workshop manager rather than the other way round, decisively reversing the situation 
prevalent before the reform period.
The party posts at the factory level and workshop are filled differently. Although 
usually party heads at both levels are elected through ballots of ordinary party members, the 
election of the higher level is often a matter of formality with the major candidates decided
63 As I discovered in the interviews, most of these security people were core members of managers and 
they acted as body guard for their bosses. Therefore, they became the target of attack by workers 
whenever the labour/management relations became tense.
64 Gao Qixiang, "Cong shige fangmian tan Zhao Ziyang tongzhi gangjian guandian de cuowu" (Talk 
from ten directions on Zhao Ziyang's mistakes on the party building), Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 
8, 1990, p. 19.
65 Information from a cadre in the Central Organization Department in 1992.
4 Reform o f Industrial Party Organisations—114
by the factory’s superior. In terms of procedures the appointment of a manager and the 
election of a party secretary are very different. Yet the Chinese leadership has pushed the 
concurrent system regardless of this procedural confusion. This means that the appointment 
of a manager has to precede the party election, which by itself indicates the belittled party 
role.66 At the workshop level, the elected head may be either a workshop manager or just a 
worker. The former seems to constitute the majority in large factories while the latter is 
often seen in small plants where managers are often non-party members.67
The concurrent system has been carried out in a flexible manner. The party centre had 
some broad guidelines for it, such as those stated earlier that in principle small plants 
should have no full-time party organs and cadres, large ones are to deploy full-time party 
offices and secretaries and the medium-scale firms decide by themselves. Later on new 
guidelines were introduced to specify different situations. Generally factory and workshop 
managers were encouraged to take the party posts if they were "politically qualified" and 
full-time party secretaries were encouraged to take the deputy factory or workshop 
manager's position in order to assist managers better in the areas of political and ideological 
work.68 After June 4 1989, with renewed emphasis on party control, some qualifiers were 
added to the concurrent reform, although the pre-June 4 practice was not fundamentally 
reversed. For instance, it was stipulated that full-time party secretaries should be restored in 
workshops with more than 100 workers.69 Managers in large factories should in principle 
not assume the party post. But after Deng's South China tour the pendulum swung back 
again. For instance, the Hubei provincial Party Committee decreed that the concurrent 
system should be implemented in all state firms in the province, with factory managers
66 Information gathered from interviews with a cadre in Beijing Municipal Party Committee's Industry 
Department in 1992.
67 This is the summary of the newspaper and journalistic coverage of the concurrent reform, which is 
quite abundant. A few of my interviewees confirmed this.
68 Zhibu shenghuo (Shandong), no. 11, 1989, p. 24.
69 Guandao zhenggong yanjiu, no. 28, 1992, p. 90.
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assuming the party duties as well. This decision was significant because it was the first 
hard stipulation on the issue versus the centre's past decrees, which always gave a flexible 
choice at the grassroots. In China's political system it is impossible to announce such a 
decision without the top leadership's acquiescence. This may herald a new impetus to 
deepen the concurrent system, with the far-reaching impact of further weakening the 
party's influence in state enterprises.
First, combining the posts normally obliges the person to regard the party job as a 
"sideline occupation", although it is beneficial for him to run the factory through controlling 
both powerful subsystems. One such person I talked to in 1991 revealed that management 
work commanded most of his attention. He remarked: "Contracted production and profit 
responsibility is certainly the harder task, into which I have to put most of my energy. To 
me, the party work is mainly a sort of trouble-shooting that helps me to run management". 
He gave an example of what he meant by trouble-shooting:
When I decided to "rationalize” a number of workers and staff (have them leave their posts), many of 
them were angry. They complained that they had been working for the factory for the better part of 
their lives. It was not fair that the factory wanted to get rid of them now that they had become old. 
Production was disrupted. So I asked the party and union cadres to talk to them one by one and find 
ways to allay their frustration. They did a good job. First they talked to the party members involved 
and then asked these party members to talk to others. At the same time the party and union systems 
tried to arrange posts for some of them in the factory's service company. Other measures were also 
taken to help them adjust to the situation. For instance, the factory introduced some of them with 
skills to part-time work in a nearby village factory which was our client. In this way the dispute was 
settled fairly smoothly. All I did was to let the party and union cadres take control of the matter.70
Clearly this party work diminishes the mission traditionally upheld by the party 
command system. Yet it is natural that factory management shifts the party machine to
70 Interview with the manager of the Beijing Heavy Machine Plant in 1991.
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serve its own purposes more than to take care of political affairs. This approach is more 
apparent at lower levels of management, as when a workshop manager is also a party 
branch secretary. When the secretary is merely an ordinary worker, the subordination of 
the party's agenda to the management's agenda will also be strongly perceived. This state 
of laxity in party work has become so serious that some firms decreed that the managers 
have to assign a proportion of their time for party work and that this will be one of the 
criteria in their contract assessment. For instance, the Shanghai Watch Factory's party 
committee stipulated that all managers who were concurrently party secretaries had to 
devote 60% of their time to political and ideological work.71
4.2.3. The Experiment in the Party's Industrial Control System
The party's 13th Congress put forward a far-reaching institutional reform for the 
state sector called shudi guanli or localized management of the industrial party affairs. Be­
tween the finish of the Congress and June 1989 the reform was steadily unfolding nation­
wide on an experimental basis. As required by the party centre, every province had to ass­
ign one prefecture plus a few industrial sectors to attempt the reform and national universal­
ization would follow when conditions became ripe.72 For instance, according to the politic­
al reform plan by the Beijing Party Committee, the reform would involve 2,100 enterprises 
and 400,000 party members. From 1988 the reform was carried out in Beijing's East City 
District and the municipal electronics industry, involving 333 plants in the District with 
165,000 workers including 25,000 party members and 103 plants in the electronics sector 
that employed 107,000 workers with about 20,000 party members.73
71 Zhibu shenghuo (Shandong), no. 2, 1989, p. 34. However, the story did not cover how the managers 
responded to such a demand.
72 An internal document drafted by the Central Political Reform Office and circulated by the CC in 
1987. For instance, in Shandong, the Zibo Prefecture was the experimental point and in Shanghai, 
Minhang District.
73 See two party documents, "Guanyuzhai dongchengqu jinxing qiye shiye danwei dangzuzhi shudi 
liangdao shidian de yijian" (The decision regarding shudi guanli in the East City District); and
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What should be made clear is that the shudi guanli reform has little to do with the 
familiar theme of tiaotiao and kuaikuai. Tiaotiao and kuaikuai depict the arrangement of ad­
ministrative controls over a factory along the lines of ministerial (branches) or local (areas), 
in terms of centralization or decentralization of bureaucratic power. It also involves the 
arrangement of property relations between the central and local government. Shudi guanli is 
a mechanism for the local management of party affairs in industries, which dose not change 
enterprise/government relations in terms of the administrative hierarchy, economic and 
property relations and the vertical manager control system. It simply indicates removing the 
party system from the industrial sectoral system (xitong) and relocating it under the local 
party office. As a result, the vertical and sectoral party command bodies are abolished once 
the reform is completed.74
The procedures are quite complicated, itself indicative of the depth of the reform. The 
first step is to distinguish various sizes of firms and to transfer their organization (leader­
ship) ties to the city level for large firms, to the county and district for medium-sized firms, 
and to the township or street party offices for small firms. The hierarchical ties of the Com­
munist Youth League and trade unions were to be transferred at the same time. The second 
step is to hand over the list of party members and cadres, the list of the party-sponsored 
activists, and the registration forms of the party's leading cadres. Then the factory's party 
cells are to submit a number of reports on the general situation of their party members, on 
the party's mass relations, and the state of affairs of their firms both politically and econ­
omically.
"Guanyuzhai Beijingshi dianzi gongye qishiye danwei jinxing dangzuzhi shudi liangdao shidian de 
yijian" (The decision regarding to carry out shudi guanli in the municipal electronic industry), 
Beijing shi gaige shinian (The ten years of reform in Beijing City), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 
1988, pp. 873-876.
74 Yan Zhi, "Qishiye danwei dangzuzhi shixing shudihua guanli wenda" (Questions and answers on 
localizing party management concerning party cells in the industrial and other non government 
units), Zhibu shenghuo (Shandong), no. 5, 1988, p. 27.
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In many ways the reform to localize the party's industrial leadership was a significant 
step in separating the functions of party control, government administration and enterprise 
management. The combination of the party control and state administration in the govern­
ment hierarchy had been the organizational base of the party/state upon which totalitarian 
reach was extended to all social units, as the bureaucratic status of industrial danwei rested 
upon delegated authority through this top-down administrative process. The logic of the 
reform is this: if the factory's party work is transferred to the local party offices, the 
functions of the party bodies in the sectoral industrial bureaus would have to shift to its 
internal affairs, as they would have no more subordinate party networks. In other words, if 
the party system is ejected from the industrial bureaus, it may pave the way for a thorough 
separation of party and management in plants under them, since the bureaus will not issue 
concrete political tasks. So from an institutional point of view, the reform has been 
regarded as a key measure to depoliticise state firms.75
This localization of party bodies was to transform the party industrial leadership from 
direct to indirect forms at the grassroots. The direct control originated from the administrat­
ive hierarchy and was characterised by controls over finance, personnel and material alloc­
ations. While the local party office had a responsibility to oversee the factory's party work, 
the ranks, pay and transfers of a factory's personnel were not decided locally, at least not at 
the first stage.76 And the local party offices did not have financial clout over the factories 
involved because of the different channels of funding. Therefore, with no direct 
bureaucratic links with firms still under sectoral command, the institutional framework 
would be weak for party cadres from the local office to have any effective say in a factory's 
internal affairs. Control thus would tend to be not only indirect but loose. Local party 
cadres previously had expressed the worry that "their small temple (local party office) was
75 Ibid, p. 28.
76 Organization Department of the Zibo Municipal Party Committee, "Ziboshi jiji tuijin shudi lingdao 
gongzuo" (Zibo City is pushing hard the work to localize party industrial leadership), Zhibu sheng- 
huo (Shandong), no. 6, 1988, p. 16.
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intruded upon by big monks (factories with higher administrative ranks)" .77
As far as factory party cadres are concerned, the reform presented a serious threat to 
their political career. Once the reform was in place, the party and management personnel 
systems would become separated. Managers were still appointed by the factories' superior 
bureaus. Party cadres, however, would be mainly elected and under the management of the 
local party office.78 In the past, opportunities for the cadres' promotion, material benefits 
and official privileges were attached to their vertically accorded status within each industrial 
system (xitong). Now the reform placed the factory party committees under the control of 
local party offices of vastly different systems, which normally had their own preferred 
personnel for advancement.79
At the same time the party cadres in the factories also began to worry that the reform 
would somewhat undercut their roots of power, as they now could rely less on the party's 
organizational backing. The organizational strength of the factory's party cells have 
stemmed from the party's vertically radiated political status and administrative ranks. 
Although the party document stipulated that factories would be properly linked to the 
various levels of governments, it is likely that many factory party committees would be 
reduced in official rank, thus losing access to their previous political and administrative 
status and privileges. For instance, when the organizational ties were arranged horizontally 
under shudi guanli, a factory party secretary at the county level may have to take orders 
from a local party boss who is only a township party head. In so doing, his own status is 
downgraded.
The designers of the reform regarded shudi guanli as an initial step in a profound
77 Ibid.
79 Zhibu shenghuo (Shanghai), no. 1, 1988, p. 12.
79 Information gathered from interviews with a number of party cadres under the reform. However, my 
impression was that the real threat was not posed to them since their ranks remained the same but to 
their successors, because it would be difficult for the latter to climb the industrial sectoral ladders if 
the reform indeed phases out the sectoral party hierarchy.
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organizational reform of the party's basic units in the state sector. This reform was 
envisaged and promoted by the party's research bodies on political reform in the Tigaisuo 
and the Central Party School. The guiding principles were adopted from the Soviet model 
of a localized industrial party structure.80 According to the researchers, the future form for 
the party's presence in firms should be a system of party representatives. Under this, the 
local party committees of the levels of province, county and township send one 
representative to the state factories respectively under their jurisdiction. This representative 
is not to be a formal member of the factory nor does his income derive from it. The party 
representative is not to be involved in the factory's routine management but simply runs its 
party committee, which is entirely composed of elected members. His main mission is to 
take care of the party's internal affairs, although he can report any unlawful operations of 
factory management to higher party and state authorities, as required by his role of 
supervision .81
These steps are designed as a bridge step in the transition to the complete removal of 
all party committees in non-political units in China, as proposed by the reformers.82 The 
logic of their point is not hard to grasp. If the leading role of a party committee is now non­
existent in millions of collective, private and joint venture concerns, there is no reason why 
this cannot be copied in state firms. Looking into the not-too-distant future, the tight party 
control in state firms will become less meaningful when the non-state sector, where the 
party committees can only play an insignificant role in overall management, may account
80 Interview with researchers from the Central Party School in 1991. The idea can be found in Wang 
Yiqing, "Guanyu dazhongxing guoying qiye shixing dangdaibiao zhi de guoxiang" (The proposal on 
the establishment of the party representative system in the large and medium sized state firms), in 
Nie Gaomin, et al. (eds.), Dangzheng fenkai lilun tantao (Study on the theory of separating the party 
and government), Beijing, Chunqiu chubanshe, 1987, pp. 178-183.
81 Ibid.
82 Harry Harding, "China's Political Reforms", in Charles Morrison & Robert Demberger (eds.), Asia- 
Pacific Report: China in the Reform Era, Honolulu: East-West Centre, 1989, p. 48.
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for up to three-quarters of China's economy by the turn of this century.83 Even in the 
considerable proportion of large and medium-sized state firms which have been injected 
with foreign capital and management, the way the party committees function is now very 
different from before.84 In fact, in the majority of joint ventures and solely foreign- 
capitalized firms, the party system has already been operating in a way similar to the party 
representative system proposed by reformers.85
In my talks with the proponents of the party representative system, some of them 
alluded to a similar party control model used by the KMT in China before 1949 and 
subsequently in Taiwan, where its party committees were set up only at county (xian) 
government level or above. They believed that this fairly loose party structure at the 
grassroots did not really weaken the KMT's monopoly of power at the apex. In their 
minds, the abolition of the party's basic cells could liberalize the grassroots political 
atmosphere in the interest of boosting economic development but would not affect the 
party's monopoly of power at the state level if the party could sufficiently control the major 
appointments in government at various levels.86 Indeed, this has been happening at the 
central and provincial levels since the 14th Party Congress. While political liberalization 
deepens at the grassroots, the party has taken actions to let the first party secretary in 
provinces assume the Chairship of the Provincial People's Congress and a key central party 
leader has become chair of the Standing Committee of the NPC, thus reversing a long 
practice that only second-line party leaders took the posts as a reward for their retirement.
83 Asian Bank Report 1992, Reuters, 11 April 1992.
84 Jingji ribao, 14 February 1993.
85 Several characteristics in the party work in these factories are: 1) the party cadres are all doing their 
party work part-time; 2) party committees often have to work under the name of the trade unions; 3) 
party activities exist at a minimum level. There is a good amount of media coverage of this, for inst­
ance, Lei Lixin, "Zenyang danghao waizi qiye dangzuzhi de shuji" (How to do a good job as a party 
secretary in a foreign owned factory), Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 5, 1992, pp. 8-11.1 also visited 
a number of these factories in Beijing and Guangdong and obtained the same impression.
86 Information gathered during a few visits to the Cenüal Party School in 1991.
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From the 8th National People's Congress onward, the People's Congresses at various 
levels play a more active role in government appointments, and the party exercises firmer 
control over them: instead of directly controlling government appointments, it will control 
them through tightened control over the People's Congresses.
The massacre of 1989 and its aftermath greatly slowed down the experiment, as the 
party leadership was more concerned with immediate control of the industrial population. 
Whether the experiment will be universalized still remains a question four years after June 
4. However, what is more relevant to the dissertation is that the philosophical ideas behind 
the reform have been kept very much alive. The CCP does not seem to have many choices 
if it wants to have a rapid economic development based on the market. This is vividly 
demonstrated by the CCP's decision to revoke some industrial ministries at the central level 
and their bureaus at the regional and local levels.87 With the carrier of the vertical party 
control system, the sectoral dictatorship, gone, it is only a matter of time before the party 
has to move the management of its industrial bodies under local command.
87 This is the theme of the current reform of the administrative system. The bureaus will be replace by 
either general companies (shareholding companies) or the official industrial associations. In fact, a 
large number of industrial bureaus have already been abolished at the county, city and provincial lev­
els. For instance, Shanghai abolished 14 industrial bureaus in 1992 with the replacement of 14 
industrial associations. Jingji ribao, 16 October 1992. Chapters 8 and 9 will discuss this in detail.
Chapter 5
Withering of the Party's Industrial Apparatus
The series of reforms in the party's internal structure at the factory level has greatly 
affected the cohesiveness of the party organizations there. According to Daniel Katz and 
Robert Kahn, like any organic bodies, an organization may gradually wither, dismember 
and die. So 'negative entropy' is very important for the health of an organization. 1 The 
organizational pathologies that Harry Harding pointed out more than ten years ago in his 
study of the CCP have been particularly relevant to the state of affairs of the CCP's 
industrial cells in the reform era. It is clear that the party's problems of personnel, structure 
and public alienation have deteriorated to a serious degree.2
Take personnel problems as an example. Lack of commitment and skills to maintain 
nominal activities has become more and more evident. The lack of commitment originates 
from the discrepancies in goals, values and policy adherence between what is demanded of 
the party's industrial members and the reality of socio-economic change affecting state 
firms. With the intrusion of the market as the cutting edge, the differentiated goals of the 
party for long-term control and the party's industrial cells as immediate control antenna 
increasingly put at stake the members' career security and prestige. Organizational matters 
are closely related to the distribution of resources such as power, income, and status among 
officials.3
The lack of commitment is a natural outcome of their perception, imagined or 
otherwise, of being seriously underpaid and poorly judged for the work they do both from
1 Daniel Katz & Robert Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organization, New York: John Wiley & 
Sons Inc., 1966, pp. 19-22.
2 Harry Harding, Organizing China, California: Stanford University Press, 1981, p. 2.
3 Ibid, pp. 9-10.
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above and below.4 At the same time the drastic change of policy priorities provides party 
members with a feeling that "whenever the party leadership thinks that it needs us, it will 
use us, but after such use, they put us aside. You need only recall history to see my point: 
the anti-spiritual pollution drive in 1983, the 1986 anti-liberalism campaign and after the 
Tiananmen events."5
This section will analyse the state of the CCP's industrial cells from the four 
conventional angles from which an organization is usually studied: its ability to adapt to a 
changing external environment, its organizational cohesiveness and ideological firmness, 
its organizational activities and the strength of its reserves. These could be seen as 
consequences of the institutional reforms in the state sector discussed earlier.
5.1. Phasing out Political Campaigns and Political Study
As a measure of re-legitimation after the Cultural Revolution in the Third Plenum in 
1978, the party announced its intention to relinquish political campaigns as a means of 
mobilization. This substantially changed the political environment in the country. On the 
whole, both party cadres and workers welcomed the move, since they had become 
antipathetic to the intimidation of the successive political campaigns in the Maoist era. Some 
of the political campaigns had been designed as "party rectification purges", targeting party 
cadres in a hope of purifying their thoughts and tightening the organization's discipline.6 
Others were directed toward members of society at large. In these campaigns "class 
enemies" were punished,7 but everybody knew they, too, stood a chance of being a target. 
The repudiation of political campaigns removed a major source of social tension and mass
4 There have been numerous such reports of such cases in the Chinese media, as expressed by an 
outcry for "better understanding" of the party's work in state firms.
5 Quoted from a party secretary whom I interviewed in Beijing in 1992.
6 See Frederick Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms 
1950-1965, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1979.
7 A Doak Barnett, p. 33.
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apprehension. Yet vis-a-vis the party as a political organization, this has generated 
dysfunctional pressures on its affairs, especially at the grassroots.
In the campaign against "spiritual pollution" in 1983, many urban and rural party 
cadres took advantage of the change of the political air to reassert their power. Tensions 
that had been accumulating during the hiatus in political campaigns since 1976 burst forth 
with their clamp-down against people not on good terms with them.* 8 These persecutions of 
1983 broke the party's repeated promises since 1976 not to initiate any political vendettas. 
They also damaged the atmosphere that the party hierarchy wanted to create to support 
economic take-off and the party's carefully nurtured new image of benevolence.
Alarmed, the party leadership adopted a middle-course measure: the drive should be 
continued against dissenting intellectuals but aborted at the grassroots. The party's CC 
decreed the campaign henceforth would be carried out only at the institutions of the 
"superstructure", not urban units and rural villages where only positive education 
(zhengmian jiaoyu) was to be pursued.9 That is to say, according to the official 
explanation, when workers and peasants were to be organized to study party documents 
about the on-going drive, organizational actions against individuals should be avoided. 
Although some factory party cadres ignored the call and continued to make life miserable 
for workers, the official policy did withdraw an important channel through which party 
cadres to persecute people on any massive scale. In the national political campaigns which 
followed, party cadres in the main could not so readily capitalize on them. Without official 
support and against the dominant social mood, factory party cadres became increasingly 
incapable of riding a political tide. This trend culminated in the general failure of the
8 There were at the time a large number of Chinese media reports about the party cadres who had used
the occasion to settle "personal accounts". See Thomas Gold, "‘Just in Time!’ China Battles Spirit­
ual Pollution on the Eve of 1984," Asian Survey, Vol. 24, no. 9, 1984, pp. 947-974.
9. Renmin ribao, 18 December 1983.
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grassroots party cells to prevent workers from participating in the Beijing Spring of 
1989.10
The phase-out of political campaigns in factories has exerted enormous impact in 
terms of depoliticisation. Firstly, it suffocated the organizational vitality of the factory party 
cells. In the past, a party branch assumed two major tasks: everyday involvement in 
management and the implementation of political campaigns. Indeed, the growth of the 
party's membership and the hardening of its authority could not be separated from this 
second mission. By organizing sessions of political study and public meetings to denounce 
"bad elements", the vigour of a party cell was recharged every now and then, as campaigns 
were pushed through from above. Mobilization was the lifeline of the CCP's grassroots 
cells. One old party cadre compared the present with some cherished memories of the past: 
In the 60s and 70s whenever a political campaign was waged by Chairman Mao, the party 
members would become very busy. Everyone wanted to show that he was a fighter. I 
remembered that our shop was given a task to print a large number of Mao portraits. All party 
members were working non-stop for two days. Now look at our party secretary! He organizes 
mahjong every time the party branch is supposed to have political study sessions. He would 
not dare to if there were still political campaigns. In the last several years our branch has had 
few organized activities.* 11
From this we see that the phase-out of political campaigns in state firms has led to a 
second type of dysfunctional pathology in the party cells: the dilution of party members' 
sense of belonging. As A. Doak Barnett pointed out: "Each campaign has been a period in 
which the cadres' loyalty to the regime has been tested. " 12 Now as the testing ground is 
being eroded, party cadres have lost their fear of being exposed in a campaign. With no
10 Andrew Wälder and Gong Xiaoxia, "Workers in the Tiananmen Protests: the Politics of the Beijing 
Workers' Autonomous Union", The Australian Journal o f Chinese Affairs, no. 29, January 1993, 
pp. 1-30.
11 Interview with a party cadre in the Beijing New China Printing Factory in 1991.
12 Barnett, p. 33.
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other forms of checks and balances, the cases of corruption among party cadres soared 
sharply. Internal decay and external mass alienation have become pervasive. Ironically, 
however, rhetoric against the use of compaigns has become a useful protective shield for 
corrupt party cadres. Whenever there are disciplinary or criminal investigations brought 
against them, the weapon they often use to preempt the investigators is the counter-attack 
that they "use political campaign methods against me" .13
The third effect induced by revoking political campaigns is a positive one, namely, it 
has reduced the fear of ordinary workers toward the party's authority. In the past, political 
drives were usually launched at the apex of power to purge a few designated members of 
the leadership, under the guise of abstract ideological justifications, and at the grassroots 
level, where the specific targets became remote, it was the task of the party cells to chase 
the "social base" of the disgraced party leaders. So followers of the erroneous party line 
were ferreted out, and very often there was a quota for factory party committees to fulfil. 
Because it was difficult to establish the exact political and ideological crimes of those tar­
geted, people who had either a "bad family origin" or a bad relationship with party cadres 
on the shop floor became vulnerable in each of the political movements. This had ingrained 
a deep fear of party cadres in the minds of many non-activist workers with each change of 
the "political wind".
Once such political drives ceased to be effective, it has become difficult for party 
cadres to put a political and ideological "label" on defiant workers. Even though some party 
cadres still try to identify "backward elements", the nature of the harassment cannot be as 
intense without real political substance to underpin it. Gradually, workers have learned that 
they can afford to be not only apolitical but resistant on the shop floor, even when a 
political campaign is unfolding in the superstructure. During my several visits to China I 
heard many stories of how workers adopted noncoorporative attitudes against the calls by
13 Words quoted in my interview with a party cadre in the Organization Department of Mentougou Dis­
trict, Beijing, in 1992.
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party cadres and managers to implement the centre's political initiatives. The next section, a 
case study of the failure of the party's investigation drive in 1989, will give a more detailed 
account of this.
The fourth consequence of the phase-out of political campaigns in factories has been 
the removal of a vehicle for the cultivation of political activists. In the 30 years before the 
reform, political drives had reinforced the core mission of the industrial danwei system in 
recruiting large contingents of activists. During these campaigns, intensive ideological 
propaganda was conducted and opportunities for upward mobility were offered to activists. 
Even ordinary workers, if they did not want to be targeted as "backward elements", had to 
appear politically conformative. Some who became true activists came to act as "big 
brothers" to their co-workers.
Activists' involvement in political persecution earned some of them a notorious 
reputation, and this now inhibits new recruitments. The changed post-Mao political 
environment has built up pressure on the few activists who send secret "small reports" 
(xiao baogao) to authorities. It is now the turn of activists to worry about the "hostile 
climate" surrounding them. Moreover, the changing patterns of work and award systems 
present little incentive for workers to become politically motivated, as political attitudes 
(biaoxian) play an increasingly minor role when allocating perks, in contrast to when the 
party's "principled particularism" lured many workers to join the ranks of activists.14 
Indeed, the very notion of activism has already become ridiculous to workers. Many of my 
interviewees would laugh the moment I mentioned the concept. As one noted:
What do you mean by activists? If you mean the Lei Feng type of people, I'm sure that there 
aren't any in our shop. If you mean the followers of shop heads, certainly they exist but they’re 
hardly active; they’re lazy and incompetent.
If the phase-out of political campaigns in state firms has removed a periodic re­
charging facility for the grassroots party bodies, the bankruptcy of political study sessions
14 Andrew Wälder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism, p. 132.
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has served to remove a major setting for their everyday activities. In the past, political study 
sessions during periods of relaxation were instruments of ideological indoctrination for the 
purpose of achieving a degree of political conformity without generating explosive 
tensions.15 This was different to a time of an unfolding political drive, when political study 
served as a more naked force of suppression, with activists mobilized and victims persecut­
ed. Yet whatever the difference, these were two sides of one coin, used by the party to 
maintain the party's organizational zeal.
In the reform era political study has been a major casualty of factory depoliticisation. 
Organizationally, the changes in the party/management leadership structure analysed in the 
previous chapter confused the issue of who should be responsible for convening such 
study sessions. Ideologically, the bankruptcy of the communist belief system has rendered 
political study into much ado about nothing. Moreover, economic imperatives that call for 
less time to be devoted to these sessions of "empty talk", to quote the words of one inter­
viewed factory director, have basically squeezed the study programs out of the management 
agenda. When a session is convened, it easily becomes meeting of complaints (expressing 
bitterness against management and the party/state), or mutual flattery or attacks (if you say 
something good or bad about me, I will reciprocate).16 As a result, study sessions have 
become at best a formality to please superiors when managers or party cadres have to report 
on how many sessions they have held; at worst, they have ceased to be held in a large 
number of state firms.
The bankruptcy of the study sessions can be attributed to the bankruptcy of the revol­
utionary ideology as a belief system. The No. 3 Beijing Chemical Plant conducted a casual 
survey on the question of faith in socialism among 60 workers in 1990. Only 20% of 
workers expressed some hope for it. 70% had lost heart. This was the result after three
15 Franklin Houn, To Change A Nation: Propaganda and Indoctrination in Communist China,
Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1961, p. 4.
16 Wang Haili, "Dang xiaozu shenghuohui weishenma kai buhao" (Why could not the party group
studies be conducted well), Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 6, 1991, p. 27.
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consecutive socialism study drives carried out by the political cadres in the factory in the 
1980s.17 So it has become obvious that the raison d'etre for political study is dead, not 
only for workers but for most of the party cadres who have to preside over these 
sessions.18 But why, then, is political study imposed on the factory floors (the political 
cadres in the factory mentioned above were about to initiate a fourth drive)? The answer lies 
in the control function of the ideology, which is regarded as so important for the party that 
nobody dares to suggest doing away with it. There is no other form of indoctrination 
available to the party, and the party leaders believe that without indoctrination, workers 
would be open to the influence of alternative ideas — the last thing the party wants to see 
occur among Chinese workers.
Yet the party's insistence on continuing these study sessions proves an embarrass­
ment for those who have to preside over the sessions. In the past, political study entailed 
awards or punishments depending whether one actively participated or not. Fourteen-plus 
years of reform have pushed the trend of de-ideologization to the point where neither award 
nor punishment can influence workers to react in the way the party likes. This is why 
managers and party cadres want to arrange political study in a fashion that pleases workers, 
such as by organizing a social gathering instead at the expense of the factory. On the other 
hand, cadres are pushed to organize such study by their superiors, as it is linked to their 
career advancement. Under the circumstances, one party cadre whom I interviewed in 1991 
related that each time he had to explain the political documents and newspaper articles in 
these sessions, he felt very uneasy.
17 Xiao Yu, "Xunqiu guanshu de yuanwang shizenyang changsheng de" (How the will of indoctrination 
was created?), Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 12, 1990, p. 19.
18 The party's propaganda boss Li Ruihan even told a large group of ideologues that the word 'revolut­
ion' should not be used too often and applied to everything. Li Ruihan, "On Ideological Education", 
Zhengzhi sixiang zhanxian (Political and Ideological front), no. 6, 1992, p. 1-3.
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This is because I know I am preaching something I myself don't have faith in. So you feel you can­
not escape feelings of hypocrisy. The best way to avoid this embarrassment is to avoid study sess­
ions where possible, or cut the number of them to a minimum.
If such sessions could not be avoided, he and most of his colleagues just relayed the 
documents as required. As soon as they finished reading, they would let the audience 
"discuss" anything they like.
5.2. Demoralized Party Industrial Cells
5.2.1. The Organizational Dysfunction
The organizational dysfunction of party cells has resulted in their collapse in large 
numbers in state firms, although we are not clear about the exact number. Most of the party 
documents only use vague language to describe the situation. For instance, Shandong's 
provincial Party Discipline Commission revealed in a 1990 report that the paralysed or 
semi-paralysed party cells comprised quite a large proportion of the total.19 At the 
municipal level, according to an investigation in Datong City, a model city in terms of party 
building, more than 20% of industrial party cells had collapsed.20 One former researcher of 
the Tigaisuo even suggested that 80% of the grassroots party bodies had become inactive 
by 1991.21 This is plausible depending on the definition of the term inactive. The official 
definition is that the party branches do not have regular meetings, party leaders are involved 
in serious factional infighting or lukewarm to their missions, party members take their 
membership lightly and do not play an exemplary role in work. The most important
19 "Dangqian dangqun guanxi zhuangkuang de diaocha yu sikao" (The survey and contemplation on the 
current party/mass relations), Zhibu shenghuo, no. 6, 1990, pp. 19-20.
20 Rentnin ribao, 12 November 1991.
21 Zhu Jiaming's seminar at the Australian National University, December 1992.
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indicator is that the party organizations and party members hold dissenting views against 
the party centre's policies.22
The impression gathered from my visits to several dozen state enterprises was that the 
above mentioned effects existed in all factories, although varying in degrees. In fact, the 
sorry state of party cells seems worse than has been admitted by the survey reports of the 
party organization departments at various levels. At the moment party activity is mostly 
confined to party meetings at the workshop level. Few industrial party branches observe 
the regulation of sanhui yike, that is, that a party branch should hold regular meetings of 
the branch committee once in a month, of branch party members once in a quarter, of party 
small groups once in a month, and should conduct party knowledge lectures (dangke) twice 
a year.23 The best party branch I visited had only five meetings in 1991, fewer than half of 
what is required. Most of the branches held two or three, usually at the middle and end of 
the year, when the assessment reports of party members had to be drafted. Two party 
branches had had no meetings since 1990. The meetings of branch party members were 
even less frequently convened. One third of the branches did not have even one in 1991. 
Party small group meetings were more regularly arranged, since at the lowest level of the 
shop, there were few party members and most of them served as the 'backbone' of the 
section. So when the section chief wanted something done he would call the members 
together to work out implementation procedures. Yet by nature this was hardly party 
activity. As far as party knowledge lectures are concerned, such a lecture took place mainly 
because a party cadre from above came down to deliver it. I found only one party branch 
secretary who said that he had arranged a lecture on his own.
With the paralysis of party organizational activities and the redistribution of powers in 
the wake of the director responsibility system, the morale of the full-time party cadres has
22 This is summarized from a book written by Wu Zhiqing, Xin shiqi qiye dang de jianshe (Party 
building in the new era).
23 Yan Pengyuan and others, Jiceng dangwei gongzuo shouce (Handbook of grassroots party committ­
ees), Liaoning: Changbai chubanshe, 1990, pp. 360-361.
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dropped to the lowest point since the communist seizure of power. One party secretary 
summarised the general psychology of party cadres in the following terms:
If you work for 30 years in the technical field, you become a senior engineer. If you work for 
30 years as a manager, you now have every access to the market (to earn big bucks), but if you 
are a party cadre for 30 years, you have nothing to show for it but an empty mind and w allet.^  
Whilst their loss of power and the decline in their political and social status are key 
factors that have dampened party cadres' morale, a more immediate factor has been their 
disadvantage in generating income as compared to managerial staff and sometimes even 
workers. Under market pressures the salaries of managers and workers have been linked to 
the plant's profits. Party cadres do not directly contribute to the improvement of production 
in terms of contracted quotas. So their salary is evaluated according to the general wage 
levels of the factory. Normally their pay is determined around the average, lagging behind 
the managerial staff and workers, although a bit higher than the logistics staff.25 For 
instance, in a large Beijing factory the management drafted a wage package in which the 
rates of political cadres were among the lowest of all. Although the draft package was later 
vetoed by the factory manager in the face of strong opposition from the party system, most 
of the party cadres were still not consoled. Half of them reportedly expressed the feeling 
that if given a choice, they would quit party work at once. This seems to be the feeling 
entertained by most party cadres.26
It is not that the party desires a situation where its industrial cadres are economically 
squeezed. Rather, it is an outcome of party cadres becoming out of touch with marketized 
state firms. The party has tried to protect the economic well-being of the factory political
24 Guan Xiaofeng, "Dui qiye dangjian gongzuo de sikao" (Pondering on building the enterprise party 
organization), Xinchangzheng (Journal of Liaoning Party Committee), no. 11, 1992, p. 28.
25 This is a summary of many Chinese reports. For a good source, see a book edited by Xu Songtao & 
others, Zhongguo gongzi zhidu gaige (The reform of the Chinese wage system).
26 Xiao Wei, "Huange jiaodu xinbuxin" (Whether we can look at things from another angle), Zhibu 
shenghuo (Beijing), no. 8, 1992, p. 17.
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cadres, and in 1991 a four-level speciality titles system was created for them: containing the 
titles of the senior political work specialist, middle level political work specialist, political 
work specialist and political work staff. The purpose of the system was to equate the titles 
and salaries of political cadres to those accorded to engineers and technicians and to make 
political work a profession so that, the morale of such personnel could be stabilized. How­
ever, the technical professionals strongly resented this equation. At the same time, political 
cadres took little comfort from the ranking. The last two years have seen increased numbers 
of party cadres tender applications for transfer. The political cadres are among the least 
liked personnel in factories and these cadres know this well. One of my interviewees noted: 
I'm aware that people like us are not welcome by workers and technical staff. But is it our fault? 
When I had just joined the workforce, I dreamed of becoming a technician. Yet Secretary Liu told me 
that because I had a "red" family background and a high school certificate, the organization (the party) 
had decided that I should work in the party propaganda department. All these years I have been play­
ing with empty words, many of which sound odd today. Now I have a senior title as a political wor­
ker. However, besides talking about stuff which nobody listens to, I am good at nothing. All I can 
do now is to prevent any of my children from following my path but instead to learn a real skill.
According to the official statistics, political cadres who have not received any special 
training in management or in other technical fields still make up more than 80% of the 
total.27 And many of these cadres are likely to share the feelings of my interviewee. Given 
this demoralized state of mind, can people believe that the party's industrial cells really have 
a future?
5.2.2. The Drying up of Party Reserves
The paralysed or semi-paralysed state of party industrial cells has also been due to the 
drying up of the party's reserves at the grassroots. Even in those factories where the party 
organizations play a key role at the top level of management, at the shop level, a large
27 Guan Xiaofeng, p. 28.
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number of work sections and small work groups have no party members at all. Despite the 
party's enormous efforts in attracting young people to join the reserves, the attempt has not 
been fruitful. Take Beijing as an example. According to the municipality's party 
organization chief Cheng Guangwen, party members under age 25 today constitute only 
3% of all party members in the city. This is in sharp contrast to 12% plus of party members 
who have retired. The number of work sections in Beijing's state enterprises that did not 
have a single party member had once reached about half of the total in the 1980s. Even after 
a long battle of "filling blanks" since June 4 1989, 35% of these sections still did not have 
any party members as of the end of 1992.28 In Shandong Province, among 2.2 million 
workers, only 11.4% were party members in 1990. As a result, members in production­
line posts had declined steadily as old party member workers retired, and "blank work sect­
ions" -- work sections where there was no party member - were on the rise.29 This has, 
ironically however, eased the tension that ordinary workers had developed towards the 
party presence around them.
At the local levels the problem is most serious. Qiang Wei, party secretary of 
Beijing’s Shijingshan District, revealed that the ratio of young party recruits in the overall 
intake had dropped from 10.1% to 1.9% between 1976 and 1990.30 In Weifang city, 
Shandong Province, in the 15 state firms under direct municipal control 51.8% of the 
1,906 work sections did not have a single party member.31 Such reports have been 
pervasive in China's party journals, illustrating that the problem is clearly perceived. Yet it 
is only the tip of the ice berg.
28 Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 10, 1992, pp. 6-7.
29 Shandong Party Organization Department, "Zai changye gongren zhong fazhan dangyuan de diaocha" 
(Survey on the recruitment of party members among the industrial workers), Zhibu shenghuo (Shan­
dong), no. 1, 1990, p. 12.
30 Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 7, 1991, p. 7.
31 Yu Hongji, "Qiye shengchan yixian dangyuan shao de yuanyin ji duice" (The reason why there are 
fewer party members in the first line work posts and counter measures), Zhibu shenghuo 
(Shandong), no. 5, 1991, p. 28.
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From the 1950s to the 1970s high political ambition could be seen by strong desires 
among the populace to join the party. When the youth in the 1980s discarded this 
enthusiasm, they clearly demonstrated their value judgement of the party's role in real life. 
In a survey carried out by CASS in 1988 in all major cities, among people polled only 
0.33% of the total still regarded joining the party and the Youth League as a priority in life. 
In the overall ranking of choices for a happy life, party membership ostensibly came last. 
Other personal goals, such as a harmonious family, successful career, to become rich, etc, 
have been far more highly valued than the wish to obtain a party ticket.32
Behind this fundamental change in people's socio-political values is a fundamental 
disillusionment toward the party.33 A party member with a special political status is 
expected to work harder altruistically. In reality, however, what is so familiar to people is 
the stories of cadre corruption. As a result, a hostile attitude towards party applicants has 
gradually gathered strength. One applicant in Beijing wrote a letter to a party journal entitled 
"What should I do" to express his sorrows about having lost most of his friends since 
handing in an application to the party. All that he was told was that his experience was not 
uncommon so he should stick to his own choice.34 When workers believe that they have 
alternatives to obtain more money and a good job, applications for party membership sharp 
drop. Beijing, with a population of more than 10 million, registered about 70,000 
applications in 1986, the next year, with the market making big strides, the number 
nosedived to around 20,000 and remained there for the following two years. It was not 
until 1990 that the number revived to the level of 1986.35 This was due largely to the
32 Lu Jianhua, "Dangdai qingnian de zhengzhi jiazhiguan" (The value system of the contemporary 
youth), Qingnian yanjiu, no. 2, 1990, pp. 1-6.
33 For an analysis of this disillusionment, see Hsi-Sheng Chi, Political Disillusionment: The Chinese 
Communist Under Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1989, Armonk: Sharpe, 1991.
34 Zhibu shenghuo (Shandong), no. 2, 1992, p. 36.
35 Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 7, 1991, p. 35.
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special organizational efforts by the party to "mobilize" applications, following the June 4 
events. 1992 saw the number decline again.36
In addition to general indifference toward joining the party, the party's recruitment 
arrangements have also contributed to the gradual exhaustion of applicants. Since 1978 the 
party has adopted an elitist approach to recruitment, that is, it wants the level of education 
for the new intakes to be as high as possible. A central document stipulated that new 
candidates should generally have a high-school certificate.37 According to a survey in Jinan 
city, the new recruits increased the percentage of party members in management and 
technological fields to nearly 10% of the total. In contrast, fewer recruits have been in 
production-line posts, the percentage being just over 2%.38
This has, however, posed a dilemma to the party: to admit more intellectuals into the 
party at the expense of workers may improve the party's general educational level but it has 
also increased the number of "blank work sections" and thus helped dry up its reserves at 
the points where the majority of workforce concentrate. The Beijing Public Transportation 
Company recruited 31,000 workers between 1978-84. The number of party members 
increased in the meanwhile by only 75, resulting in a drop of the worker/party member 
ratio to 0.9%. Some party branches had not recruited a single party member for nearly a 
decade.39 So a cycle emerged: the fewer workers a party cell admitted, the fewer party 
reserves it would find among workers. This is one of the factors leading to the paralysis of 
grassroots party cells in large numbers.
36. This is from a cadre in the Industrial Department of the Beijing Party Committee whom I 
interviewed in late 1992.
37 Zhongguo gongchandang fazhan dangyuan gongzuo xize (The CCP's regulations on recruiting new 
party members). The same document also required the party cells to recruit more youths so as to 
lower the average age of the membership.
3 8 The Shandong Party Organization Department, "Zaichangye gongren zhong fazhan dangyuan de diao- 
cha", p. 12.
39 Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 12, 1990, p. 29.
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This outcome has a lot to do with the tedious arrangements for party admittance. For 
instance, an applicant should seek at least one party member as his regular contact. He 
should attend a number of 'party knowledge' lectures and participate in prescribed training 
programs. He should be systematically assessed once each half year by the party branch 
committee. He should be involved in the party's assigned social work, some of which is 
unpleasant and unpaid. The testing period with these hard demands lasts at least one 
complete year. Towards the end of the period of testing, meetings will be held to solicit 
criticism of the applicant from the small party groups and the public. Some of these 
experiences can be very embarrassing.
Then the party cell starts the personal inspection procedures. The content of investig­
ation includes the applicant's record in past political campaigns, his attitudes towards the 
party's line and policy, and the political performance of his directly-related family 
members. Then the candidate joins others in a concentrated study program about the party 
which lasts a week. Besides studying party documents, he is also expected to make a full 
self-assessment and criticism, again an embarrassing moment. When he is at last admitted, 
he will face a year's period of probation. During this period his party membership can be 
revoked if he has done something wrong. These requirements are even stricter than had 
been the case in the 1970s. With opportunities for money presenting an alternative path to 
better social status, for the majority of people these requirements are too much to be 
bothered with, even if the party ticket is regarded as favourable to upward mobility.
Ranking party officials have realized the danger the drying up of party reserves poses 
to party control over society. Qiang Wei, Beijing's former boss of the Youth League, 
warned the Municipal Party Committee:
The fact that the party has lost its attraction to young people is indicative of how the party's 
authority and image are perceived by society at large. The rising numbers of "blank work 
sections" where young workers are concentrated will certainly produce a lasting adverse effect
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on our work. Without party members, how can the party’s line, policy and directives be relayed 
to the majority of workers?^
In spite of this recognition, it seems that the party is fighting a losing battle in this 
crucial area of influence.
5.3. A Study of the Aborted Post-June 4 Clamp-down
With party work on the shop floor becoming increasingly inactive amid a deepening 
crisis of the official ideology, it was clear that the daily political controls in the danwei 
system had been defused for the majority of workers. If they did not prefer to resort to 
dissident actions against the state or to organized resistance to management, they could now 
live their lives with little interference from the party.41 However, if the party believed that 
workers would be satisfied with these circumstances -- no political campaigns and greater 
opportunities to earn money — it was mistaken, as was proved by the workers' protest 
movement in 1989. Even if workers cared little about politics at the national level, the pers­
istent defects of the danwei system embodied in the difficulties in obtaining job transfers, 
tensions arising from uneven allocations of social welfare benefits and mistreatment of 
workers by the privileged constantly irritated workers. The workers' actions around and 
after 4 June 1989 have served as the proof of their discontent.
5.3.1. The Challenge of Workers to the Party/State
Normally workers did not vent their frustrations with their immediate bosses in a 
confrontational way, due to the complicated guanxi networks on factory floors. But 
feelings of anger accumulated, to be vented against the centre at the right time (joining the 
euphoria of a nationwide protest movement, for instance).42 This was why the slogans
40 Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 7, 1991, p. 7.
41 This is the general impression most workers and cadres conveyed to me during my two field studies 
in China in 1991 and 1992.
42 A number of interviewees told me they went into the streets because they were fed up with unfair 
treatment by their immediate bosses. But they said that in a closed and permanent community, "you 
could not break with them so you had to bury the feeling in your heart in order to avoid 'little class
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against corruption and abuses were not abstract. They were the embodiment of many 
concrete stories of discontent. The June 4 tragedy demonstrated to the party leaders that 
their design for a controlled path of transition was subject to many conditions. Workers 
were disgruntled with danwei controls, despite the progress in curbing the intensity of 
these controls.
However, it was hard for workers to ascertain whether the time was ripe for protest 
before the eruption of the Beijing Spring. The unwritten limits of protest permitted by the 
changes had to be tested before workers could decide the level of action they could initiate 
and get away with later. This had been vividly reflected in the run-up to the organization of 
China's first autonomous trade union GongzilianA3
It may not be mere coincidence that the first people who rose against the regime were 
from units where the danwei controls had been dismantled most.44 Tight or loose 
organizational control mechanisms in a party/state make a marked difference. To risk 
simplification, this was the case with the students and the self-employed getihu. Students 
are mobile and transient. After four years of studies, they leave campuses and change their 
status. And they are small in number. Although these characteristics condition their political 
capacity, the fact that they are not permanently tied to a danwei provides wide room for
shoes'". To join the demonstrations was one way of venting grievances, since the centre represented 
all of their immediate bosses.
43 Andrew Wälder and Gong Xiaoxia, pp. 4-15. Many of my worker informants told identical stories of 
how they went into the Beijing streets. At the beginning, they pretended to be on-lookers. When 
they saw no action taken by their workshop party branches, "not even a meeting called by the party 
secretary, which had been usual in similar situations in the past", said one interviewee, they 
increased their "inputs" and proceeded further and further.
44 One of the official summaries of the lessons of June 4 was that the "disaster zones" were those dan­
wei where the party's control was severely weakened. Xue Xin, "Wei jianchi zhizheng diwei er dou- 
zheng shi gongren jieji zhengdang zhengzhishang chengshu de zhongyao biaozhi" (To struggle for 
withholding political power is an important indicator of a mutual workers party), in the Editors 
group (eds.), Dang de jianshe lilun yanjiu (Studying the theory of party building), Beijing: Renmin 
ribao chubanshe, 1990, pp. 49-51.
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action. Among other things, the getihu's organized resistance to government officials has 
existed all along in the form of opposing taxation, but seldom had this had any political 
significance due to its limited goals. In contrast, once workers could quickly organize 
themselves in the manner of Solidarity, it would pose a serious challenge to the party/state. 
These facts underlie why the state has been most fearful of an organized labour movement 
and why dissident workers have encountered the worst punishments after June 4.45
After the pioneers tested the water and the party's paralysis in factories became 
evident amid the new waves of popular support on behalf of the Tiananmen occupants, 
more and more workers joined the movement around mid-May 1989. They constituted the 
bulk of the human shield in Beijing streets to block the martial law's enforcement. As a 
show of force, workers marched through the streets behind their danwei's vehicles and 
with danwei uniforms and banners,46 which clearly imprinted on people's minds an image 
of rebellion against the state by its basic units, once the front line of the state's control. 
Perhaps it was this image that prompted people to 'feel' that with the erosion of the 
foundation of the party/state, the days of the party/state itself were becoming numbered.
It seemed inconceivable that without the consent of the heads of danwei, workers 
could stop work, obtain the banner of the danwei and take to the streets of Beijing in the 
name of their danwei.41 This political evolution poses a key question as to how effective 
control the party/state can exercise in the industrial workplace. One may compare this with
45 Anita Chan & Jonathan Unger, "Voices from the Protest Movement in Chongqing: Class Accents 
and Class Tensions", in Jonathan Unger (ed.), The Pro-Democracy Protests in China, Armonk: 
M.E. Sharpe, p. 119.
4 6 Andrew Walder's seminar at Australian National University, December 1991.
47 For example, the head of the Science and Technology Research Department of the Beijing Bureau of 
Higher Education, my former employer, organized all his staff to march to Tiananmen Square with 
the Bureau's banner. For another example, Li Jingqun, a vice workshop manager and party secretary 
of the Beijing Instrument Factory, gave a vivid account of why he bowed to the pressure from his 
workers to go to the streets and how he then took the initiative to write the slogans "Workers in 
Support" and "We workers are coming". See Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 5, 1990, p. 20.
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the situation immediately after the Tiananmen incident of 1976. Once the popular protest 
was put down, all state danwei quickly responded to the party's call to subdue any signs of 
defiance. In 1989, however, after April 16 when the Beijing Party Committee convened the 
first emergency meeting of party secretaries, repeated calls for party members not to 
participate in the dongluan, or social unrest, had been issued and continuously fell on deaf 
ears. Beijing's vice party organization chief openly admitted that many party members were 
taking the lead to join the human blockade in the streets.48 The top party leadership had 
tried to employ danwei controls to intimidate workers. But few danwei seemed to be 
responsive. For workers, the danwei appeared to have lost its sharp teeth.
5.3.2. Shop-Floor Resistance to the June 4 “Settlement”
The post-June 4 clamp-down in state firms has demonstrated that, while the organ­
ized resistance of workers was suppressed, the trend toward depoliticisation and the logic it 
has generated could not. This not only undermined the party's efforts to reassert authority 
in the state sector but continuously has shaken the base of its power at the grassroots 
level.49
The history of socialist states shows that the essence of the party/state system was 
that it had the capacity to muster enough strength, whether naked or otherwise, to restore 
control in a crisis situation. But this ability diminishes with each crisis. What has made 
China distinct from the Soviet bloc is its resilience in this regard. Different social and 
cultural traditions are certainly crucial factors which have a bearing on this outcome. 
However, the danwei system in China, which is much more thorough and tighter than in
48 Gao Qixiang, "Mianshang kaizhan dangyuan chongxin dengji gongzuo xuyao zhuyi de jige wenti" 
(Several problems that need to be handled carefully in the registration of party members), Zhibu 
shenghuo (Beijing), no. 5, 1990, p. 16.
49 According to a report by director of the Central Organization Department in 1991, more rather than 
less party branches had become inactivized since June 4. See Lu Feng, director of the Department, 
"Zai dang de jianshe lilun yantaoban shang de jianghua" (Speech at the conference on the theory of 
party Building), the Editors group (eds.), Dang de jianshe lilun yanjiu pp. 1-10.
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the former USSR and Eastern Europe, has played a key role in maintaining the party's ord­
er. In terms of control at the grassroots, the mass dictatorship could be much more effective 
than the operations of the KGB, UB and Stasi.
Yet like the former USSR and Eastern Europe, China's political system is not 
immune from the destructive effects of political upheavals. The Cultural Revolution had 
been a most profound lesson to party leaders. But no damage done to the party/state by past 
crises can be comparable with the events of Tiananmen. This blow to the party's monopoly 
of power was magnified by its organizational disorder in state firms and workers' indiffer­
ence to its so-called investigationfgmgc/ia) drive, that is, the post-June 4 "settlement" of the 
1989 Beijing Spring.
The "settlement" comprised two stages. The first was an investigation period immed­
iately after June 4 and lasted for a few months. Its aim was to single out the activists of the 
"social unrest" and have those who committed "crimes" arrested. The second was a party 
membership re-registration period in which organizational measures were taken to purge 
those involved in the protest movement. As stipulated by the Centre, both were to be 
conducted not as political campaigns but rather as activities of "positive education" and both 
were to focus on the party internally, although political punishments were lodged against 
the non-party activists.50
The two-stage "settlement" revealed the extent to which the internal disorder of party 
organizations had deepened with two major features worthy of comment. The first is that 
obstruction of the "transmission belt" between the party centre and its branches at various 
levels was evident. The lower that the central decrees were relayed, the weaker the
50 This re-registration was a mini-party rectification campaign. Although the purge of dissidents in the 
party was the primary objective, it had other tasks such as getting rid of party members who had 
committed economic crimes, seriously violated party discipline and were popularly regarded as not 
up to the standard. CJiongfa wenjian (Central Document), no. 10, 1989, pp. 1-2; and Jingfa wenjian 
(Beijing Party Committee Document), no. 24, 1989, p. 1.
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response of party cells. One factory party boss I interviewed in Beijing in 1991 gave a 
detailed description of how its branch had reacted to the investigation imposed on them:
According to the dictates from the Party Municipal Organization Department, the key targets of the 
qingcha drive were party members who'd taken to the streets. They were to write a report of self 
evaluation of their motivation and attitudes during the period. The report should record how many 
times they'd participated in demonstrations, whether they'd obstructed the martial law troops and 
what they'd learned from the unrest. Then the party branch was to discuss the report, including its 
own assessment, and put on the report the seals of the branch and the personal one of the secretary. 
Then the reports from both the party branch and the individuals involved were submitted to the fact­
ory party committee and later entered into their dossiers. I was responsible for writing the summary 
for their dangan.
Unlike the enthusiasm of party cells towards political campaigns in the past, this time 
nobody in the branch was serious about the investigation. The party secretary disclosed that 
in his factory of more than 2,000 workers 23 cases had been established, although half of 
the workforce had participated in actions at one time or another. These 23 people were 
mainly party cadres and managerial staff who had taken the lead in going to the Square. 
The secretary assured me that he had never written anything serious against them. One of 
these 23 people was detained for attacking the martial law troops. Even for him, the factory 
party committee wrote a report saying that he had no record of serious mistakes in the past. 
For the rest, the secretary confirmed that putting the report in their dangan may cause harm 
to their future. So the members of the party committee all agreed that anything relating to 
the investigation should not enter anyone's dossier for the time being. "We have shelved 
the material for now and will wait and see what happens later."
When I asked what he would do if his superiors came to inspect the work of the 
investigation, he replied with some laughter:
Of course if they are indeed serious, you have to do something, like picking out one victim. How­
ever, it seems that this time most of my bosses adopted an approach of making the big thing
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smaller, and a small thing oblivious. There have been many meetings but so far no real punishments 
in our factory. After many political movements we know that anyone criminalized at the height of 
the campaigns will get a severe punishment. But after a while, the wind will die down. In the mean­
while the penalty will become ever milder for the accused. To save those who might end up in 
trouble, we just drag things on and on.
My impression from twelve interviews on the subject has convinced me that this 
attitude was widespread, although this party secretary were most explicit. His approach 
was not confined to state firms but was true of other state institutions as well. One of the 
cadres at the Beijing Bureau of Higher Education led her subordinates to the Square to 
support the students. In late 1990, when she was selected to join a delegation for a foreign 
visit, it caused some controversy. The Bureau director approved her participation, explain­
ing that in 1989 people had became confused and he believed that most of the activists were 
patriotically motivated.51 Official news coverage also gave many accounts of the sloppiness 
of the qingcha drive. When I asked party cadres whether there were cases of persecution in 
their danwei, the answer was always no, though they had often heard that somebody in 
some other work unit was arrested. Usually the arrests were made by police from outside 
the factories. There must have been a blacklist of political dissidents held by the state 
security department, they commented, but in their factories the managers adopted protective 
attitudes toward staff who had thrown stones at the approaching tanks.52
Have the party cadres become more benevolent after June 4? The answer is also no. 
What happened in Beijing's streets and across the country in May and early June aroused a 
sense of panic in the minds of party cadres. When they realized in late 1989 that it was not 
entirely impossible to see China fall as a second Romania, they began to worry about their 
own futures. Too bitter a tension between them and the workers might be fatal if next time
51 My conversation with the director.
52 Andrew Nathan reported a similar impression after his 1992 trip to China. See "China's Path from 
Communism", Journal of Democracy, Vol. 4, no. 2, 1992, p. 33.
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the tanks did not appear in the Changan Street. To a degree, tensions between leaders and 
led were an everyday occurrence, one worker told me, "But they would not capitalize on 
this kind of political event. Moreover, many of the party cadres and managers sided with 
the students."
Although it is difficult to give a sweeping conclusion from my encounters with party 
cadres and workers, it seems safe to state that while party branches still take orders from 
their superior agencies to push the various campaigns, they have become increasingly 
passive in implementing them. The largely aborted qingcha campaign in state firms serves 
as just another indication of the party's organizational disorder at the grassroots. As the 
intensity of supervision becomes weaker and weaker at each lower link in the chain of 
control leading from Zhongnanhai, the factories' party cadres gradually lose any initiative 
of their own. Millions of activists of the 1989 protest movements have thus escaped the 
clampdown at the grassroots. Ironically, while this saved the party from further con­
frontation with the population, it has sown the seeds for another round of social revolution 
in the future. Fault zones are being created along the cracks in the party's "transmission 
belt", with far-reaching consequences for state control.
The second feature of the failed clamp-down in state firms was the reluctance of 
ordinary party members to answer the calls from the party centre. Even before the 1989 
protest movement, many ordinary party members had already become disillusioned with 
the deterioration of the party's work style.53 and official corruption and worsening inflation 
caused them to suffer a decline in their living standards. So their non-cooperation in the 
qingcha was well anticipated and rendered the party’s attempts to tighten control anything 
but effective.54 During my Field work in 1991, one of the interviewees explained:
53 Lu Jianhua, p. 10.
54 The Beijing Party Organization Department, "Weishenma qingcha hui zouguochang" (Why the qing­
cha could not go deep?), Dangnei tongbao, no, 13, 1990, p.14.
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Since the early 1980s, we've received an increasingly less favourable response among workers. So 
the party branches changed their recruitment strategy. In the Cultural Revolution they took in the id­
eologically faithful. Now they try to lure those who have good skills in work. These people are 
respected, as they are usually hard working. And they are also influential because most of their co­
workers want to learn skills from them. Prior to June 4 when the party branches pressed them to 
join the party, they would say "why not". But at the crucial moment of late May and early June they 
were most supportive of the students.
Many of them had an apolitical mentality: "I'm not relying on the snobbery of the 
party cadres for a meal ticket". However, there was integrity behind their professionalism: 
stand up for what was right. Supporting the students in Tiananmen was seen as a natural 
act springing from conscience and so were the non-cooperative attitudes to the investigation 
afterwards. For the first time since 1949, during and immediately after the Beijing protest 
movement there were public announcements by party members that they were giving up 
their membership.55 In the party re-registration drive still more party members decided not 
to register.56 This prompted the party leadership to issue an instruction that party members 
were allowed not to register, that this was regarded as an ideological mistake but not a 
political one. Due to the scale of this non-registration, the party also tried to assure these 
people that if they did not want to remain in the party they could still do a good job as an 
ordinary citizen.57 The gradually changing allegiance of many party members, including 
those who have not renounced their party membership only because of fear of punishment, 
contributed much to the disruption of the "transmission belt" analysed earlier. This
55 It is difficult to get any reliable figure on how many party members revoked their membership 
between April and June 1989. In my former work unit, four out of about 70 party members gave it 
up.
5 6 Shi Jian, "Wei bushenqing dengji de dangyuan chuangzao hexie de huanjing" (To create an easy atm­
osphere for those party members who do not want to register), Zhibu shenhuo, (Beijing), No. 4, 
1990, p.18.
Zhibu shenhuo (Beijing), No. 4, 1990, p. 22.57
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underlines why the party centre made party members the priority of the qingcha. However, 
the party branches could not mobilize any significant following and the drive was doomed 
to failure.
In conjuncture with the internal party disorder among the rank-and-file cadres, the 
powerful resistance of the majority of workers sent strong signals to the factory party 
committees that any measures of political persecution would backlash badly against them. 
The following forms of boycott against the investigation drive reflected this spirit.
Against pressures to inform on co-workers During the check on individual 
workers' activities in the run-up and follow-up to June 4, workers were encouraged to 
report secretly to the party what their co-workers did in the Beijing streets. But according to 
my informants, few of them wanted to come forth. One of them commented:
The Cultural Revolution has passed ages ago. This small-report-thing sounds so odd now. In my 
workshop, where different clusters of patron-clients exist, passing gossip around is one thing 
everyone does. But reporting on such an explosive matter is quite another. Nobody would want to 
send his co-workers to jail just because they have some rifts in daily encounters. In addition, the fact 
that one has sent in information of this kind cannot be concealed forever. In a hostile climate against 
such behaviour, one shies away, even if initially intending to report on co-workers about their 
participation in Tiananmen."
Another reason for the failure of using co-workers against each other was that there 
had been general consensus that the shooting of ordinary people had been horrendous. This 
had transcended the differences of factional affiliations in shop-floor politics. Moreover, 
since most workers ignored the party's call to stay at home at one stage or another during 
the protest movement, an unwritten rule was established among workers that nobody 
should yield to the state’s pressure during the clampdown.58 This was a kind of collective 
resistance never experienced before in China's state firms. Immediately after June 4 a
58 A number of my informants expressed such a view.
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student leader was arrested due to information given to the state by his relatives and there 
had been other news reports of similar acts. However, during my fieldwork trip across the 
country in 1991 the majority of workers and managers gave me unanimous accounts of 
how qingcha in their unit failed to achieve "real results".
Boycott of the study sessions Study of the party's documents and the speeches 
of top leaders has always been an integral part of any political campaign in China. Without 
such a study program a campaign begins to falter from the very beginning. The 
investigations failed exactly because ordinary workers refused to accept the official verdict 
of what had happened in May and June in Beijing. This was reflected by their attitudes 
towards the political study sessions during the "settlement" in 1989. And very often their 
boycott was matched by the sympathy of the workshop leaders. According to my 
informants, most of their factories did not press very hard with the sessions. The managers 
excused themselves by saying that with the quota and production responsibility system in 
place, no worker wanted to spend working hours reading and hearing the propaganda. This 
would affect their incomes which were linked to the amount of work they did. One shop 
manager who was concurrently party secretary said that nowadays it was also impossible to 
arrange an after-hour meeting. Workers simply did not come. He told me that during the 
entire period of the investigation, which lasted for about one month in his factory, he was 
able to organize only one staff meeting where Deng Xiaoping's June 9 speech was read. 
For that, he needed to make it up as paid after-hour work. Although more meetings were 
conducted among party members, he continued, none of these dispelled any of the doubts 
about the party line on the nature of the protest movement.
Some other interviewees said that the meetings in large factories were much more 
numerous, due to the more sophisticated control/discipline systems there. However, they 
all claimed that nobody was really serious about these meetings. Very often, as I mentioned 
earlier, these study sessions became a good occasion for them to give vent to anger against
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the party's policies. To quote one of workers I interviewed: "the life of study sessions has 
died for good".
Party Three
De-statisation: A Remunerative Analysis
Chapter 6
The Dynamits of the Reform of the Wage System
In the three decades between 1955 and 1985 the Chinese workers’ award system 
was the eight-grade wage regime. This was a highly centralized system, which embodied 
both political and economic imperatives for tight control. Economically, the award system 
constituted the key link in the command economy. This can be seen from the overall 
government process of formulating labour and remunerative policies. First of all, the 
commanding heights entailed an aggregate national wage bill, which was decided by the 
state's financial situations. Based on this wage bill the employment policy was made, 
deciding on the number of new workers to be recruited. Under this bill, the decision was 
reached regarding whether to initiate wage increases and when, the amount of raises and 
how many workers were to be promoted. Without the unified eight-grade wage system, 
many above-mentioned indicators could not be easily come by. So it was crucial for the 
overall mandatory economic planning.
Politically, the unified system of award was closely connected to a display of polit­
ical and ideological compliance and served the state's general productive objectives. Under 
a set of politicised standards the "backward elements" were discriminated against and the 
political activists were rewarded. In this "virtuocracy", moral incentives and ideological 
attitudes (biaoxian) were linked to the workers' award. 1 These two features had been one 
of the most important traits of the industrial danwei system. The post-Mao wage reforms 
of state enterprises have made visible changes in the the remunerative system based on the 
eight-grade system.
6.1. Dismantling the Unified Wage System
Industrial wage reform has been an important component in China’s overall 
industrial reforms. It started with the restoration of the bonus system and piece-rate wages 
soon after the death of Mao in 1976. Successive wage promotions were launched with
1 Susan Shirk, "The Decline of Virtuocracy in China", p. 57.
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attempts by the Chinese leadership to butter up workers who had been subject to a wage 
freeze since 1972.2 From late 1978 a number of reforms were introduced. For instance, 
different factories were allowed to have their own bonus grades. In 1979 an incentive fund 
was created out of the factory's profit retention which was intended to allow managers 
some leeway for promoting a certain percentage of workers. The newly acquired autonomy 
stimulated the factory management to circumvent the wage controls, resulting in bonus 
expenditure surpassing the increases in productivity and profitability.3 One reason for this 
was that when normal wage increases were still under the tight restrictions of the state, 
more workers asked for the increases than the quotas allowed in each case, causing fierce 
struggle among workers and generating enormous pressure on the management.^ The 
distribution of bonus payment was then used as a measure to bypass the restriction, as it 
could be doled out as a measure of compensation for those left in the cold. As a result, 
these sudden wage increases outside the eight-grade system contributed to the over- 
issuance of currency. The loss of economic control in the late 1970s led to a retrenchment 
between 1980-1983,^ when the state imposed an unpopular bonus ceiling on all state 
enterprises.
6.1.1. The Bonus Reform 1984-1985 
The State Council's New Policy
As soon as the reform focus shifted from rural to urban areas in 1984, the reformers 
in the State Council under Zhao Ziyang chose the removal of the bonus ceiling as the 
breakthrough point for the industrial wage reform.6 In May 1984 the State Council
2 For an analysis of the state's wage policies of the period, See Peter Lee N.S. Lee, Industrial 
Management and Economic Reform in China, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 192-202.
3 Andrew Wälder, "Wage Reform and the Web of Factory Interests", The China Quarterly, no. 109, 
March 1987, p. 22.
4 Jianwei Han & Motohiro Morishima, "Labour System Reform in China and Its Unexpected 
Consequences", Economic and Industrial Democracy, Vol. 13,1992, p. 245.
5 Dorothy Solinger, China's Transition from Socialism: Statist Legacies and Market Reform 1980- 
1990, Boulder: M.E. Sharpe, 1993, pp. 41-48.
6 Xi Songtao and others (eds.), Zhongguo gongzi zhidu gaige (The Reform in the Chinese Wage 
System), Beijing: Zhongguo caiji chubanshe, 1988, p. 105.
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promulgated the Circular on Issues of Bonuses in State Enterprises. This marked the first 
step in transforming the state's direct control over the factory's remuneration system into 
indirect control. It stipulated: 1) With the ceiling for bonuses removed, enterprises may 
raise, or decrease, the overall amount of their bonus funds according to whether they had 
fulfilled state plans; 2) Based on the first point, factories could decide on their own forms 
of bonus distribution; 3) The bonus funds came basically from retention of profits. The 
state industrial and financial agencies would work out together with factories the 
proportions of the retained profits to be used for reinvestment, upgrading of equipment, 
social welfare, reserves and bonus funds7
In addition to the issue of bonuses, another key measure was introduced, namely, 
within a certain limit the enterprise management could, for the first time, increase or 
decrease the base salaries of workers. This was a major departure from the previous wage 
system. If a factory director decided to promote up to 20% of workers in any given year, 
he no longer needed to wait for the state to promulgate a national wage-grade promotion, 
although he still had to report the plan to his administrative bureau and the Labour Bureau 
in the region.^ This was an important step to pave the way for the reform in 1986 that 
overhauled the eight-grade wage system.
The crux of the new round of wage reform lay in the fact that the removal of the state 
ceilings on bonuses, hitherto a small part of a worker's income, opened the flood-gates of 
the previously closed system. From then on at least part of the workers' remuneration 
would be freed from the state's mandatory plans. While the managers increased their say 
on wage matters, for workers, it meant the first crack in the “big rice bowl”.
The opening up of the closed wage system was important both in theory and 
practice. All industrial wage reforms before 1984 fell into the category of salary additions 
and subtractions within a state ceiling and did not go beyond micro adjustments. And the
7 Ye Guangzhao, Gaige zhi lu (The road of reform), Beijing: Jingji guanli chubanshe, 1989.
8 From 1956 to 1984 the state initiated eight wage increases in state enterprises. The coverage was 
90% of all workers. This is to say that, in about three decades, not every worker had a chance to be 
promoted. See Liu Qingtang, Qiye gongzi gaige fangan de sheji yu fanli (the good paradigms of the 
designs of the wage reform), Beijing: Beijing Institute of Economics Press, 1989, p. 39.
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amounts of adjustments were entirely dependent on the financial situation of the treasury. 
As a result, remuneration became completely detached from the factory's performance. 
Allowing the bonus—an increasingly important part of their income —to rise or fall, 
reduced workers’ total dependence on the state for wage increases because the increase in 
their income was also influenced by the level of profit retention of the factory, which was 
determined not only by the state and local government, but by the factory's own market 
activities.^ Therefore, as the wage bills of individual factories tended to be a factor of 
variability, the state wage plans became less forceful.
The Bonus Tax
At the same time the bonus ceiling was removed, the state imposed on factories a 
new bonus tax in order to regulate the bonus issuance. The main purpose of the tax is to 
create a mechanism of indirect control. The tax on bonus reflected the recognition that the 
tightly controlled remuneration system had become incompatible with operation of the 
dual-track economic system. For instance, a large number of factories had been 
experimenting with various reforms of decentralization since the late 1970s. One of these 
was invented by Zhao Ziyang in Sichuan, and allowed enterprises to sell 20% or more of 
their products in the market and retain the profits thus generated. A proportion of the 
profits could be distributed as bonuses to workers. As the profit was a variable and so was 
the bonus fund supposed to be, a ceiling on bonuses was obviously inconsistent with the 
reform initiative and had made it difficult to be implemented. Not only did the ceiling 
suppress workers’ incentive, but it also discouraged the factories to increase production. 
Clearly the general market oriented reform would be hampered without a corresponding 
decentralization of decisions on wage expenditure to factory managers.^
9 In a dual-track system that combines both soft budget constraints and market incentives, the ability 
of a factory to grant bonuses also depends on its ability to obtain bank borrowings and negotiate 
with the state for a lower tax rate. These will be discussed later.
10. Sukhan Jackson, "Post-Mao Wage Policy and Trends in the People's Republic of China", 
Discussion Paper in Economics, no. 32, 1990, The University of Queensland, p. 2. Li Ruihuan, 
then mayor of Tianjing, proposed in late 1983 that there should be no ceiling on bonus payments as
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The gap between the fixed bonus and increased profit retention generated enormous 
pressure on factory managers to break the ceilings. The result was that the growth of 
bonuses of many factories went out of control. H  Therefore the state’s national wage bills 
as stated in the mandatory plan were grossly affected, as the amount of bonuses from the 
retained profits repeatedly exceeded the limits set by the state. Between 1980 and 1984, in 
order to make the figure of aggregate bonus issued match the figure prescribed in the plan, 
there was not a single year when the centre had not hurriedly readjusted the wage budget in 
its wage plans at the end of the year. ^
The creation of the bonus tax was meant to address these new problems arising due 
to the market reform. While the state's mandatory plan controlled the standard wages, the 
new bonus tax would subject the issuance of bonus to a progressive tax in order to prevent 
the increase of bonus from growing too fast. At the same time, factories were still left with 
enough room to increase bonuses with a balance between their production and wage plans. 
The rationale was built on the fact that enterprises were subject to objective constraints. For 
instance, because the increase in bonuses could not be readily transferred into the 
production cost, to issue large amounts of bonus would definitely cause losses. Some 
pressure was evident for factories to balance their immediate thirst for bonus benefits and 
their long-term concern for the development of the factory, as too high an amount of 
factory bonuses could not be sustained under the progressive bonus tax regime.13
long as they were linked to tax payment and profit remittance. Cited from Akio Takahara, The 
Politics of Wage Policy in Post-Revolutionary China, London: Macmillan, 1992, p. 139
11 Tigaisuo, the SCRES, Gaige: Women mianling de wenti yu silu (Reform: Our Questions and 
Thinking), Beijing: Economic Management Press, 1986, p. 24.
12 Xi Songtao and others (eds.), Zhongguo gongzi zhidu gaige, p. 107.
13 The starting point for the bonus tax was bonuses per year worth 2.5 months' standard wages. The 
rate for less than 4 months was 30% of bonus income; 4 to 6 months, 100%; and above 6 months 
300%. In 1987 the state lowered the rate, the starting point became 4 months. The rate for 5-6 
months was 50%; 6-7 months, 100% and above 7 months, 200%. The State Council, "Gong zi 
jijin zhanxing guanli banfa" (Provisional Regulations on the management of the wage funds), 
September 1985. Of course not all enterprises felt pressured by the tax regulations. There was an 
upsurge of bonus amounts in 1984 immediately after the urban industrial reform was announced.
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However, in reality the rationale did not work as the designers of the tax intended. In 
the last quarter of 1984 the growth rate of bonus was 117% more than in 1983 and this 
shot up the annual growth in workers' personal income by about 20%, the highest since 
the founding of the PRC.14 This sharp increase of bonus had significantly raised the 
proportion of bonus income in the overall wage structure on workers. According to a 
survey by Tigaisuo in Hunan in 1985, the proportion of bonus had reached above 30% of 
the total in all industrial sectors. In some enterprises which yielded more profits, it 
exceeded 40%. Given the short span of the reform, the result was staggering.15 This 
actually marked the beginning of a prominent problem in China's post-Mao wage reforms: 
the ever shrinking of the normal wages. This will be discussed in detail in later sections.
6.1.2. The "Linkage Reform" in 1986^
The 1984 industrial wage reform, as noted, created a two-tiered structure in worker 
salaries: the fixed part, composed of standard wages, still based on the eight-grade wage 
scheme, and later counted as the "base wage" (dang an gongzi) by factories; and the 
decontrolled portion with bonuses making up the bulk.17 From the policy-making 
perspective, the emergence of these two components was a conscious reform choice taken 
by the State Council under Zhao Yiyang. In 1984 Zhao stated clearly that the enterprise 
wage reform was meant to free the state sector from the fetters of the eight-grade wage 
system. Because of the insistence of Zhao and other reform figures, the proposals of
But the figure was lowered after the state tightened up the control. The market also exerted its 
influence.
14 See Xue Muqiao, "Tonghuo pengzhang yu wujia shangzhang zhi guanxi" (The relations between In­
flation and Price Rises), Gaige, no. 4, 1988, pp. 3-5.
15 Tigaisuo, Gaige zhong de shichang jiegou he qiye zhidu (The changing market structure and 
enterprise organization), Sichuan: Renmin chubanshe, 1988, p. 139.
16 The reform was meant to create a new remuneration mechanism that pegged the annual payroll of an 
enterprise to the fulfilment of a group of pre-determined performance indicators. The mechanim is 
supposed to be performance and output oriented.
17 The base wage serves as the core in a worker’s income under the new wage formula on whose basis 
other forms of awards are added. The calculating base of the state’s national budget is also based on 
an estimated aggregate of the industrial base wages.
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central planners, particularly from the Ministry of Labour and Personnel, to consolidate the 
wage standards were largely ignored. ^  This paved the way for some more thorough wage 
reforms in the state sector.
This "half fixed and half open" arrangement was a partial reform that soon ran into 
difficulties. From the state’s point of view, the fixed portion should be the larger one under 
effective macro wage control. In practice, state enterprises enlarged the decontrolled part 
by using various "local policies" and evaded the state taxes. The state was under pressure 
to find ways to control what it regarded as "unprincipled wage increases" of factories. 
Towards the end of 1986 a new industrial wage reform was enacted to rectify the flaws. ^  
This was the so-called linkage of a factory's wage bill to economic efficiency (gongxiao 
guagou).  By the beginning of 1989, 70% of all of China’s state enterprises had 
implemented the new reform, affecting 80% of the industrial w orkforce.^
The new wage system was a complicated one. It was made up of three key compo­
nents: the floating wages, the economic efficiency target, and the ratio determining the 
amount of floating wages based on the fulfilment of the target. According to state 
regulations, the floating wage of a factory fluctuates in accordance with the current year's 
economic results, as measured by the factory's wage bill of previous year. It includes both 
workers' standard wages and bonuses. Therefore the aggregate wage of a factory now 
consists of two parts: the annual wage bill (gongzi jishu) usually approved by the 
government and the floating part determined yearly by the factory’s production situation.^ 1
18 Akio Takahara, The Politics of Wage Policy in Post-Revolutionary China, pp. 158-159. The 
Ministry of Labour and Personnel was later divided into two separate ministries.
19 Peng Maoan, "Laodong gongzi jihua tizhi gaige de jiben silu" (The basic guidance for the reform of 
the wage and labour system), Zhongguo laodong kexue, (Labor Science of China), no. 6, 1991, pp. 
3-5. In fact, the experiment with the linkage reform began in 1985 and its prototype can be traced to 
the Zhao Ziyang Sichuan reform in the late 1970s.
20 See The Wage Research Task Group of the SPC, “Research on the Mechanism of Linking Wage 
Aggregate to Economic Efficiency”, Zhongguo gongye jingji yanjiu, (Studies on the Chinese 
Industrial Economy), no. 3, 1991, pp. 49-54.
21 The income entries such as the state food subsidies are accounted as part of wage bill but these are 
excluded when ascertaining the floating wages.
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Each year the increased part of a factory's wage bill can be shown in the formula 
below:
A = B x - | - x E
In this formula, A = the increased amount of wage bill to be distributed to workers; 
B = wage bill base (escertained normally from the previous year's); C = the targeted gross 
value of sales; D = the actual increase of the gross value of sales; and E = the floating
ratio.22
To ascertain the economic efficiency target of a given factory is a difficult task, since 
the ideal target for linkage -- the net gross sales value — is not always relevant in a semi- 
command/semi-market economy. However, the whole design of the reform was based on 
the concept of the net gross sales value, an indication of shifting the wage determinants 
from central planners towards market deregulation. Under such a gauge, the cost of labour 
and raw materials began to affect the factory's profit account.
In reality, however, China does not have an accurate statistical system to calculate the 
net gross sales value of a given factory.23 More importantly, planned allocations of 
production materials and the "policy losses" of factories allowed by the government often 
make the concept irrelevant for many large and medium-sized enterprises.^ So the net 
sales value has not been commonly used as the linkage target. At the present different 
industries adopt different linkage targets to ascertain the floating wage bill ( A ), including 
profit turnovers, the gross volume of products, the amount of foreign currency created and 
so on. Other supplementary targets are also imposed by the state to make sure that
22 Su Hainan and others, Qiye gongzhi gaige fangan sheji shouce (The handbook for the design of the 
plans for the industrial wage reform), Beijing: Zhongguo laodong chubanshe, 1990, p. 51.
23 The State Council issued a decree on 1 July 1993 that the state sector would soon implement a new 
accounting system, which was designed according to the "international practice". However, it was 
announced that it would take at least three years for the system to become operational. Renmin 
ribao, 1 July 1993.
24 The policy loss means that the state imposes onto factories the planned prices which are below the 
cost of their products and raw materials, e.g. coal, electric power and steel. Then the state writes off 
their losses.
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producers fulfil the state's requirements, such as the quality targets and the indicators of 
energy saving. Profit turnovers serve as the main linkage target for most of the factories 
implementing the reform. All the linkage targets mentioned above are components of the 
net sales value. The formula which is actually practised and determines the floating wage 
bill is:
A = B x - 2 - x E 
Cn
In fact, these unregularized variables under C represent the source of the problems 
with the new wage reform, which will be discussed later.
The new wage reform has exerted a significant influence on China’s wage structure. 
It represents a departure from the practice of enterprises "eating from the state's big rice 
bowl". One important indication of this is that owing to the reform, workers' wages have 
been uncoupled from the state's nationally unified wage system, which in the past 
embraced the government wage system (xingzheng gongzi), the institutional wage system 
(shiye danwei gongzi) and the industrial wage system. Whenever there was a national 
wage increase, it had to affect the three parts at the same time, and this made any increases 
difficult due to the pressure of the sheer number of people in the three systems on the 
financial situation at the time. The linkage reform now freed industrial wage promotions 
from the other two and placed the increases less at the mercy of the central financial 
departments. Moreover, the reform has effectively erased the so-called regional wage 
differentials, as these only affect the base wage, whose regional differences have 
increasingly become negligible in terms of the overall workers' income.
What underlies the linkage of wages to economic efficiency is the link between 
enterprises and market forces. Through this linkage, factories, at least partially, began to 
deliver wages to workers from the profits they earned from their market activities. This 
was itself an important change in that it has not only made the management but also 
workers concerned about the performance of their factory in the market. The linkage 
reform also allowed more autonomy of producers in deciding workers' wages, 
representing an advance from the bonus reform. While the latter only granted power to 
factory managers to set bonus scales, the former allowed some measure of autonomy to
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affect fixed wages as well. In fact, the introduction of the linkage reform quickened the 
pace of phasing out the eight-grade wage system. Certainly this does not suggest that the 
state's control over the industrial wages became qualitatively ineffective, as there also 
existed other direct and indirect control mechanisms. There is no doubt that the 
forcefulness inherent in the state wage system before the post-Mao reforms is gradually 
diminishing with the evolution of the linkage reform.
6.2. The Bargaining between the State and Enterprises
The two institutional changes in China’s enterprise wage system in 1984 and 1986 
allowed more autonomy to factories and also created new patterns of interaction between 
state and enterprises, which can be characterised as intensified bargaining. The state, for 
purposes of both political control and macro economic management, remained determined 
to maintain leverage in micro wage affairs.
All the reforms so far in place have entailed a great deal of expediency. Both the 
bonus reform and linkage reform were designed to guarantee to the state at least a minim­
um amount of revenue. Factories that carried out the linkage reform became liable to pay a 
new state regulatory tax in 1985. According to a State Council Circular, if the increase in 
floating wages (calculated based on the wage aggregate of the previous year) is below 7%, 
factories are exempt from paying tax. If the rate of increases lies between 7% to 12%, a 
30% tax is levied; and between 12-20%, a rate of 100% will be imposed. Any increase 
above 20% is taxable by 300%.25
It is easy to understand the concern of the state. Thanks to the reforms of decentral­
ization, the proportion of state revenue as a share in the national income has progressively 
dropped to its lowest point since 1949. The excessive dispersion of the state's financial 
strength was manifested in a drop in state revenue as a proportion of national income, from 
31.1% in 1979 to 19.3% in 1988.^6 The central government found it increasingly difficult
25 In 1987 the State Council lowered the industrial regulatory taxes. The rate for 7-12% of wage 
increase is 20%; 13-20%, 50%; 20-27%, 100% and above 27%, 200%. The Ministry of Labour, 
Laodong zhengce huibian: 1984-1987 (The selected labour policy documents: 1984-1987), Beijing: 
The Ministry of Labour, 1989, p. 156.
26 Jingji ribao, 8 December 1988.
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to muster enough revenue to proceed with its major capital projects, particularly in the 
energy, transport and power industries. The increased profit retention, enlarged wage pool 
and slow growth in productivity of the state sector had joined hands in creating a vast 
drainage process, which then absorbed a great deal of the income otherwise available for 
the state treasury. In the seventh-Five-Year-Plan period, the ratio between the growth of 
industrial wage bill and the growth of profit turnover and tax remittance had reached 5.23 : 
1.27 This means that most of the well designed control measures stated earlier were not 
effective at all.
The state, therefore, is confronted with a dilemma. It needs more revenue from 
enterprises, which is possible only when it lets go those rigid controls. Yet granting the 
authority to factories to decide on their own wage policies would in turn threaten state 
revenue and macro economic stability. The state attached three preconditions to the linkage 
reform: 1) It has the final say in the setting of enterprise wage bill (gongzi jishu). This is an 
important measure, as any increased factory income (the floating part) flows from this 
basis. 2) For most enterprises, the target variables include a compulsory minimum amount 
of profit turnovers set by the s ta t e d  This means producers have to increase production to 
a certain point to generate enough profits that ensure their income also to increase. 3) The 
state annually adjusts the wage bill and linkage ratio through administrative decrees.29 
This, together with the state regulatory taxes, serves to prevent workers in the profitable 
factories from earning too much. The bottom line of these conditions is to safeguard the 
state's capacity to squeeze as much profit from enterprises as possible.
However, the desired results were not easy to be brought about in a twisted reality. 
As stated earlier, the substitutions of net sales value as the linkage target, such as those 
variables mentioned above, can be more easily influenced by many factors, e.g. changes in 
the state's macro-economic policies and fast-changing external conditions arising from an
27 Ding Xianjiu and Yong Weiguo, "Guoying qiye gongxiao guagou qianyi" (A brief analysis on the 
linkage reform in state enterprises), Zhongguo laodong kexue, no. 7 ,1992, p. 9.
28 For those enterprises already making a loss, the state set a progressive target rate to reduce the red, 
on which the increase of wages for them is assessed.
29 Liu Qingtang and others, pp. 68-69.
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immature market. Under the circumstances of the ever changing external environment and 
state policies, it became impossible for the state and factories to work out together solid 
long-term ratios for the linkage between the wage aggregate and various economic targets. 
These have provided the setting for bargaining. As a result, the state and its enterprises 
have bogged down in a tug-of-war over the control of wages.
Bargaining over the wage aggregate
The wage aggregate is the primary target for bargaining. Its amount is ascertained 
through a count-down method, using the previous year’s wage aggregate to serve as the 
base figure to work out the coming year’s . A s  mentioned earlier, commonly this 
aggregate comprises two parts, a largely fixed amount of the workers' "base wage and a 
floating part composed of "efficiency income" (xiaoyi gongziß  ^ and other wage forms 
such as new piece-rate awards, overtime pay and national and regional per capita living 
subsidies. So the wage aggregate is a variable subject to many unpredictable factors.
This provides opportunities for producers to bargain with the state. The official 
guidance is as follows: if the efficiency income increased by within 15% vis-a-vis the base 
figure of the wage bill (the previous year's), all the increased income can be awarded to 
workers; by 15-25%, 60% can be awarded; 35-45%, 20%; and over 45%, no more than 
10% can be awarded.^2 Obviously, the base figure of the wage bill represents a key factor 
determining the amount that can go to workers. What the factories do is to choose carefully 
what items should be included in the base figure of the wage aggregate and negotiate with 
government agencies for a preferred settlement. Usually the bigger the base of the wage 
aggregate that enterprises submit to the state for approval, the bigger the floating income 
enterprises may secure later in the year. Because the assessment is done chronologically on
30 If the previous year’s figure is too low or too high, then an average figure of the last several years 
will be worked out to serve as the base.
31 The efficiency income is the term to describe all the floating income workers receive because of the 
increase of enterprise’s economic efficiency. As workers understand it, it is more related to the 
situation of sales. In China's case, however, good sales may or may not help improve economic 
efficiency.
Su Hainan and others, Qiye gongzhi gaige fangan sheji shouce, pp. 25-26.32
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a case by case basis with little horizontal comparison within an industry, factories 
deliberately manipulate their previous year’s wage indicators so as to have more room for 
wage increases in the next few years.
Some of the factory directors I visited in 1991 revealed to me their often-used techni­
ques. For instance, the state stipulates that factories should delete from the wage bill items 
such as per capita subsidies. Items like energy-saving and material-saving funds, although 
indicators of economic efficiency, are awarded by the state through a separate bonus fund 
and, therefore, should also be omitted from the wage aggregate. However, there are many 
loopholes in distinguishing these funds, and it is common for the factory directors to 
include them in the wage bill. Another is the payment to workers independently hired by 
factories on a temporary basis (usually people from the rural areas). Such payments should 
not be listed in the wage aggregate, according to state regulation, but most factories do so 
in order to inflate the wage aggregate. When these workers are let go, the already enlarged 
floating income will not shrink but will benefit the permanent workforce. Other items such 
as labour protection subsidies or penulty payments for dangerious posts should also be 
excluded but often not the case. Generally speaking, the false claims may make up as much 
as 10-30% of the wage bill that factories present to the state for approval.33
The bonus fund is a major source of manipulation. It should be counted as the key 
component in the floating part of the wage aggregate. As each enterprise has its own bonus 
practices, however, it is not possible for the state to standardize the contents of bonuses. 
So it is generally left up to producers to declare what they have delivered to workers as 
bonuses. There are many loopholes in this regard. For instance, the state stipulates that the 
amount of bonuses that have been taxed away by the state bonus tax (the part exceeding 
one's fixed wages of four and half months) should have been wiped out from the wage 
aggregate at the time factories went through the first assessment after entering the linkage 
reform. A labour department official told me that infringements were widespread among
33 Wang Kezhong, "Bachengbao jingying zerenzhi jianlizhai jiazhi guiliu jichushang" (The system of 
managerial responsibility by contract should be established according to the law of value), Fudan 
xuebao, no. 5, 1991, p. 9. This percentage seems to me a bit too high.
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state enterprises, which either delete only a portion of it, or ignore the regulation 
altogether.
Bargaining over compulsory remittances
Although the remittance (of profits to the state) target is compulsory, there is no re­
gularized assessment procedure for determining its level. So working it out has become an 
important part of the negotiation process between the state and factories. Since the rate of 
remittance is crucial to both sides, it is one of the most contested items in the wage 
arrangement. For factories, a lower remittance to the state means more profit retention from 
which more bonuses and more social welfare benefits, such as larger housing funds, are 
generated. The current state regulation allows about 25-30% of retained profits to be listed 
as a factory’s social welfare fund.
In striving for smaller levies, enterprises have a number of advantages in their 
negotiations with the state. First, the linkage reform was launched at a time when the 
national economy was undergoing drastic changes. The external economic environment 
posed risks to factories entering the reforms. Among the risks, the most acute was posed 
by the distorted dual-track price structure, which unevenly affects the profit earnings of 
different industries. For instance, the price hikes of primary materials created a situation 
whereby production and sales may both increase, while cash returns to an enterprise 
decrease. Under the circumstances, when enterprises raise this issue with their bureaucratic 
agencies, the latter are obliged to concede that they cannot reasonably stick to its original 
demands. Consequently, the adjustment to a lower rate of remittance to the state becomes a 
major form of preferential treatment in luring producers to enter the linkage reform.34 For 
instance, the three-year retrenchment initiated in 1988 greatly affected the profitability of a 
large number of state factories, and this provided a good excuse to the factories to bargain 
with their administrative superiors for reduced remittance.
Another bargaining chip available to enterprises in their negotiation with the state 
involves the impact of worsening inflation on workers. Throughout the second half of the
34 See The Wage Research Task Group of the SPC, “Research on the Mechanism of Linking Wage 
Aggregate to Economic Efficiency”, pp. 49-54.
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1980s, China’s inflation spiraled upward. At the same time, the state lacked measures to 
provide enough offsetting subsidies for workers. So enterprises had to assume a role as 
additional suppliers to enable their employees to keep up with the rising cost of living. In 
fact, this has become an important function of their newly acquired distributive power, in 
the wake of the state's control over industrial wages becoming indirect. Under the 
circumstances, managers manoeuvred to hold up remittances to the state and redistributed 
even more income to workers from profit retention. For its part, the state was forced to 
make concessions continuously, in order to "stabilize worker sentiment and production". 
So the original design to guarantee a minimum remittance to the state by producers was 
often compromised.
Apart from the external factors, any internal problem such as a change in a product, 
the installation of a new production line, or plans for new housing projects can be used to 
bargain with the state for a reduced rate of remittance. And those factories which can make 
loud noises or had better guanxi (connections) with the higher bureaucratic authorities may 
get the best deal. Even when factories fail to achieve what they want in the bargaining, they 
may adopt numerous measures to cheat the state in order to submit less in taxes. One 
popular means is to launch many technical innovation projects with loans from the banks. 
Before 1988, when most factories entered the contract responsibility system, they had to 
return the loans to banks before handing over tax remittances. After 1988 the state 
stipulated that enterprises must submit taxes first and then repay loans with their retained 
profits. However, according to the new director of the Research Institute of SCRES, Liu 
Shuren, a great number of large and medium-sized factories could not afford such a policy 
change. The state then had to choose either between allowing them to stick to the old policy 
or seeing no technical innovation in these backbone factories. Consequently, the traditional 
principle of a middle way (zhongyong zhidao) had to be used: some factories were 
permitted to carry out the old rules and some were not, and some were allowed to stick to 
the old rules one year but not the next.35 This confusion of "traffic lights" has been well
35 Liu Shuren, Gongjing neican, no. 27, 1992, pp. 12-14.
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utilized by factories, which not only try to reduce the tax remittance, but secretly distribute 
the bank loans for technical innovation among workers as bonuses. 36
Bargaining over the linkage ratio
The control over linkage ratios demonstrated another attempt by the state to subdue 
factories’ thirst for higher floating wages. The state set up a range of ratios of 1: 0.3 to 1 : 
0.7 for different factories. This range of ratios is quite arbitrarily set since there is no 
reliable theoretical explanation for such a ratio base. Nevertheless, the control over the 
linkage ratio does serve two purposes in macro economic control. First, it makes the 
growth rate of aggregate wages lower than that of rises in productivity. Secondly, by 
applying different ratios for different plants, it favoured some factories at the expense of 
others, a phenomenon often dubbed as “whipping the fast ox”. That is to say, the factories 
which started with higher levels of economic efficiency would have a low potential for any 
increase in economic efficiency, so their aggregate wages end up being allowed to rise less 
quickly. Recently, in order to address this problem, in ascertaining the various linkage 
ratios between 0.3 to 0.7, horizontal comparisons have been used to assess factories in the 
same industry to assess their average levels of productivity.37
The linkage ratio is important in that it constitutes a decisive denominator in the 
linkage wage formula. Different ratios yield different shares of income to the state, enter­
prises and workers. Therefore, the state and factories are involved in endless bargaining 
over an appropriate linkage ratio. For instance, one leading official in the Ministry of 
Labour suggested that the factories with better economic efficiency could have a ratio 
slightly higher than 1 : 0.7; the factories that could have their ends meet could have a ratio 
around 1 : 0.7; and the factories with poor performance should have a ration below 1 ; 
0.7.38 Again no sound reason was given as why this should be the standard. Since the
36 Information from an interview in 1991 with a researcher on the Research Institute of Industrial 
Wages of the Ministry of Labour.
37 Currently the indicators commonly used in assessment include factory’s tax rate per head, wage/tax 
rate, capital rate and the gross output value and so on.
38 Su Hainan and others, Qiye gongzhi gaige fangan sheji shouce, p. 23.
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judgement of whether a factory has a good performance is also very subjective, there has 
been hardly any standard from the factory’s point of view.39
Indeed, the ratio draws the boundaries of the new structure of interests in state 
enterprise interactions. In the range of linkage ratios of 1: 0.3 to 1: 0.7, the state appears to 
be in an advantageous position. For every 1% of growth in economic efficiency, often 
measured by a growth of turnover, plants may raise their floating wages by at most 0.7%. 
Through this ratio control the state may plan for the increase in the national wage aggregate 
because the capacity for a meaningful growth of economic efficiency is quite limited for 
large and medium-scale factories. As one of the designers of the reform remarked, if an 
average ratio of 1: 0.5% can be achieved, the state will surely increase its revenue by a 
large margin, while workers may also increase their income. Then the goal that producers 
may spur initiative through wage inducement but at same time still remain under the state’s 
effective control would be realized. Here the crux is to restrict the ratio of wage increase as 
strictly as possible, that is, only let a limited number of factories have a ratio near 1: 0 .7 .^  
The state would want to set a lower ratio for a factory either because its wage 
aggregate is already quite large, or because the factory's economic efficiency is too low. In 
practice, this cannot be effectively implemented. Many of the factories with a large wage 
aggregate are large and medium-scale ones. As they play a key role in their industries and 
in the national economy as a whole, they are in a strong position to bargain with the state 
and, usually, they win concessions.
Factories with a low level of economic efficiency may, as noted earlier, have a high 
potential to improve and thus to see their floating wages shoot up. It is understandable that 
the state is reluctant to grant a high linkage ratio to them. But again, many large and 
medium-scale factories have a record of poor performance. It may not be their fault that 
they are not profitable. Even for poorly managed enterprises, if the state does not allow an
39 A number of managers told me in 1991 that their factories’ performance in the two-track system 
were highly dynamic. There was no way to have a standard assessment of whether they had done 
well. Much depended on the factors they could not control.
40 Interview with a researcher in the Research Institute of Labour Science, the Ministry of Labour, 
during my 1991 field work in Beijing.
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attractive ratio, workers will have a low incentive to improve labour productivity. 
Eventually, the burden will still be carried by the state. Caught in this vicious circle, the 
state has no choice but to grant attractive ratios to them. On the other hand, according to the 
ratio formula of 1: 0.3-0.7, if factories want to increase their floating wages at a rate of 5% 
continuously, they must maintain a growth rate of 16.6-17.1% in productivity. There is no 
way that such a high rate can be sustained.^! The result is, again, that the state bows to the 
pressure from factories for higher ratios.
Sometimes the centre allowed a high linkage ratio in order to persuade the regional 
governments to enter the linkage reform. In 1988 when Fujian Province was asked to carry 
out the linkage reform in all its state enterprises, the State Council offered a preferential 
ratio of 1 : 0.8. After the centre and the Fujian Government worked out a wage aggregate 
of 1.7 billion yuan for the province, the profit remittance was fixed at 24.4 billion yuan 
according to the ratio. Although this amount of turnover was larger than the previous 
year's, it was not a high target, given the fast industrial growth of the province. Because of 
this, the province could retain a much higher amount of profit.42
As a result, the design to bring the wage growth under control through a fixed 
linkage ratio did not materialize. According to a report by the State Planning Commission, 
the increases in productivity and in wage aggregates are not proportionate and 
simultaneous at all. In 1985, the first year the linkage reform were staged, the actual ratio 
between the increase in economic efficiency and in the wage bill was 1: 0.73, already 
breaking the prescribed upper limit but still not too bad. From 1986 to 1988, the ratios 
were 1: 1.05, 1: 1.12 and 1: 1.04 respectively.^ This negative linkage (daogua) between 
economic efficiency and wage increases vividly demonstrates the shifting balance in 
state/enterprise relations in the area of income redistribution.
41 Long Xianying & Guo Hanxian, "Some Thoughts on the Linkage between Wages and Efficiency", 
Zhongguo laodong kexue, no. 7, 1990, p. 5.
42 Document no. 9, the Ministry of Labour, 1988, Laodong zhengce zhuankan (Special Journal of 
Labour Policies), no. 1, 1989, p. 22.
43 The Wage Research Task Group of the SPC, “Research on the Mechanism of Linking Wage 
Aggregate and Economic Efficiency”, pp. 49-54.
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Co-operation between Enterprises and Local Government
Another factor that helps erode the state's macro wage controls is the cooperation be­
tween local governments and enterprises to cheat the centre. Except for a limited number of 
key enterprises, the state's control and assessment system has been exercised by sectoral 
industrial bureaus in the localities. This is commonly called "fenji guanli", namely, 
management at various levels. Under this arrangement, the centre allocates a sum of wage 
aggregates to regions and sectors, which further disperse it among p lan ts .^  Yet the actual 
distribution policies are formulated by factories according to their production, sales and tax 
remittances. So the "cage" designed by the state to contain the "bird" can never be correct. 
The supervision over this bottom-up process is very weak.
Moreover, more factory profit retentions and higher wage funds and less turnover to 
the centre may help raise departmental and local income. This interest structure generates 
great pressure for the state's economic watch-dogs at the local levels to relax their actual 
control over the wage proposals put forward by the enterprises under their jurisdiction. 
They make concessions to reduce the producers' compulsory turnovers to the centre, close 
one eye to their wage aggregate evaluation, grant more tax exemptions and readily bow to 
the demands of factories to raise their linkage ratios, all the while that they require 
factories' "tributes" to local development. Very often part of these "tributes" end up in the 
social welfare benefits of the bureaucrats manning the local governm ents^ Once they 
approve the wage plans of their subordinates and submit the actual local wage bill to the 
centre, there is little the latter can do but accept the status quo.
The following is a good example showing the conflict of interests between the central 
and local governments in managing the wages of state factories. In early 1990, the Beijing 
Municipal Government raised the base wage for all the workers in the municipal factories
44 Peng Maoan, "Laodong gongzi jihua tizhi gaige de jiben silu", pp. 3-6.
45 Huang Yasheng, "Web of Interests and Patterns of Behaviour of Chinese Local Economic
Bureaucracies and Enterprises during Reforms", China Quarterly, no. 123, September 1990, pp. 
431-458.
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by one grade without prior approval from the State Council.46 The reason was legitimate 
enough: the economic retrenchment program had greatly reduced the 'efficiency wages' of 
the workers in Beijing. The promotion of one wage grade could marginally increase the 
wage aggregate of the city and thus by some measure compensate workers for the losses 
incurred. However, the central government did not concur. The Ministry of Labour, the 
State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance responded strongly. They issued a 
document worthy of quoting at some length.
The one-grade wage promotion of your city without prior approval gravely infringed 
the State Council’s national wage policy, jeopardized macro wage management and 
increased the cost of products. It has exerted a far-reaching impact on the ministerial 
factories located in your city and on other regions as well. This is an erroneous decision. 
In order to handle this properly, we have, upon receiving instructions from the leaders of 
the State Council, made decisions as follows:
1) When the state adjusts the national wage plan for the second half of the year and 
assesses the plan for the next year, it will not increase the wage aggregate of your 
municipal factories and, following this principle, the labour and planning departments 
should strictly assess the wage aggregate plan and the wage aggregate base for the linkage.
2) The one grade wage raise should not affect the actual industrial wage level of your 
city.47
3) The increase in production costs should not affect the turnovers of your city to the 
centre.
4) The ministerial factories located in Beijing should not follow your practice of 
wage promotions.48
46 This means that the workers working in the factories under the central ministries had not received 
the increase.
47 This has shown the recognition of the centre of the extent to which the proportion of the base wage 
has shrunk in the overall income of workers. Before the reform, the increase of one grade for all 
workers in a large city like Beijing would certainly affect the wage level of the city.
Document Concerning Labour and Wages, no. 66, 1990, The Ministry of Labour, Laodong zhengce 
zhuankan (Special Journal of Labour Policies), no. 9, 1990, p. 5.
48
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Following this up, I found that Beijing was not alone in such an “illegal” pursuit. In 
the same year, similar central documents were also issued to a number of provinces. When 
I enquired into the case of Beijing, people in the Beijing Bureau of Labour confirmed my 
suspicion that all the four points in the documents were largely ignored.
6.3. The Upsurge of Irregular Wage Income^ ^
One significant consequence of the shift from direct to indirect state control over 
enterprise wage distributions has been a mushrooming of the avenues through which 
factories create their own monetary awards or awards in kind. In fact, the phenomenon as 
such has always existed. The new wage reform has, however, pushed this to a point 
beyond any effective macro control. The new wage institution embodied in the linkage 
reform is instrumental for this development.
According to Professor Sun Zhen, director of the Ministry of Labour's Research 
Institute of Labour Science, the national average wage for workers grew from 615 to 
1,747 yuan between 1978 and 1988, a quite impressive increase of 1.84 fold. Excluding 
the increase in prices, this was a rise of 11% per annum, in a decade of fast growth second 
only to the first 5-year plan period from 1953 to 1957. At the same time the national 
industrial wage aggregate increased by 1.2 times, an average growth of 0.8% p.a. 
(excluding the factor of increased prices).
On the other hand, the increase in national income was 1.42 fold during the 
corresponding period. Its annual growth averaged 9.2% (calculated in terms of constant 
prices). The ratio between national income and the wage aggregate was 1: 0.87 (assuming 
the growth of national income to be 1). What can be inferred from this group of figures is 
that the increase of wages did not overtake that of production. It remains within a rational 
range of proportionate development. And the two years of 1988 and 1989 saw further
49 The irregular income refers to the awards either in cash or in kind which are not formally reported to 
the government.
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declines in wage increases. The shift in both the industrial wage aggregate and average 
wages was a negative 2% and 4% respectively.^
Professor Sun’s calculation was based on official statistics. However, it contradicted 
many other research reports by academics which deemed that state control over industrial 
wages had basically been broken since 1984. For instance, according to an economist in 
CASS, only an average 44.7% of the increased national income from 1979 to 1988 was at 
the disposal of the state, compared to over 80% before the reforms, while most of the rest 
went to boost personal incomes. In 1987 and 1988, the individual shares from the 
increased national income were as high as 45.5% and 47.9% respectively.^ 1 Other facts 
may also be used to support this argument, including the ever expanding bank deposits, 
the nation-wide consumption waves and the shrinking state revenue at a time when national 
income increased.52
The major factor behind these vastly different conclusions lies in the different ways 
that have been used to calculate the data available for factory income. The official statistics 
take into account the income items that the state requests factories to report, which are 
normally composed of three parts: 1) the wage aggregate, the floating wages according to 
the linkage ratio and bonus funds; 2) state subsidies like food, transportation and hygiene, 
subsidies to couples with an only child, etcetera; 3) funds that factories deliver to workers 
by their own income generating sources, either in the form of the outside-wage-bill cash 
awards or awards in kind. While the first and second parts may be fairly accurately
50 Sun Zhen, "On the Problems and Counter Measures in the Deepening of Wage Reform", Zhongguo 
laodong kexue, no. 5, 1990, p. 3.
51 Zhang Jun, “On the Present Financial Plight of Our Country”, Jingji Yanjiu, no. 12, December 
1990, pp. 46-50.
52 It is interesting to note that in 1990 the recorded wage bill for all workers (including non-state 
sector) was 296 billion yuan (an increase of 34.15 bullion yuan) but the same year saw an increase 
of bank deposit of 145.8 bullion yuan. Huang Weituan, Zhongguo de yingxing jingji (The Chinese 
hidden economy), Beijing: Zhongguo shangye chubanshe, 1992, p. 187. The share of the state 
revenue in the national income dropped from 26% in 1984 to 17.7% in the same year. Renmin 
ribao, 12 September, 1991.
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calculated, there is by no means a way to adequately count the third.53 in fact, factories are 
very selective in reporting what they have given to workers outside the normal wages. 
Academics told me during my field work that they could only estimate this vast pool of 
independent income. Perhaps there will never be adequate data on this, as every factory 
goes its own way and deliberately makes "irregular distributions" behind-the-scenes. It is 
exactly in this area that the cat and mice game intensifies.
The sources of the "irregular distributions" are very diverse. Some are legal while 
others not. Among the legal ones, the most resilient item is the labour protection and social 
welfare fund. It is resilient because it is not counted in the cost of production and therefore 
it is under less tight state wage controls. It can be a regular part of workers' income. 
According to the state regulation a factory could extract from its total income an amount for 
this fund equivalent to 11% of its wage bill. In addition, the factory could increase the fund 
through transferring 25% of the profit retained after paying taxes. In 1989 this fund 
reached 23.53 billion yuan, as in contrast to 67 billion yuan base wages.^4 But it can also 
become a type of irregular income. Because the profit retention changes from year to year, 
the above mentioned figure did not incorporate all that had been awarded to workers. 
Behind this legal award was an unknown amount secretly transferred from the retained 
profits. Moreover, the state allows only a few items to be listed under this fund, but now 
over 20 new items have been created without approval. And factories secretly incorporate
53 The first may be calculated on the basis of a factory’s report on its wage aggregate, wage increases 
through the linkage to turnovers and the state income regulatory tax. The second is usually 
distributed on the basis o f per head according to the state “red head documents’ and thus is 
discernible. For instance, the state subsidies on transportation was 5.43 billion yuan in 1987 and the 
only child and hygiene was 6.61 billion yuan in 1988. Zhongguo tongji nianjian (The Chinese 
Statistical Year Book), 1989 and 1990.
54 The social welfare fund included retirement fund of about 13 bullion yuan. Excluding this, the 
overall amount was still quite large because it was only one of the sources from which workers 
received income outside the standard income. Moreover, this figure applies to state factories under 
the state budget. If calculated nationally the figure can be as high as 60 bullion yuan. See Research 
Group on the Industrial Wage Distribution, the Ministry of Labour, "Yusuannei guoying qiye 
shouru fenpai yanjiu" (Research on the wage distribution in the state enterprises under state budget), 
Zhongguo laodong kexue, no. 1, 1992, p. 6.
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these into the cost of production.55 Generally, with increased autonomy granted to 
factories in remunerative matters, the loose state control over this fund has become looser.
There are many other types of the irregular sources of income available to a factory. 
For instance, the government allows enterprises to create service companies to 
accommodate surplus labourers. A large proportion of the workers in these companies 
receive state salaries, operate state machinery and benefit from the enterprise's use of state 
loans as circulation funds. Yet their earnings are regarded as having nothing to do with the 
state and are openly or secretly distributed. In addition, it is popular for factories, 
workshops and individual workers to be engaged in moonlighting in the second economy. 
While the individuals receive cash in hand, factories and workshops doing 'moonlighting' 
establish their own "money boxes" from which workers get extra income.
Giving workers awards in kind is not new in China’s industrial income structure. 
However, this could legitimately escape the state’s close monitoring only after state 
enterprises possessed a degree of autonomy in income redistribution in the wake of the 
wage reform in the 1980s. Since the introduction of the linkage reform in 1986, the 
practice has become more widespread, as an effective means of avoiding the state's 
regulatory wage taxes. Individual workers who receive money secretly also benefit by 
being able to hide their taxable income, the threshold of which now stands at 400 yuan per 
month.56 During my visit to the Beijing Capital Iron and Steel Company in 1991, a trade 
union chairman told me that every month most of the workers in the factory paid a few 
yuan as personal income tax. But if one carefully calculates their income, one could 
conclude that the workers should have paid much more. The few yuan becomes a symbolic 
gesture to show the honesty of the workers in this model factory.
The increased ability of enterprises to dole out extra money and materials illustrates 
their autonomy in income redistribution. The unusual aspect of awards in kind is that there 
is virtually no boundary for such awards: anything ranging from consumer goods, public 
meals, children's education and paid travel for staff and their families may be included.
55 Huang Weituan, p. 190.
56 Jingji ribao, 26 December 1992
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Academics estimate that the irregular income had risen from one-third to 40% of workers' 
total income in the 1 9 8 0 s .5 7  Coming into the 1990s, according to a survey by the State 
Statistics Bureau among 2,000 contracted factories, on average workers received an 
irregular income over 50% of their pay-slip, and nationally each year about 70 billion yuan 
becomes unaccounted for. If this was added to the about 60 billion yuan of other items of 
the irregular incomes that could be traced in the bank records, the total figure exceeded 130 
billion yuan, a figure that reflects the depth of the post-Mao wage reform.58
This leads to an important question: whether the increase in the irregular distributions 
reflects a corresponding increase in workers' dependence on their unit, which means the 
organized control of the unit over workers' everyday life? Answering this question 
requires comprehensive investigation. My field-work findings tentatively point to the fact 
that the irregular provisions are still vital to the maintenance of a decent living. Even 
though many surveys show that the irregular distributions have been mostly accumulated 
for buying "dajian" or electrical durables like colour television, they constitute an 
indispensable part of one's overall income at a time of high inflation.59 To some degree 
the control function associated with the workplace remunerative provisions has somewhat 
changed in nature. It has become more of a compensation for inflation and for the 
government' control over standard wages, as well as a necessity to maintain psychological 
equilibrium amidst a trend of keeping up with the "neighbours". In other words, as the 
political contours associated with a factory's welfare functions diminish, the wider use of 
irregular distributions to workers, usually on an egalitarian basis, has contributed to the 
process of weakening politicised management.
The tendency to provide workers with the irregular income reflects the clashes of 
interests between the state and enterprises. Realizing that the linkage reform did not follow 
the original design, the state has tightened up control over the wage aggregate of state 
enterprises. It has also erected stricter checks on the submission of the regulatory wage
57 Zhang Shuguang, “On the Materialization of Individual Income”, Jingji yanjiu, no. 12, December 
1990 pp. 36-42.
58 Huang Weituan, p. 193.
59 Zhongguo jiyingbao, 13 March 1990.
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taxes of industries since the introduction of the retrenchment program in 1988. As a result, 
the average industrial wages in the same year dropped by 0.8%, and the following year 
produced a further slide of 4%. According to a labour official, the run-away expansion of 
wage funds between 1987 and 1988 was basically brought under control in 1990. 
However, the expansion of the irregular distributions has worsened.^ Factories, in order 
to give workers more pay, now have had to circumvent state controls over the wage 
aggregate.
The irregular distributions can thus be seen as an independent channel of 
compensation created by enterprises in the wage war with the state. An estimate made by 
the Ministry of Labour reveals that while the regular enterprise wage aggregate increased 
by 3.1 times from 1979 to 1988, the irregular distributions of cash grew by 11.8 times 
during the same period.61 The fastest growth took place after the linkage reform. From 
1986 to 1988 the growth rate was 44%. This figure, as admitted by the researcher, was an 
underestimate because a great deal of the irregular distribution was given away with no 
record kept at all.^2
The impact of the irregular distribution on the state's industrial wage policy is 
enormous. As a double-edged sword, its increase may help quieten the outcries within a 
factory. However, the practice stimulates competition among factories for more irregular 
income. And the uneven ability of various industries to give out these distributions causes 
discontent among the workers who receive less from their factories.
In sum, it is largely because of its hidden nature that we have such a confusing 
picture of China's national remuneration. And it is not confined to the industrial sector. I 
was told that the staff of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin also depended irregular distrib­
ution to cope with the consumption wave in the country.63 On the one hand, as noted, the 
official statistics show that the increase in the national wage bill lagged behind that of the 
national income. It failed to reach the target of the 6th and 7th Five-year Plans. On the
60 Interview with a cadre in the Labour Bureau of Beijing Municipality in 1991.
61 Sun Zhen, "On the Problems and Counter Measures in the Deepening of Wage Reform", p. 5.
62 Ibid.
63 A conversation with an officer from the 8341 unit.
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other hand, it is generally acknowledged that the weakened state control over micro wage 
initiatives gave rise to a run-away expansion of consumption funds, both individual and 
institutional, which deeply ate into the state's revenue. An understanding of the irregular 
distribution helps us to bridge the gap between the official statistics and the real situation. 
As factories gain more autonomy in remuneration, the state is increasingly on the defens­
ive. At the same time some officials argue that this development, is, after all, the direction 
of the wage reform, which should create a remuneration mechanism based on each 
individual enterprise. This will gradually regularise the irregular components and phase out 
the remaining part of the eight-grade-wage system. After all, they deem that the role of the 
state in the industrial remuneration affairs is that of guidance, rather than com m and.^
More importantly, the fate of the Dengist reform and the stability of the country 
hinges largely on sizeable increases in employees' incomes. Yet the state has been unable 
to increase the wage aggregate for enterprises in a satisfying manner. At the same time 
many workers were in real need of enhanced compensation due to high inflation. If their 
compensation could be augmented by enterprises themselves, it would maintain social 
stability, saving the state a lot of trouble on the political front. For reasons of expediency, 
immediately after the 4 June 1989 massacre the state even encouraged factories to give 
more to workers to placate them. Because the irregular distributions are granted through 
highly egalitarian means, it does have the effect of narrowing the gaps in workers'
salaries.65
64 Zhang Wenmin, "Shehui zhuyi de shouru fenpai" (The socialist distribution of income), in Jingjin 
yanjiu (ed.), Zhongguo shehui zhuyi jingji lilun wenti zhengming (The debate on the socialist 
economic theory), Beijing: Zhongguo caijing chubanshe, 1990, p. 274.
65 Zhao Renwei, "Woguo zhuanxingqi zhong shouru fenpai de teshu yixie xianxiang" (Some special 
phenomenon in our country's distribution of income at the time of social transition), Jingji yanjiu, 
no. 1, 1992, pp. 61-62.
Chapter 7
The Politics of Wage Reform on the Shop Floors
China’s industrial wage reforms, in addition to altering remunerative relations 
between the state and enterprises, have at the same time altered the relations between the 
factory management and workers and among workers themselves. Chinese economists 
define the 'distribution' of profits between the state and enterprises as the first 
distribution, and the distribution between factories and workers, the 'second'. 1 In the 
post-Mao era, as enterprises were allowed to create their own sources to increase 
workers' income, the previous unified line of wage allocations through planning has 
given way to a two-tiered distribution process in which the role played by plants has 
gradually surpassed that of the state. The dominant theme of the reform in a factory's 
internal wage mechanisms has been to delegate powers from the enterprise management 
to lower work units. Again, this is another dual distribution process in which the 
factory management appropriates a flexible amount of wages to a collective according to 
its production performance, and the latter divides it into different shares among its 
members. By now the management of the majority of China’s large and medium-scale 
enterprises oversees much less directly wage awards for individual workers.^ Very 
often workshops and sections are responsible for deciding on the forms and amount of 
awards for each employee. So the first feature of the inner factory wage reforms since 
the mid 1980s has been the rise of importance of the workshop in the process of the 
"second distribution".
A second feature concerns the emergence of numerous varieties of income 
distribution as a result of delegating powers to the shop floors. According to a wage
1 Yue Guangzhao, Zhongguode laodong zhengce he zhidu (The Chinese Labour Policies and 
System), Beijing: Jingji guanli chubanshe 1989, pp. 67-70.
2 The State Economic Commission (ed.), Gaohuo qiye neibu fenpei wanshan jingji zerenzhi (To 
do a good job in the inner factory distribution and improve the economic responsibility system), 
Beijing: Energy Publishing House, 1987, p. 21.
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expert, there are now more than 200 forms of income distribution in China’s factories.^ 
The number is significant in that it illustrates the scope of wage autonomy possessed by 
factories and their lower operational units. Indeed, in the same factory or even in a 
workshop, there exist different wage forms that cluster workers in various wage 
categories. This variety not only points to a complicated wage structure, it also poses 
difficulties for an analysis of it.
7.1. A Review of Wage Reform within State Factories
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in 1985 the State Council established a 15- 
grade industrial wage system to replace the eight-grade one. In this substitution, all 
workers were promoted by a few grades. Their new grade of pay became the base 
grade later for the wage reform initiatives by their employers. Another function of this 
base grade is its role of standardization for most state enterprises. The standardized 
grades of base wages make it easier for workers who change employers to enter their 
new workplace's wage system .
In addition to the base wage grade, there is an open-ended part of ones'd income 
whose major characteristic is that it is "floating". In fact, the question of how to float 
this second part represents the key to all inner enterprise wage reforms. In order to 
further break the "big rice bowl", many factories also tried to float a certain proportion 
of the base wages. Actually this provides some clues of why the proportion of the 
regular part of wages has dropped so quickly in the industrial income structure.
Generally speaking, the following forms of income distribution are most 
commonly practised in China today:
1. Quota Contract Responsibility System (ding e gongzi)
According to official Chinese statistics, over half of China’s factories have 
adopted this system. In this form of income distribution, the main component is the 
base salary plus bonuses. Yet this has evolved into many variables. The most often 
used ones are: (1) the base salary + a floating efficiency salary + bonuses. In this
3 Xu Sondao and others, Zhongguo gongzi zhidu gaige, p. 165.
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formula the floating efficiency salary (xiaoyi gongzi) is the increased (or decreased) part 
of a worker's income depending on whether he or she can meet the assigned quotas. 
Moreover, the state allows part of the floating salary to be added to the "fixed" part, if 
workers can fulfil their contractual obligations for three consecutive years. This means 
that they will have an enlarged wage base, a favourable condition for future increases. 
This practice constituted the chief reason why in a few years after the new 15-grade 
reference wage system was introduced, the amount of the base wage of many workers, 
many of whom were still quite young, reached the top grade in the reference system, 
leaving no further grade for them to be promoted into.4
2) The base wage + partial floating base salary + floating efficiency salary + 
bonuses. This formula represents an additional effort to shake the "big rice bowl" 
system. Usually the factory management requires the lower units to tie 10 to 30% of 
workers’ base salary to the floating efficiency salary in order to further broaden the 
income gap within the workforce, for the larger the base figure of the floating wage bill 
is, the larger rises of wages that become possible. The reduced fixed wages mean 
increased flexibility for additional income.
3) The floating of the entire base salary + floating efficiency salary + bonuses. 
This is a step further than the partial floating of the basic salary. In fact, when every­
thing is “floating”, the concept of the “fixed” base salary becomes an empty shell.4 5 
Some factory directors I interviewed in 1991 told me that that they used this reform to 
impose a sense of market competition onto workers. However, I discovered during my 
fieldwork that most of the directors adopted this method of salary payment only when 
the sales of their factories were good. Otherwise they only partially floated the base 
wage system, which at least guaranteed a safety net for their workers.
2. The Structural Salary (jiegou gongzi)
4 Ding Xianjiu and Yong Weiguo, "Guoying qiye gongxiao guagou qianyi", p. 7.
5 Under such circumstances, the reference grade wage is meaningful only when a worker is to be 
transferred to another factory, when he is on sick leave or is retired, as this wage serves as the 
base for his award in new situations. Information gathered from interviews in the Ministry of 
Labour in 1991 and 1992.
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This formula first combines both the fixed and floating parts of workers' wages 
and then dissolves these into four components: the base salary, post (skills) awards, 
premiums for years of service and the efficiency pay. This form of award offers some 
consolation to workers with more seniority. More importantly, however, its key design 
is to give more incentives to the posts with difficult working conditions in the "first line 
of production".^ In terms of components, the base salary and the premium for seniority 
are static. The post award varies depending on the assessment of the factory and 
workshop managements. After these three are fixed, the efficiency wages may be wor­
ked out subject to a pre-determined ratio between the fixed and floating components. 
Currently the suggested ratio for factories adopting the system is 6: 4 or 5: 57
The structural wage scheme is a fairly complete overhaul of the old eight-grade 
system. For instance, in the structural wage scheme practised by the Beijing Heavy Ma­
chinery Factory, the proportion of the base wage was only 18%, while the proportions 
of other components were respectively, the the efficiency wage, 15%; the post and skill 
pay, 37.2%; and incentive pay based on piece-rates, 26.7%. The seniority premium 
was included in the base wage, so this played a very small role in the factory's principle 
of wage distribution.6 78
According to my field-work findings, the structural wages are less than effective 
in increasing workers' income based on an increase of production. (The aboved- 
mentioned case was an exception because the factory assigned a large proportion of 
awards based on piece-rates.) The reason was that under the restriction imposed by the 
factory or shop management on the ratio between the fixed and unfixed parts of wages, 
if the portion of the awards for seniority and posts is effectively large, this will leave 
reduced room for the increase in efficiency wages, entailing simply a change to a 
smaller "big rice bowl".
6 According to the Chinese definition, the first line of production means workers working on 
machinery, the second line, the supply and logistics sections and the third line, the management.
7 The State Economic Commission, (ed.) Gaohuo qiye neibufenpei wansheng jingji zerenzhi, p. 
31.
8 Su Hainan and others, Qiye gongzi gaige fanan de sheji yu fanli, p. 216-219.
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3. The Wholesale Piece-rate Wage System (jijian gongzi)
This system is implemented in industries which can easily count products. It 
smashes all the grades and places all the workers on an equal footing in the face of the 
number of their finished products, which is closely linked to the awards. However, 
while it is attractive to young workers who can make the most of it, the old and weak 
are disadvantaged for physical reasons. At the same time, worker income may be too 
easily subject to the sales situation in the market. Furthermore, because the concept of 
the base salary is no longer relevant in this reform, the workers have to face possible 
dramatic decreases in their pay when the market turns bad.
4. The Post-Assigned Wages (gangwei gongzi)
This system was designed for specialized posts in factories which require certain 
types of expertise. It has been widely used for the posts of first-line production as an 
incentive arrangement. For instance, in 1986 the State Council approved a wage reform 
plan for the textile industry, which established a 5-grade post-assigned wage system. 
As a measure to attract workers to remain in the first-line of production and difficult 
jobs, these posts are provided with better wages.9 The system is especially attractive 
for workers with better skills, as they receive pay not on the basis of seniority but on 
what posts they have the skills to occupy.
7.2. The New Wage Entities and New Centrifugal Forces
The institutional changes in the industrial remuneration system have provided 
channels for state enterprises to acquire additional income. Between the state and 
producers, the effort to increase an enterprise's wage aggregate is largely a collective 
effort, campaigned for strenuously by factory managers. The workers in a factory often 
lent their support to the managers in the bargaining process mentioned earlier. 
However, when the wage quotas are devolved to groups and individuals, with obvious 
benefits for fulfilment, the collective effort to maximise factory income is translated into 
acts of individual workers to maximise their personal incomes. The material incentive is
9. Ibid, pp. 138-147.
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thus more direct and the efforts to grab it become more intensified. Institutionally, this 
helps to create many new entities with distribution powers in large and medium-sized 
factories. As a result, workers now re-direct their attention to the shop floor 
management for most wage deals. The centre of gravity of the structure of interests in 
the relationships between the state, enterprises and workforce has moved further down 
the hierarchy.10
Because of this, many workshop directors I interviewed agreed that the pressures 
coming from below now controlled most of their policy considerations. Good cooper­
ation from the workers under their leadership represents the key to fulfilling the 
production quotas, which also means a higher income for himself. One workshop 
director told me that in order to satisfy his fellow workers, whenever possible he would 
open up channels to grant money to them, giving little concern to state and factory 
regulations. Indeed, the very closeness between a workshop director and his workers 
generates pressures for him to meet the demands from below. 11 A survey by CASS 
among 769 large and medium-sized state factories revealed a group of interesting data. 
While only 12.3% of workers surveyed thought that they had no weight in the wage 
policy-making process, 65.9% of the workers believed that they could influence the 
process one way or another and 21.8% were confident that they played a key role.12
The same pressure has also driven a wedge between the management at different 
levels within a plant. This originates from the conflicts of interest represented by the 
various parties. For the time being most of the factory directors of large and medium­
sized enterprises in China are still appointed by the state. Thus, hovering over the
10 Liu Qingtang and others, Qiye gongzi gaige fanan de sheji yu fanli (Design and paradigms of the 
enterprise). The book contains wage reform plans of several dozen factories. Most of them 
stipulated that the award to and assessment of workers should be formulated by the lower 
production units and then reported to the factory management only for reference.
11 This statement only describes a general trend. It does not deny the fact many factory and 
workshop managers mistreat their workers in terms of pay. Under the circumstances, many shop 
managers handle industrial relations heavy-handedly.
12 Zheng Honglang, "Gaige guozheng zhong de guoyou qiye xingwei" (The behaviour of state 
enterprises in the process of the reforms), Jingji yanjiu, no. 5, 1992, p. 28.
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shoulders of the factory directors, there is always the shadowy authority of the state. It 
is widely perceived that the contract responsibility system and the linkage wage reform 
have created differentiated institutional interests in the relations between the state and 
factory managers, and factory managers and lower level managers. And the represent­
atives of these groups must protect the interests of their groups in order to solicit 
cooperation from their following. 13 Nonetheless, at the same time, the factory manag­
ers must also be mindful of the state bureaucrats who appoint them, even though they 
try to maximise their own factory's income. This means that factory managers often put 
a brake on the wage initiatives of workshops so as to strike a balance. On the part of 
workshop managers, dealing with the state is none of their business. Their calculation 
is based more on their perception of the force of pressures from their immediate 
superiors and the workers below. ^  In fact, all the workshop directors I interviewed 
admitted that they had a lot of problems with their factory directors in the area of 
remuneration. Most of the difficulties occur when the factory management breaks the 
wage deals embodied in the quota/wage contracts, for fear that lower units were giving 
too much to workers. The factory managers claimed the state would hold them 
responsible for this.
The following is a case that gives a good account of the tensions between factory 
and workshop managements regarding wage problems. At the beginning of 1989, 
Workshop No. 3 of the Beijing Wool Textile Factory entered into a quota contract with 
the factory director by which the workshop would increase the efficiency salary by 6% 
if it could over-fulfil the contract by 10%, annually calculated, and by 9% if it could 
surpass the quota by 15%. The first two quarters saw the agreement go well, as the 
workshop extracted the 7% wage increases according to the contract. In the third quart-
13 Ma Bin, Jianchi gaige, jianchitangsuo, jianchi yuanzhe (Upholding Reform, Exploration and 
Principles), Beijing: Zhongguo zhanwan chubanshe, 1986, p. 74.
14 This impression is based on my fieldwork findings. However, it may be simplistic, for, 
according to the Enterprise Law, shop floor management is appointed by factory directors and it 
is likely that the latter appoint their followers. Yet the asymmetric pressure from above and 
below may force them to change.
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er the over-production exceeded the 16% mark but the factory management began to 
hesitate as to whether to make good on its promise, for it now realized that the increase 
of the efficiency salary by this workshop, together with other workshops, would 
exceed the targeted increase in the floating wage bill by a big margin. The state 
bureaucrats would definitely intervene. So it negotiated with the workshop over a deal 
that, for this quarter the workshop could still get its claimed share, but from the next 
onwards the previously agreed increase rate should be adjusted to 4% and 6% 
respectively. With lots of persuasion by the plant management toward the workshop 
management and the latter toward the workers, it was finally settled as the factory 
management wished, although causing a lot of complaints from workers.
However, this was not the end of the story. At the end of the fourth quarter the 
factory director wanted the rate of increase lowered again. This time the workshop 
director did not give in because his workers threatened to go on strike. The increased 
wage was paid eventually. However, the factory director later refused to release the 
end-of-year bonuses (nianzhong jiang) to the workshop, with the excuse that some of 
the products did not reach the quality standard. And he did not extend the contract for 
the workshop director at the beginning of the new year. Yet, as the bitter story goes on, 
towards the end of 1990 when the new round of contracts for the factory manager was 
again up for tendering, all the workers in Workshop Number Three stood up against 
the bid for the job by the plant director. This time it was the workers’ turn for succ­
e s s .^
For many shop-floor managers, productivity is of some concern, but not so much 
so as harmony among their fellow employees. They are constantly sandwiched between 
workers and plant management over the wage rows. Before the reforms, except for a 
few instances of limited wage promotion, for which a face-to-face group assessment 
was conducted, the wage complaints of workers were generally directed towards the 
state when the latter froze wage increases or only allocated a small percentage of 
workers for promotion. Now with the new powers of remuneration, the heads of
15 Interview with a workshop director in the factory in 1991.
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workshops stand right in the whirlwind of clashes of interest. Their short distance from 
the production line, however, often forces them to shape their attitudes and positions 
favouring the shop floor. Indeed, the shift towards smaller entities for wage distrib­
ution is really the cause for Andrew Wälder’s remark that a tacit alliance has emerged 
between managers and workers, both of whom have an interest in retaining the highest 
amount of incentive funds while distributing it relatively equally. 16 if the word 
"managers" here means the factory management, my field survey revealed that it was 
only a very loose alliance, when workers generate enormous pressure for the factory 
managers to deal on their behalf with the state bureaucrats. In fact, a much tighter 
alliance has been formed between shop-floor management and workers to protect their 
own interests, which often suggests a joint struggle against the factory management. In 
terms of the state's wage controls, it seems that there have now emerged two barriers 
between the state and workers.
The enlarged power of remuneration by sub-unit management has remarkably 
enhanced the influence of middle managers. In the Chinese command economic system 
before reform, management at the middle level had little influence in decision-making, 
particularly in strategic decisions such as pay levels. This was due largely to the organ­
izational structure of a factory as an appendage of the centralized decision-making 
system in the state sector as a whole, and a workshop within a state enterprise in 
particular. Now with the power of remuneration made available to them, middle 
managers have gained influence in several areas.
Firstly, because of the close connection between production quotas, retained 
profits and workers' income, the control over the last has strengthened the say of the 
middle level management on the strategic decisions of production and sales by the top 
management. In other words, when making a production and wage plan, factory 
directors have to take into consideration the consequences of any major policy changes
16 Andrew G. Wälder, “Wage Reform and the Web of Factory Interests”, pp. 22-41.
17 Oiva Laaksonen, Management in China during and after Mao in Enterprises, Government, and 
Party, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co. 1987, p. 305.
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to the ways the wages are distributed in workshops and the resultant response to such a 
change by the middle-level management and workers.
Secondly, the enlarged power over wage issues has strengthened the hand of 
workshop directors in everyday management. Though still unable to dismiss workers, 
the authority to set salaries has made it easier for these middle-level managers to tighten 
work discipline, decide on job allocations and work out many forms of favouritism for 
their own clientelistic network.
Another important feature of the smaller entities responsible for remuneration is 
the augmented powers with which workshops create their own channels to acquire 
income. This operates entirely outside the state industrial wage system. According to 
official Chinese sources, a good percentage of factories and their workshops seek 
business deals of their own. 18 While a plant may legitimately conduct business as an 
independent accounting unit, it is legally dubious for workshops to do the same. This is 
largely because the former is the basic unit to pay state taxes according to its production 
and sales, but the latter's income is most unlikely to be counted in the total factory 
income. A huge second economy has thus been created whose income has generally 
benefited the pockets of workers.19
These moonlighting activities originated from the state's permission to enterprises 
(not workshops) which were badly affected by the retrenchment program in the early 
1980s. As the state could not afford to 'feed' them all as usual when the central plann­
ers had no orders to give to these factories, it encouraged them to produce on behalf of 
self-survival (shengchan zijiu). Therefore, factories tried to seek their own orders, and 
when they failed, they encouraged their workshops to conduct such pursuits. The 
booming village and township industries and the newly acquired autonomy by state
18 My interview with officials in the Ministry of Labor revealed that over half of factories and 
workshops have engaged in their own business in one form or another. In my visits to factories 
in Beijing, Hunan and Shanghai, most of the factory directors confirmed that sub-account 
business activities existed at their plants.
19 For an analysis of China's second economy, see Wojtek Zafanolli, "A Brief Outline of China's 
Second Economy", Asian Survey, Vol. XXV, no. 7, 1985, pp. 715-736.
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enterprises in production and sales provided ample opportunities for these commonly 
called "xiaojingku", or "secret account" activities.
These moonlighting activities embrace a wide range of businesses: from private 
orders for small numbers of special products to selling parts or even complete sets of 
equipment possessed by the units. Examples are abundant that when a factory is in 
financial trouble — say, it could not pay workers salaries -- it asks workshops and 
individual workers to market the factory's products through their own guanxi. Each 
workshop would have a specific quota. One popular form of "secret account" activities 
has been using surplus workers streamlined from "youhua zuhe" or rationalization and 
reorganization program to engage in semi-private work outside the factory. Workshops 
sign contracts with outside customers and take the larger proportion of fees after 
submitting some to the factory and distributing a proportion to the workers doing the 
jobs. The reform principle of making sub-units entities of remuneration has cleared the 
way for workshops to do this moonlighting, and the fast-growing second economy 
provided an external environment for such pursuits. Although there has not been any 
systematic data to show how widespread the practice is, my fieldwork findings point to 
the fact that this is a widespread phenomenon. It reveals the extent to which workers' 
sense of the state as the sole provider for one’s livelihood has diminished.
7.3. The Workers' Reaction to the Wage Reform
During my fieldwork in China in 1991,1 asked about the reaction of workers to 
the industrial wage reforms since 1984. The answer was quite mixed. Some believed 
that the reforms provided more channels to earn money and inspired workers to increa­
se production. Others commented, however, that the opening up of the previously 
closed wage system also opened up more opportunities for corruption and abuse of 
power by unit heads. Industrial disputes were on the rise, too. Generally the workers 
whom I interviewed were for the abolition of the old wage system and agreed that the 
best thing with the new system was that it bought in “livelihood money” (huoqian).20
20 Certainly the designs of wage remuneration of each factory may have given rise to many 
complaints. But the general direction was believed to be in the interests of workers. The small
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The fact that the linkage reform was universalized in China's state sector in less than 
three years illustrates its general acceptance by enterprises and workers. This is in sharp 
contrast with many other reforms that were pursued very hard by the state but had to be 
aborted later due to resistance by those on the receiving end.21 Whether or not a reform 
can deliver immediate benefits to the populace has now become a touchstone as to 
whether it can be successfully implemented. Yet beyond the monetary gains offered by 
the workplace-centred remuneration system, workers' positive attitudes to it were also 
due to its inherent mechanisms that enhanced workers' strength in dealing with the 
management, as reflected by the following.
7.3.1. The Embryonic Form of Collective Bargaining
A factory's management always hinges on the cooperation of workers. Before the 
reform this "cooperation" was secured more through control over both workers' minds 
and their economic livelihood, although the social welfare provisions did play a positive 
role in maintaining a subsistant level of workers' standard of living. One outcome of 
the institutional reforms in the state sector has been that the desired cooperation is 
achieved at a much higher price now with the erosion of naked control, as increasingly 
the workers' cooperation can only be "bought" through more material provisions. For 
instance, the quota system based on personal responsibility has highlighted the import­
ance of the work of individual workers because their performance can affect the 
production of a group or a workshop in a more effective manner.
In shop floor politics, this clearly augmented the bargaining power of workers on 
matters of remuneration. The eight-grade system left little room for bargaining. Any 
attempt at collective action was too risky and thus out of the question, as workers 
would confront directly a powerful state. Now the pay of most of the workers has been 
linked, as already noted, to a floating rate, which itself entails flexibility for manoeuv-
number of workers who are still for the eight-grade wage system are old and retired workers and 
those in poor physical condition.
21 There are numerous examples to show this. For instance, the housing reform has been 
experimented with for years but proved unpopular because the citizens do not want to pay high
rents.
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ring. This trains workers to become more mindful of the connection between what they 
have done and how they are reimbursed. At the same time the delegation of powers of 
remuneration to enterprises and workshops reduced the gravity of the consequence 
when workers resorted to collective resistance to the management. Now it is the factory 
and workshop directors who design the wage payments. If these are not satisfactory to 
workers, the latter may stand up against the policies of these smaller units, an act not 
necessarily interpreted as going against the state. Indeed, this relaxation of control via 
the institutional wage reform has galvanized a large number of industrial actions not 
imaginable before the reform.22
Seen from the angle of a political sociologist, every one of these has political 
significance in a party/state like China. In western countries workers press their wage 
demands through an independent trade union, which bargains with employers on behalf 
of workers. In China since there is no such effective platform for collective bargaining, 
in order to achieve their goal of wage rises most of the workers take action outside 
normal channels. In the wake of relaxation of the state's direct control over enterprise 
wage matters, workers have developed a strong impulse to increase their say in the 
wage-setting process in their factories, but with no institutional outlet for their 
grievances,23 they have been left no choice but to take spontaneous collective action by 
themselves. This has laid the foundation for the emergence during the Tiananmen pro­
tests of the Gongzilian and Han Dongfang.
22 In an interview with a labour official in the Ministry of Labour in 1991,1 was told that in 1990 
about 40,000 strikes were reported to the ministry, although the bulk of these were small-scaled 
and not all related to wage matters. Liu Deming, chairperson of the General Trade Union 
Association of Hunan told a national conference on the workers affairs in 1991 that 42% of the 
"incidences" were caused by remunerative disputes between workers and management, including 
sitting-down protest and public demonstrations. See his conference paper "Guanche qunxin qunyi 
yikao gongren jieji fangzhen de baozhang hecai" (Where is the guarantee for the policy of 
relying on the working class whole heartedly?), Beijing, May 1991.
23 Jeanne L. Wilson, "Labour Policy in China: Reform and Retrogression", Problems of Comm­
unism, September-October 1990, p. 59.
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The Chinese labour officials have increasingly recognized the serious conseque­
nces of this trend of development.24 They proposed establishing a collective bargaining 
process. It argued that collective bargaining creates a mechanism through which to 
coordinate the differentiated interest seeking (mainly in the form of adjusting levels of 
wages) between the state, regions and enterprises.25
Through my visits to a number of Chinese factories, I found that spontaneous 
collective bargaining was widespread in various disguised forms. According to one 
interviewee, the struggle with the management over wage issues is a good process for 
learning collective action:
You have to learn the meaning of the contract and your rights associated with it. You have to 
learn how to arouse and organize your fellow workers who have fallen victim like you. And you 
have to learn the art of bargaining and compromise.
He acknowledged that after a few "encounters" with the managers, many workers 
started to develop a sense of solidarity, as they realized that “workshop directors can 
bow to the pressure of wage demands of workers, if the pressure is heavy enough. Yet 
such pressure can never be generated by individual efforts. So the victimized workers 
usually come together".
There have been few signs that the collective action originating from wage claims 
is politicised. But since wage-related conflicts are so prevalent in China’s industries, 
there is for workers no shortage of such schooling in how to organize themselves to 
protect their own rights and interests. The key is the depoliticised atmosphere in state 
factories where many party cells have become inactive, as mentioned in Chapter 5. In 
the past, under heavy pressure from the party's presence, it was difficult for any 
informal groups to emerge. But in recent years many informal groups have sprung up, 
commonly centred on a few charismatic figures in workshops who have good technical
24 Anita Chan, "Revolution or Corporatism?", The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 29, 
January 1993, pp. 31-62.
25 Editing Group, Liyi gongtongti chutan (The initial research of the community of common 
interets), Beijing: Zhongguo gongren chubanshe, 1990, pp. 329-348.
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skill, a following of tudi or apprentices, and importantly, a bumpy relationship with the 
cadres.26 A wage dispute would most likely strengthen their influence among co­
workers. A key question facing us is how to interpret this phenomenon: whether 
independent organizations from among blue-collar constituencies may eventually 
emerge from these organized efforts to achieve wage claims, and if so, how soon? Han 
Dongfang has recently given a positive answer to the question while in Hong Kong, as 
he implied that the decade of reform had opened unprecedented opportunities for this to 
take place.27
On the other hand, it should be clarified that the influence of workers over wage 
issues has not been actively wrought through collective action, such as the Polish Sol­
idarity movement was able to accomplish. Rather, many workers told me that they put 
forward wage claims in many cases due either to random violations of the contract 
terms by the shop managers or to the unfair distribution of income within the work 
units. In other words, the workers’ struggle for fair play was still in a stage of fitful 
reaction. Even so, this is an important stride forward in the workers' recognition of 
their basic rights.
7.3.2. The Alternative to Organized Dependence
As noted in Chapter Two, one major feature of the industrial danwei system has 
been organized dependence, where the workers' income could just cover the daily 
necessities provided by the state through coupons. Generally speaking, the higher the 
percentage of one's disposable income that was given over to daily necessities, and the 
fewer the alternatives to earn money, the more dependent workers would become on 
their fixed income. When they were anxious about satisfying their stomachs and 
securing basic clothes, the state’s control through the eight-grade wage system was 
ever more effective.
Throughout the 1980s the percentage of workers' disposable income spent on 
basic daily necessities was in decline. For instance, in 1989 an average of some 50-
26 Impression based on a number of interviews in factories in Beijing in 1991 and 1992.
27 The Voice of America, 2 September 1993.
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60% of one’s salary was spent on daily necessities. At the same time the base salary 
controlled by the state dropped to below 50%.2 & The new alternatives available for 
workers to earn money alleviated their sense of being helplessly owned by the state. In 
fact, never before have so many workers felt they could somehow put their economic 
lifeline in their own hands.29
This feeling has been further strengthened by the opportunities for second jobs 
created by the wage reform. During my fieldwork in Beijing in early 1991, I asked 
workers how much it cost to provide for a family of three (a couple and a child) per 
month. The common answer was about 500 yuan. This was in sharp contrast with the 
average wage they earned, which stood at 200 yuan each (husband and wife). Then I 
asked them how they bridged the gap. They remarked that they could make ends meet 
by generating their own earnings. It was much easier now to make money, people 
added, but it all depended on your ability. Apparently moonlighting has become an 
important source of income for urban workers, although opportunities are very 
unevenly distributed. Perhaps there can be no way to have any exact data on how many 
workers are now engaging in moonlighting. As mentioned earlier, the official figures 
put it as 15 million, or between 20% to 25% of the urban workforce. My question 
about moonlighting to some 40 workers revealed that more than 80% of them had had a 
second job at one time or another. The statistical gap may be due to: (1) many second 
jobs are done secretly; and (2) most of these jobs are neither stable nor long-lasting.^^
28 Shi Wei, "Fushipin jiage butie xianzhuang yu tiaozhen cuoshi" (Current situation of price 
subsidies for non-staple food and adjustment measures), Jingji lilun yu jingji guanli, no. 9, 
1990, p. 11. The percentage still appears high because it may not have adeqately taken into 
account of the irregular distributions which make it possible for workers to purchase electrical 
durables and other expensive goods.
29 Most of my interviewees expressed this feeling, although with different degrees.
30 Some of them did such outside work only once or twice a year. For instance, Mr. Li obtained a 
deal through guanxi to sell a thousand tooth brushes in 1990. He purchased these brushes at the 
wholesale price of 30 fen each and sold them at 60 fen after work, in railway stations to rail 
travellers. He earned a little over 300 yuan from this second job, which lasted only a few weeks. 
But he told me that this was only the second job he did in the year: "It takes too much time and
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Furthermore, the income so generated is subject to violently changing conditions. On 
the high side, it could be many times their income from the regular job. On the low 
side, most of my interviewees agreed that it may just only help compensate for 
inflation.
There is no doubt that opportunities for second jobs have weakened the control of 
the party/state over the urban population. While the emergence of the second economy 
increases the separation of the state and society, the profits generated by second jobs 
have magnified the determination of workers to enter the second economy. As one 
worker put it in a joking way, "the door has been slid open a bit for us to increase our 
income through our own resources — one's hands and one's business contacts. Let's 
work harder to pull it further open." His remarks send out a strong signal, going 
beyond the significance of just earning a few more dollars for personal expenditure. It 
is about the restoration of a sense of personal property, which was long suppressed by 
the party/state's ownership but now has released the entrepreneurial zeal of many 
Chinese. In terms of the damaging effect the private business activities pose to the 
official ideology and the danwei structure, these may foretell what Ivan Szelenyi 
dubbed as a "quiet revolution from below", when he analysed the Hungarian reform 
experience^ 1.
Again, despite the direction that the second economy and opportunities for second 
jobs represent for the on-going socio-political transformation, one has to exercise 
caution not to overstate it in China today. For one thing, some factories still prohibit 
workers to seek moonlighting jobs, and this makes the workers already doing a second 
job hesitate to seek more such work.32 For another, the benefits created by a second
there is a question of "face" involved. But if it is convenient, I will do so once or twice each 
year to help towards the family expenditures".
31 Ivan Szelenyi, Socialist Entrepreneurs: Embourgeoisement in Rural Hungary, Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.
32 There have been visible changes in this aspect since this chapter was written in 1991. Out of the 
necessity to relocate 'hidden unemployment' in the state sector, which takes a proportion as high 
as one-third of the total, most of state factories have actually encouraged workers to leave their 
posts and they regard that the second job may serve as the stepping stone.
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job, generally speaking, have not been near what a permanent job can provide. The 
uncertainties associated with the market also inhibit workers from abandoning what 
they have achieved in a secure job. This is the reason many workers want to keep their 
permanent jobs in state factories, even though they do well in the market.33 They want 
to benefit from both ends. As long as the "big rice bowl" delivers what they basically 
need, the desire of workers to stick to it will remain. This reality limits their choices 
and, therefore, it may be too early to talk about the "re-emergence of civil society" 
within the state sector. 34
Since Deng's South China tour, there has been one new development in moon­
lighting: the so-called "one family, two systems", that is, either the husband or the wife 
quits his/her regular state job to engage in the second economy but one of them will 
stick to his/her state employment. The one keeping the state job gets the public housing 
and other social welfare provisions not only for him/herself, but the whole family. The 
other will xiahai or jump into the "business seas" where, if successful, he/she can earn 
an income far more than his/her spouse's regular wages.35
7.4. Conflicts in the Factory Award Process
The post-Mao industrial wage reform has engendered a new search for a suitable 
award system in China’s state sector. As is common to other transitional processes, the 
most vivid feature of this endeavour is that it is pregnant with conflict. Often the wage
33 According to some surveys by Chinese academics, in addition to the social status as state work­
ers and the regular wages, a worker can receive social welfare services in his life time worth 
200,000 yuan, covering housing, medical care and other state and factory subsidies. Information 
gathered from a conversation with a researcher in the Research Institute of Labour Science of the 
Ministry of Labour in 1991. Based on this unconfirmed figure, even if a worker in the non-state 
sector earns 10,000 yuan a year, not a bad income in China, he would have to devote 20 years of 
his work efforts to achieve the same level of benefits available to state workers.
34 Cheng Yizi & others, "Notes of the Meeting to Mark the Second Anniversary of 4 June", Jiushi 
Niandai, (Hong Kong), no. 6, 1991, pp. 46-52.
35 From a few interviews I had with people who had "jumped into the sea", I discovered that many 
of them were still young and tired of the danwei environment, as they said it was too restrictive. 
The reason for some older workers to quit the job was largely due to the fact that they had 
business guanxi. Usually for older people, leaving the state job was a very difficult decision.
7 The Politics of Wage Reform—196
reforms are carried out by the managers as ad hoc measures designed to increase the 
pay of workers rather than productivity. The resultant uneven distribution of income, 
due to a lack of rules and regulations and of a full-fledged labour market, has heralded a 
lengthy period of chaos in the wage distribution system in the state sector. In other 
words, the current wage mechanisms are not at all stable for a number of reasons, as 
analysed below.
7.4.1. Panbi and Unfair Distribution
The first reason concerns the fundamental question of fairness and equity in 
meting out awards. The new wage arrangements have so far failed to address this 
adequately. The question of fairness and equity embraces two important elements of 
concern. In abstract terms it is a question of perceptions of what is fair. In practice, it 
involves the conflict inherent in a web of interests in state enterprises. The two elements 
are mutually reinforcing and constitute the core of shop-floor politics in China's new 
industrial wage system.
The feeling of being unfairly treated has underlain the prevailing sense of discont­
ent with workers with the award process, despite their positive reaction to the overall 
program. It stems not only from the complicated interactions of interests in any factory, 
but also is the result of deeply rooted Chinese attitudes towards the distribution of 
wealth and the contemporary trend of panbi, or general comparison among all members 
towards wage issues. In fact, the huge pressure generated by panbi has been a major 
factor in determining whatever wage reform measures are enacted in the state sector.
The panbi phenomenon is an expression of the traditional Chinese principle of 
egalitarianism, summed up by Confucius as "concerned not so much by the scarcity of 
wealth as by the uneven distribution of it". This sense of egalitarian fairness has 
penetrated deeply into the general social mentality, with the conviction that despite the 
scarcity of goods, as long as the distribution is even, the smooth operation of society 
would be assured. That Mao created the policy of "three people’s food for five people 
to eat" in 1953, when pressured by growing unemployment, testified to his understand-
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ing of this mentality.36 The eight-grade system wage was built on such a premise, in a 
hope of reaching some sort of psychological equilibrium on the part of the masses by 
imposing a highly egalitarian pattern of consumption. Under this consumption pattern, 
efforts were made to prevent the polarization of wealth when there was not much to 
share. Therefore, the psychological equilibrium built upon the combination of the 
communist ideology and Confucian egalitarianism had a value orientation: social 
fairness meant everyone should have a similar share of social income.
The Dengist economic reform has upset this equilibrium with an enlarged gap in 
the distribution of wealth among different social groups. Within the state sector, state 
policies and the invisible hand of the market have jointly fostered an environment where 
it is perceived by workers that while a wage reform is needed, it is unfair in its effects. 
As the powers of remuneration are being gradually transferred from the state to produc­
ers, no factory wants to fall victim to this uncertain socio-economic environment. The 
enterprises' counter-measure is to keep up with their neighbours regardless of different 
circumstances in the production and of the profits of different enterprises.
Panbi is an outcome of the emerging stratification within the workforce in both 
the state and private sectors. This stratification is best reflected in an irregularity in pay 
and in large income differentials among workers. In different state factories, under the 
distribution policies of the small work units, one worker may earn as much as 1,000 
yuan a month while another may earn just a few dozen. The same worker may receive 
several hundred yuan in March but less than one hundred in April.37 Among different 
industries the capacity to make profits varied sharply. The logic of wage reform 
together with the uneven development of market forces have left the "sunset" industries 
in a dire situation compared with the newly prosperous sectors, such as electrical 
durables. For instance, between 1984 and 1986 the retail sales of colour TVs,
36 Peng Xianzhi, Mao Zedong and His Secretary Tien Jiaying, Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao 
chubanshe, 1989, p. 54.
37 Information gathered from a labour official in 1991. However, I suspect that this is unlikely the 
situation in large and many medium-sized factories. He probably referred to some medium-sized 
and small and leased factories.
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refrigerators and washing machines increased by 69.2%, 157.3% and 77% 
re sp ec tiv e ly .^  \n contrast, a large number of factories in traditional mechanical 
industries ran at a loss and relied heavily on state subsidies, which could at best provide 
them a bare subsistence. So the profit-based industrial wage reform has built up the 
framework for enlarged income differentials between industries, regions, factories and 
workshops. The workers in the loss-making factories feel victimised, for in a command 
economy, they did not choose where to work. Yet they now have to share the misfort­
unes of their work units. They are convinced that they have a right to panbi, and they 
translate the perceived comparison with better-off firms into actions such as strikes and 
stealing the factory’s property.39
7.4.2. Worsening Labour/Management Relations.
As Wälder points out, one major change in China's state enterprises in the reform 
era is that the industrial relations have been grossly monetized, which has further 
entrenched the web of interests among the management and w orkforce.^  In the past, 
the political favouritism granted to the party faithful was not always accompanied by 
wage increases, as the factory authorities did not possess the power to provide wage 
raises any time they wanted. With this power now delegated to the hands of factory and 
workshop directors, the prospects of abusing it have become magnified, and misuse of 
the power of remuneration by managers has been widespread.41 Given the usual un­
compromising attitudes of workers in the growing contention over wages, worker/ 
manager relations have become more difficult to manage. The tripartite interactions be­
tween the state, enterprises and workers have entered a new period of enormous 
complexity.
Factory managers are now at the centre of wage conflicts. In large part it is 
because they now have the power to decide on their own wage scales, although the
38 Renmin ribao, 19 June 1988.
39 A number of my interviewees expressed this opinion.
40 Andrew G. Walder, "The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheaval of 1989", pp. 30-40.
41 Zuzhi renshi bao, 23 October 1992.
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state does have a reference wage limit for them, which stands at three times the average 
wage of the factory. In the eyes of workers, there is a widespread misuse of this power 
by factory managers to increase their own personal gains. For instance, from 1986 to 
1988 among 83 factory directors in the 61 municipal factories of Fuxin City, only one 
did not promote himself to a higher grade of base salary. 40 received raises twice and, 
in an extreme case, a director raised his base grade six times.42 As far as bonuses and 
other fringe benefits are concerned, there are virtually no limits. According to an 
investigation in Anshan City, Liaoning Province, in one industrial bureau which has 
five factories under it, the average bonus for the workers in 1988 was 258 yuan, while 
the five factory directors allowed themselves to take 59,450 yuan, amounting to 11,890 
yuan each, 46.1 times a worker's bonus. In one factory in Anshan a total of 101 kinds 
of bonuses were created to award management staff and workers in different jobs. The 
director grabbed 96 kinds.43 This widespread abuse of power has been in striking 
contrast to the policy in distributing incomes as equally as possible among ordinary 
workers.44
Yet it is too simplistic to conclude that all factory managers are capable of abusing 
power to the extent indicated above. The general trend is that the bigger the enterprises, 
the smaller the space for income manipulation by factory directors. Pressures have been 
generated from both below and above. The large and medium-sized state factories are 
under tighter scrutiny from state agencies. And the influence of the trade unions over 
wage levelling can be strong in such enterprises. Many factory directors are aware of 
the limits they can go to before enraging subordinates. Unwarranted gaps in income 
between the management and workers will enhance the already strong passive
42 Huang Yuan, Choushade qishi (Revelation of Murderers: Cases of Killings of Chinese Entrepre­
neurs in the 1980s), Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubanshe, 1990, p. 138.
43 Ibid, p. 137.
44 Sun Zhen, "Shuli da gongzi guannian" (To look at wage matters from the macro perspective), 
Zhongguo laodong kexue, no. 10, 1992, p. 10.
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resistance and, at worst, pave the way for violence.45 Many factory managers in the 
provincial capitals and Beijing are exercising self-constraint in deciding how much they 
receive. This has been particularly true since June 4, 1989, when the state stepped up 
its control over the remuneration received by factory management as an important 
measure for stabilizing industrial relations.^
On the other hand, it is equally misleading to state that the managers of large and 
medium-sized factories are cleaner than their counterparts from small plants. Although 
they now abide fairly strictly to the state's "three-time" requirement, they have their 
own ways of "getting rich before others". For instance, they are more inclined to 
conduct behind-the-door dealings among themselves. Commission fees are one 
common source of extra income. Secret awards in kind attached to business deals prove 
to be safer than outright promotion of one's own salary. In this regard nothing may be 
too small and no gift too big. This shihui, the benefits received by factory directors, 
range from cigarettes to wine to housing to payments of university tuition fees for their 
children when they fail the national examinations. These practices are snowballing, as 
business autonomy becomes bigger, and the value of the "gift" given and taken is 
calibrated to the nature and size of business transactions.47
What these factory managers do in seeking windfalls cannot be entirely hidden 
from the eyes of the middle-level management and workers. Taking advantage of their 
newly acquired autonomy in determining remuneration in their units, many workshop 
managers similarly design for themselves the form of salary that will bring in the 
highest possible amount of money. Where possible, they also create behind-the-scenes
45 There have been heated discussions in China about the phenomenon of factory directors being 
murdered since 1987. The discontent of workers over the wage gap between themselves and man­
agement is listed as one of factors in galvanizing the killings, especially when this discontent is 
constantly suppressed.
46 According to one of my informants in the SCRES, after 4 June 1989 a check on factory direct­
ors’ personal income was added to the investigation list of the state’s industrial work groups that 
are sent to factories at the end of each year.
47 A number of workers expressed this complaint to me in 1991.
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workshop business in such a way that they receive commissions and gifts. Workers do 
not know exactly how much their factory and workshop bosses receive from private 
channels, but they are conscious of what is going on. Some of them may be bold 
enough to raise collective demands for salary increases and extra compensation through 
bonuses. Others simply steal products, destroy machinery or adopt go-slows to give 
vent to their anger at the advantages taken by the managers at different levels.
Monetized industrial relations prove to be very fragile. In 1988 a group of 
workers at the Shenyang Tractor Factory went on strike. To outsiders their reason may 
seem trivial: it was because their section leader had received 20 yuan more in bonuses. 
However, this shows well the sensitive nature of such an issue and the limits of the 
workers' tolerance toward uneven remuneration within a factory. In fact, according to 
Chinese labour authorities, the majority of industrial disputes occurred at middle and 
lower management levels and involved moderate amounts of money.48 However, 
when we link the appalling methods to reap wealth that many factory managers resort 
to, as the examples indicated earlier, to the over-reaction from the workers in the 
Shenyang Tractor Factory, the depth and gravity of industrial problems in China 
presents itself in a clear manner.
7.4.3. Tension Among Co-workers
The central theme of the post-Mao industrial wage reform is what Susan Shirk 
terms a “meritocratic” tendency in China’s state factories. This stresses that pay be 
based on objective standards of performance. Compared with the old wage structure, 
the basic feature of this new tendency has been an attempt to undo the ties that linked 
the pay to specific people based on seniority and retie it to job, posts and work 
efforts.49 in theory, the application of quantitative measures to count and evaluate 
work results is a process of depersonalizing a reward system, thus reducing the potent­
ial for tensions among workers that would emerge from any subjective meting out of
48 Huang Yuan, Chousha de qishi, p. 140
49 Susan Shirk, ’’Recent Chinese Labour Policies and the Transformation of Industrial Organizat­
ion in China”, The China Quarterly, no. 88, December 1981, pp. 575-593.
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wages by factory cadres. In practice, however, it upset the long-held balance of 
interests that had been provided under the "big rice bowl" arrangements. In addition the 
technical problems associated with inventing credible and fair mechanisms in spreading 
benefits, or in other words, in establishing a new balance, have so far proved 
insurmountable.
The profit-oriented wage system is by nature an open-ended award system, as 
profit is an uncertain variable and fluctuates continuously. As a corollary, the incomes 
of workers float constantly. This imposes a great deal of difficulty in setting pay to a 
certain amount of work effort. In the past, group assessments provided a major method 
to determine what one had done and how much he or she should be paid in bonuses. 
Points of contention arose in the assessment but were somewhat contained because the 
amount of bonus was not significant compared to the fixed graded salary. More often 
than not bonuses were distributed fairly equally in order to preserve group harmony. 
The current floating wage system has made this very difficult to be maintained. For one 
thing, a large proportion of one’s salary is tied to the floating profit. So the setting of 
one’s production quota puts one's livelihood more at stake and thus evokes more fierce 
contention among co-workers. Group harmony is still regarded as important but in 
many cases it is adversely affected by contention for material gains. Chinese 
economists and sociologists call this phenomenon the 'dilution of human sentiments' 
towards co-workers.50 This dilution has undermined the guanxi interactions in a group 
which are the foundation of the stability of the group. The upsurge of wage-related 
conflict among co-workers in the wake of wage reforms shows the extent to which the 
decay of the group environment has worsened.
This statement may seem to contradict my earlier description of proliferation of 
collective industrial action. However, the collective action is attempted by one group of 
workers and often counteracted by another because the irregularity of the award system
50 Hu Chengfu, "Shilun dangqian woguo renji guanxi bianhua de erxiangxing" (On the current dual 
changes in human relations in our country), Shehuixue yu shehui diaocha, no. 4, 1991, pp. 7- 
10.
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gives workers different stakes. And this has been solidified by a paternalistic clustering 
of workers with different statues.51 The monetization of relations can at once enhance 
the leaders' role as a dispenser of justice when the group becomes more fragmented and 
yet reduce their say in daily management, as discontented workers exert themselves in a 
more organized manner.52
The intensified disputes among workers have been partially due to the fact that the 
shift to profit as a base for determining wages makes the setting and resetting of quotas 
and awards more frequent. This in turn dictates that the group of co-workers meet 
regularly to discuss wage issues. Each of these sessions may prove to be a nightmare 
for some workers. Even if many workers wanted to eschew active participation in the 
potentially explosive gatherings, as they often did in the past, they cannot afford to do 
so now: "The endless group assessments mean that you have to struggle to protect your 
own interests or otherwise you will always be trampled down."53
Furthermore, links of mutual support among relatives and friends in the industrial 
workforce exacerbate these tensions, As wages monetize the relations among co-work­
ers, the immediate result is that the already fragmented workforce becomes even more 
fragmented. From the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s the officially sanctioned recruitment 
of the children of employees had affected the organizational texture of the workforce. A 
large proportion of the workers now had close relatives in the workforce. And the 
smaller the factory, the graver became this situation. For instance, in the Hongdu 
Molding Factory 45% of the 765 workers have at least one family member in the same 
factory.54 According to a survey of several dozen factories by the labour department in 
Hunan, the coverage of chains of relatives in the labour force of each factory reached 
35% on the average, with the highest 72% in one factory. The survey report revealed 
that the conflict over pay issues became much more serious as the coverage rate
51 A number of workers and managers informed me about this during my fieldwork in Beijing in
1991.
52 Wälder, "The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheaval of 1989", p. 31.
53 Interview with a worker in Beijing in 1992.
54 Li Lin, "A Strange Phenomenon", Sociological Survey, no. 4, 1989, p. 21.
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grew.55 The large factories suffer the same symptoms, although with less severe 
adverse effects. These are, however, the factories that are forced to carry out most 
strenuously the reform of "rationally regrouping workers". When the section and group 
leaders proceeded to place their followers in better posts, this, too, factionalized the 
workforce into different groups. Consequently if one worker is not satisfied with what 
he has been paid, he may drag his coterie into the conflict. In the last several years there 
have been numerous reports of one such group of workers ranged against another over 
wage matters. One worker told me that he was fed up with factory life because the 
stresses undermining worker solidarity had mounted to an unbearable degree, brought 
to a head by the frequent wage disputes among co-workers. 56
55 Lun Yuan, "Buke hushi qiye zhigong qinshuhua qinxiang", (Tendency toward a workforce of 
relatives should not be ignored), Zhongguo laodong kexue, no. 1, 1991, p. 7.
56 Interview with a worker in the Beijing 768 Factory in 1991.
Part Four
De-statisation: An Ownership and Organization Analysis
Chapter 8
The Ownership Reform and Corpratisation of State Factories
The Party's 14th National Congress in 1992 finally brought reform from the peri­
phery to the core of the economic system; namely from an emphasis on price adjustments 
and on redistribution of decision-making power between the centre, locality and enterprise, 
to a reform of the ownership structure. This was manifested in the party's announcement 
that thereforth the key word guoying qiye or state-run enterprises, which connotes the 
nature of the state/enterprise relationship as one where the former directly runs the latter, 
would be replaced by guoyou qiye, meaning state-owned but not necessarily state-run. In 
March 1993 the 8th National People's Congress made amendments to the Constitution to 
legalize this strategic change and paved the way for a deep ownership reform. Consequent­
ly, if the state no longer runs its factories directly, there will be little need for the colossal 
bureaucratic machine to exist. A systemic reform of the administrative system became 
unavoidable. The basic form of organization of state firms will also have to be overhauled 
because it is designed chiefly to respond to the commanding heights. Therefore, the market 
consensus immediately put China's economic reform at a crossroads, where the economic 
system is poised for a qualitative change based on transformation of the socialist ownership 
structure and administrative system.
The Chinese experience has shown that in order to achieve a level of efficiency 
dictated by the market, it is necessary to implement various reforms to dilute state owner­
ship through injections into it of property owned by non-state administrative agencies. As a 
result, control over state enterprises by state bureaucrats is undermined. The correlation 
between the dilution of state ownership and an enterprise's business autonomy has been 
fairly clearly illustrated by a transitional process in which the enterprise transforms itself 
from a bureaucratic appendage to a contracted producer (chengbaozhi). And this transition 
will be further accelerated by the current reform to corporatize state enterprises by convert-
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ing them into limited liability companies and joint stock companies (gufenhua).1 This may 
be a fairly slow evolution, as quantitative change breeds a gradually qualitative change. 
However, every further step alters state/enterprise relations to allow the latter more 
autonomy. Although right now a massive denationalization is out of the question, the 
direction of ownership reform along the line of corportisation seems to point in this 
direction. Leading theorists like Yu Guangyuan and Li Yining currently are trying to 
explain that public ownership is not the unique trait of the socialist economy and that joint 
stock companies are not a form of privatisation. It is basically a change of mode of manage­
ment from the state's control to corporative control (minyinghua).2 Official economists, 
meanwhile, are trying to show that the current economic problems can be attributed to the 
fact that privatisation of state enterprises has not gone far enough.3
Apparently, the 14th Party Congress has given a green light for the leadership to 
push ahead with a slow but a far-reaching ownership reform. At the enterprise level, it 
inevitably gives rise to a process of divestiture. From my approach, it is a fundamental 
reform that undercuts the roots of the industrial danwei system, as it is from the monolithic 
state ownership structure that state enterprises have derived many key features of danwei, 
features such as their bureaucratic ranks and the unified remuneration system.
8.1. De-statizstion through a Hybridized Ownership Structure4
The dilution of the state ownership structure and administrative controls began with 
the contract/profit responsibility system introduced to state plants in the mid-1980s. The
1 According to a leading figure in the SCRES, the reform program for the rest of the decade will be
centred on transforming the ownership structure of state enterprises. Qiye gaige tongxun, no. 2, May
1992, pp. 6-10.
2 Jingji ribao, 5 August 1993.
3 Information gathered from a number of interviews with researchers in the SCRES in 1992.
4 There can be many angles to study the contract responsibility system, such as the resultant tax
regime and the legal aspects of the contracts. But this dissertation mainly confines its analysis to the 
changes in property relations in such a reform.
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system has, to date, involved about 70% of state firms. This reform at the macro level has 
had two purposes: 1) through a contract negotiated between the government and factories, 
the state was guaranteed a reasonable proportion of profits, with a zero marginal tax on the 
incremental yield.5 This was designed to prevent the second-track (market) transactions of 
factories from absorbing too much of the profits otherwise meant to be delivered to the 
centre. 2) Based on mutually agreed conditions, the reform would neutralize the problem 
that the autonomy promised to factory managers had been intercepted by the state agencies 
at various levels. It was hoped that the legally acknowledged contracts would bind the 
"visible hands" of the bureaucrats.6
The contract/profit responsibility system rested on the premise that in socialist 
economies property rights could be separated from management rights.7 In practice, 
however, the Chinese experience has shown that in granting management rights to the 
producers, the state has transferred property rights in one way or another. In theory, this 
transfer entails two important categories of power: ownership and control. As pointed out 
by Yu-Shan Wu:
Ownership here refers to the power to appropriate income and to dispose of it... And control refers to 
the power to make decisions on production. In the socialist economic reforms, the transfer of the 
control power to the property users is called marketization, while the transfer of the income power to 
the users is called privatisation.8
5 Anthony Y. C. Koo, "The Contract Responsibility System: Transition from a Planned to a Market 
Economy", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 38, no. 4, July 1990, p. 797.
6 See a series of speeches made by Zhao Ziyang on the contract responsibility system, in Zhu Shulian 
& He Cung (eds.), Qiye jingying chengbao cerenzhi shouce, 1989, pp. 141-163.
7 Liu Guoguang, Zhongguo jingji tizhi gaige de tnoshi yanjiu (The study of the models for China's 
economic reform), Beijing, Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1989, p. 12.
8 Yu-Shan Wu, "Reforming the Revolution: Industrial Policy in China", The Pacific Review, Vol. 3, 
no. 3, 1990, p. 243.
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In the key areas of production and distribution, the extent to which the contract 
system plays a pivotal role in diluting the hitherto tight ownership control of the state, it is a 
clear process of de-statisation.
According to Gao Shangqun, vice minister of the SCRES, the essence of the contract 
reform was that through promised fulfilment of the state's requirements (such as profit 
remittances and asset accrual), factories obtained the rights for relatively autonomous 
business decisions. The property rights were thus partially transferred to factories on the 
basis of a contractual relationship where the contractors, either as physical persons or as a 
corporate entity, undertook a level of risks to obtain the rights to run the property .9 This 
reform tried to repeat in state firms the success of the rural responsibility system whereby 
the state leased the land to farmers and only collected "rents" .10 In the countryside by 
giving the farmers the right to decide what to grow, farmers had more incentive to prod­
uce . * 11 To a lesser extent, the industrial contract system allowed more management 
autonomy to state firms, whose own market initiatives have gradually given rise to a 
structure of hybridized property.
With the advent of the contract system, the mechanism of the state's investment to its 
factories has changed from allocation of free grants to bank loans (pogedai) . 12 Concerned 
with possible erosion of pubic assets, the state stipulated that before the signing of the
9 Gao Shangqun, "Shenhua gaige de zhongdian shi qiye gaige” (The key link of reform is the 
enterprise reform), Jingji yanjiu, no. 8, 1990, p. 9. The risks include those of both finance and 
career. For instance, many of the contractors have to mortgage their personal assets for the use of the 
property. This is more of the case for small state factories. But in medium-scale factories, it is not 
uncommon for the contractors to deposit a large sum in personal funds to win the bid. The Chinese 
media has had wide coverage of this and my interviews with a number of those contractors confirmed 
the a practice.
10 Theoretically, land belongs to the collective of peasants, but the state has the ultimate say as to how 
it is owned.
11 See for instance, Daniel Kelliher, "Privatisation and Politics in Rural China”, in Gordon White (ed.), 
The Chinese State in the Era o f Economic Reform, London: Macmilian, 1991, pp. 318-341.
12 Zhang Jiguang, "Inspecting the Bond Market in Shanghai", Jingji yanjiu, no. 7, 1991, p. 40.
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contract, there must be a process to assess and record in a book the existing capital stock. 
Any further increase of the fixed assets, however, enters another book. This system of 
separate books (zijing fenzhangzhi) technically resolved the question of how to take 
account of old and new fixed assets. 13 An enterprise now has several ways to create its 
own property. First, after submitting the state taxes prescribed in the contract, it may invest 
in its own capital projects from the profit it has generated from its market transactions (vis- 
a-vis inside-plan activities). According to former minister Yuan Baohua, this created a new 
investment body parallel with the state which may concentrate on large projects. Under the 
principle of "whoever invests reaps the benefits", the contractors had rights to the new 
property. 14 Secondly, a contracted factory may seek large loans from the banks with which 
it launches new capital projects. After paying back the interest and principal, the new assets 
created by these successful projects are regarded as belonging to the factory, since the state 
has not injected any funds, at lease from the factory's point of view. The state also sees 
investment by factories as an incentive measure for factories to increase production and 
profits. 15 Thirdly, many factories now set up their own collectively-run sub-factories, 
sometimes for relocating redundant workers and their families and sometimes simply for 
generating additional profits. These sub-factories are created mainly with the self-raised 
funds. Sometimes the assets thus generated may surpass the assets of their parent factories.
13 Gao Shanqun, "Shenhua gaige de zhongdian shi qiye gaige", p. 9.
14 Editing group, Chengbaozhi lilun yu shijian (The theory and practice of the contract system), Jingji 
ribao chubanshe, 1987, p. 4.
15 This is reflected from the on-going debate on whether to acknowledge the factory ownership as a 
legitimate component of the public ownership. See for instance, Huang Sujian, "Lun qiye gufenzhi 
gaizao de chanqun jieding wenti" (On the question of defining different property forms in the stock 
reform), Gaige, no. 1, 1993, pp. 65-73.
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This distinctive collective property often expands in contrast to the shrinking share of state 
ownership. 16
There are also other ways to acquire collective property. For instance, a contracted 
factory may extend its operations with joint production with township factories and foreign 
concerns to make products not counted as the property of the state. Many large state 
factories see this "graft" as stimuli to transform their obsolete management mechanisms.17 
This self-created property has given birth both to a new diversity in organizational forms 
and a plurality of property rights, representing an intermediate property form driven further 
and further by new pressures for efficiency and flexibility. 18
Accordingly, the evolution of the hybridized property formation has created a notion 
of collective ownership in a state factory based on property owned by members of an 
economic entity. This notion is in contrast to the concepts of state ownership and private 
ownership. Chinese economists allude to the concept of social ownership in Yugoslavia, 19 
where "behind the permanent sources of funds of enterprises (behind the equity of firms in 
a market economy) one cannot find any person to whom these funds belong".20 However, 
the Chinese concept is different in that, while the latter prescribes that nobody is the owner
16 For instance, Xiamen Fishery Company No. 2 set up a few hotels and shops with its own invest­
ment in the late 1980s. These sub-factories were so profitable that they remitted large sums of 
money to the parent Firm which set up six more factories. Now the parent factory only produces 25% 
of the gross output. The nature of the factory as state-owned has changed as a result. According to 
Guangming ribao, this is the origin of a change-of-factory-name frenzy in China. Guangming ribao, 
21 July 1993.
17 Jingji ribao, 19 February 1993.
18 Victor Nee, "Organizational Dynamics of Market Transition: Hybrid Forms, Property Rights, and 
Mixed Economy in China", Administrative Science Quarterly, no. 37, 1992, pp. 1-27.
19 See for example, Liu Wei, "Suoyouqun de jingjixingzhi, singshi ji qunneng jiegao", (The economic 
nature, form and structure of property right), Jingji yanjiu, no. 4, 1991, p. 65.
20 Ivan Ribnikar, "How to Abolish Social Ownership: A Soft Transition to a Market Economy", in 
Centre for Research in Communist Economies, (ed.), Privatisation: An International Symposium, 
London, 1992, pp. 11-12.
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of the factory property, the former does identify the factory and its workers as the owner.21 
This originated from the definition of property relations in China's collective enterprises 
where fixed assets belong to all staff in legal terms. So this kind of social ownership is 
more often called enterprise ownership (qiye suoyou).22
This hybridized property form (state ownership plus enterprise ownership) has given 
rise to heated debates over its nature and functions among Chinese economists and offic­
ials: whether the property created by factories' own investment should be regarded as be­
longing to the state (qunmin suoyou). To a large extent, the debate reflects the effects such 
hybrid ownership has had on to state/enterprise relations. Equipped with the 14 decision­
making powers granted by the Regulations for Changing State Enterprise Managerial 
Mechanisms of 1992, enterprises have become more confident in dealing with their bureau­
cratic superiors than before.23 In the evolution of the contract reform, the bureaucratic 
authority of the state over factories was initially weakened by the separation of property 
rights and management rights. This has led to the quickened acquisition of enterprise
21 For an analysis of the Yugoslavian social ownership, see Robert Miller, "Theoretical and Ideological 
Issues of Reform in Socialist Systems: Some Yugoslav and Soviet Examples", Soviet Studies, Vol. 
XLI, no. 3 July 1989, pp. 430-448.
22 In legal terms the concept of enterprise ownership is vague and carries the "non-property" 
characteristics of the Yugoslavian social ownership. In political terms, it is vulnerable under the 
conditions of the party/state. Nonetheless, the emergence of enterprise ownership owned by all 
workers in the enterprise has shaken the monolithic control of state ownership and created new vested 
interests vis-a-vis the state. This chapter is not so much concerned with the legal definition of the 
concept, nor the reason why it is vulnerable in the party/state, as with the weakening effects it has 
generated for the political control functions of state ownership.
23 These 14 powers include major decision regarding production, pricing, marketing and sales, purchas­
ing, export and import, investment, autonomous use of retained profits, management of the fixed 
assets, joint operation and merger, employment, personnel, wages and bonuses, institutional set-up, 
and resistance to the demands of state agencies for "donation". Xia Zhiqiang (ed.), Quanmin 
suoyouzhi gongye qiye zhuanhuan jingying jizhi tiaoli (The Regulations for Changing State 
Enterprise Managerial Mechanisms), Beijing: Zhongguo dabaike qunshu chubanshe, 1992, pp. 206- 
214.
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property, which in turn stimulates the contractors to acquire powers of control embodied in 
the integration of ownership rights (stemming from the property owned by factories) and 
management rights. If a point is reached where an enterprise's property reaches parity with 
that of the state, its appendage relationship with the state has to be fundamentally altered. 
Former minister Ma Hong summarised the debate with the following worries:
What is the difference between the fixed assets invested by the state and by the 
factory? These are questions of great significance that we must recognize. Compared with 
state investment, factory investment has improved efficiency. If the state takes over these 
newly created assets, it will hurt the producers badly. But if we endorse these to be enterpr­
ise-owned, enterprise ownership will gradually erode the state's proportion that is 
depreciating day by day. State ownership will one day be replaced by enterprise owner­
ship, fundamentally affecting the property base of our socialist system. The hybrid pheno­
menon revealed the efforts by a factory to "transform 'big' public (dagong, the state's) to 
'small' public (xiaogong, the factory's) and to private (through factory-based income 
distribution).24
This transition is actually occurring in a large number of profitable small and 
medium-sized factories in China, and to a lesser extent, in large ones as well. The reform to 
substitute investment grants by bank loans allowed enterprises to pay back the loans before 
remitting taxes. The property accrual at the disposal of enterprises thereby has increased 
steadily during the course of the contract reform. For instance, during a period of ten years 
between 1979 to 1989, the apportionment of industrial profits between the state, enterprises 
and workers rose from 78 : 2 : 20 to 51 : 14 : 35.25 The proportion of factory-controlled 
capital had risen from 2% to 14%, at the same time factory managers strived to increase the
24 Ma Hong, "Guanyu guoying qiye chengbao jingying de jida wenti", (Some major issues concerning 
the state enterprise contract system), in Zhuo Shulian and He Cung (eds.), Qiye chengbao jingying 
gongzuo shouce, p. 236.
25 Security Work Department of the ACFTU, "Studies on the Distribution of the National Income 
Tilting to Individuals", Zhongguo laodong kexue, no. 3, 1992, p. 12.
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percetage of their profit retention (currently between 10 to 30%). And enlarged profit 
retention is only one of the channels through which the hybridized ownership structure is 
substantiated.
The effects of this remarkable change on the relationship between the state and state 
factories have begun to show. The following case study can shed a lot of light to deepen 
our understanding.
The Beijing Percussion Instrument Factory is a "big collective" (dajiti) factory, a kind 
of factory that comprises about 80% of China's state enterprises.26 Since the mid-1980s, 
when the factory entered into a contract with its administrative boss -  the Beijing Xinghai 
Musical Instrument Company, the factory has increased its fixed assets from 144,000 yuan 
to about 1.3 million yuan without any state investment. The per capita annual income of 
workers jumped from 1,600 yuan in 1986 to 4,200 in 1992. The workers attributed this 
impressive progress to their capable factory manager, Zhang Xueshan, who signed the 
contract with the state agency.
On 15 December 1992 the company suddenly notified Mr Zhang that he would be 
transferred to another factory under the Company and one of his deputy managers would 
be promoted to his position. When Zhang accepted the order and informed the managerial 
meeting three days later, the management and many workers voiced strong opposition to 
the transfer. Then Zhang convened the Workers Congress to elect another factory manager.
26 This kind of collective enterprise is created and financed by local government. It is different to those 
"small collectives" which originated from the co-operatives before the industrial nationalization in 
the 1950s. But since the local government is not in a position to inject capital continuously into 
these big collectives, in the 1980s the proportion of the factory ownership has grown larger than the 
state's. So in terms of capital formation and management styles (most of them have been contracted 
or leased to individuals), it has become increasingly difficult to tell whether they should be called 
state factories at all, although China's state statistical books still list their outputs, numbers of 
employees and net assets under the category of the "public". According to an official figure of 1988, 
among 463,210 state factories, 367,842 belonged to this group (no further breakdown between the 
■big' and 'small' collectives). See The SCRES, (ed.), Qiye jizhi gaige chutan, p. 157.
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However, among 30 deputies, 28 voted for Zhang to continue his term. The following day 
the head of the Company came to the factory and called party and management meetings 
where the transfer order was formally announced. But this time the previously decided 
promotion of the deputy manager was withdrawn, as the Company now wanted a cadre 
from the Company's office to take over the factory, obviously a move to show its 
displeasure over the popular opposition in the factory. In the meanwhile a working group 
was sent to the factory to "rectify the situation".
Over the next few days two factory managers were acting as the factory head. One 
was appointed, another elected. At the same time the workers became restless and product­
ion halted. When this caught the attention of the Beijing First Light Industry General 
Company, the superior of the factory's boss, it reversed the decision so as to ameliorate the 
tension. The appointee had to return to his office and Zhang was officially reaffirmed. The 
conflict seemed to be eased but what did the people involved think about the event?
The workers expressed their opinions as follows. First, they were the owners of the 
factory because the state had not provided any money for a long time. This gave them the 
power to decide who should run the factory. Secondly, because Zhang’s current contract 
with the Company was supposed to last for another three years, it was illegal to transfer 
him before he finished the job if he did not commit any serious mistake. What did the 
Company officials say about the incident? The head stated that the appointment of factory 
managers had always been the mission of the Company's personnel management. The 
transfer of Zhang was a normal everyday decision under the principle of the party 
controlling cadres. There was nothing wrong with it. Secondly, the election by the factory 
was not valid because the Workers Congress did not submit to the Company the decision to 
hold an election beforehand and did not notify the party branch of the factory. Thirdly, the 
election should not have been held in the first place because, according to the regulations of
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the Beijing Municipal Government, only approved plants could elect managers and only the 
Beijing Government could decide which factories would participate in the experiment.27
What does the story tell us about China's enterprise reforms? First, the workers of 
the factory started to "feel" the links between property rights and power of control over 
management appointments and production. And they wanted to exercise the powers associ­
ated with the property rights. Even the fact that their target was the powerful state did not 
prevent them from taking action. Secondly, the workers' action illustrated the extent to 
which the notion of factory ownership countered the traditional concept of state ownership 
under which property rights were defined only through bureaucratic ranks and administrat­
ive allocation. Thirdly, the factory ownership challenged the combination of political and 
economic relationship that were imbedded in its being a danwei of the command system 
and called for recognition of factories as economic entities.
It is likely that the workers would not see these points this way. Neither would the 
Company head who ordered the transfer of the manager. While the workers felt that it was 
not right for the state to do whatever it wished without any contribution to the factory's 
well-being, the company cadres saw it as only natural from the party/state's point of view. 
Apparently, things are changing beyond the calculations of the party leaders who first prop­
osed the contract reform for the sake of generating stable revenues. Now the question is 
how deeply the logic of destatization, driven by the hybridized factory property formation, 
has cut through the previously monolithic structure of state ownership.
The Repercussion Instrument Factory is only one example among numerous cases 
that I heard about during my field trips in China in 1991 and 1992. There have been media 
reports about fierce conflicts between state agencies and factories over the former's efforts 
to take away the latter's property through tanpai or forced "donations" and over their violat­
ion of contracts, such as by arbitrary termination of the terms of service of factory man­
agers. My interviews with factory managers repeatedly confirmed these reports and gave
27 Jingji ribao, 16 January 1993.
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me the impression that the contract reform had greatly enhanced the sense of property rights 
on the part of managers and workers. This was often expressed in terms of striving to gain 
control over production, distribution and autonomy in management. In contrast, when talk­
ing with state industrial bureaucrats during my two field surveys, I obtained the impression 
that their sense of being marginalized was equally strong. The prospects of the factory 
property reaching some parity with the state's may not worry them as yet, though it does 
official economists. Their immediate concern is with the loss of control over enterprise 
management. The development of the contract reform has ingrained on them this sense of 
being marginalized.28
8.2. Corporatizing State Enterprises through the Stock System
To convert a state factory into a stock company is a new phenomenon in a command 
economy.29 The Chinese authorities admitted such an endeavour involved a lot of risks. On 
the first of March 1991 Premier Li Peng raised the issue of the stock reform when 
addressing the national conference on the economic reform in 1991: the enterprise groups 
could not work if they were not transformed into joint stock companies. Without a clear 
delineation of property rights, profits generated by an enterprise group could not be 
properly distributed, and then the factories could not cooperate."30 Later in the year Li 
approved the report of the SCRES advocating a forward push in the shares reform, 
expanding it outside the enterprise groups.31 During his Southern China tour, Deng
28 Impression from talking to a number of cadres working in various industrial bureaus in Beijing.
29 A simple comparison with international practices entails distortions, as the converted firms are 
themselves distorted forms of stock companies. Elsewhere in socialist economies in transition, 
similar conversion has met with many problems and progressed very slowly.
30 Jin Jian, Zhongguo gufen jingji gailun (On the stock economy of China), Guangzhou: South China 
University of Science and Technology Press, 1992, P. 362.
31 China Enterprise Reform and Development Research centre, "1992 Zhongguo qiye gaige mianlin de 
zhuyao renwu" (The major tasks of the Chinese enterprise reform in 1992), Qiye gaige tungxun, no. 
1, 1992, p. 12. The article does not mention Li Peng by name but the editor of the journal, Mr 
Sheng Hongsheng, conveyed to me this information.
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Xiaoping categorically rejected the accusations that the reform would lead to privatisation 
and capitalism. This "green light" at once caused massive stock-shares "waves" in the 
country, which made many firm supporters of the shares reform very nervous. Li Yining 
commented: "When housewives won't crowd into the vegetable market but the stock 
exchange, the danger signal flashes." As the prospects of a loss of control are always 
present, the fate of the stock reform remains unassured.32
8.2.1. The Rationale for the Reform
Although the contract reform touches upon ownership issues in an indirect way, on 
the whole it has failed to develop a clearly defined property relationship between the owner 
and user. Gradually, the proposal for a thorough ownership reform based on the shares 
system has regained currency since the early 1990s. As shown from the firms practising 
the reform, visible changes in state/enterprise relations have occurred.33 The experiment 
vis-a-vis a stock system began in 1985, but due to strong resistance to the reform it zig­
zagged slowly. However, since a consensus had been reached in the party's 14th Congress 
in 1992, a new momentum for the reform has gathered force, driving a fast expansion of 
stock companies in the state sector. The prompt change of policy toward the stock system 
by conservative figures like Li Peng and Zhou Jiahua raises unanswered questions about 
the decision-making process.34 Is this a suicidal path for the party/state? This was the
32 The general index of the Shengzhen and Shanghai stock market jumped several dozen times within a 
short space of time, driving home a twisted perception that the shares bring big money. This causes 
instability of the economy because there are few outlets for the more than one trillion Renminbi 
deposits, such as house buying and insurance.
33 The SCRES report to the State Council, Qiye gaige tongxun, no. 3, 1992, p. 3.
34 My interview with some officials in the SCRSE revealed some points on the personal side of the 
decision process. Some major reform designers, particularly Gao Shangqun and Jiang Yiwei, had 
used their close relations with Chen Jinghua, the former minister of the SCRES, to get separate 
access to Li Peng, who is the long-time mentor of Chen. In early 1991, they finally convinced Li 
that the stock system was the only way to save China's large enterprises and, as a corollary, save 
Chinese socialism. At the same time, the joint limited liability companies based on the enterprise
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question I asked to quite a few Chinese officials during my field trip in China in 1992. 
While a common-sense reply was simply yes, most of them offered a more sophisticated 
explanation, which can be summarised by me in one sentence: only Capitalism can 
save the party. China's post-Mao reform has been a process of adopting capitalist 
measures to run the economy.35 However, the immediate reason behind the leadership 
consensus on the stock system was its grave concern over a sharp rise of corporate losses 
in the state sector.
China's state-sector losses have gone through cycles since the post-Mao reform, with 
three peaks registered in 1981-2, 1986-87 and 1990-91. Each was worse than the previous 
one and revealed the extent to which the state ownership structure and the resultant factory 
management mechanisms had increasingly become incompatible with changed economic 
realities.36 In the crisis of the state sector in the early 1990s, two-thirds of factories became 
loss-m akers.37 In 1991 subsidies to cover losses reached 31.5 billion yuan, engulfing 
about two-thirds of all industrial profits and affecting the state's ability to invest in infrastr-
groups composed of these large firms would preserve the dominant position of the state sector in the 
economy. It is also interesting to point out that the change of mind started from Chen Yun, the 
"commissar" of central planning, who reportedly sent a note to Deng in 1991 before Deng's South 
China tour, stating that the Soviet experience had shown that if this road would lead to a dead end, 
why should not try another road, which may also lead us to a dead end but may lead us out of the 
situation. This unconfirmed message was obtained from an interview with a member of the SCRES 
in November 1992. The translation is deliberately done by word to word. These words best catch the 
spirit of using capitalism to save socialism (i.e. the party's hold on power).
35 For a comprehensive description of this process, see Dorothy Solinger, "China's Transition from 
Socialism", Problems o f Communism, Vol. 38, no. 1, 1989, pp. 19-33.
36 For instance, state subsidy reduces the coverage of the market in directing the micro-economic activ­
ities. It offers a channel for bureaucratic intervention of economic affairs. It also confuses the nature 
of loss-making by state factories, be it caused by an irrational price structure or bad management. Li 
Yang, Caizheng butien jingji fenxi (An economic analysis of subsidies), Shanghai: Sanglian 
shudian, 1990, p. 263.
37 Gongren ribao, 13 June 1992.
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ucture, educational and scientific projects and social development programs.38 The state 
sector, once the source of transfusions of revenues to the party/state, now had started to 
milk the state treasury in an unsustainable way, seriously threatening the political stability 
of the country. Chen Yuan, vice governor of the People's Bank of China and a son of 
Chen Yun, issued a warning in behalf of central planners: the loss-making was not just an 
economic problem. It was a political one, with dire consequences for the party and 
government.39 The following case illustrates the difficulties a state factory suffered during 
this period of painful transition.
The Jiangxi August First Linen Fabrics Factory is the second largest linen factory in 
China, employing more than 6,000 workers. From 1989 to 1992 the factory registered 
losses of over 60 million yuan. Among the debts, borrowed 'circulation funds' and unsale­
able goods have exceeded the factory's fixed assets by two-fold. Travel reimbursements 
alone, just one of the items of money it owed workers, reached about 800,000 yuan. This 
had been a model factory with a "glorious past": it submitted profits to the state valued at 
200 million yuan during its 30-year history until 1988. This is about 20 times the money 
the state had invested in the factory.
The factory's ultimate quandary should be primarily attributed to the command 
economy. Between 1958 and 1984, the factory produced only one product: gunny-bags, as 
prescribed by the state planning. This inflicted on the factory a heavy price in the wake of 
the fast development of market activities in the linen fabrics industry. In the 7th five-year 
plan period (1985-1990), almost overnight a large number of village and township gunny- 
bag factories emerged. This was due to the nature of the industry, which is labour 
intensive, with low levels of capital investment and technology. The result: in contrast to
38 Research Group on "Efficiency and Reform of State Enterprises", CASS, "A Feasible Approach to 
State Enterprise Reform", Jingji yanjiu, no. 7, 1992, p. 3.
39 Chen Yuan, "Wuoguo jingji de shenceng wenti he xuanze" (The problems in the deeper economic 
structure of our country and our reform choices), Jingjin yanjiu, no. 4, 1991, pp. 18-23.
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560 million gunny-bags produced nationally in 1988, 1.5 billion of them rolled off 
production lines in 1989, while the market became saturated once production reached 700 
million bags. While the state factories in the industry bore the brunt, the August First 
Factory was worst hit. Still basking in its special status as the second largest in the country, 
it was entrapped by its single-product structure.
The factory had stuck to the old ways of production management and labour controls. 
Among 6,000 workers, only 2,000 worked on production lines. Over 600 management 
staff manned 48 offices and departments. They, however, could not propose any feasible 
methods to market the products in stock. As a result, about 1,000 workers had to wait for 
relocation and another 1,000 had tendered applications for transfer. Moreover, the factory 
had to support another 1,000 retired staff. So every worker on the lines had to provide for 
two and half other persons. The factory actually was a "living fossil" of the command 
economy amidst a changing economic order.
However, the workers and managers had their own complaints against the state. 
They believed that they should not be held responsible for the sorry state of the factory. In 
the past the state took all the profits, leaving nothing for the factory to modernize its 
facilities. This milking policy created a vicious cycle applicable to all state factories: when a 
factory was healthy, the state squeezed it continuously to the point where the factory 
became so weak that it had to receive a transfusion of "blood". When the factory became 
well, it was milked again until it became feeble again. The missing link in this mechanism 
was that the factory had no capacity to create its own "blood". Had the command economy 
not experienced the post-Mao reforms, this phenomenon might have continued for a while 
but not indefinitely - as demonstrated by the USSR, the state itself would run out of steam 
one day. However, the market in China has rung the death knell for this type of 
state/enterprise relationship. The state's allocation of grants no longer came naturally, as it 
aggressively adopted the market and profits-oriented investment policies. More 
importantly, the state now cannot afford to give out subsidies freely, as it faces enormous
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financial problems itself. It is against this backdrop that the Chinese leaders finally arrived 
at a consensus to turn state concerns into stock companies. As an official in the Tigaisuo 
pointed out to me in 1992, if a stock company makes profits, it may help the state increase 
revenues through increased dividends and taxes. Otherwise, it does not oblige the state to 
maintain the "paternalistic ties" beyond its share of liability.
More insights can be drawn from further analysing the case. Starting from October 
1992 when the market for linen fabrics products boomed again, The August First Factory 
designed a number of new products with good market prospects. Yet the state banks firmly 
rejected its application for additional loans on the grounds that it was on the brink of 
bankruptcy. Without even circulating funds, the factory had to watch the market quickly 
taken over by the much more affluent township industries without being able to respond. 
The banks had realized that it was too late to save the factory.40 The state has not declared 
the factory bankrupt only because it fears the political and social backlash of laying off 
6,000 workers with a safety net still not in place. As a result, the provincial government 
offered a series of "favourable policies" to the factory, including partial waiver of its debts 
and exemption from taxes. But at the time of writing, the banks still refused to lend 
additional funds unless the factory mortgaged its land, although they agreed to provide 
loans for the factory to dole out minimum wages, about 70% of the basic salary. What is 
significant about this factory is that, currently, about 40% of all large and medium-sized 
factories nationally were experiencing a similar fate.41 What can the state do? Gordon
40 This story was carried in Jingji ribao, 24 May 1993.
41 Zhongguo gongye jingji xiehui, (The China National Industrial Association), "Guoying gongye qiye 
kuisun yanzhong" (The serious situation of state enterprises that make a loss), Gongye jingji neican, 
no. 88, 1991. This Journal carried case studies of more than 100 large state factories making a loss 
in the first six months in 1992. The situation of many of these factories were worse than the Linen 
Factory.
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White uses the term "riding the tiger" to describe the dilemma of the state: it is dangerous to 
ride a tiger but equally dangerous to dismount -- and let the factories go under.42
The state has realized that if the status quo drags on, it will have to inject more 
subsidies for the loss-makers until one day the state itself becomes insolvent. Jiang Zemin 
made it clear that the next stage of economic reform would have to solve this "core 
problem" in the system, as a matter of great urgency.43 It is against this background that 
the shares reform is seen as the most promising way out for the state sector and ultimately 
for the party/state, according to vice minister Hong Hu of the SCRES.44 This was a choice 
for the state between bankrupting a number of factories or having itself go bankrupt. 
According to another vice minister of the SCRES:
Now the enterprise reform has reached a critical pass: all that can be changed has 
been changed in the reform process, and we now must tackle the ownership system. This 
is the key to the creation of a market economy, but the key to this change is first of all a 
change in our traditional thinking on ownership issues.45
On the other hand, the consensus to undertake the stock reform in the state sector will 
be based on shaky ground if it is not guided with a well defined theoretical framework for 
the conversion of state factories.46 Chinese reformers are idealistic about the stock system
42 Gordon White, Riding the Tiger: The Politics of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China, London: 
Macmillan, 1993.
43 Rentnin ribao, 15 May 1993.
44 Renmin ribao, 25 July 1993, Hong Hu is now a powerful figure in Chinese political circles not 
only because he is a son of a powerful military general, Hong Xuezhi, but also because he is the rep­
resentative of the younger generation of reform-minded technocrats. Although they hold similar 
views on the reform with Zhao Ziyang's think-tanks, they have different motivations. What they do 
and think is always motivated by the thought of how to best maintain the party's rule. (Impressions 
from my interview with people around him in late 1992.)
45 Jingji ribao, 25 May, 1993.
46 Paul Bowles and Gordon White, "The Dilemmas of Market Socialism: Capital Market Reform in 
China - Part II: Shares", The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 28, no. 4, July 1992, p. 575- 
594.
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as the solution to the problems facing the state sector. A hasty approach toward the stock 
reform may sow the seeds of collapse if the factors contributing to loss of control set in. 
Clearly the stock reform is not a panacea, especially as it has put so many interests at stake.
8.2.2 The New Property Ties
Corporatization through the stock reform is a step forward from the contract reform 
in terms of transferring property rights between the state and factories. Some Chinese 
economists believe that the transition from the contract system to the stock system is a 
natural process because in the evolution of the former a new property structure is being 
developed. This can serve as a base of business organization. The stock system is the best 
form for it.47 It is an attempt to define and personalize the property in legal terms. The 
properties owned by different parties in a factory, such as the state, the factory itself, 
corporate investors and individuals, can be identified by their stock holdings. The reform 
entails the creation of new forms of factory organization in terms of corporatization, which 
form the base for new state/enterprise ties. The stock reform is designed to provide 
substance to the transformation toward corporatization. It is meant to create different quasi­
owners in order to ensure the business autonomy of producers.48 Gao Shangqun, vice 
minister for the SCRES, elaborated in great detail the reform program for such an endeav­
our:
A stock firm must fulfil three basic requirements inherent in a real corporation. First, it must be a 
civil entity with legal property ownership; secondly, shareholders only assume limited liability for the 
debts; thirdly, shareholders entrust the property management to a board of directors whose managing 
principle is solely for profit49
47 See for instance, Li Yining, Zhongguo jingji gaige yu gufenzhi (The Chinese economic reform and 
the stock system), Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1992, pp. 8-27.
48 Li Yining, "Gufenzhi shi mingque qiye caichan guanxi de zuihao xingshi" (The stock system is the 
best mechanism in ascertaining the property relations in state firms), Hongqi, no. 1, 1988.
49 Jingji ribao, 20 April 1993.
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The socialist stock system has been envisaged in essence as the corporate ownership 
system where an enterprise possesses and manages properties belonging to the public (the 
state). This concept is antithetical to that of state ownership which is both absolute and ab­
stract. It is absolute, for the economic powers stemming from state ownership give cadres 
concrete channels to dictate micro economic activities. It is abstract, as public ownership is 
vested in the hands of bureaucrats, rather than reflected by any clearly defined capital 
entities. These cadres are not beholden to any responsibility even when the property is lost. 
The stock reform centred on the corporate ownership is designed to dilute the absoluteness 
of the state's direct control over plants through abolishing most of the commanding heights 
(more on this in the next chapter). At the same time, through defining the state and 
corporations as the ultimate (abstract) and practical (corporate) owners of the property, the 
state's links with the property are mainly governed by the shares it controls in a corporation 
and by the dividends it extracts from its stockholding. As a result the practical property 
rights are thoroughly transferred to the firm, making it a new capital principal. So the stock 
system is the main carrier of the transformed state/factory relations, separating the ultimate 
and practical ownership but integrating at the same time their interest seeking through 
dividends accrual and distribution.50
At the macro level, the erection of the stock system can help reform the management 
system of state property. Under the command economy, the concept of state property has 
been arbitrarily broken up into two categories in China: incremental capital and stock capit­
al. The former describes the capital invested in an on-going project and the latter the fixed 
assets after the project becomes operational. Each is placed under the management of two 
sets of state bodies, the State Planning Commission (for the former) and the Finance Min­
istry (the latter). This gives rise to an abnormal phenomenon: there is no need for the 
investor to care about the outcome of investment while the property user has very limited
50 Liu Jiaqi, Zhongguo gongyouzhi jingji yunxing hongguan tiaokun (The macro regulation of China's
state economy), Beijing: Zhongguo caijing chubanshe, 1991, pp. 54-55.
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access to the investors' initial decision process.51 So the reform to create independent 
investment bodies will unify the artificially separated processes of capital management and 
make the investment decision an economic rather than a bureaucratic policy.
To the government, this is a viable way to lessen its heavy burden of subsidies to 
loss-makers and the heavy interference of bureaucrats in the management of firms. Gao 
Shangqun has pointed out:
When the investment companies as main shareholders serve as property caretakers of 
the state in relations with state enterprises, they will relieve the unlimited liability of the 
state, which now invests in a plant and accepts for better or for worse the results of its 
management. Instead, these companies take only limited liability according to their amount 
of shares. They lose their investment only to the point where they cannot recover the 
money when the factory is badly run but are not obliged to grant further subsidies.52
Although much of the reformers' enthusiasm was aroused by its concern over the 
loss-making firms, the significance of the reforms has certainly gone beyond the narrow 
focus on industrial losses.
8.2.3 The Creation of the Stock System in the State Sector
Before I go into the specific features of the conversion, one point needs clarification: 
about the scale of the shares reform (gufenhua). As mentioned earlier, more than 90% of 
China's state factories are small. The current practice is that a large number of these will not 
proceed with the stock reform but engage in a more clear-cut ownership reform: leasing, 
auction or merger with non-state concerns.53 So the stock reform covers mainly the large
51 Qiye gaige tongxun, no. 6, September 1992, p. 12.
52 Jingji ribao, 20 April 1993
53 He Zhongze and Zhen Anping, "Guanyu gaohuo dazhong qiye de duice” (The measures to enliven 
large and medium-sized enterprises), Qiye gaige tongxun, no. 2, May 1992, pp. 13-14. A senior 
research in the SCRES told me in an interview in late 1992 that, in terms of ownership mode, the 
state’s plan was to let these small state concerns "retreat" to the form before the nationalization
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and medium-sized state factories. As such, a small percentage of state factories will be 
affected. Further, according to an official of the State Council, the state will continue to 
control directly about 20% of these large and medium-sized factories. These are in key 
sectors such as the military industries, mining of precious materials and large public 
facilities that the state believes to be too important to let go.54 For the remainder, the state 
will maintain a tight control over the shareholdings of a proportion of the factories in certain 
sectors such as energy and transportation, so as to maintain sufficient leverage to regulate 
the economy.
Types of Stock Companies
Generally speaking, the stock reform will create corporations of four major types: 1) 
corporate stock companies of limited liability; 2) the "internal shares" companies issuing 
non-transferable shares to staff;55 and joint stock companies, of which there are to be two 
kinds: 3) those which can issue public offerings but cannot trade shares on the stock 
exchanges, and 4) those that can. While the second group is to be dominant in terms of 
numbers, the first is the most important because it embraces the majority of the large and 
medium-sized state enterprises in the country. The state has exercised tight control over the 
final two kinds.56 Here the state is concerned not only about the economic conditions for
movement in the mid 1950s. It was up to these small concerns to decide what form of enterprise 
they preferred, stock firms or otherwise, he added.
54 "Guanyu gaige guoyou zhichan guanli de shige wenti", Qiye gaige tongxun, no. 6, September 1992,
p. 11.
55 Obviously the Chinese reformers learned the American method of Employment Shares Ownership 
Plan (ESOP) only at face value. However, this type of firms represent an important mechanism with 
which the state tries to transform its factories.
56 For instance, the Stock Company Rules promulgated by the SCRES in May 1992 require that the 
minimum registered capital of a stock company should be 10 million yuan. If it is a company with 
foreign investment, the minimum is raised to 30 million. And approval for creation of such a 
company has to be jointly processed by a number of state agencies, the SCRES, SPC and the 
People's Bank of China.
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such a transformation, e.g. the operation of the stock exchanges, but also about socio­
political consequences, such as the level of popular acceptance of the rules of the shares 
game or the backlash from the ideologues and central planners who are always fearful of 
the effect of privatisation inherent in such an endeavour.
A limited-liability company is a corporation with two or more shareholders which are 
corporate persons, not individuals. The state has imposed upon a limited-liability firm sev­
eral restrictions that distinguish it from a joint stock company: 1) It may issue investment 
certificates but not stocks to shareholders; 2) the transfer of shareholding is conditional; and 
3) the number of shareholders is restricted.57 These regulations are designed to ensure that 
a substantial proportion of shareholding remains in the hands of state firms participating in 
the company and, therefore, that the domination of state ownership is not lost. But under 
this principle the firm has all practical property rights to the shareholding as a full legal and 
civil body. Because the limited-liability companies are to represent the majority of large and 
medium-sized factories in the state sector, China's reformers argue that the shares reform 
will not change the socialist nature of the country's economic system. On the other hand, 
the shareholdings in these firms as a whole are to be effectively dispersed to allow each 
party to bear only limited liability in proportion to its investment.58 This is very important 
to the state. As each party erects a "safety valve" between the company (which is liable for 
its debts to the full extent of its fixed assets) and the state, this reduces the latter's 
obligation to subsidize it when a loss incurs.
The company that issues shares to employees is officially called a "fixed direction" 
(dingxiang) shares company, (private placement in a "fixed direction"). The purpose of the 
reform is three-fold, according to vice minister Hong Hu — that is, collecting capital, redef­
ining property relations (between the state, factory and workers), and raising the workers'
57 The Opinion on the Standardization of Limited Liability Companies, promulgated on 15 May 1992. 
See the appendix in Jin Jian, Zhongguo gufen jingji gailun.
58 Gaige, no 2, 1993, pp. 42-47.
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concern for the factory's well-being.59 It was argued by State Council economists that only 
through transforming employees into shareholders may the contradiction of a state factory 
pursuing short-term gains (thirst for higher wages) and long-term development (dividends 
from stocks) be reconciled.60 In 1993 the SCRES issued very tough regulations regarding 
the management of these shares. For instance, the overall proportion of the shares held by 
employees should not exceed 25% of the total subscriptions. A company cannot issue 
stocks but stock-rights certificates bearing the names of purchasers in the firm. The certific­
ates are not transferable among the employees within three years after purchase, nor to 
people outside the company at any time. The regulations for the management are stricter. In 
addition to the three years' restriction applied to other employees, the board members and 
managers of the company can transfer shares that comprise no more than 50% of those 
purchased and the transfers must be approved by the board of directors.61
Only limited numbers of state factories are to be converted into stock companies of 
the third and fourth types, which can issue shares in society. Professor Sun Xiaoliang, a 
key designer of the stock reform in the SCRES, compared this policy with the practice in 
the US where among 10 million firms the percentage of companies that list their shares on 
the stock exchanges constitutes only 0.2-0.3%.62 The third kind of stock companies are 
created mainly through promotions and are permitted to sell stocks on the stock exchan­
ges.63 Usually their creation requires a minimum of three promoters. Their subscriptions to 
shares must exceed 35% of the total to be listed. To ensure state control over the
59 Renmin ribao, 10 April 1993.
60 Wu Jiaxiang and Jin Lizuo, "Shareholding Enterprises: An Approval to Future Reform", Chinese 
Economic Studies, Fall 1989, Vol. 23, no. 1, p. 32.
61 See "Regulation on Internal Shares in a "Fixed Direction" Stock Company Limited", promulgated 
by the SCRES, 1993.
62 Sun Xiaoliang, "Gufenzhi qiye shidian de jige wenti" (A few questions about the enterprises that 
experiment the shares reform), Qiye gaige tongxun, no. 7, 1992 p. 3.
63 Opinion on the Standardization of Stock Companies, May 1992.
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conversion process, private and foreign concerns are not allowed to be promoters. The 
foreign capital in a joint-venture firm should not exceed one-third when it is being 
converted. The holdings of any single person must be below 0.5% of the total shares 
issued.64 Clearly these discriminatory regulations reflect the concern of the state over the 
holdings of the state sector. The fourth type of stock company is created through a 
prospectus (specific and public offerings). The companies as such are permitted to issue 
stocks to the public but their shares are not to be listed on the stock exchanges.65 Like the 
third type, the state, too, is to exercise tight control over the conversion process by limiting 
the proportion of public subscriptions.
Types of Shares
In the three stock company regulations, the SCRES established four categories of 
shares: state shares, corporate shares, private shares and foreign shares. Every type of 
share is to hold the same rights and obligations. Practically speaking, the nature of the 
economy in transition will hinge upon the uneven growth of these types of shares.
State shares refer to the shares held by state agencies and are, in general, common 
shares. There is no restriction with regard to state share holdings. Corporate (legal 
person) shares refer to the shares owned by various social organizations. There are 
some restrictions on this type of shares. For instance, if one corporation owns 10% of the 
shares of another company, the latter is not allowed to hold any shares of the former. 
Private shares (natural person shares) can be further divided into two categories: 
management and employee buy-outs and shares purchased by individuals on the stock 
exchanges or through the companies' public offerings. Both kinds of shares are treated as 
ordinary shares and subscribers to both kinds need to enter their names on the certificates. 
The difference is that the employees have preference in subscribing to the shares over
64 Wang Jian and others, Zhongguo gupao shichan wenti zhenming” (The debate on the Chinese stock
reform), Jianjing: Nanhai University Press, 1992, p. 125.
65 Opinion on the Standardization of Stock Companies, May 1992.
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people from the outside when their company lists public offerings. Foreign shares refer 
to the shares held by foreign investors. They do not include the Chinese "B" shares offered 
on the overseas stock exchanges. According to the Chinese explanation, the "B" shares 
offered by state firms on the overseas stock exchanges are small in volume, as compared to 
the overall subscription.
Amidst the stock reform an increasing number of stock companies set up a new 
category of shares, despite the opposition of the government. These are called collective 
shares. With a hybrid ownership structure emerging in contracted factories, most of their 
managers strongly resist the state's requirement that the company's own fixed assets be 
incorporated into state shares, when factories are being converted into joint stock 
companies.66 They argue that the collective shares originated from the property a factory 
has accumulated during the transition in which the state's direct control had given way to 
the factory's fairly independent operation. A large part of the factory's assets had been 
created from their own social welfare funds. This is important because this part of factory 
ownership has a function of compensating the under-paid workers through a series of 
social welfare schemes, such as housing and medical care. It is not only part of the prod­
uction goal of the factory but also an outcome of its distribution principle. To scrap the 
collective shares amounts to denial of a basic right of the workers.67 During my field work 
in China in 1992,1 found that most of the converted firms in Beijing actually had instituted 
collective shares from which employees extracted additional income as dividends.
While the proportion of shares owned by different parties varies, the first two kinds 
always occupy dominant percentages, as the state prefers.68 Generally, the number of
66 Wang Jian and others, Zhongguo gupiao shichuan wenti zhengming, p. 77.
67 Ibid, p. 84.
68 It is necessary to explain that in the Chinese literature of the share reform, there is common confus­
ion about the terminology of the first two categories. Some economists use the term corporate 
shares farengu to describe the state shares controlled by an enterprise. This is especially true for large 
enterprises where the proportion of factory ownership is small. Under the assumption that the state
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people who can purchase large sums of shares remains small. This gives the state and 
companies a lot of advantages, given the long capital accumulation of large and medium­
sized factories. As a result, it gives a better position to the firm vs other outside 
organizations and workers. The state prescribes the proportion of these latter shares to that 
of its own shares through its control over investment companies or banks. According to a 
survey of stock firms by the Shenzhen government, the corporate holdings have now ex­
ceeded the state's.69 It is likely that in inland provinces the percentage of state shares is 
considerably higher, but again, the percentage of corporate shares is growing the fastest.70
8.2.4. The State's Plan and Factories' Practice
The SCRES has worked out a comprehensive program for the transformation, which 
concretely deals with the means of conversion and a prescribed time-frame for it. Generally 
speaking, there are 14 mechanisms for the conversion:71
1) A new factory that is created through multiple investors should be made a limited 
liability company and each investor will hold stock certificates to express their limited 
liabilities.
2) The existing joint ventures and integrated complexes should be converted to 
limited liability companies.
3) The establishment of a joint stock company through promotion.
4) A factory is converted to a joint stock company through public offerings, with its 
registered fixed assets turned into share subscriptions.
is only the abstract ultimate owner, they simply equate the state shares and corporate shares. Again, 
in some cases, corporate shares include both the state and comoany's collective shares, indicating a 
weak sense of distinction between the two, as they see the diminishing significance of the role of the 
state's ownership in a joint stock company.
69 Jin Jian, Zhongguo gufen jingji gailun, p. 356.
70 The information gathered from a number of joint stock companies in Beijing in 1992.
71 The SCRES, "Guanyu guoyou dazhongxing qiye zhuanhuan jingying jizhi de yanjiu baogao" (The 
report of the study on the changing operational mechanisms of the large and medium-sized state 
factories), Gaige, no 2, 1993, pp. 42-47.
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5) A factory is converted into a joint limited stock company through specific 
offerings, with its existing stock capital turned into share subscriptions.
6) A factory is converted into a limited joint stock company through private placement 
(ESOP), with its stock capital turned into share subscriptions.
7) A number of factories are merged to form a limited liability company with each 
party's stock capital evaluated as investment certificates.
8) A factory establishes a joint stock company in its subsidiaries through specific or 
public offerings.
9) A number of factories are merged to form a joint stock company with their fixed 
assets, patents and marketing networks, etc, serving as shares.
10) A factory is converted into a limited liability company with its creditors (the 
banks or investment companies) using their loans, or their creditor's rights as share 
subscriptions, while its fixed assets are transformed into shares.
11) A factory is converted into a limited liability company with the investment from 
various social foundations or insurance firms turned into stockholdings, while its fixed 
assets are transformed into shares.
12) A factory is converted into a limited liability company by absorbing foreign 
capital.
13) A factory is converted into a limited liability company by absorbing capital from 
the non-state sectors.
14) A factory is converted into a joint stock company by issuing "B-shares" abroad.
As far as the time-table is concerned, according to the SCRES's report to the State
Council, large and medium-sized factories whose production and sales have already been 
directed mainly by the market could be corporatized mainly in the form of limited liability 
comapnies at an earlier date. These factories include: 1) all the large and medium-sized state 
factories in the special economic and development zones, all the large and medium-sized 
factories in the sectors of commerce, services, construction, and light industries; 2) most
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large and medium-sized factories in the sectors of building materials, manufacturing, metal 
processing, equipment for transportation, electronic facilities, petrochemical products; and 
3) some large and medium-sized factories in the telecommunication industry, the power 
industry and military industry that have already been converted to civilian production. The 
number of factories mentioned above comprises nearly 80% of the 13,000 large and 
medium-sized factories under the state budget. These factories should be transformed 
during the period of 8th-5 year plan (1991-1995). The next five years will see remaining 
factories in categories 2) and 3) transformed to raise the total to 90%.72
A number of measures have been taken to prepare the transition. As far as large and 
medium-sized state factories are concerned, the most important ones are the following four: 
1) to form a large number of enterprise groups and grant them with full property 
management responsibilities. By the end of 1991 there had been more than 2,500 enterprise 
groups of various sizes.73 2) to transform a large number of large and medium-sized state 
enterprises into joint ventures, particularly through the graft of foreign capital. In fact, 
some provinces have gone quite far in this direction, as they see this as the "fast track" to 
save their large but technologically out-dated factories. For instance, according to Yue 
Qifeng, governor of Liaoning province, the province has transformed 156 of its 1200 large 
and medium-sized factories into join ventures. Many of these have already been converted 
into joint stock companies.74 Shanghai, too, has made one-fifth of its 1,600 large and 
medium-sized factories into joint ventures, including 143 projects with foreign investment 
of over five million US dollars each on average and involving nearly 100 transnationals.75 
3) In m id-1993, the State Council launched a national project to have all the state fixed
72 Ibid, p. 37.
73 Qiu Jinji, "Tantan qiye jituan de jige wenti" (A discussion on some issues of enterprise groups), 
Qiye gaige tongxun, no. 9, December 1992, p. 45.
74 Jingji ribao, 16 August 1993.
75 Guangming ribao, 24 March 1993.
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assets reevaluated. 4) Since 1 July 1993, the state sector has been implementing a new 
accounting system, which is said to be designed according to the international practice.76
If things go as planned, by the year 2000 most of China's state factories are 
supposed to be operating within a new hybridized ownership structure and with a new 
relationship with the government. There remains serious doubt about the ability of the 
Chinese to carry through the plan, though. The prescribed time-table is astonishing, 
compared with even capitalist economies which have privatised a much smaller state sector 
over a fairly long period of time. In fact, what some of the reformers advocate is to reverse 
a standard practice of the past: experimental points-distillation-universalization. The reason 
is not difficult to understand: the traditional way of reform is unworkable with the stock 
reform. The reformers' argument is that:
A stock company under this experiment and the stock system have a qualitative difference. The 
former is aimed at changing property structures at the individual factories. The dominant economic 
concern is fund-raising. The latter is aimed at changing the ownership system country-wide. The 
economic purpose is to realize the rational allocation of resources. There is a close connection 
between the scope and the efficiency of the reform. So the success of the stock reform is not reflected 
by the fact that a few firms have listed their shares in the stock exchanges but by the conversion into 
shareholdings of the state's predominant position in the ownership structure.77
The August 10 incident in 1992 at the Shenzhen Stock Exchange testified to the 
danger of allowing only limited number of companies to mount public offerings. The small 
amount of shares available at the exchange caused a serious imbalance of demand and 
supply. As a result, the price of the shares rocketed to the point where it completely lost 
touch with the real value of the shares. This fanned a mood of speculation and widespread 
corruption. Unlike the contract reform, over which the state could exercise fairly effective
76 Renmin ribao, 1 July 1993.
77 Research Group on "Efficiency and Reform of State Enterprises", CASS, "A Feasible Approach to 
State Enterprise Reform", Jingji yanjiu, no. 7, 1992, p. 6.
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control, the stock reform poses the government with a cruel reality: if it goes in for it, it has 
to do it in a sufficiently big way to meet the pressing public demand.
On the side of implementation, since 1992 there have been big strides in the stock 
reform. In a report to the State Council in early 1992, the SCRES proposed that the speed 
for conversion of the first and second categories of stock companies (the limited liability 
company and the firms issuing shares only to their employees) should accelerate, while the 
number of companies in the third and fourth categories should be restricted. That is, the 
third-type companies should be experimented with only in Guangdong, Fujian and Hainan 
and the fourth only in Shenzhen and Shanghai.78 In late 1991 Li Peng approved a plan by 
the SCRES, entitled On Quickening the Development of the Large Enterprise Groups, 
which designated 55 national conglomerates to be converted into stock companies, starting 
from those established around 1985. For those remaining to be converted, they would be 
entrusted with full property rights and delinked from their bureaucratic chains as a 
transitional measure. In these groups financial corporations were erected to facilitate the 
movement of capital and prevent monopolies.79 Given the fact that these groups are the 
backbone of China's key industrial sectors, the reform marked a turning point in the 
ownership reform. So far a dozen of these have completed the conversion, including the 
Shanghai Petrochemical Complex, the Changchun Automobile Corporation, The Chinese 
Heavy Vehicle Corporation, The Chinese Textile General Corporation, The Oriental 
Electric Hardware General Company, and so on.
After the August 10 incident, the State Council quickly expanded the experiment in 
category three firms and increased the number of companies allowed to enter category four. 
In early 1993, the State Council ordered most provinces to convert a number of well-run 
state enterprises into stock companies with public offerings (type three) and chose two or
78 Qiye gaige tongxun, no. 3, 1992, p. 6.
79 "The Major Tasks of Chinese Enterprise Reform in 1992", Qiye gaige tongxun, no. 3, 1992, p. 6.
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more large firms to list their stocks on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges.80 At 
the end of 1991 there were 3,220 share companies in China's state sector after seven years 
of development. In 1992 alone an additional 1,060 companies (excluding those located in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen) became operational. And in terms of company size, there was a 
qualitative change, as many new ones were converted from large and medium-sized 
factories.81 Among these companies, the majority - about 86% - fall into the category of the 
"fixed direction" stock companies (employee buy-outs), 2.5% are companies with public 
offerings, and 12% are joint limited liability companies.82 The last group has a variety of 
forms. Some are dominated by one principal shareholder and others may have a more equal 
distribution of shares owned by a group of partners. The following case study shows how 
a stock company is being created in the state sector.83
Case One: The Shandong Electric Pump Factory illustrates how a medium-scale 
state factory was transformed into a joint stock company through public offerings. As one 
of the first 50 large and medium-sized factories in the province going for stock reform in 
1992, the factory was a second-grade state factory with over 1,100 workers and a key 
producer of maritime pumps.84 The factory was chosen for the reform because it had 
registered an increase of after-tax profits of over one million yuan each year for three years
80 Guangming ribao, 5 July, 1993.
81 Laowang, no. 4, 1993, p. 5.
82 Jingji ribao, 17 April 1993.
83 During my field research in China in 1992,1 collected good cases of transformation along the lines 
of the 14 types mentioned below. Yet due to the limits of the thesis, I can only do two of them and, 
it is important to note that the practice of the transformation may cause more questions than answers 
if they are subject to comparison with the western norms. So my concern is mainly placed on the 
changing relations between these factories and the state through the reform, rather than on how well 
the conversion goes.
84 To be qualified as a second grade state factory, it has to have annual sales exceeding 10 million yuan.
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in a row, a precondition for the state's approval and for the public's confidence in its 
shares.85
In order to provide an accurate valuation of the factory's property, the first step in the 
conversion is to assess the fixed assets that both the state and the factory had invested as 
stock capital in the past. Under the auspices of the The Administrative Bureau of State 
Property (ABSP) of Zibo city, where the factory is located, the city's Office of Audit 
Affairs undertook a thorough evaluation of the factory's fixed assets, which stood at a 
value of 40.87 million yuan. Within this amount of property value, the state's invested 
capital was 28.1 million yuan, and the factory's own investment 12.77 million, including 
the social welfare fund of 5.13 million. The welfare fund was excluded because it could 
neither bring profits nor could it be used as collateral in case of liquidation. So the overall 
value of stock offerings based on the factory's net assets was 35.73 million yuan. After 
this assessment the factory formally changed its name to the Shandong Electric Pump 
Company Limited.
The company could now issue shares to the public. It decided to sell one million 
share certificates, each valued at 10 yuan, but sold at 12 yuan. According to the principle of 
equal rights to all shareholders, the factory's net asset of 35.73 million yuan was valued at 
29.77 million yuan. The offerings were divided into two parts, corporate and private (the 
percentages unknown). The minimum sum to qualify a shareholder to become a 
representative for shareholders was 100,000 yuan. The company also encouraged its 
workers to buy shares in order to forge a bond of interest linking workers more closely to 
the lot of the company. One shop party secretary called for his workers to buy as many as 
2,000 yuan worth of shares apiece.
According to the company's brochure explaining its offering, the capital newly 
acquired through share issuance would be used mainly for technology upgrading to increa-
85 See The Interim Regulation on Management of Stock Issue and Trading promulgated by the State
Council in May 1993.
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se exports and the scale of production. By 1995 its sale income will have reached 120 
million yuan with net profits of 13.6 million. This bright prospect for the company's devel­
opment attracted a warm reception from the public. On the first day shares worth 1.5 
million yuan were sold.86
Case two The Shanghai Jiabao Industrial Company Limited represents the type of 
conversion based on an enterprise group. Its predecessor was the Shanghai Jiabao Electric 
Lighting Company, a loose enterprise group comprising four individual factories. This 
enterprise group was created in 1990, but under the "three-no-change" principle, that is, no 
change in the ownership (the state or collective), administrative linkage and the channels of 
profit turnover, not only could the four factories not coordinate their production and sales 
to meet the pressure from the market, but they themselves were involved in constant 
internal competition. Each had to answer to their own bureaucratic bosses, each produced 
similar products, and all fought for investment funds from limited sources.
In October 1990 the four factories agreed to turn this loose enterprise group into a 
limited joint stock company. The company issued initial shares in a public offering it valued 
at 106.26 million yuan  shares. This figure includes the net assets of the four factories, 
valued at 81.26 million, and offerings to legal persons of 15 million yuan  and to 
individuals of 10 million yuan (the value of each share was 10 yuan sold on the basis of a 
stock premium for 50 yuan). The four factories merged into one, and the company got rid 
of all their previous administrative overloads. The highest control body is the general 
meeting of shareholders in which the board of directors is elected. As far as daily
86 This case was published in Jingji rihao, 3 January 1993 but key points were missing in the 
coverage, like the questions of who approved the efforts, where the shares were sold, who were the 
corporate buyers, and so on. My own investigation through personal correspondence obtained some 
additional information. The state agency that approved the transformation was the Provincial 
Commission for Restructuring the Economic System, the stocks were sold at the local banks (there 
was no stock market in Shandong to this date.) and a fairly large number of factories, schools, 
government agencies, and even the police department bought the corporate shares. Because of high 
demand and short supply, a lot of guanxi had to be employed to obtain the shares.
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management is concerned, the company practises the general manager responsibility system 
answerable to the board of directors. All the members of the board of directors, general and 
deputy general managers had to buy 200 shares. They can transfer 50% of shares as a 
maximum during their terms and only after two years in service, a policy designed to peg 
their career commitment to the well-being of the firm.87
8.3. The Consequences of the Corporatization Reform
As pointed out by Paul Bowles and Gordon White in an article written before the 
CCP had reached consensus on the corportization reform, share issues had been economic­
ally unimportant but politically important since they challenged the ideological and 
institutional underpinnings of a 'socialist' economy.88 Following this line of argument, this 
section is trying to portray the logical outcome generated by the stock reform through 
identifying the factors contributing to quasi-privatisation, which are inherent in such social 
engineering. It will also analyse briefly the dismantling effects vis-a-vis the industrial 
danwei system.
8.3.1. The Factors Contributing to Quasi Privatisation
Stock issues have been an effective means of privatisation world-wide since the 
1970s. When the post-socialist economies embarked on the road of privatisation, they all 
adopted this stock reform. Logically there is a strong connection between a stock reform 
and privatisation. China is no exception. Compared with the contract reform, which prom­
otes dilution of state ownership in an implicit fashion, the shares reform openly diversifies 
ownership through private and foreign inputs. However, it is simplistic to conclude that if 
the CCP launches a stock reform, it will be inevitably committed to privatisation. By the 
Chinese concept of minyinghua, it is not a transfer of the bulk of state ownership to private 
hands, although the state will transfer part of the property to private investors through
87 Lu Wanxin, "Qiye gongsihua, gongsigufenhua" (Enterprises should be transformed to be 
corporations in the form of stock companies), Qiye gaige tungxun, no. 7, 1992, pp. 27-30.
88 Paul Bowles and Gordon White, p. 575.
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issuing of shares or private placement. In the process this will lead to at least partial 
privatisation or denationalization. In comparison with monolithic state ownership, this has 
far-reaching political and economic significance, yet a smooth transformation depends on 
many conditions. The Russian experience has shown that without marketization, 
privatisation can amount to a massive transfer of assets from the state to private buyers at 
prices that benefit those few individuals who are in a position to scoop up these assets.89 
This nomenclature capitalism naturally creates a social backlash. Moreover, the 
practicability of privatisation based on a stock reform depends also on a number of 
preconditions such as the existence of state property in the form of equity.90
However, even though the stock reform is not intended to privatise the state sector, 
the outcome of the reform has created mechanisms that dilute state ownership, as in any 
country in the world which carries out such a reform. The resultant effects of de facto 
denationalization have become increasingly apparent. A 1991 survey of shares traded on 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange disclosed that shareholders had aggressively taken hold of 
large sums of state shares controlled by the firms instituting public offerings. The 
proportion of the state and corporate shares of these firms had been constantly in decline, 
as a fast growing number of private investors entered the "share frenzy".91 From another 
sample survey of 20 joint stock companies in 1991, the average proportions of shares in 
the stock structure were as follows: the state shares, 22.6%; corporate shares, 13.8%; 
collective shares, 13. 2%; private shares, 36.6%; and foreign shares 13.8%.92 Although 
we do not know how representative of these results are, they may reveal a trend — the
89 Nicholas Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992, p. 146.
90 Tomasz Gruszecki, "Privatisation in Poland in 1990", Communist Economics and Economic Transf­
ormation, Vol. 3, no. 2, 1991, p. 143.
91 Lu Ren, Sheilai dan gudong (Who will become the shareholders), Beijing, The Chinese People's 
University Press, 1992, p. 53.
92 Jin Jian, Zhongguo gufen jingji gailun, p. 356.
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private and foreign shares would become increasingly more important, not to mention the 
dubious nature of the collective shares. In non-listed stock firms, the erosion of state assets 
has also been dramatic, often with the backing of local officials. Generally speaking, the 
phenomenon of de-statisation in the state ownership system is reflected in two natural 
developments of quasi-privatisation in the state sector: an erosion of state property due to 
flawed implementation of the corportisation reform; and the logical effect of privatisation 
inherent in such a reform.93 The first development is shown in:
1) Deliberate under-capitalisation in order to reduce the proportion of state shares. 
There are many methods through which this can be done. For instance, a large number of 
factories only calculate the net assets on their books, ignoring the cost of land, non 
productive buildings and facilities. The most popular method is the exclusion of "invisible" 
assets such as patents and intellectual property. According to economists in the State 
Council, under-capitalisation occurred in virtually all stock companies in the process of 
being converted.94
2) Different rates of dividends for different kinds of shares. Usually, the rate of the 
private shares is made higher than that of the corporate shares, which is higher in turn than 
the state's.95 One Hunan firm that I visited in 1992 had stipulated that the dividend rate for 
private shares was to be 3-5% higher than the firm's collective and state shares. And the 
holding agency (in this case, the Municipal Machine Bureau), deliberately turned a blind 
eye to this because, as I was told, the firm paid dividends and taxes at a level higher than its 
profit turnovers under the contract reform. So it became a show-case. Due to this leniency, 
the firm could keep a portion of dividends of state shares at its proposal.
93 What must be pointed out is that flawed implementation is actually a logical rejection of the govern­
ment policy that allows people to possess stocks but restricts their trading, a policy that distorts the 
rights and delimition represented by stocks.
94 Information from my interview with the official in 1992.
95 The report submitted to the State Council by the SCRES and the State Council Production Office of 
the State Council, Qiye gaige tungxun, no. 3, 1992, p. 4.
8 The Ownership Reform—242
3) The free hand-out of collective shares as gifts to members of the "fixed direction" 
companies. As mentioned earlier, one component of the collective shares is a factory's 
social welfare fund accumulated from its retained profits. But as the factory is allowed to 
distribute only a limited percentage of this fund each year, the remainder became an 
independent fund to be doled out in future. Once this fund is calculated as part of the 
factory's net assets for offerings under the category of collective shares, factories openly 
hand these out to workers as "social security shares" or "incentive shares". The state's 
previous control over the social welfare fund is thus circumvented. In practice, firms 
deliberately confuse the lines between the social welfare fund and funds under other 
categories: the corporate and collective property items.96 Thus the collective stock becomes 
a grey area in terms of property definition, the so-called "no head" ownership.
4) To privatise the corporate shares. The corporate shares are regarded as the public 
component of the stock system, as they originated either from the firm's own investment or 
from the investment from other state concerns. On the whole, however, these are another 
grey area in the stock system. Privatisation can take place on two fronts. The first concerns 
the shares subscribed through the firm's own investment, which are treated in a similar 
way to the collective shares. The same hand-out process mentioned previously occurs. 2) 
The second involves the corporate shares subscribed by state bodies in joint stock firms, 
only to be freely distributed to their staff later or sold as private shares on the stock 
exchanges. According to Yu Guogang, deputy president of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
when the Wanke Company first instituted corporate shares in 1989, these amounted to 
5.298 million share certificates, or 13% of the total shares subscribed. By mid-1992, 2.93 
million share certificates had been sold to private buyers. For this the company earned 50 
million yuan, of which 30% was allocated to build staff housing. Another 10% was used to
96 Jingji ribao, 17 April 1993.
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purchase shares of other companies for speculative purposes. The remaining 60% was 
considered social welfare premiums earmarked for free distribution to its staff later.97
5) The transfer to outsiders of the non-transferable private placement (neibugu) of 
shares to employees. In theory, the internal shares are created more as a measurement of 
property than as real shares of property. The state stipulated that though the stock bought 
by members of a work unit carry a value based on which staff receive dividends, they are 
still the property of the firm and indirectly the state. Workers could transfer their internal 
shares only to people within the unit.98 Yet there have been serious breaches of the rules. A 
survey of several provinces revealed that among 20 billion yuan of internal shares issued in 
1991-1992, only 10-20% were still held internally. The rest had secretly found their way to 
society at large.99
6) In order to achieve a demonstrable effect from the experimental firms, many local 
governments have temporarily suspend the extraction of dividends from the state shares but 
stick to the levy of taxes only. In other cases they reduce the rate of dividends from the 
state shares. The objective is reasonable enough: not to increase the burden of these firms 
by extracting both taxes and dividends to surpass the current level of their remittance to the 
state. However, this has caused unbalanced growth of different types of shares with the 
proportion of the state shares shrinking as a result.100
There is, in short, an increasingly serious drainage of state property into private 
hands channelled through the malpractices mentioned above. At the moment, due to the 
experimental nature of the stock reform, it may have not reached unbearable proportions.
97 Wang Jian, Zongguo gupiao shichang wenti zhenglun, pp. 76-77.
98. Renmin ribao, 10 April 1993.
99. Ibid.
100 .1 encountered a number of cases as such during my fieldwork in 1992. Also see the conversion plan of 
the Beijing Oriental Commercial Company Limited, in Zhou Shulian and He Cung (eds.), Qiye 
chengbao jingying zerenzhi gongzuo shouce, pp. 837-838.
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On the other hand, the available information has indicated that the logic inherent in the stock 
reform has dictated a trend of state property being diversified, although the empirical data 
on its extent are still scattered. The following are some features of the development.
First, in theory, state shares are not allowed to be traded on the stock exchange due to 
the fears of central planners concerning privatisation. However, the experience of both 
Shanghai and Shenzhen has proved that this is nearly impossible in the stock market. When 
the price of a share becomes too high, the company is forced to release more shares to ease 
further rises in price. Often the released shares are state shares. Although this practice has 
been somewhat successful in keeping a rough equilibrium, more and more state shares 
have landed in private pockets this way. Among the circulation of shares on the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, over 40% are state shares and they change hands every day. As a result, 
the proportion of state shares versus other kinds of shares in firms with public offerings 
has been on the decline.101
Second, most of the limited liability and non-listed joint stock companies are created 
through grafting joint investment programs onto them. A review of the 14 ways to convert 
state factories reveals that seven are related to the injection of capital from collective, private 
and foreign concerns. Although the state has stipulated a minimum proportion for the state 
shares, once the firms become operational, it is again difficult for the firms to adhere to the 
prescribed proportion. There are ample examples where state enterprises seek more and 
more investment in the form of shares from private and foreign concerns. In fact, this has 
been strongly encouraged by local governments as a major mechanism to revitalize the state 
sector. According to finance minister Liu Zhongli, 8,500 state firms have been injected 
with foreign capital. Over 5,000 of them did not conduct capital assessment at the time this 
was done, causing serious erosion of state assets.102
101. Wang Jian, p. 92.
102. Jingji ribao, 21 July 1993.
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The thirst for investment has pushed the local government to go beyond the general 
guidelines of the SCRES that foreign capital should be restricted in the key areas of the 
national economy. For instance, the fast expanding economies in Shanghai and Shandong 
are handicapped by the lack of electric power. The two governments have decided to 
transform their entire power industry into the stock system based on the joint ventures. 
Shandong reached a contract with a Hong Kong capitalist, Gordon Wu, that Wu would be 
allowed to control 50% of the shares.103 Guangdong has gone further in soliciting foreign 
shares. The majority of its large public works have been funded by large portions of private 
and foreign shares.104
Third, people's growing financial strength to buy into state ownership through stocks 
as one quick option to become rich heralds the long-term effects of the stock reform on the 
dilution of state ownership. Currently, the gross asset value of the state sector on the books 
is evaluated at about two trillion yuan, while private bank deposits have reached 1.3 trillion 
yuan.105 In the last several years, however, this two trillion yuan of state assets has been 
absorbed with private investment. For instance, a large number of the top 500 state 
enterprises have been seeking foreign capital. Many of them have set up joint venture 
subsidiaries. At the same time the number of private businesses has risen rapidly, and so 
have their assets.
That the non-state sector is in an aggressive position, with adequate funds to penet­
rate into state ownership, serves as an advantage to China's ownership reform as compared 
with the former Soviet bloc. Once the Chinese shares reform cuts across the state sector, 
deeper de-statisation may set in, as seen in the phenomenal stock sales in China in 1992. 
By the end of 1991, 22.5 billion yuan worth of shares had been issued and 137.3 billion 
yuan of state bonds and debentures put into private hands, a year which simultaneously
103. China Central Television, 2 July 1993.
104. Jingjin ribao, 27 July 1993.
105. Xie Ping, " An Analysis of the Structure of Chinese Financial Capital", Jingji yanjiu, no. 11, 1992,
p. 35.
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saw huge demand for the securities. This foreshadowed a change in China's structure of 
financial capital, which generated huge pressure both on expansion of the non-state sector 
and speedy divestiture of the state sector.106 This was soon proved by the fast circulation 
of shares in 1992. According to Liu Hongru, vice minister for the SCRES, stock 
transactions worth 69.28 billion yuan were made, 13.4 times the 1991 figure of 5.15 
billion yuan.101 By May 1993 the market value of the shares on the Shenzhen and 
Shanghai Stock Exchanges had reached 317.7 billion yuan.m  This happened despite tight 
state restrictions on issuing shares. The evolving stock system has created a force which 
increasingly weakens administrative control.
8.3.2. The De-statising Effects
Predictably, stock reform will have strong effects both on state/enterprise relations 
and state/society relations. The process will be long and can be subject to reversals, as it is 
conditional on a number of far-reaching economic, political and social reforms. For instan­
ce, the economic prerequisite for this is, among other things, maturity of the market, 
consisting not only of commodity markets but factor markets. The former entails fundam­
ental changes in China's planning, circulation and pricing systems. The latter dictates deep 
reforms in China's investment and financial mechanisms, and the labour and personnel 
system. None of these can be achieved overnight.
In the political realm, stock reform will quicken the decomposition of the state's rigid 
hierarchical dictatorship radiating from industrial bureau/enterprise relations.109 State stock 
firms are most likely to have no "bureaucratic bosses", (wushangji qiye). They will lose 
their bureaucratic ranks, a key feature of the industrial danwei system, at the same time that 
they lose the commanding agencies. Ostensibly missing in the Stock Company Rules is any
106. Xia Ping, p. 36.
107. Beijing Review, 17-23 May 1993, p. 13.
108. Jingji ribao, 25 June 1993.
109. Xie Qiuhan, Guoyu zichan jingying yuanli yu shijian (The theory and practice of managing state
property), Beijing: Jingji kexue chubanshe, 1992, pp. 67-69.
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provision requiring a stock firm to stick to central planning. The political function of state 
ownership will diminish gradually, as it becomes more and more abstract for the property 
users. It may then become possible for the slogan of "small government, big society" to 
bear some fruit.
As far as social change is concerned, shareholdings will alter social stratification 
through concentrating wealth in certain directions. The gap between the "new rich", to 
borrow the term from David Goodman, and ordinary people will become more visible. 
Moreover, the reform will cause a large number of state factories to be closed, as the state 
starts to assume only limited liability for loss-makers and unemployment is politically 
legitimized. The current efforts to do away with the "big rice bowl" system will be stepped 
up with unpredictable social consequences. 110
Equally important is the stimulating effect that the stock reform exerts on the 
development of the legal system vis-a-vis the regulation of share issues and company 
activities. Without a set of laws such as the Company Law, Anti-trust Law, laws on fair 
trading, and so on, the stock reform will prove to be more of a disaster than a bonus. At the 
moment thirteen laws concerning the shares system are being drafted, a major boost to the 
development of a full-fledged market. A leading official in the SCRES made it clear: the 
failure of the stock reform would be more likely caused by enthusiastic supporters of the 
reform who, nevertheless, do not understand the workings of the system than by those 
who oppose it due to their rigid ideological adherence.* 111
110. According to an estimate by the SCRES, Chinese society can absorb only 4% unemployment at any
time. Social unrest will erupt when this percentage is exceeded. See the SCRES, "Guanyu guoyou 
dazhongxing qiye zhuanhuan jingying jizhi de yanjiu baogao", p. 44. But the current official rate of 
unemployment of 2.5 to 3% (excluding non-city dwellers) has already flashed a signal of unrest. So 
the room for sustainable unemployment is actually very small.
111. Sun Xiaoliang, speech on the shares system to a national conference on 26 September, 1992, which I
attended.
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In terms of the trend away from the danwei system in the state sector, the reform will 
deal a fatal blow to the political functions of a state factory. As a stock firm is mainly 
delinked from the state agencies, it will take fewer political orders from the party/state. 
Stock firms in Shenzhen and elsewhere, like township industries, are interested mainly in 
the accrual of capital and freedom from many concerns that state enterprises have about 
their administrative rank, the required number of political study sessions, and fulfilment of 
state quotas. A different management mechanism prevails in shares companies than in the 
danw ei system. According to the Stock Company Rules, the highest authority is a 
shareholders' conference, which entrusts the daily management to the board of directors. In 
fact, Article 55 of the Rules gives detailed rights in business decision-making to the board 
of directors, which are similar to those under the company laws of western countries.112 In 
contrast, the party cells lose their dominant position, a development that may finally settle 
the two-centre contention. Indeed, the stock reform represents a real possibility to trans­
form a state factory from a functional trinity into a basically economic entity. State and soc­
iety relations will be further changed in the process. Although their economic and social- 
welfare dependence on a firm may continue, more and more workers will be able to break 
away from the everyday politicised control of the crumbling danweiized industrial order.
112. Wang Guiguo, "China's Economic Legal Reforms", in Joseph Cheng & Maurice Brosseau (eds.), 
China Review 1993, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1993, p. 7.18.
Chapter 9
The Reform of the Administrative System: the New Model1
This chapter deals with a gradual process of separating state enterprises from the 
command bureaucratic chains. To this end it describes the emergence of a new set of 
institutional arrangements that sketches an embryonic model of state/enterprise relations for 
China's socialist market economy — one that takes account of the new stock shares system.
According to Luo Gan, Secretary General of the State Council, the reform is aimed at 
establishing a new system of macro economic regulation, whereby the command organs 
will be relieved of their oversight of micro economic activities.2 This new system is to be 
constructed through a thorough reform of the administrative system, currently under way at 
all five levels of government from the centre to the province, prefecture, county and 
township, although the development is uneven at different levels and in different regions.3 
This administrative reform is now recognised as deciding the outcome of China's second 
revolution because, as was argued above, if the basic organization and functions of the 
government are not transformed, it is unlikely that state factories can become truly 
autonomous business entities. The bureaucrats will always interfere in the management of 
factories. The difference in this round of reform compared with the previous ones is that it
1 According to Kenneth Lieberthal, there are six clusters of bureaucracies in China. This chapter 
concentrates only on one of them: the economic bureaucracy. See Kenneth Lieberthal, Bureaucracy, 
Politics and Decision-making in Post-Mao China, pp. 2-3.
2 Renmin ribao, 22 July 1993.
3 It is interesting to note that for the first time the CCP used the phrase xingzheng tizhi, or 
administrative system to characterize the reform, a departure from the term xingzheng jigou, or 
administrative structure, used previously. The difference is that while the former describes the 
aggregate of political relations and functions embodied in the system, the latter touches upon only 
the operational functions and structure. See Xing Zheng, "Xia juexin zhuahao guanli tizhi he jigou 
gaige" (Resolutely pushing ahead with the reform of the administrative system and structure), 
Zhongguo jigou yu bianzhi (China's organization and establishment), no. 12, 1992, pp. 4-7.
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starts from a fundamental change in the ownership system, on which the vast economic 
bureaucratic machine rests.
9.1. The Emerging New Model for China's Market Economy
The essence of the new system is to change the current direct administrative control 
over factories to indirect control based on property management, described by Chinese 
economists as zhengzi fenkai, namely the separation of state administration and ownership 
operations.4 The last chapter pursued the nature of property relations between the state and 
the joint stock company. Here the analysis is focused on the administrative side of property 
control in the new model. In China over the past four decades, each industrial ministry, 
each level of local government and each industrial agency within that level have invested in 
factories and thus created a multi-level sectoral property control system, which divided the 
national economy along tiaotiao and kuaikuai lines. In this system, as earlier noted, the 
industrial bureaus are at once administrative superiors to their factories and the owners of 
their property. The relative failure of the contract system lies in the fact that even though the 
bureaus are supposed to refrain from involvement in the daily affairs of firms, they are still 
commanded by the central and local governments to exercise property control, such as 
evaluation of new investment projects proposed by factories and conduct of annual 
financial investigations. Often property control is confused with administrative control, 
which causes the bureaucrats to intervene in micro business decisions, which in turn 
provides factory management with excuses to evade responsibility for business failures.
At the same time, this multi-level sectoral system has been further confused by a 
"multi-headed property boss system", which comprises the bureaus of the general 
economic administrations, such as the planning, industrial and commerce administrations, 
the taxation department, audit offices, etc. The bureaus exercise general economic 
administration over factories on the basis of state ownership on behalf of the state. They
4 Jiang Yiwei, "Guanyu shenhua qiye gaige wenti de tantao" (Contemplation on the deepening of 
enterprise reform), Gaige, no. 5, 1990, p. 51.
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can cause real headaches to factories, as any one of them can shut down a factory's 
production lines due to some easily found fault. In addition, the central and local industrial 
controls over factories can overlap. The vertical agencies are entrusted with sectoral policy 
supervision and so they tend to interfere with the production of local factories. At the same 
time, because the ministerial factories have to recruit workers locally, and contribute to 
community development, they have also been directed one way or another by local 
governments. Consequently, state factories, as a whole, have had to respond positively to 
at least two masters in order to stay out of trouble.5
The whole administrative reform is based on a reform to create an entire new multi­
level property system to transform both the multi-sectoral system and the multi-headed 
system.6 The key features of the model are as follows: 1) the new property control system 
is to be erected through recentralization under each level of government of the powers over 
state property operation vested in industrial ministries and local bureaus. Its mission will be 
to take care of the interests of the state as the ultimate owner of all state factory property in 
terms of capital accrual; 2) The system will also be multi-leveled to reflect the reality of 
multi-level investment mechanisms rooted in China's command economy; 3) The new 
multi-level ownership authority will not be directed along sectoral lines, although it may 
entrust management rights to holding companies under it which may be erected along 
former sectoral lines; 4) Although state ownership in China will still operate in a multi-level 
manner with the central property, provincial property and local property specified, the new 
system is a unitary one with each lower level being answerable to the higher one and the
5 For a detailed analysis of the multi-level ownership structure, see David Granick, Chinese State 
Enterprises: A Regional Property Rights Analysis, pp. 20-70.
6 The system is proposed to be based on the Administrative Bureau of State Property (ABSP) currently 
under the Ministry of Finance at the centre and the Bureau of Finance in the local governments. A 
debate is going on about whether the ABSP should be placed under the control of legislative bodies 
so as to draw a clearer line between government and business. For instance, see Tong Zongkun, 
"Guo you chanqun zhidu jianshe de dangwu zhiji" (The urgent task in the reconstruction of the state 
property system), Gaige, no. 2, 1993, p. 61.
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highest one answerable to either the National People's Congress or the State Council; 5) 
Other parties in the "boss system" will continue the state's social and economic 
administrative functions. Yet they will be delinked from the controls over the property 
operation of a firm. In other words their mission is to ensure the firm abides by the rules of 
market competition and state regulation.7
In order to achieve the goal of zhengzi fenkai, the state system of property control 
will be dissolved into two tiers: state administration and business operation.8 The national 
and local Administration Bureau of State Property (ABSP) will assume the first task, which 
is centred on formulating the rules of the game at the higher tier. The business operations, 
on the other hand, are to be based on the market, normally through three mechanisms in 
accordance with international practice: 1) specialized independent investment banks at 
various levels; 2) financial investment companies created locally or through industrial 
sectors, which are to maintain a significant proportion of the shares of state firms; 3) the 
core company in a conglomerate, which is to serve as a stockholding company and is 
entrusted with the management of the full property rights of the conglomerate.9 The 
importance of these various new investment bodies is that they are to exist in-between the 
ABSP at various levels and producers, thus buffering the likely administrative pressures of 
the former toward the latter. The links between the the ABSP, investment bodies and the 
producers are basically to be expressed in monetary terms.10 That is, the ABSP will see
7 Liu Guoguang, Zhongguo jingji tizhi gaige tnoshi yanjiu, p. 32.
8 Ibid, p. 128.
9 A recent report by the SCRES elaborated this in detail; see China National Centre for the Study of 
Enterprise Reform and Development, "Guanyu gaige guoyou zichan guanli de shige wenti" (Ten 
questions concerning the management of state property), Qiye gaige tungxun, no. 6, 1992, pp. 10- 
12.
10 This is stated in the "Regulations on the Management of State Assets". Xie Cichang, head of the 
Policy Bureau of the National ABSP, revealed in a press conference in July 1993 that after five drafts 
the Regulations would be submitted to the State Council in late 1993. China Central Television, 21 
July 1993.
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that it receives sufficient dividends from the fixed assets entrusted to the investment bodies, 
which in turn will make sure that the factories under them submit adequate dividends from 
profits.
At the national level, it is proposed that the national Administration Bureau of State 
Property will become an independent agency entrusted by the National People's Congress 
or the State Council with the administration of the property belonging to the central 
government. Under it will be the six national investment companies currently under the 
State Planning Commission. The Construction Bank should be transformed into a 
specialized national investmentment bank. Except for a number of large conglomerates 
which have already been granted full property rights by the State Council, they will manage 
the property of large and medium-sized enterprises attached to the central ministries. The 
investment companies will become holding companies and extensively offer shares to other 
organizations, e.g. banks, foundations and insurance companies, etc. In terms of the 
relationship between them and the lower level corporations, the former will represent 
themselves as the major shareholders but possess no administrative powers.11
At the provincial and municipal levels, this model of new asset management and 
administrative systems is being experimented with by a number of cities of various sizes. 
Hainan and Shanghai are the first province and municipality to transform their entire 
administrative system into this model. The mayor of Shanghai, Huang Ju, announced in 
July 1993 that a three-level state assets management system had been established and that 
this system would become fully operational before the end of the year. At the very top there 
is a municipal management commission for state property with Politburo member Wu 
Bangguo as the head. The commission is the legal representative of all state assets in the 
city (the ultimate owner). At the second level there are a number of management companies 
of state assets which are entrusted with full property rights by the commission. These
11 Gao Zimin, "Lun zhuanbian zhengfu zhineng" (On how to change the government's functions), Qiye
gaige tongxun, no. 11, Feburary, 1993, p. 10.
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companies will further delegate to the third level companies the authority of operation of 
state assets. Companies at this level are to be composed of three types: subsidiary holding 
companies, solely state-owned and run subsidiaries, and subsidiary joint companies.12 In 
this new system the municipal commission is the administrative authority which makes 
strategic policies regarding the management of state property. The management companies 
are economic entities composed of key investment bodies. The third-level companies 
actually are to operate the assets.13 Although the second level will mainly be created from 
the specialized economic bureaus, they are no longer within the government structure, and 
therefore, they are no longer to hold political and administrative functions on behalf of the 
party/state. The third level companies are converted mainly from the second-grade 
administrative corporations (xingzheng gongsi) under a particular industrial bureau. They 
usually have a number of factories under them. In the new system they will become 
holding companies or conglomerates. In this process of transformation the vast 
bureaucratic hierarchy will be gradually digested into a corporatised hierarchy with the 
linkage between each level rendered into one that is business oriented, signalling the 
beginning of the end to the four-decade dictatorship of tiaotiao and kuaikuai, (for a 
preliminary description of the model at the central and provincial levels, see the two graphs 
below) 14
Organizationally, there is to be a transitional period. Some of the central industrial 
ministries and local bureaus will be converted step by step from state agencies (zhengfu 
jigou) into sectoral associations (hangye xiehui). Others will become economic entities 
responsible for their own property losses. They will eventually be unhooked from the 
government structure and state budget. In the process, according to vice minister Hong Hu
12 Renmin ribao, 18 July 1993.
13 Ibid.
14 This model was explained to me by a researcher in the SCRES in late 1992 but since then a lot of 
elaborations have been worked out in the evolution of administrative reform. For a detailed analysis, 
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of the SCRES, the bureaucratic ties between state factories and these agencies will be 
removed. Generally speaking, the relationship between a sectoral association and a factory 
will not be that between an administrative boss and a subordinate.15
However, at the beginning of the transition, these associations and corporations will 
remain the channels through which the state monitors factories. Each central industrial 
ministry and local bureau currently control a number of companies and factories. Until the 
new asset management system becomes operational, these bodies will in theory continue to 
be the agencies responsible for the ownership of means of production of these factories. 
They will also keep some of their former administrative missions, including, for instance, 
allocation of the export quotas to different regions (more on this later). Even in the future it 
is proposed that the core membership of these associations will be composed of key state 
firms in each sector. In the meetings of these inner circles, the heads of the associations 
(state appointed) will assign various tasks to the firms in order to "influence" the entire 
sector, but this is to be more along the lines of MIT's influence over firms in Japan.16
9.2. The Reform of the Central Bureaucracies
The Chinese government has launched several rounds of administrative reform since 
1949. Each of the rounds axed a number of ministries and laid off functionaries but soon 
afterward new ministries sprang up and more staff were recruited. For instance, in the 
previous administrative reform in 1988, the number of offices at the ministerial level was 
reduced from over 90 to 44. Four years later it had exploded again to 90. In the meanwhile, 
over 42,000 staff employed by more than 900 agencies at the bureau level were on the pay-
15 Renmin ribao, 25 July 1993.
16 This was explained to me by a researcher in the Research and Policy Office of the State Council in 
late 1992. Zhu Rongji made a speech along the similar line of thinking to the Shanghai delegation 
to the 14th Party Congress in October 1992. Later he published a more theoretical discussion on the 
changing state/enterprise relations in Zhongguo faxue, no. 4, 1993, pp. 3-5.
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roll of the State Council. And the numbers of institutions and staff directly attached to the 
centre reached 3,000 and two million respectively.17
The on-going administrative reform was launched in July 1991 when the State 
Council froze the number of staff at the centre. The 8th National People's Congress in 
March 1993 further boosted the reform when it approved the State Council's decision to 
push through reform of the central government in three years. It was announced that the 
focus of this reform was to remove the government functions incompatible with the micro- 
economic activities based on the market.18 Generally speaking, reform at the macro-level is 
characterised mainly by streamlining industrial ministries.19
China's central economic administrative system is composed of two parts. The first is 
the general policy making and coordinating agencies, including the State Planning 
Commission, the Finance Ministry, the Central Bank and so on. The second part is 
comprised of the specialized industrial ministries, numbering 18, and a similar number of 
central administrative companies (xingzheng zong gongsi) directly attached to the State 
Council. The two parts combined employ about 70% of the central bodies and staff.20 The 
strategic importance of cutting back the central industrial ministries lies in the fact that they 
still control a large number of products in both mandatory and directory plans. One figure 
was often quoted by both Chinese and western analysts to indicate the reduced coverage of 
the state plan. That is, the number of various kinds of producer goods in the central 
mandatory plan (controlled by the SPC) had been reduced from 256 in 1979 to 19 in 1992. 
But few point out that the number of products in the mandatory plan controlled by the
17 Ni Di, "Zhongyang zhengfu jigou gaige qianzhan" (A preview on the central government reform), 
Zhongguo jigou yu bianzhi, (China Organization and Establishment), no. 7, 1992, p. 14.
18 Ying Guanghua, "Zheci jigou gaige de jiben tedian" (The basic features of this administrative 
reform), Zhongguo jigou yu bianzhi, no. 5, 1993, p. 18.
19 Jingji ribao, 2 April 1993.
20 Zhang Chenglian, Xin tizhi, dasilu (The new system and general line of thinking), Beijing: Gaige 
chubanshe, 1991, p. 89.
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central industrial ministries was still as large as 400 in 1991, compared to 2,000 in 1979.21 
The 400 products concern strategic materials, the control of which gives the central 
planners enormous power in the national economy, particularly over large state enterprise. 
The reform of bureaucracies at the central level is aimed at once at streamlining the central 
industrial ministries and at further reducing the coverage of ministerial mandatory plans. It 
is this aspect that distinguishes the current reform of the administration system in China 
from previous efforts.
The streamlining of the central industrial ministries has been directed along two 
fronts. The first was immediate removal of seven ministries from the the State Council, 
three of which were changed into business associations and corporations and the rest 
merged into new ministries. The second concerns the industrial ministries which are to 
remain for some time, in order to ensure a smooth transition towards the market economy. 
They are to be stripped of their specialized bureaus exercising direct control over 
enterprises. By the end of the three years prescribed for the reform, many of these, too, 
should be transformed into sectoral associations. 22
At the first stage three ministries were affected, the Light Industry Ministry and The 
Textile Industry Ministry were converted into business associations and placed under the 
State Council as non-administrative bodies (Shiye jigou). The Aeronautics and Aerospace 
Industry Ministry was turned into two separate corporations, which fall into the category of 
about 10-20% of conglomerates directly run by the state, mentioned in the previous 
chapter. There are several reasons why these ministries were removed first. The Light 
Industry and the Textile Industry Ministries were axed because the enterprises under them 
are already overwhelmingly directed by the market. For instance, by 1993 about 90% of
21 Li Bailin, Zhuanxin Zhong de zhongguo qiye (The Chinese state enterprises in transition), Shandong 
renmin chubanshe, 1992, pp. 112-113.
22 Tang Jin, "Weirao zhuanbian zhineng zhongxin huangjie sannian wancheng jigou gaige renwu" 
(Focusing on the change of functions and completing the reform of the administrative system in 
three years), Zhongguo jigou yu bianzhi, no. 4, 1993, p. 7.
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the business transactions of the factories under the Textile Industry Ministry are taking 
place in the market. The ministry was left with few meaningful responsibilities in 
administering the sector, just distributing export quotas (mainly to the US and EEC) for 
different regions and some of its immediate affiliates, a few products such as silk and wool 
that still needed allocation through mandatory plans due to chronic short supply, and 
appropriation of investment funds made available to the ministry by the State Planning 
Commission. As the market takes control over most of the tasks formerly pursued by the 
ministry, its existence became unnecessary. If allowed to continue, as a well known 
economist, Professor Li Yining commented, the staff members would have to create some 
new tasks to do at the grassroots level. The manufacturers would pay a price for this.23
For those ministries still in operation, substantial restructuring has taken place to meet 
the dictates of the market economy, that is, to be reoriented from administering micro- 
economic activities to sectoral management. Organizationally speaking, an industrial 
ministry has two major components in terms of economic activities. Among its two dozen 
bureaus, about half are the so-called general policy bureaus. They assume the functions of 
planning both short and long term, statistics, audits, foreign affairs, co-ordination and so 
on. The other half are created along the divide of control over specific products, normally 
placed under central mandatory planning. For instance, in the Ministry of Machine 
Industry, there are bureaus of automobiles. Within the bureau, there are departments of 
light vehicle, heavy vehicle, agricultural vehicle, and so on. These specialized bureaus and 
divisions have enormous power over the factories that produce these products. Each of 
these bureaus (sometimes each of the divisions under the bureaus) has a number of 
factories under its control (the so-call dingdian chang, or the "fixed spot" factories) that 
they monitor vis-a-vis fulfilment of the plan, supplying raw materials, and even 
recommending their mangers to the relevant department in the ministry or in the local 
government. Usually when the factories encountered any difficulties they could not resolve
23 A public seminar at Beijing University in November 1992.
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by themselves, they would seek ministerial help. The people in the bureaus are those they 
must first come to for help. Only through them will they acquire access to higher 
authorities. In other words, the bureaus are the central joints in the command economy 
linking the state plan and manufacturers. And between these bureaus and the "fixed spot" 
factories, paternalistic ties are most clearly reflected, causing other factories in the sector to 
complain that they are only "step sons".24
The abolition of these specialized bureaus is a precondition for the relationship of the 
state and its factories to be transformed from one based on administrative decrees to one 
based on sectoral macro-management. With the removal of mandatory plans, the functions 
of the 'general policy bureaus' can be fairly easily transformed to those of sectoral 
guidance, based on the government's industrial policies. As a further step, the ministries 
that remain can then be converted into business associations like the Ministries of Light 
Industry and Textile Industry. The following two cases reveal the extent to which the 
reform of the administrative system affects the economic bureaucracy.
The Ministry of Chemical Industry is one of the ministries retained for the time being 
in the State Council structure. According to its minister, Central Committee member Wu 
Wenying, the direction of change has been "fixed", that is, away from the current mode of 
control over state enterprise in terms of administrative allocation, and to the sectoral 
guidance of all factories in the industry, regardless of the nature of these factories, state- 
owned or otherwise. This change in function was reflected in the reduction of numbers of 
products in the ministry's mandatory plan (from 27 to 3), thus paving the way for the 
ministry to gradually streamline most of its specialized bureaus. But she went on to say that 
a few bureaus still remained because they were still required to monitor production of items 
remaining in the plans. At the same time the ministry could not get rid of all its micro-
24 Ironically it is these “fixed spot” factories that have registered most debts. Partly this is because the 
price of their products is also under tighter scrutiny. More importantly, because of these paternalistic 
ties, they have not developed good market mechanisms, and cannot compete well in the changed 
situation.
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economic controls at this stage because it needed to take care of production of about 250 
items in 15 categories currently prescribed by directory plans, although that number had 
dropped from over 500 a year before.25
The removal of specialized bureaus is also the principle under which the four 
ministries were restructured into new ones. The purpose is, too, to remove the functions of 
these central bodies to manage micro-economic activities. The merger of the Ministry of 
Commerce and the Ministry of Raw Materials into the Ministry of Domestic Trade serves as 
a good case for analysis.
The Ministry of Commerce was an important body of central control. Under the 
command economy, manufactured goods were not at the disposal of the producers but had 
to be assigned through the state's network of allocation. At the top of the system lay 
specialized bureaus such as the Bureau of Hardware and Electric Goods, the Bureau of 
Mechanical Products, and the Bureau of Daily Industrial Goods, and others in the Ministry 
of Commerce. Each of the bureaus had specialized divisions such as the Home Electric 
Goods Division, the Chemical Hardware Division and so on. Under these bureaus and 
divisions, there were allocation stations of four grades. Grade one encompassed ministerial 
centres in the name of national companies responsible for allocating goods across 
provincial boarders. The next level comprised the provincial stations under the control of 
the provincial bureaus responsible for allocating goods within the province. This network 
went down to the municipal and county levels. A complicated aspect of this network was 
the specialized nature of each allocation station, that is, a hardware and electric goods 
station was not able to supply chemical goods. And each station had a list of clients 
pertaining to its rank in the hierarchy. This is to say, a ministerial factory had to order its
25 Wu Wenying, "Zhuanbian zhineng, jiaqian huaxue gongye hangye guanli" (Changing functions in 
the chemical industry to enhance sectoral management), Zhongguo jigou yu bianzhi, no. 5, 1993, 
pp. 4-6.
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materials through the grade one stations. It needed a document from the relevant bureau in 
the ministry to go to these stations. Under such networks funny things happened.
For instance, a ministerial steel factory in Shandong needed a boiler. It had to apply 
to the Ministry of Metallurgy, which then made an order to the State Planning Commission. 
If it acquired an approval, it then went to a relevant ministry for its supply. The ministry's 
grade-one station that specialized in such goods would arrange for the factory to obtain a 
boiler, probably made in Shanghai. Then the factory would wait for months for the boiler 
to be transported. However, the factory's next-door neighbour may be a boiler producer 
making the exact boiler the factory needed. But it could not supply it because it was listed 
with the grade-two station under a provincial bureau of supply. It was because of this 
command structure that Chinese economists called the economy the administrative or 
allocative economy.
The post-Mao reform has partially changed the situation. The emergence of the 
market provided producers alternative sources of supply and sales. Now the steel factory 
may go directly to its neighbour to buy a boiler. However, the supply system is still extant 
under the control of the specialized bureaus of the ministries, which administered the state's 
mandatory planning. For instance, if the plan imposes a quota of certain products to one 
factory, the products would normally have to be allocated to other factories. This allocation 
is carried out through the network mentioned above. The current reform to remove the 
specialized bureaus is in essence to remove the allocative chain in the remaining part of the 
administrative economy, thus making room for more market transactions.
As far as concrete steps are concerned, the Ministry of Commerce abolished the 
Bureaus of Daily Industrial Goods Administration, Non-staple Food Administration, 
Native Produce Administration, and others before 11 October 1992, as prescribed by the 
State Council. In the meanwhile, the ministry divided the missions of these bureaus into 
different blocks to be taken by various functional bodies. Their management functions 
(mainly the control over allocation of supplies to factories) have been delegated to the
9 Reform of the Administrative System—262
companies immediately attached to the ministry. These companies are currently a 
combination of administrative and economic bodies. In the future they will be converted 
into mainly business corporations. The sectoral functions of these abolished bureaus 
(mainly the formulation of general macro-policies and sectoral development plans) have 
been transferred to various general policy bureaus in the new ministry. Some of their 
administrative functions (e.g. the powers to approve the scope of business of ministerial 
factories and provincial bureaus) have been eliminated. Although there is a period of 
transition in which the economic functions are to be run through administrative means, 
such as approving investment projects proposed by enterprises and maintaining a list of 
industrial goods in the centre's mandatory plans, the detailed control over micro-economic 
activities will be increasingly phased out.26
9.3. The Reform of Provincial and Local Bureaucracies
The central ministries served as the hubs of the command economy in that they are 
the "dragon head" of the tiaotiao systems, in which industrial bureaus were established at 
all levels below the centre. And it was through these bureaucratic chains that state factories 
became administrative appendages. Therefore reform of the central ministries paved the 
way for reform of the provincial and local industrial bureaus.
The significance of the reform to streamline the specialized industrial agencies can 
been seen more clearly at these provincial and local levels — and also its complications. The 
central industrial ministries run only a tiny proportion of state enterprises, although they are 
the most important ones.27 Moreover, the ministerial enterprises are among the largest 
within a group where many of them have already been converted into companies with fairly 
independent operations. In contrast, the majority of state concerns are under the firm
26 Shi Xin, "Bushe zhuanye sijiu de shexiang shi zenyang shixiande" (How was the design of removing 
the specialized bureaus realized), Zhongguo jigou yu bianzhi, no. 5, 1993, pp. 42-43.
27 According to the SCRES, in 1985, there were only 4,833 state enterprises under central control out 
of 463,210 nation-wide. Today the number is even smaller. See, The SCRES, (ed.), Qiye jizhi gaige 
chutan, p. 157.
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control of the local bureaus. The statistics published in 1988 revealed that among 93,658 
state factories, the number run directly by the provincial bureaus was 39,689 and those run 
by the county bureaus, 49,136. Almost of all the 367,842 collective factories are run by 
local bureaus.28 These employed the bulk of the Chinese industrial population.
Another important aspect of the reform lies in the number of these bureaus to be 
removed. A central industrial ministry may have several bureaus at the provincial level. For 
instance, The Light Industry Ministry had at least two bureaus in each province (although 
mainly run by the provincial government): the First Light Industry Bureau, which ran state 
factories; and the Second Light Industry Bureau, which ran collective factories. The 
Machine Building Ministry may have many more bureaus in its local bureaucratic chain. It 
had, for instance, a heavy machinery bureau, an automobile industrial bureau, a mining 
machinery bureau, a military industry bureau and so on. What is worse, as earlier stated, is 
that at the provincial and municipal level, these bureaus have also set up a number of 
companies of the first and second grade, which add to the list of bureaucratic superiors of 
factories. It is this "Parkinsonian fission" of industrial bureaus that has not only pumped up 
the size of the government structure but also put numerous shackles on producers. Very 
often a factory manager finds himself ordered to do something by the head of his superior 
company one day. And next day this instruction is countervailed by a bureau head who 
happens to visit the factory.
The reform of the administrative system at the provincial and municipal level is 
carried out along similar lines to the centre. It has started by phasing out the administrative 
functions of state economic agencies and moved to separating the specialized sectoral 
bureaus from the government structure. In this process of reform, the name of the game is 
Gradualism, which reflects the harsh reform environment. In fact, the practicability of the 
reform hinges on several preconditions:
(a), satisfactory outlets for the economic cadres whose positions are to be abolished;
28 Ibid.
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(b), concerted steps between the centre and localities. If a central ministry is first 
streamlined, it is fairly easier for its local departments to be removed. Otherwise the locality 
is under pressure to maintain its local feet, for the ministry may not provide access to cheap 
materials, projects and free overseas trips. For the centre, the concerted steps also serve as 
a brake on the economy because when the need to cool down the chronic overheating 
arises, the local bureaus are the mechanisms to do it.
And (c), experimental spots. This is seen as necessary to avoid upheavals in policy 
implementation. All these require the art of control to effect massive social engineering 
where the factors of timing, content, compensation and compromise are crucial to 
success.29
The implementation of the reform at the provincial and municipal levels is 
characterised, furthermore, by its uneven development. Generally speaking, the coastal 
provinces have gone much further than the inland regions. This is logical, as the market has 
played a more important role in these areas. The Guangdong provincial government, for 
instance, has separated six economic bureaus from the government. It planned to complete 
this reform with many other bureaus in 1993-94.30 The streamlining has been based on 
three patterns. The first is to transform some ot these agencies into general corporations of 
enterprise groups. This involves the commerce bureau, grain and non-staple food bureaus, 
the provincial co-op, the raw materials bureau and a number of others. The form of these 
corporations is superseded to prepare the ground for the establishment of holding 
companies in the future. The second is to convert some of the industrial bureaus into large 
conglomerates, composed mainly of large state enterprises. The automobile and 
petrochemical bureaus are cases in point. The third method is to create sectoral business 
associations out of the bureaus that run large numbers of medium-sized and small factories
29 Zhang Zhijian, "Qunli xiafang: shenhua gaige de zhongyao neirong" (Devolution: the key contents 
in the deepening of reforms), Zhongguo jigou yu hianzhi, no. 11, 1992, pp. 12-13.
30 Xiaomei, "Kangzhun fangxiang, xiangang qilai zaishuo" (See the direction, let's do it first), 
Zhongguo jigou yu bianzhi, no. 3, 1993, p. 10.
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that are more easily directed by the 'invisible hand'. Whichever the pattern, the new 
establishments will gradually phase out their administrative functions in their relations with 
producers.
Shanghai is said to have gone faster than Guangdong, due partly to its status as the 
national experimental spot and partly by the determination of its municipal leaders.31 The 
establishment of the new three-level property management structure, discussed earlier in the 
chapter, has created favourable conditions for a fairly quick overhaul of the economic 
bureaucratic chain, because once these state factories are registered in the Municipal 
Commission of State Property, and managed by the state investment bodies and holding 
companies, they will become detached from their bureaucratic superiors. This will undercut 
the very existence of the specialized economic bureaus. According to former Renmin ribao 
editor Hu Jiwei, the municipal government took a decision in 1992 that most of the 
specialized economic bureaus would be abolished in three years.32 By October 1992 14 
specialized bureaus had been removed from the government and changed to business 
associations.33
Beijing's case is interesting in that the city has created sectoral business associations 
yet still maintained the sectoral bureaus. This is the phenomenon of so-called "one 
organization with two name plates". One leading member in the Research Office of the 
municipal government explained that this co-existence was only transitional. Ultimately, 
bureaus would be supplanted by associations and different forms of economic entities. For 
the time being, these bureaus still have some role to play in coordinating macro and micro 
economic activities. In addition, there was a serious problem of relocating the personnel in 
the bureaus. The number of cadres at the bureaus stood at 50,000. This number is
31 Information gathered from interviews with cadres in the municipal government in 1992.
32 "China Report", The Voice of Atnerica, 8 August 1993.
33 Jingji ribao, 12 October 1992.
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augmented by the staff in the two grades of administrative companies under the bureaus 
which would have to go once the streamlining is finished.34
At the county and township levels the reform of the administrative system has been 
pushed with greater force. In fact, the reform at the county level pre-dated that at the centre 
by three years. The major reason was that most factories at this level were extra-budget 
ones. This means that the production and sales of the factories were subject to deregulation 
of the market at an earlier date and with greater thoroughness. Accordingly, the existence of 
the specialized bureaus has caused more conflict vis-a-vis the dual-track allocation system, 
as their administrative control was pursued but with less compensation in allocated goods. 
This has been reflected, moreover, in the incessant trade wars between regions. The local 
protectionism adopted by these bureaucratic authorities effectively divided the national 
market that the reformers at the centre intended to create.
On the other hand, many state factories at these two levels may be under tighter 
control by the county and township governments because ownership is more direct and the 
distance from the administrative powers shorter. This feature has become more of a burden 
to the factories, as they are subject to endless "donations" demanded by the local cadres.35
The main thrust of the reform at the county and township levels is that all state 
economic and technological agencies will be gradually streamlined within the government 
structure.36 About 350 counties have experimented with these reforms since 1990.37 The 
current central policy is to allow each county to decide whether to introduce the reform 
according on its own conditions, although its provincial government has to approve its
34 Information gathered from the interviews with cadres in die city government in late 1992
35 Ironically, however, these 'donations' have actually bought more business autonomy for these 
factories, as they were not subject to detailed plans. Information obtained from interviews with a 
number of factory managers in this category in 1992. They claimed that the control from the local 
government could be "handled very skillfully".
36 Jingji ribao, February 11, 1992.
37 Rentnin ribao, May 26, 1992.
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reform program. Put another way, the counties are not forced to universalize the reform 
when they are not willing to do so but they are supposed to do whatever they can. In fact, 
counties outside the experimental spots are encouraged to carried out reform on their own 
initiative.38
The official account states that most of China's 1,89^ counties welcome the reform. 
Over half of them were chifan caizheng, or their revenue was smaller than their budget and 
heavily dependent on state subsidies. The chief reason for this has been a proliferation of 
government agencies and overstaffing. According to the vice governor of Shanxi Province, 
50% of its counties are even unable to deliver salaries to their staff on time. As far as the 
county leaders are concerned, the reform presents the best way out of this predicament.39 
In fact the reform of the administrative system at the county level is much broader than 
simply separating the specialized economic bureaus from the government. It also deeply 
affects party and government institutions (shiye danwei). Under the principle of 'small 
government and big service', it is required that the party organs be trimmed to a minimum 
staff. Government institutions will also be removed from the state structure gradually (over 
three to five years) and become responsible for their own revenue.40 Because this 
dissertation focuses on state/enterprise relations, it will concentrate on the reform of 
government economic agencies.
Addressing a national conference on the county reform in September 1992, Li Peng 
outlined the position of the State Council on the issue of their relations with the factories 
under their jurisdiction by saying that they would not assume any of the state's 
administrative functions. To this end, the enterprises' relations with the county government
38 Tang Ji, "Gaige tupokou de liangdong xiaoying" (The domino effects at the breaking away points in 
the reform), Zhongguo jigou yu bianzhi, no. 11, 1992, pp. 4-7.
39 Wang Shuanxi, "Santiao huiliu, gengjia tongchang” (Three-way outlets and a smooth transition), 
Zhongguo jigou yu bianzhi, no. 12, 1992, pp. 12-13.
40 These institutions include bureaus of culture, science and technology, public health and education and
so on.
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should be that of taxation, as they must be responsible for their own profits and losses.41 
Two months later when touring Shishi City, Fujian Province, Li Peng expressed his 
endorsement to the county's handling of government/enterprise relations as "you invest, we 
welcome it; you make profits, we levy taxes; you violate the regulations, we apply 
penalties; and you go bankrupt, we are sympathetic but no more than that."42 Certainly, 
there is a long way to go before such a goal can be achieved. The general direction of the 
county reform, however, signals that state/enterprise relationship at this level is poised for a 
fundamental change.
A Case Study: The Reform in a Poor County
It is difficult to generalize the effects on state/enterprise relations induced by the 
county reform (xianji gaige). There are different models under which the reform is carried 
out in different places. Generally speaking, two common patterns have emerged. In 
Shandong and some other coastal provinces, the reform is more thorough-going, as 
embodied in the model of "dismantling the temple first and then letting the monks go". This 
is to describe a situation where the economic bureaus are removed from the government 
overnight and a large portion of the staff are re-allocated elsewhere. Researchers in the 
SCRES gave the following reasons why this model was possible in these places. First, the 
market is more mature, as indicated by the fast growth of the tertiary sector, the village and 
township industries and foreign investment. So employment outlets are more available for 
the government staff made redundant in the trimming of state agencies. Secondly, the 
economic conditions in these provinces are favourable for compensating cadres dismissed 
from office. In late 1992 I saw at the entrance of the county government headquarters of 
Panyu, Guangdong, a public notice stating that anybody employed by the government 
office and institutions directly affiliated to it could be awarded with a 50,000 yuan 
settlement if he/she tenders a resignation. In addition, he/she would receive a lump sum
41 Renmin ribao, 11 February 1993.
42 Zuzhi renshi bao, quoted from Shenzhuo xueren (The Chinese Scholars), no. 1, 1993, p. 32.
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salary according to years of service (the minimum was one and half years). Thirdly, in 
these places the cadres' sense of career success has largely changed from a focus on official 
rank to a market valuation of themselves. This allays the resistance to "dismantling the 
temple". As the result of the thoroughness of the retrenchment reform there, state factories 
have gained unprecedented autonomy to conduct business in the market.
But in poor inland counties, like Yuanping, Shanxi Province, the model is to set up a 
separate temple before the conditions for dismantling the previous one are ripe. So a period 
of transition (normally up to three years) is allowed for county economic bureaus to be 
delinked from the government budget, although organizationally they are stripped of their 
missions in the administration of factories.
Yuanping County has a population of 445,000. In 1991 its GDP stood at 600 million 
yuan with revenue of about 52 million yuan, less than the income generated by most 
townships in Panyu. In the process of reform, the government has reduced the number of 
its bureaus and offices at the county level from 46 to 21, and its staff from 912 to 478, 
exceeding the state prescription of a 25% reduction rate (cadres at the division level 
dropped from 232 to 132, i.e. 43.2%).
The axed bureaus included the manufacturing industry, first and second light 
industries, grain, commerce, materials, economic co-ordination, agricultural and animal 
husbandry, agricultural machinery, village and township industry, water conservancy. 
These became mainly corporations, as the first-grade legal person (yijifaren) and their 
factories became the second-grade legal person, (erjifaren) for the transitional period.43 
Their relations with both the government and factories were based on profit contract. As
43 The existence of these first grade legal entities is transitory, according to the county's reform 
program. It is mainly for the staff employed by the bureaus. Their fate depends on whether they can 
fit into the market economy. Some o f them have done well, as they assist their factories in 
marketing and purchasing. Others have actually become barriers for their factories, as they interfere 
too much. The current policy is to gradually turn various blocks of corporations into independent 
economic concerns.
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institutional entities, some of them became service centres offering to clients paid 
technological assistance and professional consultation, such as crop protection and 
agricultural equipment maintenance. Their formal economic administrative functions were 
to be taken care of by one or two general offices under the government. To this end, an 
economic and trade commission was set up. However, it would have no direct bureaucratic 
ties with factories. And the social welfare functions formerly assumed by these bureaus are 
now run separately by government offices responsible for the whole local community 
rather than by the state industrial sectors themselves. These office include the labour 
bureau, the public health bureau, state-run insurance agencies and so on.
So far most of Pingyuan County's industrial bureaus have been converted into 
general corporations and thereby decoupled from the state administrative budget. The 
Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Bureau and Agricultural Machinery Bureau were 
turned into service centres. In accordance with the redefinition of functions, the county 
government gave up ten core economic missions which were taken over by factories. The 
two most important ones are: the decision making power of investment through self-raised 
funds and the authority to lease, transfer and mortgage their fixed assets. In addition, 
factories were told to exercise "three-open" powers: "open employment" (hiring and 
firing), "open operation" (business autonomy) and "open distribution" (self-made rules for 
income distribution).44 Certainly the conflicts between factories and corporations have 
continued to bring to the surface unclarified relations of property rights. However, to a 
degree, both corporations and factories share common interests against state intervention.
9.4. The Tug-of-War over the Control of Factories
Soon after the industrial reforms were launched in 1984, the local economic cadres 
have intercepted the powers of decision-making which the centre had meant to delegate to
44 The case study is based on the detailed report of the county submitted to the Shanxi Government and
the SCRES, which I read while doing fieldwork in China in late 1992. Parts of the report were
published in Zhongguo jigou yu bianzhi, no. 11, 1992, pp. 10-11.
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factories, often making the tiaotiao and kuaikuai dictatorship more detailed. This constituted 
a major reason for Deng Xiaoping to propose in 1986 political reforms narrowly focused 
on the curtailment of the powers of the middle-level economic cadres rather than a basic 
change at the very top of the political system.45 However, even this limited effort failed to 
deliver real results. This cast a heavy shadow on the current round of reforms of the 
administrative system.
An organizational analysis of the changes in state/enterprise relations of the last 
decade may be summarised in one sentence: a tug-of-war over the control of state factories. 
Upon the result of this war hinges the outcome of China's economic reform, as it covers a 
wide range of crucial issues. As one example, the provision of business opportunities to 
the cadres, a buying-off policy to lure them away from their current positions, is closely 
connected with deepening corruption. For another, the centre has been working hard to 
transfer to factories the 14 enumerated powers now vested in the hands of middle-level 
bureaucrats. However, since the central push is mainly through administrative orders 
without adequate backing of an established legal framework, it has so far registered 
progress far short of the expectations of the reformers. Although the deepening reform of 
the administrative system seemingly puts the economic bureaucrats on the losing side, the 
tug-of-war has intensified.
Generally speaking, there have emerged two patterns of changing state and enterprise 
ties: the factories whose superior bureaus have been removed from the government 
structure, now have to face various general corporations as the new popo or "mother-in- 
laws", and for factories still under specialized bureaus, various arrangements have been 
made to enable them to circumvent direct control by the bureaus, arrangements such as
45 Deng Xiaoping, "Zai tingqu jingjin qingkuang shi de tanhua" (Talks during the report on the 
economic situation), Jianshe you Zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi (On building socialism with 
Chinese characteristics), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1987, pp. 132-134.
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entering a direct contract with the bureau's boss, joining an enterprise group, or merging 
into a factory which has already got rid of its bureaucratic boss.
Corporate Control and Commercialization
It is still too early to draw any definite conclusions about the nature of the new 
relationship between an enterprise and its new superior corporation that has been shaped 
out of an industrial bureau.46 However, there are a number of changes in the bilateral 
relationship, as embodied in corporate controls that are superseding former bureaucratic ties 
between the state, state agencies and factories. On the whole, however, this trend should be 
treated more in terms of an expedient transition than a long-term objective.
Among the changes, the first one has been the efforts to commercialize the economic 
commanding heights. As far as the relations between the government and its bureaus are 
concerned, commercialization is a buying off policy to the bureaucrats who will lose their 
cadre status within the party/state. In fact, this policy is as old as the reform period itself. It 
accompanied the original rural reform, where commune cadres were released from office 
but granted opportunities to make big money. The industrial reform has seen a need for and 
a similar pattern of buying cadres off, as its deepening course renders many government 
offices obstacles to the development of the market. In response to the interception of power 
by middle-level bureaucrats, Zhao Ziyang initiated in 1987 an administrative reform in 
central industrial ministries. By design, most of the specialized bureaus there were to be 
streamlined.
Soon Zhao and his followers found themselves challenged by two difficulties: 1) 
how to reassign the large number of cadres affected by streamlining; and 2) how to 
maintain the operation of the national economy when the functional bodies in central
46 It is not easy to define the nature of these corporations. On the one hand, they are not supposed to be 
administrative companies but they are still entrusted with a range of administrative missions. They 
are supposed to become economic entities but without many key basis for conducting business, they 
are largely empty shells. So the ambiguity of their status represents the characteristics of a command 
economy in transition.
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ministries were dismantled but the market had not become mature enough to drive micro- 
economic activities. What the reformers did was to introduce a transitional program that 
turned the specialized bureaus in central ministries into semi-administrative and semi­
business companies. These companies still had access to state capital and materials. But 
instead of allocating these directly to their affiliated enterprises, they sold them to factories 
at intermediate prices, and they acted as salesmen for the factories rather than as an agency 
that transmitted the goods according to the central plan. It was argued that when the market 
became mature, the semi-administrative nature of these firms would diminish, and that they 
would then be generally guided by the "invisible hand", with enterprises guided through 
market signals. As this would prevent a vacuum during the transition, this reform choice 
presented a rational compromise acceptable to central planners. In fact, in having access to 
both state goods and power to do business, the former economic cadres could reap 
enormous benefits through profiteering (guandao).  While this might lower their 
resistance to the reform, at the same time it constituted a serious source of corruption. The 
social cost to the government and reformers was staggering. It was not a coincidence that in 
tune with the institutional reform in central ministries, the number of bureaucratic firms that 
were erected grew at breathtaking speed. In Beijing alone, 703 were registered between 
January and May 1988. Most of them were affiliates of central ministries.47
The new round of the administrative reform basically evolves along the same line of 
thinking. According to the SCRES, the transformation of specialized bureaus into corpor­
ations is an inevitable outcome of the transformation of the command economy into a 
market economy. As it is an important channel for relocating government personnel, it 
should be encouraged as long as the corporation is unhooked from the state structure.48 
With this "green light", history repeats itself, as seen in a frenzied setting of corporations. 
By the end of 1992, there were 486,700 corporations in the country. Among this number,
47 Jingji ribao, 27 July 1988
48 Jingji ribao, 22 April 1993.
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226,000 were registered in 1992 alone, although it is impossible to tell how many of them 
were erected from government offices.49 Theoretically speaking, compared with 1988, the 
party's consensus on the market spelled a clearer objective and time-table for the new round 
of reforms, which were missing in the previous attempts. While this consensus may make 
implementation easier, more importantly, it serves as a prerequisite for systematic reform. 
Now the effort is being carried out at all levels of government rather than just at the centre; 
it is accompanied by a reform in the ownership system that undercuts the foundation of the 
existing bureaucratic structure; and it is pushed by the growth of the market and a reduction 
of planning.
To a degree, this trend of commercializing bureaucratic economic control has been 
instrumental in broadening market activities, for the new corporations not only coordinate 
the business transactions of state enterprises under them, but they are engaged in market 
exchanges themselves. Indeed, although they also try to take advantage of their former 
status in the command economy, as the market grows, there is a built-in trend in these 
bureaucratic firms to move towards further marketization. This has promoted commercial­
ization of the relationship between government and producers. According to the state 
regulations, after an initial period of up to three years, these companies are to be delinked 
from the state budget and lose administrative functions over factories as government 
agencies. In other words, while they are treated as extensions of the organs of political 
power, they must create their own sources of revenue.
The significance of this commercialization can also be seen in its detrimental effects 
on the state's central planning. The process of commercialization creates self-interests in the 
bureaus-turned corporations, as their efforts to increase revenues are naturally at odds with 
the government's planned allocation of products.
Another feature of corporate controls is reflected in the deepening of bargaining 
between enterprises and their corporate superiors. However, in the evolution of the
49 Jingji ribao, 2 March 1993.
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corporate ties, the intensification of bargaining may not indicate tighter control of the 
corporations over the factories below. On the contrary, commercialization has reduced 
control precisely through the bargaining process. The command economy was 
characterised by bargaining, as different interests existed. Yet strict planning had never left 
sufficient room for true bargaining. Both the Soviet and Chinese experience has shown that 
freelance bargaining had often caused disciplinary reactions from the party/state. Now that 
the commercialization of state/enterprise relations has enlarged the room for bargaining, it is 
an indicator of weakened state administrative control. The intensified bargaining partly 
demonstrates the factories' increased strength to bargain for more autonomy. Although the 
tug-of-war continues, the balance of power moves more in favour of the factories, which 
have seen a degree of difference in the power embodied in an administrative boss and in a 
business boss. This emboldens the factories to fight back against the controls placed on 
them by the corporations. The following case study provides us a good example.
A Case Study of Fanpai Gongsi50
The Beijing Liulihe Cement Factory is the largest in the Beijing area, employing 
5,000 workers and with an annual sales income of more than 200 million yuan. In 1992 the 
factory was forced to join the Beijing Building Material Corporation, newly converted from 
a government bureau. For the corporation it was of vital importance to have the factory 
incorporated into it. There were several reasons for this: (1) it had to have a few core 
factories to claim the status of a large corporation of enterprise group, and the factory was 
the largest among over 80 factories in the corporation; (2) as the factory earned 70-80% of 
all the revenue in the concerned sector, without its presence, the corporation was not only
50 There is no equivalent term in English to translate fanpai gongsi. Literally, the terms means that a 
state agency changed its name plate and became a corporation overnight. In practice, things are more 
complicated. When the name is changed, it is likely that its functions will also have to change, and 
its status and position in the government will have to change. But these changes come much more 
slowly than the change in name.
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unable to fulfil its tax commitments to the municipal government, but unable to cover its 
loss-making factories; (3) the factory was the only one in the sector that could provide not 
only the bulk of the operation fees for the corporation, as it was newly cut off from the 
state budget, but the bulk of the wages and bonuses for its 200-some staff.
Accordingly, the manager of the factory was called to attend a meeting at the 
corporation, where he was asked to fill in a form, as were all other participants. The form 
was uniform in format and wording: "I, of xxx, will join the corporation voluntarily and 
abide by the charter of the corporation..." The manager voiced strong opposition to joining 
the corporation, but the head of the corporation mustered all the power he could to coerce 
him, including the 'organizational principle'. The manager finally signed the form.
Soon the manager found what was in store for him. He was notified that the full legal 
person status (first-grade) of the factory was withdrawn to become a second-grade legal 
person, since the corporation now became the first grade legal person; that the factory had 
to submit a proportion of its profits as the corporation's management fees; that monthly the 
factory had to surrender all its R & D funds for new products to the comapany to be 
returned quarterly, but 30% of the funds would be kept within the corporation; that the 
factory's retained funds from depreciation had to be handed over to the corporation for
"unified usage",..... What the corporation demanded was to take the factory's financial
power into its own hands. The last two items alone affected 30% of the factory's operating 
funds of 20 million yuan. At a time of a general shortage of circulation funds in China, this 
was a quite large sum of money, even for such a large factory.
In other factories in the corporation, these demands would probably have to be 
swallowed, because they were not in a strong bargaining position. Some even saw 
advantage in relying on the corporation, which could subsidize their losses through a 
transfer of profits from factories with good market performance. This was not the case with 
this factory. According to Yao Bowen, the factory's chief accountant, when the corporation 
was delinked from the government structure, it could not help the factory in any way. The
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factory had to cope by itself in the search for investment funds, raw materials and 
transport. The technological innovations of the factory would require several hundreds of 
millions of yuan, which the corporation was in no position to obtain for the factory. In 
short, the corporation was a shell.
The manager launched a counter-offensive. He ordered the accountant not to 
surrender any of the money demanded from above. He told the head of corporation that the 
factory accepted that the corporation was its superior, and because of this the factory was 
willing to take all financial responsibility for the corporation's staff, namely, the factory 
could pay 4,000 yuan each to its staff under the condition that it "be left alone". When this 
proposal was rejected, the manager issued an ultimatum to the head of the corporation that 
if he insisted on his demands, the factory would openly announce in the newspapers that 
the factory was withdrawing from the corporation. And if the corporation dismissed him, 
he would bring a lawsuit against it. In his own words, this conflict would "either cause the 
death of the fish or damage to the fishing net".
There is no doubt that the pivotal role of the factory in the corporation allowed it to 
challenge the corporation unlike its other factories. And because of this role, the factory got 
the total support of the mayor of Beijing, who told the general manager and party secretary 
of the corporation in the presence of the factory manager: "the factory was already stifled 
badly enough under your 'ties'; if you want to ruin the factory, I will tie you to death first". 
Despite this support, the manager admitted later that even though the mayor uttered harsh 
words like those, what could he do in reality?
Apparently, this was not so much as a personal fight as a structural conflict, a matter 
concerning the strategy for deepening reform. From the government's point of view, the 
transformation of specialized economic bureaus into corporations relinquishes the 
government' responsibility, as these bureaus become delinked from the bureaucratic ranks, 
state budget and pool of the government personnel. Their relations with the factories below 
them are generally corporate controls between a corporation and its subsidiaries rather than
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administrative controls based on the planning and quotas. In our case study, the 
corporation did not interfere with the factory's daily management in terms of what to 
produce and what to sell. It had a general contract with the factory, largely based on a quota 
of tax the factory had to submit each year. In a sense the corporation acted as the state's tax 
guarantor. It is fairly understandable that it demanded some financial authority over the 
factory. The most important motivation for this was the contradiction between the need for 
the corporation to increase the income of its staff and its lack of other resources. The 
downgrading of the factory's legal person status did not affect the factory's operations 
under the current Chinese situations.
The factories have a completely different point of view. It is difficult for them to 
distinguish corporate controls from administrative controls. Any controls countervail their 
search for autonomy. Moreover, the so-called corporate controls can be detailed and 
involve administrative coercion, particularly when these involve matters of personnel 
appointments and financial arrangements. Their reaction to these corporate ties are generally 
negative, underlining the changed nature of bargains: from bargains over cheap materials 
and production quotas to bargains over more fundamental issues such as personnel and 
financial authority, which were non-negotiable only a few years ago. This has indicated a 
qualitative change in state/enterprise relations: anything short of basic business autonomy 
will not satisfy the profitable factories.
The tug-of-war over the control of factories is a natural outcome for a command 
economy in transition but still under the party/state. By the design of the state, thtfanpai 
gongsi is a transitional phenomenon, evolving from a quantitative change (reduction of 
administrative functions) to a qualitative change (independent business entities). Without 
subsidiaries, these corporations can never become business entities. Yet making the 
factories formally under them their subsidiaries will definitely affect the business autonomy 
of the factories. For one example, to meet the state's requirement that they be financially 
self-reliant (vis-a-vis the state budget), they have to force their subsidiaries to "contribute".
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This inevitably hurt the interests of factories under them. For another example, in order to 
establish the authority and image of the corporation, they tend to exercise corporate controls 
over the marketing and sales of the factories, an act perceived as worse than administrative 
controls.
Clearly, the "subsidiaries" believe that these non-substantial corporate "shells" should 
not have been set up in the first place. Recent strong resistance from factories nationwide 
has shown the level of determination of the factories. It has also alarmed the leaders at the 
apex of power. In a media report of the case mentioned above, Zhu Rongji categorically 
branded the phenomenon as reactionary to market reforms and proposed dire measures to 
have it rectified. He pointed out that the corporations would give rise to sectoral and 
regional monopoly, although he also acknowledged the need to set up these corporations in 
the course of the reform of the administrative system .51 The ambiguity reflects a serious 
dilemma for the reformers: they want factories to be directed by the market; however, in 
dealing with the bureaucrats, they do not have a better alternative than the buying off 
policy .52 More fundamentally, the corporations represent a key component in their new 
model of state/enterprise relations: many of these will be transformed into holding 
corporations linking the state and producers in terms of property ties and sectoral policies 
(chanye zhengce). Perhaps unintentionally, the scheme may have created a new system of 
vested interests similar to the nomenklatura capitalism seen elsewhere in socialist 
economies in transition.
51 Jingji ribao, 2 March, 1993.
52 The chief designer of the policy is Li Peng, who is deemed as the representative of the powerful 
interest group of state administrators, one of the three most influential groups of interest in current 
Chinese politics (the other two: the PL A and central planners). It is natural Li Peng wants to protect 
their interests, as the group consists of one comer stone of the so-called Jiang-Li alliance, the 
transitional structure of political power toward the post-Deng era. Elsewhere, I discussed this in 
detail, see You Ji, "The Formal and Informal Sources of Power of Jiang Zemin and the Chinese Elite 
Politics after June 4", China Information, Vol. 5, no. 3, 1991, pp. 1-21.
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As for those factories that are still under the tight control of the specialized industrial 
bureaus, transitional measures have been worked out to guarantee a degree of autonomy for 
factory management. One key reform measure in this direction has been the introduction of 
a series of redefined responsibility systems signed directly between large and medium-sized 
factories and the provincial and municipal authorities, thus circumventing the control of the 
former and remaining bureaus. In Beijing, for instance, the municipal government has 
directly signed contracts with 444 large and medium-sized factories.53 The main purpose is 
to make superfluous the remaining industrial bureaus - and to place factories in a stronger 
position to stand up against the intervention of other immediate superiors.54
To this end the Beijing Municipality stipulated that all enterprises practising the new 
reforms have authority to change the state's remaining mandatary plans if they feel there is 
not enough market demand. Except for a few commodities whose prices are controlled by 
the central government, enterprises have the power to price their products. They can 
independently recruit workers according to their needs and formulate their remunerative 
policies and institutional setup. And they can decide without approval from their 
bureaucratic agencies on any new productive projects within an investment limit of 10 
million yuan and technological renovation projects within an investment of 30 million yuan. 
Obviously these reforms have significantly curtailed the authority of middle-level economic 
bureaucrats and paved the way for their eventual elimination. Under the new arrangements, 
especially the contracts with municipalities and provinces, enterprises may have more 
business autonomy through freeing themselves from the detailed control of their immediate 
superiors, because the fairly large distance of power between a provincial government and 
a state firm usually provides more room to operate independently.
53 Renmin ribao, April 19, 1992.
54 By the first half o f 1992, the number of enterprises which have entered similar reform arrangements 
had reached 20,000 across the country, covering a significant percentage of China's large and 
medium- scale enterprises. China Central Television, July 9, 1992.
Chapter 10 
Concluding Remarks
This dissertation has gone to some length in demonstrating the effects of the post- 
Mao industrial reforms on state/enterprise relations and on shop floor politics. These effects 
are characterised by the dismantling of party/state controls over the grassroots work units, 
as the title of the dissertation suggests. However, as the transformation of the state sector is 
still on-going, with visible changes observed from month to month, any conclusions about 
such a dynamic process become difficult and necessarily intricate.
It has become increasingly clear that China's state enterprises have become 
depoliticised since the reforms were launched in 1978, and that the key to this depolitic­
isation lies in the changing functions of the party in the state sector: a shift from an all 
embracing authority to an organization that has progressively narrowed its activities in 
many key areas of enterprise control. This development is both a deliberate design by the 
party leadership and a natural outcome, as the incompatibility of a political organization 
supervising factory management has become ever more clear in the transition of the 
economy toward the market.
Although party cells in the state sector are still powerful, particularly in large and 
medium-sized factories, their power base has been gradually eroded. This has been brought 
about by a set of institutional reforms both within the leadership structure and the party 
cells in the factory. As shown in Chapter 3, the introduction of the director responsibility 
system gravely affected the party's monistic leadership (yiyuanhua) and has given rise to a 
two centre-contention between party secretaries and factory managers. At the national level 
this reflects a deeply rooted concern of the party over whether it can continue to hold firmly 
onto its monopoly of power, which depends heavily on whether it holds effective control at 
the grassroots. Within a state enterprise, not only have the inertia and habits associated with 
monistic party controls continued to find recipients in state firms, but party-vested interests
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are entrenched in the remaining institutional framework of control. The current top party 
leadership wants to maintain this framework in case it is needed for repression, as in the 
aftermath of June 1989. The dilemma for the party leadership is that tight control over the 
grassroots through party cells may inhibit the growth of the economy, stimulate abuse of 
power by party cadres and alienate the majority of workers, thereby threatening the party's 
legimacy and monopoly of power. The two-centre rivalry reflects a soul-searching of the 
party in a period of a massive socio-economic change.
Nevertheless, a trend seems clearer now. As documented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, 
the reforms to the party's industrial organizations will continue to weaken party cells in the 
state sector. For instance, the unfolding cadre contract reform will undercut the foundations 
of the party's industrial nomenklatura system. A large number of managers will lose their 
permanent and hierarchical cadre status and rank, and as a result, the political authority 
attached to status. The demarcation line separating cadres and ordinary employees has thus 
been blurred. With this reform, the criteria for selection and evaluation of managers have 
also become basically non-political. This change has reduced the political consequences for 
workers who raise complaints against their immediate managers, since the latter no longer 
so directly represent the party/state. Moreover, the reform has paved the way for the em­
ergence of a large contingent of professional managers, who form the base for entrepren- 
eurialism among managers of the state factories. This in turn may help nurture in China a 
new middle class with distinctive economic and political interests.
The bankruptcy of the official ideology has helped stifle the organizational vitality of 
the party's industrial cells. Organizational entropy has set in as a result. Many dysfunction­
al symptoms, such as the collapse of party basic cells in large numbers and a drying up of 
party reserves, have become evident. Of particular significance is the emergence of many 
"fault zones" in the party's "transmission belt", as revealed in the discussion in Chapter 5 
of the aborted attempt to purge 1989 Tiananmen activists. This indicates that somewhere in
10 Concluding Remarks—283
the process of transition from socialism, the decay of the party's industrial organization will 
reach a point beyond repair.
The trend of 'de-statisation' has similarly picked up momentum. Among other things, 
the new ownership structure and hybridized property formation within the monolithic state 
ownership system have had a far-reaching impact on state/enterprise relations. The 
separation of property rights and management rights in the contract reform has enhanced 
the managers' autonomy in production, remuneration, investment and sales. So, too, has 
the creation of enterprise property through investment of retained profits and bank loans. 
Although this form of property has never been clearly defined in legal terms, it has 
generated a more pronounced sense of self-interest on the part of state enterprises, which 
increasingly see a need to strengthen their management rights vis-a-vis their newly acquired 
property. Hybridized ownership has also brought political pressure on the state, as not only 
managers but workers fight to protect their interests embodied in contracts and new 
remunerative arrangements.
Current efforts to corporatize state factories will promote ownership reform. For 
most small state factories, corporatization will be carried out through spontaneous privatis­
ation, that is, the state will allow non-state sectors to buy or to take a long-term lease on the 
small state concerns.1 This has been happening on a massive scale since 1990. This 
dissertation is more focused on the corporatization of large and medium-sized state 
factories, which has mainly been through the limited liability company or joint stock 
company. The rationale for such dramatic change can be approached from different angles. 
At the theoretical level, if China really goes in for a market economy, the current factory 
organization of the state sector has to change fundamentally because it is essentially a 
product of the command economy, as an "appendage of state bureaucracies". Factories 
have to become solely economic entities in order to compete in a changing environment.
1 Gao Shangqun, "Shi qiye zhenzheng chengwei shichang jingzheng de zhuti" (To make enterprises the
true entities of market competition), Qiye gaige tongxun, no. 14, May 1993, pp. 3-10
10 Concluding Remarks—284
Most state factories have already learned this lesson from the "squeeze" on them by the 
non-state sectors. Corporatisation is really a matter of life or death for many state factories 
in the increasingly tough competitive environment.
In practical terms, two factors have affected this transformation: the blow-out of 
subsidies by the state to loss-making factories; and the need to raise funds to rescue techno­
logically obsolete state enterprises. There is a strong link between the two. It is increasingly 
clear that the state cannot afford to subsidize large numbers of loss-makers. Mechanisms 
have to be found to let state factories shoulder the burden, or at least a substantial 
proportion of it. This factor has underscored Chinese attempts to convert a large number of 
state factories into limited liability companies. It is increasingly clear, too, that the state 
cannot afford to upgrade the level of technology of most of the large state factories that 
were created in the 1950s and 1960s, so many of these factories will continue to make a 
loss. Now the state has made a strategic decision to save these factories by injecting into 
them foreign capital and funds from society at large.2 To do this, however, the first 
condition is to transform the current formula of factory organization and ownership 
structure.
The process of corporatization of state factories will necessitate a reform of the 
administrative system, which, too, is a product of the command economy. The logic of this 
government reform is apparent: when state factories are corporatized, why should there be 
still a vast costly economic bureaucracy? The new model of government/enterprise 
relations, represented in Chapter 9, provides a preliminary line of thinking among Chinese 
officials and theorists, although the model presented by them is not crystal-clear, either to 
themselves or to observers outside China. However, it is important to construct a model to 
analyse the path of transition of the state sector toward the market economy. There is no
2 Most recently, China has been making new efforts to attract foreign investment to bail out failing 
state enterprises, — including selling them outright to overseas investors to form wholly foreign 
owned concerns, according to a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign and Domestic Trade. China 
Daily, 19 September 1993.
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doubt that it will be a fairly long and painful process to realize the principles of the new 
model: sectoral guidance through industrial policies; macro regulation through the central 
bank system and other economic levers; and property management in the form of capital 
accrual (taxes and dividends vs the control of assets [shiwu guanli] ). Some Chinese 
optimistically claimed that they have seen the light at the end of the tunnel: with the political 
hurdles for marketization largely removed, now a direction for the economic reform both at 
the macro (indirect regulation) and micro levels (minyinghua) has been generally fixed after 
14 years of 'crossing a river by probing for stones'.3
Will China privatise its state sector? One of the factors contributing to the failure of 
market socialism in Eastern Europe was the fact that the communist leadership wanted to 
have some market-oriented reforms but maintain state ownership at the same time. The 
double dependence of state factories caused economic confusion. On the other hand, the 
current economic difficulties in these countries can be partially attributed to comprehensive 
privatisation of state factories without enough marketization. There is a strong connection 
between the market reform and privatisation. The point is that if China wants to have a 
market economy and if it wants to corporatize its state sector, some form of privatisation or 
another is likely to take place. The dissertation has introduced a concept of de-statisation to 
describe a state-controlled course of quasi privatisation in China's state sector, mainly 
through diluting the dominant position of state property to improve market efficiency. As 
more and more foreign and non-state capital is injected into the structure of state owner­
ship, the effect of privatisation will be more clearly felt.
The dogmatic socialist concept that socialism is built upon the domination of state 
ownership still holds some ground, as the voices of opposition against the erosion of state 
property can still be heard. Moreover, the central planners have a big stake in the control of
3 Gao Shangqun, "Shi qiye zhenzheng chengwei shichang jingzheng de zhuti", p. 8. The notion of 
spontaneous privatisation also describes the fast-changing production structure of the national 
economy, with the non-state sector taking an increasing share of the GNP.
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the bulk of ownership in the national economy. This has been behind many discriminatory 
rules against private stock making up more than a certain proportion of the share 
subscriptions offered by state companies. However, it seems that the loss of control over 
the conversion of state enterprises into stock companies has presented a more serious threat 
to the development of the stock system in China,4 despite the fact that consensus exists for 
a fairly quick expansion of the reform to more state factories. The path for the reform will 
not be easy and smooth. Most importantly, whether the reform of corporatization can 
qualitatively improve China's state sector remains to be seen.
In the area of remuneration the state's tight control over income distribution has been 
greatly weakened. To a large extent, this has been by the state's own design, as embodied 
in the principle of making a factory "an independent body of distribution". The Chinese 
economist Liu Guoguang has pointed up the logic behind this design: that it was inconceiv­
able to allow a state factory to engage independently in market activities but not allow it to 
have autonomy to decide on its own remunerative policies.5 Along this line the post-Mao 
industrial wage reform has achieved a breakthrough by abolishing the centrally controlled 
and nationally unified eight-grade wage system, — with a profound impact on de- 
statisation. On the other hand, the structure of workers' payments largely retains the 
characteristics of the old wage system: low time-rate pay (the normal wage), high irregular 
pay and high subsidies. This is the chief cause of the ad hoc nature of the post-Mao 
industrial remuneration system.
The industrial wage reform has greatly affected the tripartite relationship between the 
state, enterprise management and workers. Between the state and enterprises, the new 
mechanisms of the wage award (with the 'linkage system' as the mainstay) have enhanced 
the status of a state enterprise as a community of interests. While the state hopes that an
4 Liu Hongru, "Woguo de gufenzhi he zhengjuan shichang" (The stock system and securities market in 
our country), Qiye gaige longxun, no. 10, January 1993, pp. 3-8.
5 Liu Guoguang, Zhongguo jingji tizhi gaige de moshi yanjiu, p. 301.
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enterprise will increase tax and profit remittances through generating more profits in the 
market, the enterprise is strongly influenced by a desire to keep more profits for itself so as 
to increase the wage awards to workers and staff, a phenomenon also directed by the 
market. This desire has in turn fundamentally altered the goal of the enterprise's product­
ion: from fulfilment of the state's plan to an effort to extract more income from its market 
activities. Consequently, a tug-of-war has intensified, as the state tries hard to control the 
floating part of the enterprise' wage bill, while the enterprise wants to reduce the proportion 
of the fixed part within the overall income distribution. The result is the rapid growth of 
'semi-secret irregular' distributions over which the state has only a weak control.
Meanwhile, the workers' perception of the state has also changed. Their dependence 
on the state for their entire income has been reduced to dependence only for a base income, 
guaranteed by the fixed part of their wages. As I pointed out in Chapter 6, now that the 
fixed part of wages for a large number of workers has dropped below 50%, their factory 
managements have become the key source of wage rises. This leads workers to enter into 
an alliance with their managers to fight against state control. The new system of wage 
distribution constitutes the rallying point for an enterprise to be transformed into a 'comm­
unity of common interest' (liyi gongtongti).
Within an enterprise, the devolution of the contract responsibility system to sub­
factories, workshops and sections required delegation of remunerative authority to smaller 
units. This has changed the locus of power and moved it downward, paving the way for a 
new type of labour/management relations to emerge. On the one hand, the delegation of 
authority over incomes to lower level managers has enhanced their say in a key aspect of 
management. Yet at the same time, the reduced distance has brought pressure from workers 
to bear on the managers of lower levels. As a result, labour relations have become more 
tense.
One factor leading to this change is that due to the weakened political and ideological 
controls over shop floor politics, more and more informal groups (xiaotuanti), have
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emerged, usually centred around a few influential figures who are not always in agreement 
with management. Another factor is the insecure feeling of workers toward wage affairs 
due to the ad hoc nature of wage distribution in the wake of the wage reform. There is a 
need for them to come together for collective action. Disputes over remuneration have 
strengthened the cohesion of these groups. At the same time, wage disputes have brought 
to the surface contradictions among workers, which are rooted in the abnormal mechanisms 
of distributing social welfare provisions. Allocation of enterprise housing, for instance, has 
always a source of conflict among employees. Each time a wage increase is made available, 
moreover, the past wounds are reopened. Consequently, a fragmented workforce has made 
the workshop atmosphere difficult to manage.
The changed remunerative system has also produced a lasting political impact on 
state/society relations. Distribution at the lower levels has created settings for informal coll­
ective bargaining for wage increases. Although this is often a kind of spontaneous reaction 
to what workers believe to be unfair wage distributions, its significance lies in the fact that 
workers have become more conscious of their interests and rights in wage matters. It is too 
early to predict that this informal efforts at collective bargaining could have major political 
ramifications, like a solidarity movement. But the creation of Gongzilian in 1989 has 
demonstrated that given the right political situation, an organized voice for workers can be 
raised against the state.
As mentioned earlier, the danwei system constitutes the infrastructure of the party/ 
state, and any change in this regard involves a significant redefinition of the boundaries 
between the state and society. Therefore, the process has been and will remain a zig-zag 
course whose results will determine the shape of the Chinese socialist system. For inst­
ance, as shown clearly in Chapter Three, it has taken more than a decade of seesaw battle 
for the party leaders to make up their minds about what they should do with the enterprise 
party committee, since the management is supposedly to be in command of the firm. A final 
decision has yet to be made. Yves Chevrier has pointed out that the greatest obstacle to the
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director responsibility system does not lie in the remnants of the high-level command 
structure but the lingering power of party organs.6 That the successive administrative 
reforms in China did not produce desirable results was largely due to the intransigence of 
the bureaucrats responsible for carrying out these reforms. As many of them had a serious 
stake in the status quo, their strong resistance could well be anticipated, a fact which casts 
heavy clouds over the current administrative reform. In short, the basic structure of the 
party/state in the danwei has not been as damaged as in the countryside.
The development of the two D's — depoliticisation and de-statisation -  may not lead 
to the third D, democratization. At the grassroots, the two D's have been largely in the form 
of limited de-commissioning of the danwei, far short of a fundamental political reform that 
gives workers such basic rights as organization of autonomous unions or legitimate collect­
ive bargaining. Workers have enlarged room for non-political activities, as politics retreats 
from shop floors. However, the many of the institutional reforms have not been institution­
alized to allow a "free and knowledgeable public". Workers are indifferent and cynical 
toward "politics". So far what we see is only workers' passive and sporadic agitation 
against managers, sometimes even in the form of enlisting support from the state.
China's transformation proceeds along the lines of its own authoritarian tradition. 
Dialectically this raises the questions of how to control and control better. The cruel truth is 
that while tight control may not guarantee any lasting monopoly of power, relaxation is also 
fraught with crisis for an authoritarian regime. The Romanian experience proved the first 
point, and the reforms of the USSR testified to the other. Although China's situation 
differs vastly from both, its own history tells the CCP leaders that when change (biange) is 
inevitable, the questions of who takes the initiative and the timing for it are crucial for their 
own survival. One leading cadre in the Central Party School argued:
6 Yves Chevrier, "Micro-politics and the Factory Director Responsibility System", in Deborah Davis 
and Ezra Vogal (eds.), Chinese Society on the Eve o f Tiananmen, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1991, pp. 109-131.
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If we first inaugurate the changes while we are still relatively strong, we can manage the direction 
and pace for change. What Deng Xiaoping contributes to the party is his two timely initiatives to 
push the country toward the course of change in 1978 and 1992.7
So the reform from below has been regarded as serving the purposes of the party. 
Dismantling totalitarian institutions within the danwei system is meant, from the party's 
point of view, to help ease tension between workers and the state, especially when the 
majority of workers remain politically indifferent. My interviews with workers revealed 
that by and large they welcomed these reforms because they could enjoy more choice. For 
instance, job transfer has become easier, and they can now travel without their danwei's 
document, although they still have a lot to be angry about, particularly overt submission to 
their immediate bosses, which points to the need to further dismantle the danwei controls. 
The party's design of generally easing controls at the grassroots but keeping a tight grip on 
national politics distinguishes its path of transition from other socialist states in the Soviet 
bloc, but does not fall outside the pattern of East Asian scenarios of political and social 
change.
The state will endeavour to remain powerful partly so as to 1) coordinate economic 
development and, 2) ensure a reasonably even distribution of income during the process of 
modernization. Both requirements could argue for preservation of an authoritarian 
superstructure dominated by one party. But at the same time, it could precipitate a loosen­
ing of controls over the economic and social pursuits of the population. This has been the 
direction of social change in other East Asian countries,8 but whether it can take place in
7 Interview with the cadre in 1992. It is interesting to note that when I alluded the CCP reform to the 
late Qing reform and quoted a Qing high official as saying that "the reform may save China but can't 
save the Dynasty", he answered that if the people believed that the CCP could save China, they 
would vote for the CCP, when time for open elections came.
8 For an analysis of the state's role in Taiwan's social and economic transition, see Ezra Vogel, The 
Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1991.
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China depends on whether Chinese work units achieve greater autonomy from the 
party/state, and most importantly, on the depth of the ownership reform currently under 
way in China's state sector.
To sum up, the development of the two D's has brought about major changes to the 
core functions of the industrial danwei system. While the systemic innovations are clearly 
intertwined with systemic continuities, the former may represent the life of the future, with 
the latter becoming increasingly moribund. In light of this evolution, what hypotheses can 
we derive from these changes?
As argued throughout the thesis, two major functions of the industrial danwei 
system: as a political institution and as an appendage of a bureaucratic agency -  have been 
largely eroded. On the other hand, one key role of a danwei, namely, its function as a 
social welfare provider, will remain crucial for workers, probably more so than before due 
to the 'shocks' of transition, until this function is gradually taken by the state or other social 
organizations outside the factory.9
All these changes tempt one to think again and more closely about the idea of work 
unit socialism and enterprise corporatism put forward by Brandy Womak and Peter Lee. 
The first hypothesis, looking forward in time, would be that a factory that is depoliticised, 
de-ideologized and generally rendered free from bureaucratic whims would come fairly 
close to such a model. On the other hand, an enterprise catering to a variety of workers' 
needs but maintaining links with the state may stand as a buffer between the state and 
workers. Through the filter of an enterprise many of the state's authoritarian controls will 
be diluted in intensity. At the same time, however, the enterprises under such a model also 
serve the state’s purposes. They constitute a stabilizing factor in the course of social 
transition: they generate taxes, increase employment and provide social welfare benefits to a
9 According to vice labour minister Zhu Jiazhen, the long-term reform goal for the industrial social
welfare system is to change it from enterprise-based to society-based with the assistance of the state.
Zhu Jiazhen, "Speech to Liaoning Labour Conference”, Labour Science of China, no. 6, 1992, pp.
6- 8 .
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large number of workers, ameliorating the burdens of the state. More generally, by sever­
ing the intimate ties between politics and economics represented by the danwei system, the 
transformed enterprise may, to a degree, become less vulnerable to the changing political 
environment, thus contributing to economic stability, which may in turn help lessen the 
likelihood of political instability.
A transformed firm may also fit the East Asian development model, which 
emphasizes collectivism in a social organization and a strong role for the state. This model 
entails institutional mechanisms in a firm where workers are granted as many social welfare 
services as their work units can manage (vs the state), but at the same time are denied basic 
political rights. The transformed state enterprise, as Peter Nan-shong Lee has pointed out, 
is centred on the role of collectivism and mutual obligations between workers and 
management; the status of individual workers being meaningful only as members of the 
community and the community harmonious only when it fulfils its obligations to 
workers . 10 This feature of enterprise corporatism can be seen in the many institutional 
welfare provisions and employment arrangements sustained by enterprises, not only in 
China but also in other East Asian industrial communities, although varying to considerable 
degrees.
A second hypothesis, again looking forward in time, is that the development of the 
two D's in state enterprises will fundamentally change the mode of the state's control over 
society. Unlike the former USSR and the East European socialist states, which had strong 
elements of a police state, China's state control over society has been more organization- 
oriented, that is, it relied less heavily on the formal machinery of the state but more on the 
organizational networks rooted in people's workplaces. * 11
10 Peter N.S. Lee, "Corporatism and the Chinese Economic Reform", Ershiyi shiji, pp. 150-160.
11 Lu Feng, "The Origins and Formation of the Unit (danwei) System", Chinese Sociology and 
Anthropology, Vol. 25, no. 3, Spring 1993, p. 81.
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As stated earlier, this workplace control was carried out in large part through the 
party system. Now the party's industrial cells are gradually losing their organizational 
vitality and decaying. Along with the removal of a number of state control functions from 
the workplace, such as those related to state security and political monitoring, this has led 
the population to gain more confidence in pursuing their own interests. Although in terms 
of social welfare provisions, the workplace still holds control over workers, from the 
state's point of view the collective interests represented by a factory as a community have 
nurtured a rebellious attitude towards its intervention. More often than not, as has been 
noted, managers would ally with workers in the struggle for more income. To some 
degree, we have observed that this is already changing the nature of control inherent in the 
state remuneration system. Many state factories still assume administrative control 
functions entrusted to them by the government, including tasks such as family planning, 
documents for marriage registration, household registration and so on. But as these 
functions are generally stripped of political content, they have had less deterrent effect on 
workers than before. Some of the methods of control exercised by the danwei have been 
removed altogether, not just in matters such as permission to travel, but also, to a lesser 
degree, over moonlighting.
As these developments continue, the giant of the party/state will eventually become 
clay footed, as its foundations lose cohesiveness. To enforce unpopular measures, it will 
more often have to rely on the hardware of the state machinery. On the other hand, as the 
processes under way alter the existing political order without any visible replacement, this 
will have further transformative and destabilizing implications. One can perceive enormous 
uncertainties ahead for China. In dealing with the dynamics of change and a more 
sophisticated population, as David Goodman pointed out, the longer the current policy line 
is maintained and becomes institutionalised, the more difficult it will be for the CCP to
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distance itself from it at some point in the future, and the more likely that disaffection may 
lead to other political solutions. 12
The positive side of this development is the gradual phasing out of the danwei system 
— the authoritarian infrastructure of the party/state. This may allow more choices for the 
ordinary Chinese in their daily pursuits, and may thus reduce the tension between the state 
and the population. The best the party can hope for from this is that workplace decontrol 
may help to relegitimize it and slow down the party's internal decay, depriving some of its 
corrupt rank-and-file members of their power, while pushing economic growth to improve 
the standard of living of workers. In the meanwhile, however, possibilities loom large that 
the country might become ungovernable. 13 In the event of such an extreme trend, as the 
state loses cohesiveness, the corruption of those in positions of power, alongside banditry 
and violence by those with nothing to lose, would represent China's journey "back to the 
future".
12 David Goodman, "Introduction", in David Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds.), China in the Nineties: 
Crisis Management and Beyond, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 18.
13 For a worst scenario, see Harry Harding, "China at the Crossroads: Consertivatism, Reform and 
Decay", Adelphi paper 275, 1992, pp. 36-48.
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